

criticism of Clement, and feels safer when he can quote a secondary source in support of his views. Consequently this is a valuable source-book, but one would now like to see the author sail out into less sheltered waters. How do Clement and his Gnostic contemporaries fit in with the whole history of the Gnostic movement? Does Clement really solve the problem of evil? Is this not a problem which is solved by an appeal not to reason but to faith—faith in the goodness of God who loved the world so much that he sent his only Son to undergo evil and triumph over it through love; faith in the truth in Jesus' saying that the grain must die in order to be fruitful?

There are three especial points on which the reviewer disagrees with the author. First, it is surely an anachronism to depict the Gnostics as second-century existentialists who built their extravagant cosmogonies mainly to account for their Angst.

Secondly, Clement's teaching on original sin is interpreted through the spectacles of twentieth-century opinion, which tries to reduce original sin to 'social heredity conveyed through parental example and environmental influence', and sees this as a 'more optimistic alternative' to the (western) view that original sin is transmitted by the passion that accompanies the act of conception. But why more *optimistic*? And is the difference between East

and West as marked as is supposed? The author sees that this explanation does not tie in all the strands of Clement's thought. For although Clement does not teach inherited guilt, he does teach an inherited tendency to sin; and it is going beyond the evidence to reduce this tendency to 'social heredity', even if one accepts as genuine the passage from the doubtful Commentary on Jude, 'We are all subject to Adam's sin according to the pattern of his sin'; for heredity as well as environment can lead to the recurrence of a pattern of sin. It seems anachronistic again to suggest Clement links original sin with Adam 'so that he might give the impression of rendering lip-service to a doctrine which was part of ecclesiastical tradition even at this early date'.

Thirdly, since a discussion of the problem of evil inevitably applies modern categories to second-century thought, it would have brought clarity to the treatment if the different kinds of evil had been more sharply distinguished. For example, is suffering an evil in itself, or should the term be reserved for the moral attitude that reacts wrongly to suffering?

This is a valuable study, enlivened by quotations from modern literature. Can we look forward now to a deeper penetration by the author into some part of a field that he has so thoroughly prospected in this first work?

E. J. YARNOLD

SCIENCE ET THEOLOGIE—METHODE ET LANGAGE. Centre Catholique des Intellectuels Français. *Desclée De Brouwer*, Paris. 1969. 249 pp. 40F.

This book contains the papers presented at a colloquium held in Rome in November 1968, organized by the 'Secrétariat international pour les questions scientifiques' of Pax Romana. It represents a serious attempt to illuminate the lesser understood areas of scientific and theological thought and method and to compare them at a fairly deep level. Half of the papers are on science and half on theology, and each paper is by an expert in his own field.

The tone of the whole volume is honest, rigorous and highly unpretentious, at the same time as being genuinely stimulating. The papers are divided under two headings, 'Role of Hypothesis and Types of Certainty' and 'Problems of Language—Symbols and Concepts'. Then follows some notes compiled by study groups, which can be (and should be!) viewed as guidelines for further thought, and finally a 'Final Document'. Included in the same volume are some essays on research and a debate on the origin of the scientific mind.

One of the features of a subject as vast as science and theology is that there is still so much that needs to be said and to be understood. Even such a seemingly simple activity as research in fundamental physics is characterized, as Dr Peter Hodgson points out, by experimental surprises and conceptual uncertainties. The physicist is often forced to believe in apparently contradictory ideas, and, if he is to make any progress, requires a passionate involvement with and caring for his subject, grounded in a faith in the ultimate simplicity of the world. Faith for the theologian, on the other hand, is certain but non-evident knowledge (Mgr Carlo Colombo) and it is precisely this intellectual unsatisfactoriness that underlies the desire to re-search, and to see more clearly. There is a very interesting paper by Gustave Martelet, S.J., on the anthropological unity of science and theology, which arises from the impossibility of complete objectivity in theology and in the social, and even physical,

sciences. For the first two, lack of objectivity is almost built into the subjects: since it is the total man that is engaged in the mystery of God, objectivity and subjectivity are inseparable; also we only know God by virtue of the transformations he effects in us. Social sciences are a study of man reflecting on himself, and so there is evidently something in common. For the physical sciences, 'objectivity' as a concept came in for some revision after Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle, but this reviewer is very suspicious of attempts to draw parallels with theology and social sciences. The Uncertainty Principle, despite its name, has a very precise application, and is not a statement about the futility of clarity of thought. Nevertheless, the idea, though not new, is stimulating.

The papers dealing with concepts in science and theology are probably on less familiar ground. There are two excellent and long papers by Henri Bouillard, S.J., and Professor

Jean Ladrière. Henri Bouillard discusses theological language, the elaboration of theological discourse, and the way in which signs, symbols and figures depend on one's theological stance. The presentation is beautifully lucid and there are many examples to illustrate the abstract points. Jean Ladrière treats formal, empirico-formal and hermeneutic sciences separately and analyses the role of signs and concepts in each one. This is rather difficult material, but greatly repays the effort of reading. In both parts of the book, biological sciences are also treated. Here we are on rather less demanding ground; questions which occur are, for instance, to what extent is the doctrine of original sin independent of the origin of species?

To any serious students of science and theology this book is greatly to be recommended.

LEWIS RYDER

COUNCILS AND ASSEMBLIES. (Studies in Church History, vol. 7.) Edited by G. J. Cuming and L. G. D. Baker. Cambridge University Press, 1971. £5.

Since *Studies in Church History* have adopted the practice of devoting each annual volume to a specific theme of Church History, these collections of papers have come to rank among the most important contributions to their field. The present volume continues this practice, and contains an appetising collection of papers on the theme of its title. In the nature of the case, the papers do not provide a general assessment of the role of councils and synods in the life of the Church, but indicate, rather, the interests of scholars active in this field. Nevertheless, the theme as a whole cannot fail to be of interest in the post-Conciliar age in the Roman communion, and some of the papers touch directly on questions which Vatican II has brought to life under our eyes. A number of studies are clustered around the Conciliar period. Dr A. J. Black's short study of 'The Council of Basle and the Second Vatican Council' will be of particular interest to Roman Catholic readers. Its keynote—that the renewal of the Church draws together threads which have been pulled apart in the past—might well stand as the motto of the whole collection (indeed, perhaps, of the study of Church history as a whole?). His more specific concern here

is to draw attention to the collegiate model of the Church and the use made of that model in the two councils. His quotation from the proceedings of the Council of Basle nicely pinpoints two models found in conflict both at that time, and generally in the Church's history:

The bishop of Ardjisch had happened to say that the Roman pontiff was the servant of the Church, which Panormitanus could not tolerate; and that day so far forgot his learning, which is very great, as not to shrink from claiming that the pope was ruler of the Church. John of Segovia replied, 'Watch what you are saying, Panormitanus, it is a very honourable title of the Roman pontiff when he calls himself "servant of the servants of God".'

In a fascinating essay on 'The Byzantine reaction to the Second Council of Lyons, 1274', D. M. Nicol shows what is apt to happen when a scheme of reunion is forced through a council against the grain of the *sensus fidelium* (in this case of the Greek Orthodox faithful). These are only two examples, picked almost at random, from a rich, varied and distinguished collection.

R. A. MARKUS