

The blurb, as is usual with blurbs, calls the book lucid. I have probably quoted enough already to indicate the amount of trust to be placed in this case in the publishers' claim. Possibly they thought the system of sections, sub-sections, sub-sub-sections, etc., an aid to understanding. To my mind it is anything but helpful, apart from the fact that it is not always easy to locate '5.2.2.(iii)B'. The practice of placing conclusions, or supposed conclusions, of sections in ugly boxes does little to improve intelligibility. Does the momentous dictum 'Whether proper names are to be said to have a "meaning" seems a matter of choice' gain much by being placed in a box?

It is hard to interest students in philosophical logic. If they are allowed to waste their time on this book it will be harder than ever to persuade them that the subject is worth their attention. If it does fall into their hands the best hope is that they will find it so boring that they will quickly lay it aside. The danger is that some of them will persevere with it and be seriously misled.

C.J.F WILLIAMS

**RELIGION, REASON AND THE SELF. ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF HYWEL D. LEWIS.** Ed. by Stewart R. Sutherland and T.A. Roberts. *University of Wales Press, 1989. Pp. xvi + 173. £20.*

This is an interesting collection of essays. Each of the authors is distinguished in his own field, so the essays merit attention individually on that account. But they are also of value as a collection, in disclosing something of the variety of ways in which philosophy of religion is presently being conducted.

D.Z. Phillips offers a piece on 'William James and the Notion of Two Worlds'. Characteristically, he is out to repudiate the notion that religious beliefs may be construed as hypotheses concerning metaphysical realities. Here the problem has to do with the idea of communication from the dead: 'What is at issue is the grammar or logic of "from the dead"'. What I am suggesting is that the grammar involved is such that any notion of "tracing the message" distorts and misunderstands it' (p. 137). The examples Phillips submits seem enough to establish that 'communication from the dead' need not be understood in other-worldly terms, but I am left unconvinced that as a matter of principle (of 'logic') it must not be so understood.

In 'The Concept of Revelation', Stewart Sutherland also raises the matter of the other-worldliness of religion. He distinguishes picture (a), 'in which behind the empirical world of phenomena there lies a second world of ultimate or spiritual reality', (p. 36) and picture (b), where 'one is depicted as trying to perceive the structures or substructures of this world, rather than trying to understand this world better by gaining knowledge of another ultimate reality' (pp. 36–7). Sutherland's sympathies would lie, I think, with picture (b), as do Phillips's. But here he focuses upon the question of what must in general be true of any example of revelation.

In 'Meaning in the Bible', Richard Swinburne investigates what it would be like for one particular (supposed) revelation to be true, examining how assumptions about the Bible's author, intended audience and structure have a bearing on this matter. His willingness to admit the possibility that God might have dictated the Bible marks out his position on the general

character of religion from that of Phillips, who would no doubt regard such an idea as too much akin to 'tracing a message'. Swinburne argues that 'if we wish to take seriously claims for the truth of the Bible, we must understand it in the way that both philosophical rules for interpreting other texts and original canonizers suggest, and that includes their admission that it contained deeper truths which future generations wiser than themselves might detect by using their rules' (p. 31).

The matter of the fundamental nature of religious belief emerges again in Frederick Copleston's 'Faith and Philosophy'. Here Copleston reviews the work of a number of nineteenth century Russian theologians, especially that of Vladimir Solovyev (1853–1900). These men were exercised by the question of how philosophy might provide a supportive framework for Christian faith. Copleston is approving of their project, and one example of how he conceives of Christian belief relating to other spheres of knowledge is evident in these remarks: 'Given Christian belief in the creative activity of God, it can be inferred that creation is in principle intelligible. Christian belief is thus capable of stimulating the scientific study of nature and the human being' (p. 57).

This question is subjected to more detailed analysis in Ivor Leclerc's 'The Issue and Nature of Metaphysics'. He asks why mathematics should prove to be so useful a tool in understanding the physical world, and intimates that there may be room for a theistic metaphysics here: 'With the elimination, after the eighteenth century, of that portion of the answer about God's having created the world, this answer, namely that the world is a mathematical structure, has remained the tacit metaphysical presupposition of the inquiry into the physical down to the present day. This is a metaphysical doctrine, and it requires to be justified—a mere pragmatic justification is insufficient' (p. 96).

In 'The Soul and Person in Theological Perspective', T.F. Torrance also connects the doctrine of creation with the application of scientific norms of rationality (pp. 103–4). But his main object is to uncover the use made by various patristic writers of, for example, the doctrines of the Incarnation and the resurrection of Jesus in developing their understanding of the notions of soul and person. Further reflections on the character of personal existence can be found in H.P. Owen's 'The Sinlessness of Jesus'. Owen's central claim is that we should suppose Jesus to have been *unable* to sin, allowing that he may have been tested but not tempted.

That leaves two further essays. In 'Decision and Religious Belief', Thomas McPherson argues that 'it is proper to allow a place for decisions to believe' (p. 72). And in 'Religious Experience', T.A. Roberts advances an account which calls for some modification of Swinburne's conception of these things.

At a time when most English and American philosophers viewed theology as a nonsensical enterprise, Hywel D. Lewis stood out in his opposition to their consensus. This volume of essays testifies to the revival of philosophy of religion in recent years, and so is a fitting tribute to one who did much to make that revival possible.

MARK WYNN