

*Recent Contributions to Mental Philosophy.**

What is the original meaning of *salad* or *salade*? In the oldest use of the word it means a kind of helmet-cap worn by soldiers, both in French and Norman-English. We venture, though not without hesitation,—especially remembering that some derive it from *salted*,—a surmise that the mixture of herbs and dressing got its name, just as a comfortable dose before going to bed came to be called a nightcap; as a good kind of thing for the head. Be this as it may, we have before us a salad, in either sense: a mixture of various esculents, and a stiff kind of wear over the brain; not without salt either, though there might have been more. But this was not the way we came to use the word. It was our own considering-cap we thought of. Our readers know that of late years we have been obliged to put books of mental philosophy together in a heap, and make one job of them: how can we do otherwise when the nature of things, in its totality, is presented to us for consideration once a fortnight? On the present occasion, when we saw that we had a budget ready, there came into our minds, in a whimsical way, two lines of the satire on Wolsey—

“Aryse up, Jacke, and putt on thy salatt,
For the tyme is come of bagge and walatt.”

And so we were reminded to ask for the connection between the two meanings of *salad*, and to refer the question to the Philological Society.

We are by no means sorry that mental philosophy is exciting so much attention; but we should be in despair if it were necessary to give a discussion every time we open a book on the subject. It is not desirable to examine the works whenever we are asked the time of day. We pro-

- * 1. ‘Spiritual Philosophy: founded on the Teaching of the late Samuel Taylor Coleridge. By the late Joseph Henry Green. Edited, with a Memoir, by John Simon. (Macmillan and Co.)
- 2. ‘An Examination of J. S. Mill’s Philosophy, being a Defence of Fundamental Truth. By James M’Cosh, LL.D. (Macmillan and Co.)
- 3. ‘Mill and Carlyle: an Examination of Mr. J. S. Mill’s Doctrine of Causation in relation to Moral Freedom. With an occasional Discourse on Sauerteig, by Smelfungus.’ By P. P. Alexander, A.M. (Edinburgh, Nimmo.)
- 4. ‘Three Essays on Philosophical Subjects.’ By T. Shedden, M.A. (Longmans and Co.)
- 5.* ‘The Battle of the Two Philosophies.’ By an Enquirer. (Longmans and Co.)
- 6. ‘The Philosophy of the Unconditioned.’ By Alexander Robertson. (Longmans and Co.)
- 7. ‘An Essay on the Platonic Idea.’ By Thomas Maguire, A.M. (Longmans and Co.)
- 8. ‘The Harmonies of Nature, or the Unity of Creation.’ By Dr. G. Hartwig. (Longmans and Co.)
- 9. ‘The Philosophy of Ethics: an Analytical Essay.’ By S. S. Laurie. (Edinburgh, Edmonston and Douglas.)
- 10. ‘E pur si muove.’ By N. A. Nicholson, M.A. (Trübner and Co.)
- 11. ‘A Manual of Human Culture.’ By M. A. Garvey. (Bell and Daldy.)
- 12. ‘Odd Bricks from a Tumble-down Private Building.’ By a Retired Constructor. (Newby.)
- 13. ‘Discourses.’ By [the late] Alexander J. Scott, M.A. (Macmillan and Co.)

ceed to a short notice of the several writings before us, which will be of more use to our readers than any detached reviews.

1. Joseph Henry Green, so well known as a surgeon, died December, 1863, as his biographer ought to have told us, but forgot it. It is not very widely known that he was all his life a diligent student of philosophy, a pupil of Tieck, the intimate friend of Coleridge, whose literary executor he was. The posthumous works which have appeared under Green's editorship have been very little thought of in connection with their editor. The present work is not Coleridge, but Green founded on Coleridge. Its subdivisions are, "On the Intellectual Faculties," "On First Principles in Philosophy," "On the Truths of Religion," "On the Idea of Christianity in relation to Controversial Theology." The reading will repay those who have a strong appetite for such subjects; and it will give information, of a general kind, to those who want to know something of Coleridge, subject to the difficulty of separation incident to the writings of teachers who found their own instructions upon those of the master. With those who come between these two classes, we do not think these volumes will find much acceptance; in fact, Green is not Coleridge.

2. Dr. M'Cosh's work involves no fewer than nine points: the nature of things, Hamilton, J. S. Mill, the relations of each to the other, Dr. M'Cosh's relation to either, and Dr. M'Cosh's relation to the way in which either looks at the other. In this subject nothing but a very long article would allow us to go into detail. Though, by title, we should suppose that only Mill is examined, yet this is far too brief a description of the work. There are twenty-one chapters, running through as much difference of matter as could be brought in under the general subject. Dr. M'Cosh holds his ground fairly, and will be useful to all readers of the psychology of the day. In such points as his attack on Mr. Mill's notion of intuition and necessity, he will have the voice of mankind with him; in things which are more like matters of opinion, there are many who will find him useful in attaining perception of the point at issue. In the matter of Hamilton and his impugners and defenders, we shall soon want a digested index, if we are to avoid utter confusion. Dr. M'Cosh has given two pages of reference to the places of his own writings which concern the matter; and it may fairly be said that these are two of his most useful pages.

3. We shall not enter on freedom and necessity. Mr. Alexander writes in a style of a "little vivacity of expression," for which he apologises: this so far as Mr. Mill is concerned. If the reader should ask which are the vivacities, he will get from us no other answer except that given to the little boy who asked which was Wellington in the peep-show—"Whichever you please, my little fellow! You pays your money and you takes your choice." As to the article on Mr. Carlyle, there is internal evidence that it was intended for wit from beginning to end. The author "entirely honours" Carlyle, and considers him "simply our greatest man of letters living." Accordingly, he invests him with the name of *Sauerteig*, which the German dictionary makes to be *sour dough*, and gives him more than forty pages, of which the following is a specimen:—"Sauerteig indeed, nothing doubting, girt with his cook-aprons, infinitely manipulating with his hero-gridirons, and due 'inimitable sauce piquante,' cooks busily, with vigour even unusual in him. 'Right stuff of properest hero-porkhood here,' iterates the singular Sauerteig-Soyer, cooking" Surely this must be wit!

4. Mr. Shedden's three essays are on the Infinite, on Arabic Peripateticism, and on the controversy between Mr. Mill and the school of

Hamilton. In the third he ranges himself rather on the side of Mill, but not wholly. In his last sentence he expresses, but in other words, that he has much more agreement with Mr. Mill than with Hamilton, except as to the value of formal logic, which he holds Mr. Mill grievously to underrate.

5. The inquirer into the battle of the two philosophies takes the other side: he assails Mill and defends Hamilton on various points. With a bias which is not uncommon,—that of having a grand field of opponents,—he informs us, that while Mill's work against Hamilton was "hot from the press, it was pronounced by the writing public to be a complete success." We really were not aware of this. There are individuals who will decide between two such opponents at a glance; but they are neither the whole writing public nor the whole reading public.

6. Mr. Robertson's philosophy of the unconditioned is strong *à priori* theism: the existence of God is to be finally reduced to a logical axiom. He attacks both Hamilton and Mill, and criticises many others. There is a great deal of vagarious thought, in less than a hundred pages.

7. Mr. Maguire informs us that his essay is the result of an independent study of Plato; and of this there is good appearance. His first "conviction that mental science was not mere verbiage," was derived from the chapter on Socrates in Grote's history: and his essay was complete before Grote's 'Plato' appeared; on this his criticisms, &c., are added in notes. Plato, under nine heads, in one hundred and fifty pages, is of a concentration which we cannot separate; but many readers who have the first smattering will find this short treatise both enlarge and bind their knowledge.

8. Dr. Hartwig's book at first looks like a system of natural history: it swarms with woodcuts of zoology and comparative anatomy, But it properly belongs to general psychology: for its object is comparison and deduction, and a view of the chain of being, which, in a rough way, may be described, like a rod and line, as having a fly at one end and a fool at the other. After some general cosmogony, this book begins at the lowest phases of vegetable life and ends with man. How little the collection of harmonies can pretend to be a system of zoology is manifest from the very small space taken up by the mammals when compared with that given to low creatures with hard names. One great object seems to be to illustrate the way in which all living things are the destroyers of their inferiors and the destroyed of their superiors. This is carried the length of saying that it is the "business" of the Deirodon snake to restrain the undue increase of the smaller birds by devouring their eggs. It is just as much the business of the smaller birds to produce eggs enough, over and above what are wanted for hatching, to nourish the Deirodon family. There is one great omission. When man is arrived at, it is not pointed out that, for want of a higher race to destroy him, he is furnished with a wish to do the job for his fellow-creatures, and with inventive power to find out means. A treatise on weapons of all kinds, from the club to the needle-gun, would have been the proper ending. There should have been a double frontispiece: on one side a Deirodon robbing a nest; on the other two high-minded gentlemen snapping pistols at one another for their mutual satisfaction; and both performing the function assigned to them in the order of things, as seen from the standpoint of a naturalist. This book is very interesting, and fills a very useful place.

9. Mr. Laurie's system of ethics places first manifestation of the moral sense in a feeling of being pleased or displeased (complacence or displeasure), and, denying that right is discriminated by a special inner

sense, finds all the rest in promotion of "felicity," either that of the agent himself or of others. There is power of analysis shown in this work: all other judgment we leave to the reader.

10. What is it that moves? This the author does not explain, and we cannot find out. There are chapters on Truth, Experience, Space, Time, &c. We do not think much of them. The author desires for his jury those who think calmly and examine closely: we doubt if they would need to retire. We cannot approve of the division of the cardinal virtue, justice, into justice towards one's own self, and justice towards other people: it is a perversion of terms quite parallel with the division of murder into suicide and slaughter of others. We hardly know whether the author is in joke or in earnest when he reconciles freewill and foreknowledge by the hypothesis that God foresees what he pleases, and does not choose to foresee the acts of his creatures. The old chapter from Volney, the meeting of the religions, to prove that there can be no revelation because men advance and defend opposite revelations in much the same way, is really behind the age. Most opponents of revelation would now say, each for himself, Well! I know I do not believe; but I trust I know a better defence of my unbelief than that comes to! The only chapter of which we can almost unreservedly approve is that on Space. There is in it a little reiteration, but no fallacy. It consists of four pages, no one of which contains anything but the head-line and the number of the page. Some more of the paper might have been advantageously treated in the same way.

11. Mr. Garvey's work begins, as a barrister's work will often begin, with a sound and sufficient table of contents. It goes through a large number of points connected with the education of the reason and of the feelings, and abounds in just remarks. At the end of each chapter is a supplement, headed "Practical," containing suggestions of books to read or courses to take. The whole is rather too much spun out: condensation is wanted. But those who make education a study should consult this book.

12. The odd bricks are piled into as much of system as is seen in some of the buildings. They are in dialogue, brought out by a loan of Mill upon Hamilton.

13. The late Alexander Scott—it will set him up with many to say that he was a bosom friend of Julius Hare—was a man of remarkable life, thoughts, and words. When he used to deliver Sunday evening discourses at we forget what institution, he collected around him a small audience who thought his sermons—so to call them—among the most remarkable things of the day. In the work before us the greater part has been printed before; but some discourses appear for the first time.

Having thus looked through a considerable number of psychological essays, a thought comes into our minds which has intruded itself on former occasions. It is this: Do our writers mean the same things by the same words? Certainly, it will be answered, in some cases at least; for they explain their words in exactly the same way. We know they do, is our reply: but *Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Do the words in which they explain carry the same sense in all the minds? On this point we crave leave to doubt; but we by no means despair of a final settlement. Once more, to authors of all amounts of knowledge, and of all grades of reputation, we recommend curtailment of prolixity. We suspect that the streams of words which go to very fundamental points indicate that the writers have no very brief enunciation which *themselves would understand*; that is, that their fundamental words are not well settled in their own minds.—*The Athenæum*, July 28.