"unrelenting consciousness of non-identity" that Adorno develops in *Negative Dialektik* (1966, 15) and to the materialist view of *bourgeois* libidinal confinement in Eric Fromm's early social psychology. But Henao Castro does not pursue these links.

More generally, Henao Castro does not include a chapter on—and hardly mentions—any of the Frankfurt School critical theorists, who otherwise loom so large in the tradition. This omission is particularly noteworthy in the case of Max Horkheimer, to whom we are not only indebted for the term "critical theory," but who also developed a conceptualization of the theorist's "critical attitude" that closely aligns with Henao Castro's "militant intellect." In fact, Henao Castro's description of the Marxian conceptual persona of "the Communist" as "actively militating for [the world's] transformation in the emancipatory direction that would make freedom and equality a material reality" (41) almost reads like a paraphrase of Horkheimer's description of the critical attitude as "directed towards emancipation" and as having "the transformation of the whole of society as its aim", in his "Traditional and Critical Theory" essay (1982, 208). Horkheimer developed this idea of the "critical attitude" in response to his own experience of living in a time that was not, as he had previously supposed and hoped, ripe for revolutionary change. In Theodor W. Adorno's work, in turn, this premise of untimeliness takes on systematic importance. As Adorno suggests in the opening sentence of *Negative Dialektik* (1966), "Philosophy, which once seemed passé, clings to life because the moment of its realization was missed" (13). I would have liked to have read Henao Castro's reflections on these closely aligned philosophical arguments from within the tradition of critical theory. Yet his focus remains elsewhere, and I confess to being curious about the reasons for leaving them out. Is it because Henao Castro feels that these thinkers no longer speak *to us* in the way that Rancière or Spivak do?

I want to register two concerns with Henao Castro's argument—both with reference to Adorno. The first is with the adjective "militant." As Henao Castro notes, "militant" captures "the combative modality of that thinking that performs its own labor against the very system of commodification that is trying to incorporate it" (7). However, "militant" and "combative" also share an association with "aggressive" that one might worry, with Adorno, can conflict with what it means to *think critically.* In a short essay called "Resignation" written shortly before his death in 1969, Adorno sought to justify his disagreements with the German student movement and what he saw as the students' impatient "actionism." Adorno insisted that since the conditions for true emancipatory action were not ripe in the late-1960s German Federal Republic, the students' demand for revolutionary praxis risked annihilating truly critical thinking. In order to remain free, Adorno argued, critical thinking must not only keep its distance from practice but it is also characterized by *not* being aggressive in the way that the figure of the "militant" might seem to suggest. As he wrote in his radio address, "Resignation," "Whoever thinks is, in every critique, not enraged; thinking has sublimated the rage" (2003, 799).

The second concern is more important. In most of the book, Henao Castro's "militant intellect" invokes an understanding of the critical theorist for times that are *not* ripe for revolutionary change, in which the struggle for the "death of the colonist" should be understood in metaphorical and structural terms. But Henao Castro sometimes writes as if this call should be taken literally in times that *are* ripe for revolutionary change. As he puts it, "only at the right time – that is, under specific historical circumstances – can militating for such death be understood in literal terms" (4). I am unsure if this is Henao Castro's considered view, but I would suggest that drawing such a sharp distinction between a metaphorical and literal understanding of revolutionary violence is an oversimplified and morally questionable way to conceive of emancipatory struggle.

I find Adorno's practically disengaged position unattractive—as I suspect Henao Castro might also do. However, I want to suggest that Henao Castro's definition of the militant intellect may in one way be closer in spirit to Adorno than he might be comfortable with. For in defining critical theory, "as it takes place in the academy and elsewhere, as contributing to cultivation of that militancy during *the time that is not right*", while simultaneously defining "the right time" as one in which "the intellect can be cultivated in just that revolutionary way", as "perhaps only in the armed struggle" (4), I worry that Henao Castro leaves much too narrow a conceptual scope for what might, in his view, constitute emancipatory action. To be sure, this revolutionary conception of when "the time is right" leaves plenty of space for the critical theorist to cultivate intellectual militancy. But it may come at the cost of disengaging from practical struggles that, even if not revolutionary, are nonetheless genuinely emancipatory.

Henao Castro's book offers a welcome meditation on the status of the critical theorist today. It offers important lessons for anyone aspiring to nurture an appropriately intersectional critical attitude towards the multiple forms of domination and injustice in our world, even if it leaves fundamental questions unanswered about what emancipation from those forms of domination might ultimately mean.

Response to Malte Frøslee Ibsen's Review of *The Militant Intellect: Critical Theory's Conceptual Personae*

doi:10.1017/S1537592724002019

— Andrés Fabián Henao Castro

Malte Frøslee Ibsen raises three important questions regarding my book. I do not have a very satisfying answer

to Ibsen's first question about my decision to leave out all authors from the critical theory of the Frankfurt School from my book, other than my desire to write about other thinkers. The Frankfurt School has been central to my training as a critical theorist, and I continue to read, teach, and write about these authors (in a recent article, I use Walter Benjamin's theory of dialectical images to qualify the political ability of Claudia Rankine's play, *The White Card*, to capture the masochistic, rather than sadistic libidinal structure that white supremacy takes under neoliberalism). The Frankfurt School is, however, not the sole tradition of critical theory missing from my book; many others are, for I was not trying to be comprehensive. I, however, can imagine a *Militant Intellect II* focused exclusively on the Frankfurt School's conceptual personae, with chapters on Benjamin's Baudelaire, Herbert Marcuse's Orpheus, and Narcissus, and so on. Maybe Ibsen and I can coedit that book one day.

His second question refers to my qualification of the intellect as militant, and thus with the intimation of effects like rage, which T. W. Adorno considered inimical to critique in his late essay on "Resignation." All I have to say here is that while there is an important tradition critical of these negative effects—traceable to Friedreich Nietzsche's critique of *ressentiment*—there is also a feminist Global South tradition that recuperates their political potential. Think of Audre Lorde's "The Uses of Anger" (1981), Sianne Ngai's *Ugly Feelings* (2005), or Laura Quintana's excellent way of distinguishing "political anger" from *ressentiment* in *Rabia* (2021). Thus, I prefer Glen Sean Coulthard's nuanced claim in *Red Skin, White Masks* (2014) that "under certain conditions Indigenous peoples' individual and collective expressions of anger and resentment can help prompt the very forms of self-affirmative praxis that generate rehabilitated Indigenous subjectivities and decolonized forms of life" (p. 109) to Adorno's blank rejection of these effects.

Finally, Ibsen is concerned that my understanding of revolutionary time is potentially oversimplifying if not altogether "morally questionable," for I do not condemn armed struggles *tout court*, as is clear from my chapter on Fanon's decolonial version of the militant intellect. This does not mean, as Ibsen seems to suggest, that I think of armed struggles as the only way to conceive of emancipatory struggles. My inclusion of a chapter on the nonviolent alternative theorized by Judith Butler—which should by no means be considered as correcting Fanon's—proves this wrong, as do other chapters. What form revolutionary action takes is a historical question I neither engage nor make normative claims about. My book is not even about the form that critical theory takes under revolutionary conditions, even if there is enough in my chapters on Fanon and Karl Marx to consider this. My book is about the ways in which critical theory cultivates a free intellect even when revolutionary conditions are absent, and about *one* rather than *the* way it does this well: by producing conceptual personae capable of dramatizing critical thinking. Here, I do feel closer to Adorno, but not as Ibsen implies, for I do not endorse Adorno's disengaged position. Rather, I feel closer to the Adorno that defended critique as an essential democratic attribute (hence my reference to the general intellect and to universality), because it brings "the power to resist existing institutions, to resist everything that is merely posited, that justifies itself with its existence," as he put it in an essay on "Critique" published in the 2005 edition of *Critical Models* (p. 281-2).

A Critical Theory of Global Justice: The Frankfurt School and World Society. By Malte Frøslee Ibsen. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023. 384p. $135.00 cloth.
doi:10.1017/S1537592724001981

— Andrés Fabián Henao Castro, *University of Massachusetts Boston*
Andres.HenaoCastro@umb.edu

To students interested in the Frankfurt School, I used to recommend Martin Jay's *The Dialectical Imagination* (1973), but Malte Frøslee Ibsen might have just changed that. In *A Critical Theory of Global Justice*, Ibsen offers a compelling reconstruction of the Frankfurt School's idea of critical theory by means of six paradigms: Max Horkheimer's original paradigm (27-65), Theodor Adorno's negativist paradigm (85-126), Jürgen Habermas' communicative paradigm (149-199), Axel Honneth's recognition paradigm (227-282), Amy Allen's contextual paradigm (299-312), and Rainer Forst's justification paradigm (313-341). The synthesis that he offers of these authors' work is superb, accessible to nonspecialists, clear without sacrificing any of the notorious complexity of some critical theorists, and very original. Ibsen shows that transversal to these scholars' otherwise vast interests is a common concern with the historical embeddedness of reason in social practices and institutions (the historical dimension), with the basic structure of society as that which gives form to social life (the sociological dimension), and with a normative account of human autonomy (the normative dimension). The historical dimension recalls Hegel, the sociological, Marx, and the normative, Kant, making Frankfurt School critical theory into an innovative synthesis of German philosophy in which "these three dimensions are *methodologically integrated* in a critique of the historical genesis, present, and possible future forms of the basic structure of society that can guide emancipation in practice" (346).

But does the book's reconstruction of these paradigms offer a critical theory of global justice? Here, Ibsen overpromises. The geopolitical imaginary of the book,