

It is a disarming philosophy. His belief in privilege, in inequality, in cricket as something more than a game, his approval of the Munich agreement, opposition to sanctions and scepticism about the results of victory, may infuriate certain Left Wing crusaders, but they are so fully justified by the plainest arguments that no valid refutation is likely to be produced. In fact, the sympathetic reader is again and again left with the feeling that we are heading for first-class disaster (not in war, but in the coming peace), and that, because the immediate mood of the public is not receptive, nothing can be done about it.

Surely the Government know as well as Mr. Hollis (Sorry, Robert Fosssett !) that 'it will be with the defeat of Japan that the Yellow Peril will really begin'! Or perhaps they have good reason for thinking otherwise; in which case one would have expected writers of the same calibre to present solid arguments against this point of view. The fact that this and other startling assertions have been largely unchallenged by the reviewers implies that the dangers are recognised, but cannot be anticipated. Was not our failure to prepare for the anti-Fascist war demanded by the intellectuals partly due to the fact that those same intellectuals advocated unilateral disarmament, and thought, themselves, 'that you hold up a panzer division with a couple of vermouths, a hang-over and a dirty joke'? Fortunately their day is ended, perhaps even more definitely than that of the English gentleman. But the institutions which facilitated their particular kind of self-expression remain, and will be a menace to ordered peace for many years to come: 'There is every reason to think that communications now work more rapidly than minds, and that the world has got into its mess very largely because information now accumulates more quickly than the capacity of the mind to assimilate it.'

The remedy, whenever it is applied, must consist partially in the restoration of conventions which, however unreasonable they appear in themselves, have created the civilisation which is now disappearing and formed the gentlemen who are gallantly and vainly fighting for it. Meanwhile,

'It is little I repair to the matches of the Southron folk.'

EDWARD QUINN.

MAN: THE FORGOTTEN. By F. J. Sheed. (Sheed & Ward; 1s.)

It is a good rule in apologetics to start from some common ground. Now whatever men may deny, they will usually agree that they exist, that there is, in fact, such a being as man. Mr. Sheed begins his plea for a better understanding of the nature of man at that very simple point of agreement. He asks: 'What is man?' and wisely turns at once to meet the objection of the impatient or merely lazy. Does the answer matter? Is it a 'practical' question? Why, yes. It is just your answer that will determine how you treat men. The

Nazi treatment of man reveals the Nazi view of man. The answer is most important, and in the highest degree practical. What then is man? Mr. Sheed gives the classical Christian answer in terms that the ordinary man can follow. He does not, he says, propose to prove it, but he does show how it agrees with and reinforces the observable facts and is fundamental to the ordering of human society. The more men can be got to consider these truths, the brighter the hope for the future. As Mr. Sheed says, 'Democracy will work, not so much if everybody votes, as if everybody fits himself for the judgment that a vote should express.' This little book is very well done: the language is clear and the appeal is to common sense and reason rather than to emotion. It should be welcomed with relief by those—and they are many—who have not found a diet of vague uplift very nourishing.

A.E.H.S.

METTERNICH. By Algernon Cecil. (Eyre and Spottiswode, 10s. 6d.)

This work was first published in 1933 and Mr. Douglas Jerrold, in his *Georgian Adventure*, described it as the most notable book he had ever published. In 1941 Mr. Cecil published a book called *Facing the facts in Foreign Policy*, to which Mr. Jerrold wrote what was, in effect, a reply, entitled *Britain and Europe, 1900 to 1940*.

To this new edition of an excellent study of Metternich, Mr. Cecil has added a long introduction which is, in effect, his book on foreign policy re-stated, without any notice being taken of Mr. Jerrold's presentation of an opposite case. Mr. Cecil has made up his mind that we should never have entered this war and he adduces every possible argument, whether drawn from Metternich's life or not, to prove his case. Conversely, he leaves out that which Mr. Jerrold so rightly emphasises, the whole ethos and policy of Germany, Imperial and Nazi, and its deadly threat to ordered society. How remote Mr. Cecil is from reality is shown by the fact that he accuses the British Government (not Hitler) of megalomania, in starting this war. It never occurs to him that our action was a last desperate stand to avert world decay. As he has attempted to write Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark, it is not surprising to find him being grossly inaccurate about the nature of the Triple Entente and the relation of the 1918 Armistice to the Fourteen Points, both quite sufficiently documented to-day; and to find him completely self-contradictory on the use of power-politics.

When this introduction has been omitted, the book will again become what it was in 1933, a very lucid and balanced and valuable account of the great European statesman, whose greatest mistake was ever to imagine that he could 'appease' Napoleon, and who would consequently never have made the mistake of imagining that European politics after the accession of Hitler to power could be substantially the same as they were between 1919 and 1933.

P.U.F.