

RURAL EXODUS AND INDUSTRIALIZATION

Are country people destined to disappear in the near future as a result of the constant advance of technical and urban civilization? Having discovered that three-fourths of mankind are country people, American ethnologists and sociologists are studying their "urbanization" and their "industrialization" throughout the world in an effort to see to what extent there is compatibility—or incompatibility—between their traditional "cultures" and the demands of industrial production and of life in a mass society.¹ European writers appear to be less perturbed by this dilution of peasant civilizations through contamination from the cities. They are concerned rather with the gradual disappearance of country people themselves, drawn into the cities by the rural exodus.

As early as the end of the last century, many writers had dealt with the rural exodus, most often in order to denounce it as the gravest social

Translated by Wells Chamberlin.

1. Cf. Henri Mendras, "The Agrarian Revolution," *Diogenes*, No. 16 (1956), pp. 124–35, and his "Cities and Countrysides," *ibid.*, No. 8 (1954), pp. 111–17.

scourge of our times.² In the abundant literature of that period there were, however, a few scientific studies that reached conclusions which still remain valid, at the very least for the industrialized countries of western Europe. John Saville,³ in particular, recalls "The Laws of Migration" as they were stated in 1885 by E. G. Ravenstein:

a) "The great body of our migrants only proceed a short distance"; they leave their villages to go to the nearest industrial or urban center.

b) "Migrants proceeding long distances generally go by preference to one of the great centers of commerce and industry" (London in particular).

c) "The natives of towns are less migratory than those of rural parts of the country."

d) "Females are more migratory than males." As a result, there are fewer women than men in the rural areas, and more women than men in the cities.⁴

Ravenstein analyzed the mechanics of the rural exodus as follows:

The inhabitants of the country immediately surrounding a town of rapid growth, flock into it; the gaps thus left in the rural population are filled up by migrants from more remote districts, until the attractive force of one of our rapidly growing cities makes its influence felt, step by step, to the most remote corner of the Kingdom.⁵

The simplicity of the formula casts some doubt upon its value as a generalization. It synthesizes what has happened in England, where industrial centers are relatively well distributed over the national territory. In France, on the other hand, rural areas having no important industrial cities in their vicinity sent their emigrants directly to Paris, and the traditional flow of seasonal migrations also played a determining role.

However, the example of Great Britain is certainly instructive, since that country is the most urbanized in Europe. A hundred years ago, urban and rural populations were approximately equal (as they were

2. Cf. Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale, *Les Migrations rurales, éléments de bibliographie* (n.d. [1959]). (Roneo, not paginated.) See also the first congress of the Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale (Louvain, September 22-28, 1958), *Les Migrations rurales* (Bonn: Secretariat de la Société, 1959). (Roneo.)

3. John Saville, *Rural Depopulation in England and Wales, 1851-1951* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957); see also his paper read before the first congress of the Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale.

4. "The Laws of Migrations," *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Vol. XLVIII (June, 1885).

5. Cited by Saville, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

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in France twenty years ago), whereas today 80 per cent of the British population live in the urban zones. As long as the rural population is sufficiently prolific and as long as the urban centers are in the first stages of their development, the normal demographic increase is sufficient to populate the cities without a reduction of the absolute number of country people. It was only in the second quarter of the nineteenth century that the number of country people began to drop in England and Wales; up to that date it increased, despite the growing industrialization of the land.

The proportion of city dwellers (80 per cent) has changed little in the last thirty years. This conceals, however, a more complex phenomenon, since it is the most rural districts that have continued to lose population. We can assert that, the more rural (perhaps we should say "agricultural") the area is, the more surely it is destined for depopulation, while the small rural centers and the dormitory suburbs of the large cities experience an increase in population. Indeed, if we study, as Louis Leroy has done for France, the curve of the development of agricultural population and that of the development of non-agricultural rural population, we see that until about 1920 the two were almost parallel in their descent.⁶ From that date on, however, agricultural population shrank much more rapidly than rural population. Consequently, we may say that, as we follow the curve, rural population shows less and less a peasant or agricultural dominant. Formerly, the middle-class inhabitant of a small town would willingly characterize himself as a "peasant," whereas today the tradesman relates himself to his fellows in the large cities and not to the farmers who are his neighbors and customers. This is one of the manifestations of the urbanization of the way of life in country districts and a result of the "law of decreasing farm population," to use Pierre Fromont's term.⁷

The causes of the rural exodus, particularly the attractive power of the cities, have been denounced so often that it is pointless to enumerate them again. John Saville adds, however, an important detail when he shows that in Great Britain during the second half of the nineteenth century farm wages were lower than industrial wages by half. Pierre Fromont notes also that,

6. *Exode ou mise en valeur des campagnes* (Paris: Flammarion, 1958).

7. *Économie rurale* (Paris: Génin, 1957).

despite the fact that workers, by the hundreds of thousands, are leaving their fields for the cities, despite the fact that available labor is shrinking in the country and growing in the city, we are not witnessing a mass increase in farm wages, nor a reduction in the others. If the outlets of these two groups of activity progressed at the same speed, this one-way transfer of workers would long since have equalized salaries.⁸

And A. Maris foresees, for all of western Europe in the next fifteen years, the departure of nine million active men from the agricultural sector (three million for the six nations of the European Common Market).⁹

Brutal as they may be, these figures are not enough to close discussion. Opinions continue to clash, as they did a hundred years ago, as we seek to find out whether this profit lure is not illusory; for life in the city is more costly, the resources of nature are not found there, and living conditions are less "healthy." The economist cannot hope to decide moralists' debates.

Under the term "rural exodus" we have looked principally at the peasant who abandons the land. It took the minute investigations of John Saville and of Philippe Pinchemel¹⁰ to show that a parallel movement has led the old rural industries into leaving the villages, to be transformed and concentrated in the cities. "The divorce between industry and the village is a modern phenomenon." The closing of the rural workshops forced their workers into the exodus, workers who were usually also small farmers (*petits paysans*), or *ménagers*, as they are called in Picardy. These *ménagers* would go to the shop or would work at home. They also cultivated their little plots of ground by hand or with a team borrowed from a big farmer. Consequently, they quit the land at the same time that they left the factory and the village.

In a typical canton of Picardy, the drop in population during the last hundred years is due solely to the decrease in the active industrial population (textiles), and the active farm population is slightly on the rise in several communes. These observations permit us to emphasize once again that, in order to study the rural exodus scientifically, we must

8. *Ibid.*, p. 515.

9. In his paper read before the first congress of the Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale.

10. *Structures sociales et dépopulation rurale dans les campagnes picardes de 1836 à 1936* (Paris: Colin, 1957).

bring the analysis down to the commune level. All mass statistics are deceiving, for they confuse a number of phenomena and tend to establish averages which mask the sharp outline of things as they really are.

Craftsmen for their part have suffered quite as much from the development of mass production as the rural industries. W. M. Williams has studied the problems of craftsmen in Devon with meticulous care.¹¹ His book takes us into all the details of their professional and social life. It is interesting to note that their mentality as “bosses” is quite close to that of the farmers who are their customers. They resist keeping accounts for fear of discovering that they are losing money. They continue their work until they die, but their children rarely follow in their footsteps.

To try at any cost to keep numerous service craftsmen alive in the villages seems rightly, both to Williams and Pinchemel, to be a utopian solution. The case of craftsmen in the building trades is less desperate. And, on the contrary, the future appears to be brilliant for garage men, mechanics, and dealers in farm machinery, even though there are already too many of them in Devon.

Craftsmen who make products intended for sale in the village, but especially outside it, are not in the same situation. It is understandable that cabinetmakers, weavers, and potters continue to live in the country and to sell their products in town. In Devon they are generally city people who have recently moved to the country, simple folk who earn a living this way; but among them are artists or simply “eccentrics,” wearied of city life, who want to live in the country and work with their hands.

This new handicraft industry occupies only a few individuals and cannot therefore suffice to replace all the traditional craftsmen’s workshops. Moreover, these newcomers rarely become integrated into the social life of the village; they remain “outsiders,” closer to their city customers than to their neighbors. In particular, the blacksmith’s shop used to fulfil an important social function in Devon—here the men gathered to talk, and village news was made. Its passing accentuates the social atony of the village.

The end result of the exodus is indeed to make all social life impossible in the villages, since their population is reduced and, moreover,

11. *The Country Craftsman: A Study of Some Rural Crafts and the Rural Industries Organizations in England* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).

has grown older and includes too few women. The latter, as we have said, leave sooner than the men. It is easier for them to find husbands or jobs in the city, and the family inheritance, falling to the brother, does not hold them in the village. Moreover, for marriages to be contracted normally, the choice must be wide enough to give an impression of freedom, without which there is no real choice. Bachelors are becoming more numerous and remain single, living in the homes of their elderly parents. Thus the aging of the population is accentuated. As a final result, one may find districts in which the autochthonous population is in the process of disappearing and where an appeal will have to be made to "foreigners" to start a new rootstock; but these are extreme and relatively rare cases.

Albert Meister studied the various forms of rural associations which flourished at the end of the nineteenth century in the Canavese district of Piedmont.¹² Associationist traditions were particularly strong there, among workers as well as among farmers. Almost every village had a whole range of societies, mutual groups, and co-operatives: self-help associations, consumers' unions, fire-protection groups, protection against accidents to livestock, dairy co-operatives, etc. And Meister shows conclusively how the rupture of village economy no longer allowed these societies, established as they were on a local basis, to survive to serve local needs. Workers go more and more into town and no longer need the village societies. Among the groups utilizing leisure time, the brass bands have had the longest life. Carnival associations come back to life each year in some villages. But the city creates new leisure, and the surviving village societies suffer from a growing lack of participation. Aside from the attractive force of the cities, the fundamental cause of this disaffection is clearly emigration, particularly to the United States from 1900 to 1920. Certain villages lost more than 40 per cent of their population.

Meister noted that co-operative vitality diminishes especially in villages where the population has fallen below five hundred inhabitants, "as if there were a minimum threshold below which the establishment of voluntary associations is greatly handicapped."¹³ Thus he states the

12. *Associations coopératives et groupes de loisirs en milieu rural, enquête sur la tradition et les formes d'associations dans le Canavèse (Piémont)* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1957).

13. *Ibid.*, p. 238.

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serious problem of the optimal size of the rural community. Some have proposed abstract figures which generally fall between five hundred and two thousand inhabitants. Need we remind the reader that Fourier's phalanstery totaled sixteen hundred members, as does Le Corbusier's radial city?

But we must beware of any attempt to find a norm. All depends upon the intensity of contacts with neighboring groups and with the city, upon the number and the variety of the cleavages within the group itself, upon the prevalent type of social life, etc. The colonization experiment of Holland's polders is informative on this point. According to M. Constandse, consulting sociologist of the administration of the polders, new colonists do not want to get back to the "rustic" life they used to lead in their original areas but desire rather to "urbanize" their way of life.¹⁴ As a result, they are more attracted by the city center than by their villages, although in the latter all the institutions and means useful to a satisfying social life have been provided.

This tendency is particularly strong among the large landowners. The small ones are more easily satisfied with village life, and farm workers even risk remaining there. The problem is made more acute by the presence in every village of three religious denominations which all try to maintain various associations, doing the same job twice or three times over.

With one accord, all these studies bring out the fact that the first consequence of the rural exodus is devitalization of rural areas; thus they confirm current observations which have stimulated the abundant literature lamenting the exodus. However, we have also seen that economists such as Pierre Fromont consider this transfer of labor normal and even necessary, since, theoretically, the lowering of demographic pressure is a requisite condition for the progress of agriculture. Louis Leroy finds himself caught in this contradiction. His experience as a director of farm organizations led him to entitle his book *Exodus or Utilization of Rural Areas*, whereas the mass of data he collected for France might have led him to conclude along with the economists: "Exodus and Utilization." In reality, it clearly seems that the problem arises in a more complex way than it is envisaged, on the one hand, by the theoretical economists or, on the other, by the conservatives (wheth-

14. In his paper read before the first congress of the Société Européenne de Sociologie Rurale.

er right or left) who want to keep the peasants on the land. In France, in general, it is not those areas which have known a large rural exodus which have made the most progress—quite the other way around. It seems, indeed, that the departure of young people, especially the best ones, prevents a rural society from profiting from the exodus by adapting, transforming, and regenerating itself. The society tends, rather, to lose confidence in itself and to retreat into its traditions and its structures—in other words, to become sclerotic. Unfortunately, we do not yet have a good study of this process, which is nevertheless of capital importance.

Among the areas of western Europe, southern Italy, still little industrialized, offers a particular problem. It has kept its traditional mores, some of which go back to the pre-Roman era. That is the hypothesis offered by the great American sociologist C. C. Zimmerman in his study of emigration from a village located between Rome and Naples.¹⁵ According to him, the inhabitants of San Giovanni Incarico have retained their original “purity,” refusing to accept any demographic or cultural mixing. They have thus kept their autonomy, and neither the Romans, the Arabs, nor the Germans colonized them. And very suggestive is this meticulous and subtle study of the way in which the village was able to survive during the last war by hiding in the hills and by being satisfied with the products of fruit-picking and of the little herds the peasants had taken out with them. Marriage statistics show, moreover, that never has an outsider who stayed temporarily in the village married there.

Equally revealing is the examination of the emigration from this village to the United States. San Giovanni has more than four thousand inhabitants today, and more than three thousand of its natives are found in a suburb of Boston and in Providence, Rhode Island. Zimmerman thinks that the sudden and violent mixing of this pre-Roman people, which had remained “pure,” with modern civilization and with a human group as different as the American should give rise to hybridization and heterosis. We must wait for a study on these emigrants to confirm this bold hypothesis.

15. Carle C. Zimmerman, “American Roots in an Italian Village,” *Genus*, XI (1955), 78–139.

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The village is sufficiently prolific for this emigration not to have had the disastrous consequences stated earlier; quite the contrary, emigration can operate without affecting the autonomy of the cultural system. The rich do not emigrate, and thus they retain their prestige and power. On the other hand, emigration is both a group action—because it is the family and the group that supply the funds required for departure—and an individual action—since, in the last analysis, a man makes his decision by himself, goes away by himself, and may even leave his wife and children behind. He sends money to pay his debts and to support his family, and, if he returns, he again takes his place in the village. Thus emigration is integrated into the economic and social system without greatly disturbing it.

Montegrano, in Lucania, has also supplied its contingent of emigrants to various parts of the world, especially to the United States, while preserving its cultural autonomy. Edward Banfield is not concerned with research into its antiquity; he limits himself to giving us an analysis of the village's "ethos," which has elicited violent criticism from his Italian colleagues.¹⁶ His study is certainly an unflattering one, since it may be summed up in the formula "amoral familism." It is no doubt partial, perhaps in both senses of the word, insofar as it shows the reaction of an American, shocked by this individualism and this amoral attitude and relatively less sensitive to the ruggedness of the natural conditions, to the weight of history and to the very remarkable refinement of the culture and its deep wisdom. Would one find in the United States many "rustics" who know Latin and French? This is not a matter of a "backward" society and is still less a matter of a "backward" civilization but simply of a "backward" economy. Banfield's analysis nevertheless remains penetrating and informative to the extent that it corroborates, completes, and, above all, sharpens the studies which we already had on the mentality of Mediterranean farmers and which had brought Redfield to wonder whether there were any real "peasants" (in the precise meaning he gives the word) on the shores of the Mediterranean. Banfield's rich and stimulating book shows once again all that the techniques (particularly the Thematic Apperception Test) and the problematics of social psychology can contribute toward a

¹⁶ Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

better understanding of European rural societies. Up to now they have been studied chiefly by historians, geographers, and demographers.

Now that the avenues of emigration to new lands are virtually closed, one may wonder what the future of southern Italy is to be. Francesco Compagna, in his paper read before the Louvain meeting and in his book, shows that the northern cities are still welcoming emigrants.¹⁷ And this geographically and socially vicinal emigration is beginning to have its effect on the originating villages, with which emigrants maintain relations and to which they return more frequently. Curiously enough, the long-distance emigration at the beginning of the century helped to solidify the southern civilization instead of making it evolve, as Zimmerman has shown. Today, on the contrary, no longer having any distant outlet, this emigration is forced into an adaptation which often takes the form of a transformation as harsh as it is deep. Moreover, the various plans for agrarian reform and for economic and industrial development contribute significantly to it.

In countries undergoing industrialization, the rural exodus is also developing rapidly. The problems which arise here are no doubt analogous to those of western Europe in the last century, but they have nothing in common with western Europe's present-day problems.

There are certainly many areas on the earth which are not yet overpopulated. The Hanunoo of the Philippines, described by H. C. Conklin, have been able to establish an almost perfect equilibrium between man and his environment.¹⁸ Population density with reference to arable land is about ten acres per person and does not appear to have varied for a century. It permits an itinerant agriculture which gives a sufficient standard of living under present conditions; but the improvement of the standard will clearly have to be considered as links with Western civilization become closer. One is reluctant, however, to tamper with a system which is so well adjusted technologically and socially, for fear of not immediately finding a replacement system which is equally satisfying.

17. *I terroni in città* (Bari: Laterza, 1959).

18. Harold C. Conklin, *Hanunoo Agriculture: A Report on an Integral System of Shifting Cultivation in the Philippines* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization, 1957).

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In India, on the contrary, rural overpopulation is so great that there is an urgent need for increasing agricultural production, but resistances from structures and habits require much circumspection and *savoir-faire*. Albert Mayer's example will be valuable to all who work to improve rural welfare. Thanks to him, the Etawah area has made great progress. Its daily record of action, presented by ethnologist McKim Marriott, tells of the difficulties he encountered and how he overcame them.¹⁹

In the Serbian village of Orašac, the population has doubled in the last hundred years, but agricultural resources and mining nevertheless are allowing improvements in its living standard.²⁰ Emigration is beginning to be felt here to some extent. The result is an aging of the population, and, contrary to what is happening in England and in France, there is an excess of women. Here, men emigrate more than women. The first stage of industrialization offers little employment to women, and at the same time the rural society remains fairly coherent and is satisfying to them.

The contagion of the outside world has begun to make its effects felt, particularly on family organization. The *zadruga* is losing its importance, becoming smaller on the average, and the authority of the *starešina* has been disparaged since 1869 as a result of universal suffrage. This gave a political role to each man and diminished the political role of the *starešina*, considered up to that time as the sole representative of the *zadruga* to outside authority. Moreover, the development of a money economy was incompatible with the total economic self-sufficiency of the household group. Finally, the generalization of the dowry, including land among other things, has also played a part in the weakening of the *zadruga*.

Serbian peasant society is undergoing a profound transformation which the political modifications of the postwar period have not failed to accelerate. Certainly, villagers who have worked all their lives as clerks, miners, or craftsmen remain fundamentally "peasants," but one may wonder if the same will be true of their children. The elders complain that the spirit of the village is changing, that their authority is no

19. Albert Mayer *et al.*, *Pilot Project, India: The Story of Rural Development at Etawah, Uttar Pradesh* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1958).

20. See Joel Martin Halpern, *A Serbian Village* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958).

longer respected, that the church is less well attended, that fast days are no longer kept, and that children decide to marry as they choose and without heeding their parents' observations. What will Orašac be like in another generation? Let us hope that another sociologist will then assume the task of painting a new picture of it, like the one given us by J. M. Halpern.

The essential value of Daniel Lerner's book lies in the fact that he set out for himself a relatively vast field of inquiry but also a clearly circumscribed one—the Middle East.²¹ Within this field he treats each country separately, taking into account all the revolutions, recent or in progress. Most often, he limits himself to presenting his materials (accounts of events and of interviews) while suggesting elements of interpretation. And through these "case histories" we find again most of the problems just touched upon.

In the methodological introduction David Riesman wonders how interview techniques can be used in traditional civilizations that do not value the verbal expression of opinions and where a man is little interested in what goes on outside his village or his tribe. He emphasizes the importance of the "Don't knows" and of their interpretation. For example, when a Turkish peasant is confronted with the question of knowing what he would do if he were president of the council, he feels completely lost: "My God! How can you ask such a thing? How can I . . . I cannot . . . president of Turkey . . . master of the whole world?"²² In this way he is teaching us as much, perhaps more, about himself as the American who always knows what he would do if he were President. It is nevertheless clear that, if they are to be utilized for such civilizations, projective techniques (the Thematic Apperception Test and all questions which ask the subject to react as if he were someone else) should be subjected to long and painstaking revision. After that they would be very effective, as the examples of Banfield and Lerner already show.

Until recently, mass media scarcely touched any but city dwellers in the most industrialized countries. During the last decade these forces have been stirring the crowds which rural exodus has built up in

21. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 3 and 24.

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the cities and in other areas of the Middle East, and they are beginning to penetrate even the most remote and most tradition-bound villages. This stream of slogans and opinions, replenished daily, is brutally taking the place of the old proverbs inherited from ancestral wisdom, and men guided by an immutable tradition of the past find themselves plunged overnight into a world in which they must constantly participate in a new movement of ideas or of action. One may reflect upon what the French Revolution might have been if the great "rumors" which led the Parisians to Versailles and which stirred the peasants to burn the castles had been disseminated in ways other than by direct word of mouth.

Thus the ideologies of industrial civilization are reaching into traditional areas long before the products of industry get there and before the structures and norms of modern civilization are introduced. And in this form the conflict of civilization is clearly extremely violent and destructive. Daniel Lerner sums it up and illustrates it in the following parable, which he calls "The Grocer and the Chief":

In 1950, Balgat, ten kilometers from Ankara, was still a peasant village, without a highway or electricity. There authority was in the hands of the Muhtar, incarnation of the traditional values of obedience, courage, and fidelity. The Muhtar had left Balgat only to go to war, and the thought of leaving his village appeared to him impossible to contemplate—he would rather die. But the village grocer had another view of the world. Bitterly he deplored having to live in this little hole, and he thought only of going to Ankara to see American films and to listen to the radio.

In 1954, Balgat was overrun by the Ankara suburbs, which brought with them the road, water, and electricity, and where most of the men went to work. The grocer had died. Now it was the Muhtar's son who had the finest shop in the village, full of canned goods. And his father said to Lerner: "I am the last *Muhtar* of Balgat, and I am happy that I have seen Balgat end its history in the way that we are going."²³

We can take this parable as exemplary of the decline of traditional society, not only in the Middle East, but also in the rest of the world where, according to Macaulay, "civilization of courage" is giving way to "civilization of ingenuity."

This conflict of civilization is not, however, universal. Manning Nash found in Cantel, Guatemala, a curious example of mutual adaptation

23. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

of the local civilization and industrial life.²⁴ The textile mill built in Cantel allows a greater number of inhabitants to live according to the traditional ideal. To satisfy the ideal, to “live well,” it takes twenty *cuerdas* (about two acres) of land—but only a fifth of the families have that much. On the average, a family must be satisfied with eight to nine *cuerdas*.²⁵

In Cantel as elsewhere, factory work is quite different from farm work, and no one can escape its demands. On the other hand, the system of command is capable of taking local habits into account. For example, no one teaches his job to a beginner—it would be an insult to the beginner to think that he cannot learn by himself. He simply stands watching for some time behind an older worker, and, when he considers himself able to operate a machine, it is intrusted to him. In the same way, the foreman, always a local man, respects the local manner of treating one who works for another—he never raises his voice, and in no case is he to treat his subordinates roughly.

The factory has had little influence on the family. A man does not become fully adult until the day he can leave his family and have his own home. Factory work permits a young couple to set up housekeeping as soon as they are married and consequently to attain their ideal more easily than in farm families, where the son must go on working beside his father. Some unmarried girls go to the factory, as well as some married women, but the latter are in a difficult position if they want to fulfil their domestic obligations. Is it not said that the death rate of children of working mothers is higher than that of the others? Thus the prevailing type of family in Cantel has been strengthened by the factory more than it has been modified. The same is true of social stratification and of the various social institutions. Only the rare bonds of camaraderie or sometimes of friendship, formed in the shop or at the union, appear as a novelty in this peasant civilization, which is ignorant of such ties.

In such conditions it is normal for religion and the world view not to have been affected either. It is more unusual to see that the type of

24. *Machine Age Maya: The Industrialization of a Guatemalan Community* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1958).

25. It is interesting to note that these Mayan peasants want precisely twice what they have, just as do the Greek peasants we have studied (cf. Henri Mendras, *Six villages d'Épire, problèmes de développement socio-économique* [Paris: UNESCO]. (In press.)

rationality which dominates industrial work has not slowly penetrated the other activities and the general mentality. Farmers, whether factory workers or not, think that offering a *tioš jal* (a cross fashioned from the finest ears of grain) after harvest is a guaranty for the next harvest. Only the biggest farmers are beginning to think in rational terms of soils, fertilizers, varieties of seed grain, etc. The workers do not seem to be aware of the evident antithesis between physical and mystic causality. For them, these are two separate domains, and they do not feel the need to bring them together in a coherent view of the world.

To sum it up, we may say that the factory has taken its place in the life of Cantel and that it has improved this life without transforming it. The formation of a labor union did not, in itself, give any aggressive character to the disputes with the factory management or against "Yankee imperialism." Just as they follow the Corpus Christi procession, the crowds parade on May Day to be taking part in a collective celebration. Only the militant individuals (a few of whom were sent to the Vienna Congress in 1954) have become aware that they belong to a global and international organization.

From this remarkable example, analyzed so precisely and so vividly, Manning Nash draws the conclusion that "factories may be introduced into peasant societies without the drastic chain of social, cultural, and psychological consequences implied in the concept of revolution."²⁶ This is no doubt a special case, but a general lesson nevertheless comes from it. If they are not to be erroneous, those generalizations which flatly set peasant civilization against industrial and urban civilization must always be checked by an examination of the concrete historical situation.

The implanting of industries in overpopulated rural areas clearly seems to be, all things considered, one of the best replacement solutions when emigration is no longer possible. This is, moreover, the conviction of those who are fighting against rural depopulation, since they are most often apostles of industrial decentralization, which alone is capable of saving both overpopulated and underpopulated districts. Ford wanted to put factories in the fields, and long before him Fourrier (and Le Play and others) thought that industrial production should

26. Nash, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

be carried on in rural areas. Leroy, Saville, and Williams agree in thinking that the dissemination of workshops in the villages is a utopian solution. They have more confidence in the decentralization of industries into small and average-size towns with populations from ten to fifty thousand. The efforts made in this direction in France have been disappointing. However, the extension of dormitory suburbs, the maintaining of rural industries which are traditional or which are undergoing expansion (such as the food industries), and a few implantings of new factories in small towns are helping to bring industrial workers, if not the factories themselves, back to the country.

Thus we may wonder if the peasant-worker described by Y. Le Balle is not a modern reincarnation of the *ménager* of Picardy studied by Pinchemel. When the worker spends his day in the factory and comes home to till his little plot of ground, we have the division of labor which Fourier had already set up in his phalanstery. It has its advocates as well as its critics. The fact is that it is becoming more and more extensive in France because, as Robert Owen said, those concerned find in it their security against the risks of industrial unemployment. Moreover, it is interesting to note that, in this case, agriculture is again becoming the production of daily foodstuffs as it was in the past centuries. Paradoxically, industry could thus foster, in certain areas, a return to the traditional self-sufficiency of agriculture, while production for the city markets would be concentrated in large operations. However, the economic effects of industrialization and of urbanization have not yet been subjected to concrete investigations which would allow us to confirm or deny hypotheses of that kind. They could nevertheless be very valuable for the purpose of setting aside any "phalansterian" utopia which, through the mixing of two ways of life, might fondly hope to build a civilization "of courage and of ingenuity."