

Bellah, Yinger, Wilson—the lot—and to accuse them of presenting in one way or another little more than social myths of secularisation. (To be with it these days, one has to use the term myth!) In Glasner's eyes, all have sinned, for all have indulged in ideological promiscuity. They have leant too much on the Weber-Troeltsch dichotomy of church and sect, they have idealised the Catholic establishment of the middle ages, they have been seduced by ecclesiastical organization, they have clung to church membership, to cult, to magic, and they have used conventional definitions of church, religion, secularisation, and so on.

And so Glasner wants to lead us out of the ideological jungle. But how does one transcend ideology? How does one differentiate it from truth? There is no carefully worked out or unequivocal answer. In his final chapter, he offers a solution by falling back on a little known work of Simmel, which was translated some years ago, and from it, and from a certain reading of Weber and Durkheim, suggests that the religious should be differentiated from religion or religions. How the religious is to be defined and described is not spelt out in great detail: briefly it is seen 'as a specific form of

social relationship found within the undifferentiated group.' It is located in certain types of social relationships involving humility and exaltation. The religious is therefore not subject to secularising processes: it is eternal. By contrast, religion, based on organization and institution can be influenced by such forces and will probably disappear. What is the relation of one reality to the other? Why should the religious be defined in such a way? Glasner fails to answer such questions and appears to be indifferent to religion but holds the religious in high regard. The personal-social relation is protected but the organization is of no consequence. And without describing it, he refers to 'the normal processes of religious development'. What are these? Here is ideology confirmed, not eliminated. And so we remain in the jungle.

The book may well turn out to be useful for undergraduates yearning for a comprehensive collection of resumes of what other writers have written on secularisation, coupled with critical notes. The style savours of a doctoral thesis, and a final glance at the preface confirms the hunch.

W. S. F. PICKERING

DEVIA NT LOGIC: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, by Susan Haack. *Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974. xiv + 191 pp. £3.80*

The title of this book makes obvious what its subject-matter is: it is concerned with non-classical logics, and not with their formal characteristics, but with whether there could be good grounds for adopting them. In another respect, however, the title is misleading. The use of the apparently pejorative term 'deviant', rather than 'variant' or 'non-standard' or just 'non-classical', suggests, first, that Dr. Haack is convinced that classical logic is in possession, and, secondly, that she frowns on attempts to dislodge it. Actually, Dr. Haack adopts no clear attitude to the question whether or not classical logic encapsulates the principles of inference that we are in practice accustomed to recognise as valid; and she expressly maintains that we *might have* good ground for adopting a non-classical logic, although she is at most only very mildly sympathetic to the thesis that we actually do have such

grounds. Her failure to answer, or even very clearly to pose, the question whether classical logic is in possession, is a serious defect, because it obscures the distinction between two quite different sorts of ground that may be offered for the adoption of a non-classical logic. One type of ground is the contention that we do not, as a matter of fact, recognise all classical forms of reasoning as correct when applied to statements of certain kinds: that we therefore need to diverge from classical logic if we are to remain faithful to the logic of our language. The other type of ground is that, while we do in practice acknowledge classical reasoning as valid, our doing so produces a kind of incoherence in our language. Many philosophers, including Frege and Tarski, have argued that accepted linguistic practice involves such an incoherence, that it is like a game whose rules have not been formulated and

could not be systematically formulated; any attempt to do so would diverge at some point from existing practice.

It is, perhaps, not of great importance to decide, once and for all, whether the logic of our language is classical: but it is of great importance to distinguish clearly between these two types of criticism of classical logic. A criticism of the first kind is compatible with, and often accompanies, the view that existing linguistic practice is not open to criticism, that it is justified simply by being generally accepted. When classical logic is criticised in this way, it is the *logicians* who are being criticised, for having incorrectly formulated the logical principles to which we in fact adhere, or, at best, for having neglected those principles in favour of ones governing an artificial language functioning differently from natural language; it is not being said that anyone has actually reasoned incorrectly. But a criticism of the second kind is more radical because it exemplifies the view that an established linguistic practice may yet be shown to be incorrect: the error lies, not in the way which the logicians have formulated the laws that we observe, but in our observing them. The attack made by Strawson in *Introduction to Logical Theory* in classical logic was of the first kind: it was an attack made in the name of ordinary language, of actual practice. But the attack made on classical logic as applied to mathematical practice involved, according to them, the use of fallacious reasoning. Dr. Haack's book would have afforded a clearer view of the subject if she had kept this distinction more clearly in mind.

The book is divided into two parts. The first part considers the subject in a general way, and gives clear, and for the most part, sound reasons for rejecting various views that would rule the consideration of non-classical logics out of court.

Dr. Haack herself adopts what she calls a 'pragmatist' view of the subject, which she summarises by saying that 'logic is... a theory on a par... with other, "scientific" theories; and... choice of logic, as of other theories, is to be made on the basis of an assessment of the economy, coherence and simplicity of the overall belief set'. Of course, the reason why disputes over the validity of fundamental logical laws have appeared so perplexing and so deep is precisely that logic does *not* appear, on the face of it, to be a theory like any other, scientific, or merely 'scientific' or even altogether non-scientific. Appearances may be deceptive; but the book would have been improved if Dr. Haack had gone more deeply than she has into the reasons for thinking that logic is not to be assessed in exactly the same way as a scientific theory. In particular, she should not have so lightly dismissed the possibility that a critic of classical logic would rest his case on a non-pragmatist view of logic; as it is, advocates of 'deviant' logics are virtually relegated, willy-nilly, to the pragmatist camp by Dr. Haack; and this is certainly a misrepresentation of some of them – of the intuitionists, for instance.

The second part surveys the principal grounds on which non-classical logics have been proposed: the problem of future contingents; vagueness; the occurrence of empty singular terms; constructivist views of mathematics, and their extension to other areas of discourse; and quantum mechanics. Dr. Haack has less to say about these topics than about the general question: the discussions are sensible and lucid, but seldom penetrating, and usually inconclusive. All in all, this is an intelligent, level-headed, well organised but very far from profound book on an intensely interesting subject.

MICHAEL DUMMETT