My summary does scant justice to the complexity and richness of Fujitani's book, but space limitations preclude a fuller presentation. Here, I offer three observations. First, Fujitani's thesis presumes that there was no political focus on the emperor and little sense of national identity before 1868. People lived in disparate "vertical compartments" (*han*) and "horizontal estates" (*mibun*). Commoners knew little of an emperor who was out of sight and mind; what they did know was confounded by folk beliefs that identified him with local deities (pp. 4–9). So far, so good. But this presumes a bit too much. Fujitani contends that only from the late nineteenth century—and mainly due to government-staged, emperor-centered pageantry—do we find "people who were starting to recognize themselves as the Japanese" (pp. 200, 214). The terms "*Nihon*" and "*Nihonjin*" were not in everyday use as they are now, but the *sankin kōtai,* popular pilgrimages, and a market economy from Satsuma to Matsumae had already produced an unusually high degree of linguistic, religiocultural, and socioeconomic homogeneity. Then in the 1850s a foreign crisis spawned an embryonic form of emperor-centered nationalism in all classes, as seen in the case of Kanno Hachirō, a semiliterate peasant from Mutsu. Having heard rumors spreading "all over Japan" (*Nihon kokujū*), Kanno raced to Uraga "in the 120th [*sic*] emperor's reign" to observe the barbarian Perry (Shōji Kichinosuke et al., eds., *Nihon shisō taikei 58: Minshū undō no shisō* [Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1970], pp. 88–90). Here was a sense of "Japaneseness" that marked time and its passing by imperial reigns. Late Tokugawa thinkers were already citing a need to bring the emperor into plain sight, clarify his role as the spiritual core of the nation, and make him perform rituals designed to instill national allegiance in all people. Unlettered commoners might confuse the emperor with some local deity, but they still held both in reverent awe as *kamisama,* and they recognized the imperial court ranks granted to that local deity or shrine. Thus, certain shared reference points enabled commoners—when "enlightened" by Meiji officials—to accept the emperor as their "master" or sovereign (*nushi*) in a nation (*kuni*) that transcended *han* and *mibun.* Likewise, Meiji commoners could mentally link their local shrines with Yasukuni. This is not to refute or belittle Fujitani's findings, only to suggest that he has brushed aside important historical continuities. Second, I hope Fujitani will in future work examine who derived what material benefits from the emperor system. Surely it did not arise and thrive only as a result of staged pageantry. Third, the bourgeois ideal of conjugal monogamy—among other alien values propagated by the new imperial "couple"—enhanced the basic human rights of Japanese women at that time. We are on tricky normative ground when we argue about how the emperor system "modernized" or "Westernized" traditional Japanese social mores. What is oppressive for Owada Masako in the 1990s was liberating for women in the 1890s.

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Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan. By ARNE KALLAND. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995. 355 pp. $38.00.

Given the longstanding scholarly focus on agriculture and agricultural communities in early modern Japan, two books published in 1995 offer a welcome shift in view. David Howell's *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley: University of California Press), documents the emergence

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of a capitalist fishing industry in nineteenth-century Hokkaido (see *JAS* review, 55.2). Arne Kalland's *Fishing Villages in Tokugawa Japan* examines a group of fishing villages in northern Kyushu. From each of these studies we learn about ways in which fishing communities enriched and expanded Japan's nutrient base and diversified and strengthened a growing commercial economy.

Kalland, a social anthropologist, is most concerned with resource management. He argues that Western scholars have not paid close attention to systems of sea tenure, in part because they have assumed that the sea and its resources are for all to exploit (pp. 2–7). Japan, however, offers a model of strictly regulated resource management and the "world's best" example of adapting traditional systems to fulfill modern functions. Kalland examines the networks of social and legal institutions—as well as political, economic, cultural, and demographic factors—which governed fishing people's access to the bounty of the sea in early modern Japan. He aims to offer a comprehensive approach to marine resource management that will "contribute both theoretically and methodologically to social anthropology" (p. 4).

Kalland's study, which is based on research conducted between 1975 and 1992, focuses on 39 coastal villages (*ura*) in Fukuoka domain. His sources are impressively thorough: they include published and unpublished materials left by village headmen, merchants, and shrines and temples, particularly from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The book is divided into three sections. In the first, Kalland analyzes the local and regional environment. Part 2 examines the technologies and structure of Fukuoka's fishing industry. Noting that sea tenure was part of the daimyo's domain, Kalland explains the development of village-based fishing territories in Fukuoka and the use of licenses to limit the exploitation of marine resources. In the final section, he examines the ways in which taxes, official welfare schemes, and private credit institutions affected the supply of capital available for the fishing industry.

Kalland knows marine species, fishing methods and the fishing communities of Fukuoka well. I found chapter 10, devoted to female abalone divers, and chapter 11, on whaling, especially interesting. Moreover, his descriptions of corvée labor (*kako*) and local credit associations offer information that is not available in English-language scholarship elsewhere. Finally, his analysis of population trends in Fukuoka—the eighteenth-century low came in 1732–33, when famine killed as many as 22 percent of the domain's residents—includes valuable detail that helps to illustrate the dynamics of population growth and decline in the Edo period.

There are, however, drawbacks to Kalland's comprehensive approach. At times I found the weight of technical detail overwhelming. Moreover, despite numerous particular examples, I missed stories of individuals and individual communities that might have added color and some human faces to the analysis. Again, although Kalland nowhere claims to offer an historical account of his region, I sometimes found it difficult to evaluate examples selected variously over a two-and-a-half-century time frame.

Most importantly, while there seems little to argue with Kalland's general proposition that fishing (like agriculture or any other economic activity) should be viewed as part of a network of social relations, the dynamics of those relations often remain obscure. For instance, in examining taxation in chapter 14, Kalland does not go beyond a detailed but rather simple classification of various impositions and the predictable conclusion that taxes "did not help those at the bottom of the society to accumulate capital" (p. 251). Again, his assertion in chapter 15 that domain welfare

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schemes were significantly responsible for changing people's reproductive behavior in the nineteenth century, though interesting, remains hypothetical.

Despite these problems, Kalland's examination of fishing villages in Fukuoka offers detailed and reliable information in an important and often-neglected area. It will be valuable not only to specialists in resource management but to historians and others who have a serious interest in the economy and social structures of Tokugawa Japan.

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The Impact of Traditional Thought on Present-Day Japan. Edited by JOSEF KREINER. Munich: Iudicium-Verl, 1996. 236 pp.

The eleven essays in this monograph grew out of presentations on economic growth in East and Southeast Asia at a conference in Fukuoka City, Japan, on March 5–7, 1990. They consider the ways that the spiritual traditions of Buddhism, Confucianism, Shintoism, Taoism, and Zen, as well as traditional legal thought, influenced Japan's modernization.

Ronald Dore details a "Confucian" explanation for Japan's economic growth: the sense of duty, acceptance of hierarchical structures, development of an elite based on an examination system, and a faith in rationality. Tu Wei-ming challenges this with a "post-Confucian" hypothesis, that certain "Asian" qualities created a dynamic toward growth: a style of political leadership that is not just paternalistic; a pattern of social interaction that values reciprocity and mutuality; and the belief that life can be improved, beginning with the character of the individual. Kim Kyong-Dong echoes Tu's frustration that Confucianism is often viewed too simplistically, as either an obstacle or a catalyst, and that for too many scholars, "modernization" is still synonymous with "Westernization." Arguing that there are many "Asian" models of adaptation to modernization, he shows that Confucianism can be a force for change in a society. He points out that the West's preoccupation with a completely materialistic concept of development has led to persistent social dislocations, which Asian societies may be able to avoid by relying on the spiritual values of Confucianism.

Heinrich Dumoulin writes, in "Tradition and Modernity in Japanese Buddhism Today," that, while on the one hand Buddhism was "modernized" as a result of modern critical scholarship and demythologization, and embraced a renewed commitment to society and service, on the other hand it returned to an older tradition, to the study of the Lotus Sutra and the search for "original" Buddhism. As a result, Japanese Buddhists began to see themselves as members of a world religion. Gerhard Schepers sees signs of Buddhism's continuing influence in the popularity of books on the life of Shinran (1173–1262). Intellectuals still regard Shinran as a seminal thinker, while ordinary people look to his writings for guidance on problems of the inner life and for help in coping with the problems of modernity.

The scholars represented in this volume have a difficult time defining the ways in which Shintoism has shaped modern life. For example, although Michael Ashkenazi lists Shinto practices which may have influenced Japanese business practices (linking "purity" in Shintoism with "perfectibility" in manufacturing, *hansei-kai* with performance analyses in the company, etc.), he admits that he cannot provide any evidence of a direct link between the two.

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