

elements scored >1.0 versus MDRO (22%), influenza (25%), and whistleblower (11%). **Conclusions:** We developed a systematic method to quantitatively evaluate hospital policies. Our review of hospital policies most commonly contained thorough instructional elements such as organizational requirements and protocols and procedures. Policies often lacked implementation elements such as expectations for monitoring, enforcement, responsibilities, accountabilities, and staff training and education. As we begin to characterize policy, endogenous in nature, as a potential exposure, it is important that we develop rigorous measurement. We have provided a first step in developing such an approach.

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#### **Presentation Type:**

Poster Presentation

#### **Hospital Preparedness for a Community Measles Outbreak in Ribeirao Preto, Brazil**

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**Background:** Measles was considered eradicated in Brazil in 2016, but the virus reemerged in the country in 2018, causing large outbreaks. Ribeirao Preto has been measles free since 1997, but the outbreak in Sao Paulo City, 180 miles away in June 2019, alerted us to the possibility of measles patients coming to our emergency room (ER). The preparedness challenge was considerable: most healthcare workers (HCWs) had never seen a measles case before, and confirmatory measles laboratory tests were not readily available to us. **Objective:** To describe the hospital preparedness for the coming community measles outbreak. **Methods:** Hospital São Francisco is a 170-bed, general, tertiary-care hospital with 10,000 ER visits monthly. Measles preparedness consisted of measles training classes for HCWs, and flow charts with pictures and measles information in every ER office, also sent to HCW cell phones. We also designated areas for suspected measles patients for prompt medical evaluation; and we implemented mass measles vaccination for all hospital HCWs regardless of vaccination status, excluding pregnant or immunosuppressed HCWs. We considered a measles suspected case any person with fever, 1 of 3 symptoms (cough, coryza or conjunctivitis), and a generalized maculopapular rash with head-to-toe distribution. All contacts for suspected cases were recommended to obtain a measles vaccination. Detection of viral RNA in a biological sample and/or a positive IgM result in serum was used to confirm a clinically suspected case. The study period spanned July 2019 to September 2019. **Results:** Measles training occurred for 3 weeks in July–August and reached 200 HCWs. The measles vaccination was offered July 23 to August 15; 1,362 HCWs were already vaccinated (93% of target population). In total, 35 clinical suspected measles cases were seen in the ER, and 3 of these were HCWs who had received the measles vaccine in their incubation period. Also, 3 patients were admitted to the hospital and 1 to the intensive care unit; there were no deaths. Overall, 8 patients had laboratory-confirmed measles, and 1,343 community contacts of these patients were vaccinated. We did not detect measles transmission to inpatients or to other HCWs after mass

vaccination began. In the same period, Sao Paulo state had >7,000 laboratory-confirmed measles cases and 12 deaths. **Conclusions:** Community measles outbreaks are a challenge for the hospital infection control team, and they can potentially disrupt the daily activities in the hospital. We were able to adequately prepare for the largest state outbreak in 20 years without secondary cases or deaths.

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#### **Hospital-Acquired Bloodstream Infections With MRSA and VRE: Standardized Admission Screening Did Not Impact Rates**

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**Background:** Bloodstream infections (BSIs) are an important cause of morbidity and mortality in severely ill patients, contributing to increased length of stay and a higher cost of care. Surveillance of hospital-acquired (HA) BSI is considered a measure of quality of care and has been performed provincially in Alberta since 2011. Prior to October 2015, a nonstandardized, risk-factor-based VRE screening process was used. Screening practices for antibiotic-resistant organisms (AROs) were aligned in October 2015 with a provincially standardized admission screening tool to allow for early initiation of contact precautions for patients colonized or infected with MRSA or VRE. In this data review, we sought to determine whether this admission screening change influenced ARO infections through review of HA-BSI rates. **Methods:** Prospectively, we reviewed reports of all patients admitted to Alberta Health Services/Covenant Health acute-care and acute-/tertiary-care rehabilitation facilities who met inclusion criteria: (1) positive blood culture identified with MRSA or VRE; (2) new episode for the patient; and (3) positive result occurred on or after calendar day 3 of admission. Data are presented as quarterly rates. Screening practices for MRSA and VRE were standardized provincially in October 2015 to include screening for MRSA on admission for patients who had an inpatient admission, received hemodialysis, or was an inmate in a correctional facility in the past 6 months. We also screened for VRE patients admitted to a solid-organ transplant unit or a hematology unit, regardless of risk factors. **Results:** We detected no changes in the quarterly rates of HA-BSI with MRSA or VRE after admission screening was standardized. Prior to standardized screening, MRSA BSI rates ranged from 0.12 to 0.25 per 10,000 patient days, with an overall rate of 0.18 per 10,000 patient days. After standardization, rates ranged from 0.09 to 0.30 per 10,000 patient days, with an overall rate of 0.17 per 10,000 patient days ( $P = .46$ ). VRE BSI rates prior to standardization ranged from 0.03 to 0.13 per 10,000 patient days, with an overall rate of 0.08 per 10,000 patient days, which increased slightly to 0.09 per 10,000 patient days after standardized screening, ranging between 0.04 and 0.16 per 10,000 patient days ( $P = .61$ ). **Conclusions:** Following the implementation of standardized admission screening and the early initiation of contact precautions, no significant changes were observed in rates of either HA-BSI with MRSA or VRE. Further investigation is required to identify the most effective strategies to reduce HA-BSIs caused by MRSA and VRE.

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**How Standard Are Standard Precautions? Knowledge and Attitudes Toward Standard Precautions at an Academic Medical Center**

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**Background:** Standard precautions are the basis of infection prevention and include a set of common-sense infection control practices that prevent transmission of diseases acquired by contact with blood, body fluids, nonintact skin, and mucous membranes. These measures include hand hygiene, personal protective equipment (PPE), cleaning and disinfecting, linen handling, waste disposal, sharps safety and respiratory etiquette. Standard precautions require that the risk for exposure be assessed and appropriate precautions taken based on risk. Observations and anecdotal evidence have led us to believe that understanding of standard precautions is lacking among healthcare personnel. **Methods:** A survey was conducted at a large health system to assess knowledge and practices related to specific elements of standard precautions. **Results:** More than 3,000 HCWs responded from inpatient settings (41%), outpatient settings (37%), and both settings (22%). Nurses comprised the majority of respondents (54%), and others included physicians (9%), respiratory therapists, as well as physical and occupational therapists. **Discussion:** The vast majority (96%) of respondents agreed that standard precautions were required in the care of all patients, but a significant proportion (34%) interpreted that to mean that standard precautions always involve wearing gloves, and 22.5% thought that PPE was always required for standard precautions. Hand hygiene and sharps safety were identified as the best understood elements of standard precautions. Respiratory etiquette and cleaning and disinfection were reported as the least understood elements, with PPE, waste disposal, and linen handling also being reported as inadequately understood components of standard precautions (Fig. 1).

**Conclusions:** In an era of increasing drug resistance and fewer effective antibiotics, standard precautions are our best defense against the spread of infections in the healthcare setting. Our survey showed that there is room for improvement among healthcare workers in understanding of the elements of standard precautions. We plan to use the survey to craft a targeted education campaign to improve understanding of and adherence to standard precautions.

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**How to Convince People and Get Adherence to Hand Hygiene Practices? The Success of Ozires, the Humanoid Robot!**

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**Background:** Our team has been fighting nosocomial infections since 1991. During our journey, we often ask why people do not wash their hands! Semmelweis discovered in the 1840s that hand-washing prevented deaths from puerperal sepsis, but we still need to convince healthcare workers about hand hygiene. One answer is that washing hands is an unsophisticated gesture, without any technology, so people just do not do it. How can we improve compliance with hand hygiene? We imagined a robot in our team to remind people to wash their hands. Then, in 2016 we met Meccanoid, a US\$200 toy robot: a 4-foot-tall programmable humanoid robot with voice recognition capabilities. We made adaptations in the robot (mini-projector + audio amplifier + alcohol dispenser + spy camera), and we gave him a name (Ozires) and a




Fig. 1.