of God cease to watch the earth, except when they come to wreak vengeance on the human race.'

All these show that the author *was* concerned for church reform; they are exactly the issues that concerned church reformers, councils and synods throughout medieval Europe. I can think of no good reason for refusing to describe the Céli Dé as reformers. Also their concern for pastoral ministry in the church as a whole, as well as their constant concern to offer 'soul-friendship' to the laity, contradicts Rumsey's view that the 'elitist' Céli Dé sought to hold themselves aloof from other Christians.

Another central plank of Rumsey's argument is the assertion that the Céli Dé's extraordinary daily routine of reciting the whole psalter (the 'Three Fifties') and making countless prostrations, cross-vigils, devotions to saints, extra prayers and so on, all show that they had rather lost interest in the Liturgy of the Hours, distracted by this huge burden of non-liturgical piety. But she gives no evidence for such loss of interest. The lack of discussion of the Liturgy of the Hours in the Céli Dé texts she examines is not evidence that the Céli Dé were neglecting or despising the liturgy; they simply take it for granted, as suggested by the *Rule of Ailbe* (which has close affinities to Céli Dé texts) which requires the monks not only to recite the 'Three Fifties' and make a hundred genuflections, but also asserts that 'the assiduous observance of the canonical hours is regarded as primary'.

Rumsey describes the Céli Dé as an over-scrupulous, elitist, world-denying, miserable bunch of narcissists. Countless pieces of evidence are interpreted to fit this view, even when other interpretations are available. Certainly, the Céli Dé were weird in some ways, but the lack of empathy which Rumsey shows, her hostility to the strange (in spite of her commendation of the Navigators for their delight in the weird and wonderful things they saw), make her account of this movement unconvincing and prevents her from exploring some of the weirder things as fully as she might. What are we to make of the Céli Dé attitude to bodily fluids and bodily functions? What of the prohibition on drinking after urinating, and on bathing in semen or putting it on your head (why exactly were monks ever tempted to do this?) and the description of privy-houses as the abodes of demons and the prohibition on praying there except for saying *Deus in adiutorium meum intende*? All these warrant proper exploration, perhaps along the lines of Mary Douglas's *Purity and Danger*. But Rumsey's lack of sympathy makes this impossible for her to contemplate.

This book has opened up a wide new horizon of historical and liturgical scholarship, and sets high standards for a new kind of exploration and interpretation of early medieval Gaelic literature. Rumsey has opened many books for us to (re-)read in new and exciting ways. But she has also reminded us that without a certain degree of empathy, of hospitality to the strange, we can close those books again, and silence the interesting and strange voices of those who went before us.

GILBERT MÁRKUS

FROM A TOPICAL POINT OF VIEW: DIALECTIC IN ANSELM OF CANTERBURY'S DE GRAMMATICO by Peter Boschung (*Brill* Leiden/Boston 2006) Pp. 346 c.£80 hbk.

Anselm referred to *De Grammatico* as a 'not useless introduction to dialectic'. This is a view, it has to be said, that has not been shared by everyone who has read it. (Just how does one translate the title? 'On the paronym, grammatical'?!)

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Consequently, until the groundbreaking work of the late Desmond Henry, it was little addressed, since it appeared very difficult to make sense of what it was about. So two obvious questions raise themselves: (1) why would Anselm consider it an introduction, and presumably, therefore, understandable by neophytes, when it is clearly difficult to understand, and (2) if this is an introduction to dialectic, then what did Anselm think dialectic was?

In his welcome addition to the discussions of Anselm's intentions in *De Grammatico*, Peter Boschung does not address the first question directly. However, his book can be seen as an attempt to answer the second and in so doing to provide a useful counterbalance to Henry's use of Lesniewski's 'ontology' as a heuristic device. (To regard it as more than that would be to accuse Henry of anachronism.) His conclusion is that Anselm regards dialectic as 'primarily the theory of proper dispute' (p. 315) and that *De Grammatico* is a complex introduction to dialectic (p. 314).

The title of this book is instructive since it makes clear that one of Boschung's goals is to establish the origins of Anselmian dialectic in Boethius' treatment of the topics. This is an important insight, which others such as Steiger have noted. If it is true, then one would think that Anselmian dialectic is related to the discovery of arguments concerning matters in doubt, for that is what the topics are concerned with. But, of course, one cannot throw a copy of *In Ciceronis Topica* or *De Topicis Differentiis* at a student and tell them to start discovering arguments. They have to be taught. They have to know how to identify middle terms and to assess them. They have to know how to 'construct syllogisms', as Anselm instructs and guides his student in doing in *De Grammatico*. In fact, a central thesis of Boschung's work is that Anselm's particular concern is to pass on to his student a clearly worked out methodology for handling fallacies. This is perhaps to overstate the case, since whilst dialectic must concern itself with the identification and avoidance of fallacies, its primary purpose is surely to provide convincing arguments.

Boschung claims to identify a clear distinction in *De Grammatico* between 'argument' and 'argumentation' (pp. 60–64). He states that this distinction is based on that of Boethius (p. 63), but he has already shown that it is not a clear distinction in Boethius (p. 52). He makes use of what Steiger calls the *Verstehensregel*: the statement in *De Grammatico* 4 that it is the meaning rather than the words that binds the syllogism, i.e. gives it its demonstrative power. Middle terms may be concealed or not present at all in the expression of an argument, but this does not necessarily destroy the validity or the effectiveness of the argument, since it is what is to be understood that is important. If one identifies the argument with the meaning and the argumentation with the expression, this would appear to support a distinction between argument and argumentation of the kind Boschung claims to find. However, Boschung does not look at the use of the term in Anselm's other writings. If he had, he would have seen that the lack of clarity in Boethius appears to have passed into Anselm, and that the terms appear to be used interchangeably. (Compare *Responsio* 10, '*necessaria argumentatione*', with *De Grammatico* 2, '*argumenta . . . necessaria sunt*'.) It is surprising that there is no mention, let alone discussion, of Anselm's use of the term 'argument' in the *Proslogion*. One might expect to be able to throw light back onto *De Grammatico* by seeing how Anselm uses dialectical terms in his other works.

In identifying the sources of Anselm's dialectic, Boschung turns his attention to a 12th century catalogue of the library at Bec. The catalogue he is referring to is not complete (e.g. most of Lanfranc's works are missing), so one should not conclude as the author implies one should (p. 24) that the *Categoriae Decem* is not a source for Anselm on the grounds that it is missing from this catalogue. Lanfranc was certainly acquainted with it. (See R. Hunt, 'Studies on Priscian

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in the eleventh and twelfth centuries' in *Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies* 1 (1943) 194–231, p. 208.)

Boschung is unwilling to accept that Anselm is a lone genius. He is rather 'an outstanding testimony to a broader strand of 11th century' logic. Anselm 'operates in a purely Boethian framework' (p. 315) without knowledge of Aristotle's *Sophistici Elenchi* and yet manages to develop a theory of fallacious reasoning. Boschung offers a helpful discussion of the relationship of signification *per se*, signification *per aliud*, and appellation. He argues convincingly that signification *per aliud* and appellation are not to be identified (pp. 249–253).

The book contains rather too many typographical errors, particularly in Boschung's own translations, some of which verge on the incomprehensible. (See, for example, the quotation from the *Glose in Aristotilis Sophisticos Elencos* on p. 74.) For some reason, the extracts from Priscian on pp. 206–213 go untranslated. It is also surprising given the title and the suggestion of the importance of Boethius' *In Ciceronis Topica*, that the index does not contain entries for 'middle terms' or 'maximal propositions'. The work is not a history of reception, and certainly did not require an entire chapter (originally intended as an appendix?) given over to Henry's use of Lesniewski.

That said, there is much of importance in this book (for example the discussion of *usus loquendi*) and it should be essential reading for anyone who wants to get to grips with Anselmian dialectic in the *De Grammatico*, which is, I suspect, a necessary condition for the understanding of his other writings.

IAN LOGAN

ST THOMAS AQUINAS by Vivian Boland OP (*Continuum Library of Educational Thought, Continuum:* **London and New York 2007) Pp. 256 £75 hbk**

This book is one of a new series designed to introduce major thinkers on education to students and teachers. The subjects of the other volumes so far published range from Plato to Rudolf Steiner, from Rousseau to Newman to Maria Montessori; it is good to see Aquinas on the short-list, so to speak, of philosophers of so important a topic. Vivian Boland takes a broad approach to his theme, arguing that Aquinas' ideas on education can be understood only in the contexts of his life, which was largely that of a teacher, and of his thought as a whole. Teaching and learning are not sharply delineated exercises, separable from the rest of life, as one might think of a ball-game, but an activity of the whole person, an expression of one's total understanding and commitments, in which one engages far beyond the narrow confines of the classroom.

The book has four parts: an intellectual biography of St Thomas, an exposition of the main passages in which he directly discusses teaching, an account of the reception and influence of his writings in general, and finally a discussion of the contemporary relevance of his ideas. The biography is a standard summary, useful to those readers of the series who are new to Aquinas, which includes an explanation of teaching methods in medieval universities and argues that Thomas' choice of the Dominicans was in large part motivated by his desire to teach. The second part ranges widely over Aquinas' oeuvre, showing how he returns repeatedly to the theme of teaching, sometimes in unexpected places.

In the early commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, St Thomas makes the point, under the influence of Augustine, that while a human teacher can provide the words that point the pupil to the truth, he or she cannot provide the power of understanding in us: that comes from God. Later on, he clarifies this point, steering a middle way between a Platonic idea of innate knowledge on the one hand, and, on the other hand, two beliefs that he found in the Arabic

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