

a slight chance we have made a slip. But this chance is often negligibly small, which is all we need to escape scepticism of the self-refuting kind.

CHARLES HARTSHORNE.

*Department of Philosophy  
The University of Chicago  
Chicago, Ill.*

#### SPATIAL LOCATION AND THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM

My dear Editor,

I have just read Professor Feigl's *Logical Analysis of the Psycho-physical Problem* (this Journal, October 1934) with a mixed feeling of pleasure and disappointment. I was pleased to observe a logical positivist tackle a specific epistemological problem, such as the localization of a sensed patch of color (p. 440), with the promise of either analyzing the problem out of existence if nonsensical or of solving it if significant. My disappointment arose from the fact that, so far as I can see, he did not keep his promise.

In the language of pure descriptive psychology (or "data"), obviously a patch of red is "precisely where I see it" (p. 440) or exactly where it appears to be in "visual psychological space." But, to the epistemologist, the important problem is how to locate the visual sense-datum if not literally in, at least with reference to, physical space. Professor Feigl says that physical space "logically analyzed is a construction and correlation of a manifold of data given in the various psychological spaces" (p. 441), and that is the only hint he gives us as to the place of colors in physical space. Does this mean that, since we speak significantly of colors only in the "language of data," and of physical position only in the "language of constructs," we cannot even significantly ask about the position of a color (datum) in physical space (construct)? If so, I suppose the same is true of positions of "psychological spaces" in physical space. Are we to say that, for example, my psychological space is neither in nor not in physical space, since we cannot significantly even raise the question? Are only physical constructs (compounds of data, not simples) to be located in physical space? I believe that Professor Feigl answers these questions in the affirmative, as for example Phenomenologist Price does in his book entitled *Perception*. But an affirmative answer—besides conflicting with the statement that one language is translatable into the other—raises a problem, which I shall state in conclusion, in the hope that someone will lead me out of the dark into the light of understanding.

Professor Feigl asserts that in the language of data or from a radically empirical point of view, the question about the evolution of consciousness and animal life cannot be raised. Only in the language of constructs is the question significant and answerable, the physical space and presumably also time in which such evolution occurs being themselves constructs. Now, my problem is this: what does the constructing of a construct? What constructs constructions? It seems to me that this constructing agency would be a *conceiving* (mental) or logical operation of some sort, such that physical space and time, according to positivism, are *resultants* of the kind of activity we call mental. In short, before there can be physical space and time—the conditions of evolution—there must be logical or mental agency. And, if the positivist is right, the question of the origin of consciousness itself (the *constructing* agency) cannot be significantly raised in any sense whatever, *particularly not in the language of constructs*. How then are we to speak significantly of the evolution of consciousness or of that agency which constructs physical space and time?

Will Professor Feigl help to see the light by answering these questions one by one? I have a genuine suspicion that my critical questions are terribly old-fashioned, perhaps even nonsensical. In which case, I want only to be shown why I should never have asked them.

V. C. ALDRICH.

*Department of Philosophy,  
The Rice Institute,  
Houston, Texas.*

Dear Sir:

Professor Aldrich's question concerning my view of the location of a color-datum in *physical space* involves the danger of the very confusion of syntactically incongruent languages which I was so anxious to eliminate. The hopeless condition of traditional epistemological discussion, especially as regards the location of *sensa*, and more generally, the relation of the knowing subject to the known objective world, etc., can be overcome only by closer attention to the ways in which "languages express meanings," i.e., to the syntaxes of our conceptual systems. If two languages are as heterogeneous as the Language of Data and the Language of Physical Constructs, greatest care must be taken in transferring concepts typical of the one language into the other. The two languages do not have as simple a relation of one-to-one correspondence as, for example, English and German so nearly exhibit. But as there