

events seem moderate and calm. Nicholas I was a dutiful and sincere man; the February Revolution of 1917 is presented as a painless, orderly, and dull series of events; and the Bolshevik seizure of power, October 24–26, is detailed in a single paragraph. This stylistic blandness carries over into Professor Westwood's interpretation of events. One seeks for penetrating analyses of the significance of the events described, but in vain, for the stolid descriptions glide over the surface, revealing little awareness on the part of the author of the profound depths beneath.

A case in point is the following typical paragraph, which is all the author has to say about the quality of Russian soldiers and the impact of the Soviet presence in Eastern and Central Europe in 1944–45: "The common soldier tended to be of great endurance and stolidity. Individuals at times of isolation often demonstrated a certain cunning and initiative but on the whole the soldiers fought bravely and intelligently only when well-led. In the final stages of the war, when the Red Army advanced into Europe, tales were spread of how Russian soldiers relieved the local population of their watches, and how no female between 8 and 80 was safe. But if, after four years fighting a barbarous enemy, the Red soldier could be accused of nothing worse than rape and watchstealing, then he was a relatively benevolent conqueror" (p. 343).

For this reviewer, Russia's history is a matter of hope and passion, desperate struggle to solve insoluble problems, and tragedy. Here all these are obscured by a genteel style and superficial analysis.

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THE EUROPEAN PENTARCHY AND THE CONGRESS OF VERONA, 1822. By *Irby C. Nichols, Jr.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971. xiii, 363 pp. 49.50 Dglds., paper.

In this first book-length monograph on the Congress of Verona, Professor Nichols has devoted about a fifth of his space to the genesis of the congress (February 1821 to October 1822), some two hundred pages to the congress, and another fifth to the problems in historiography and interpretation. His focus throughout is on British diplomacy, and the bulk of his research is based on British and French archives; he did not consult the governmental archives of Vienna, Berlin, or Leningrad.

The tsar and diplomats at Verona debated questions of the slave trade, Black Sea commerce, Latin American independence movements, the Russian boundaries in the Western hemisphere, and—most urgently—the current revolts in Spain, Italy, and Greece. Nichols handles this complex narrative with clarity, wit, and control, but one wishes for the probings of the statesmen's political conceptions which were shown, for example, in Patricia Kennedy Grimsted's *Foreign Ministers of Alexander I*, a work which was not consulted.

Nichols's principal thesis, though not new, is well demonstrated: Chateaubriand boasted that the French expedition of 1823 was his war, not the Alliance's; and so it was, despite the wishes of Austria, Prussia, Britain, and even Villèle, the French premier.

For Slavists, the book suffers from an antiquated view of Russian diplomacy and the tsar's character. Nichols notes that one of the "prominent myths of modern Russia" is that Alexander I plotted hostilities against the Turks after the Greek

insurrection broke out in April 1821 (p. 234): "For the last four years of his reign, Alexander wanted peace, not war" (p. 244). But Nichols himself notes the tsar's attempts in May–July 1821 to get an offensive alliance with France. And in 1822, even without an ally, Russia was ready, as Strangford warned, to fall upon the Porte with a "huge army" if the Russian demands were not met. Nichols also notes Alexander's eagerness to send a corps to Spain or, if he could not get allied consent for that, to send them to Piedmont. The author dismisses Strangford's reports of the tsar's belligerency toward Turkey in 1825 as "mere legend" (p. 235), for the tsar had lost interest in foreign affairs.

But it is the latter which is mere legend. It was not only Strangford who believed that Alexander was preparing for war, but also the Austrian and Prussian envoys. And after Alexander's death his successor confirmed that his brother had been preparing to "finish the matter." When Alexander went to the Crimea, he took his chief of staff with him, and his armies were already concentrated in positions that Canning knew meant war on the Danube in the spring.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO NINETEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIAN SLAVOPHILISM: A STUDY IN IDEAS. Vol. 2: I. V. KIREEVSKIJ. By *Peter K. Christoff*. Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, no. 23/2. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1972. xiii, 406 pp. 68 Dglds.

A comparison with a recent study of Kireevsky by Abbott Gleason underscores the significance of this book's contribution to our understanding of Slavophilism. Gleason, a historian, scrutinizes the imprint of Nicholaevan repression on Kireevsky's mind, stressing the origin rather than the import of his ideas. Professor Christoff, writing with evident sympathy from within the philosophical tradition of Lossky and Zenkovsky, presents the Slavophile doctrine as a major, uniquely Russian contribution to the theory of knowledge. Ivan Kireevsky, who is the subject of the second volume of his Slavophile series (the first one was about Khomiakov), is viewed as the theoretician of the movement.

After following young Kireevsky's sporadic forays into the arena of literary criticism and cultural history, Christoff concentrates, in the second and by far the more valuable part of the book, on Kireevsky's mature contribution to Slavophile ideology. The maximum importance is given to the last two epistemological essays, one of which ("On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy") is reproduced in the appendix. The most controversial aspect of part 1 is Christoff's systematic attempt to disparage Peter Chaadaev as a thinker and mover of men. He argues that the famous comparison between the civilizations of Western Europe and Russia was being developed by young Kireevsky in the late twenties, in the same terms as Chaadaev's and independently of him. Thus deprived of much of his originality, Chaadaev is not even credited with consistency, as Christoff singles out, somewhat maliciously, all the discrepancies between the private letters and the public pronouncements. Kireevsky, on the other hand, gains in substance and emerges as an "inspirer of Moscow Slavophilism," with a faith in Russian genius dredged from the depths of folk poetry and wisdom.

Christoff sees the Slavophiles as authentic philosophers of Orthodoxy, and this leads him to minimize their debt to German Idealism. His case is well served