

enough has been said in calling attention to their admirable comparison between pagan philosophy at its highest theological moment and Christian thought.

In such a book it is always possible to query details; it seems, for instance, misleading to suggest that the analogy of Being is characteristically Christian and not Aristotelian, as a phrase on page 90 does. No doubt the application of that analogy to God and creatures was Christian, but the analogy of being itself was certainly plain Aristotelian doctrine of a piece with his categorical system.

This introduction does what all introductions should do—stimulates and encourages an approach to the philosophers themselves. Might it be suggested that practical assistance to this end would be afforded if references to the main loci were inserted, in future editions, down the margin? This would preserve the cursive character of the book but at the same time show the beginner where to start his own researches: there are all too few references in the book as it stands.

The bibliography at the end is useful. Miss Freeman's recently published *Companion to the Pre-Socratics* should now be added; and Professor Taylor's little book on Aristotle should be dated in its latest edition, 1944, for in that he made changes and additions that were clearly the result of his study of scholastic philosophy.

COLUMBA RYAN, O.P.

FOUR ESSAYS. By C. Lambek. (Copenhagen, Einar Munksgaard; Oxford University Press; 7s. 6d.)

This work of a Danish thinker has been rendered into English by a Danish translator. There are certain errors, like 'in the first line' for 'in the first place' and 'a spiritual Frenchman' for 'a witty Frenchman', but the version, although not quite English, is usually intelligible. Perhaps it would have been more satisfactory to read the book in Danish if only one could read Danish, but one is not in doubt about Mr Lambek's general meaning.

The four essays are on 'Time and Reality', 'Objectivity', 'Logical Coherence' and 'Antagonisms in the Individual'. They represent a type of philosophy with which the world has become increasingly familiar since Kant, in which the two poles of thought are the crude material of sensation and the concepts employed in the sciences. The main discussion is not so much about what we know as how we come to think as we do; attention is directed not so much to the awareness of a real world as to the construction of a world of thought. Mr Lambek finds the origin of knowledge in the bringing into relation of the initially atomic facts of temporal experience. Different types of relation, static and dynamic, result in the things and laws of which we are accustomed to speak both in ordinary life and in the sciences. But there is no particular reason, other than instinct, choice, and habit, why we should combine our experiences in one way rather than in another.

To anyone familiar with Greek and medieval philosophy such an approach seems desperately inadequate. Let it be said once more that it is not the function of philosophy to be a commentary upon the sciences but to be the master-science, with a theory of objective knowledge and a metaphysic of intelligible being. Until this is recognised, thinkers will go on, like Mr Lambek, inquiring how we arrive at the notion of a persistent self while forgetting to ask in what sense the self may truly be said to persist through time. Physics and psychology without an autonomous philosophy inevitably land the mind in subjectivism.

D. J. B. HAWKINS

NATIONALISM AND INTERNATIONALISM. By Don Luigi Sturzo. (Roy Publishers; 15s.)

This volume is a collection of nine papers on various questions—Nationalism, the Roman Question, Fascism, Christian Democracy, Workers' Unions, Modern Wars, Imperialism, Internationalism, Post War Crisis. There is no stringent cohesion between them except that the author says that he wishes to emphasise the influence of morality on politics.

Don Sturzo makes a useful distinction between the *thesis* of the ethical and religious principles of society which Christianity asserts and proclaims and the *hypothesis* or given realisation of these principles. But while he is willing to use the distinction against a dead Fascism he does not apply it to the living fact of Communism. In fact there is a strange unawareness of Communist philosophy throughout the whole book. Surely if a priest and a theologian is going to comment on modern political affairs, we expect him to do so from the standpoint of professed philosophical principles of the leaders of Communism. Otherwise his comment is misleading and very akin to journalism. Catholics are entitled to know the inner meaning of the Communist tactics, which may change, though the principles do not change.

Throughout Don Sturzo gives the impression that he is writing as a politician, with all the vagueness and reservation of a man of affairs, who must, perhaps, pay lip service to the expression of moral principles but never go below the surface. It is not sufficient to say: 'Today one country only may say *no* to the international organisation and it is Russia' and then not explain why. A reading of Lenin's *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* would make the thing clear. For Lenin the mind is merely a camera depicting the evolution of matter and the mind of a communist is the perfect camera, which gives the only true picture of the state of evolution at any given moment. The mind of a non-communist reflects a state of past evolution and is imperfect. Hence it is the communist alone who possesses truth and in his mind there are only two categories, viz. the certain and the certainly false. The mind of the non-communist being an imperfect instrument may have opinions and hold one side of a proposition with