

say . . . but what A seems to have meant is, etc. . . .’ But sometimes the readiness to discuss may be intrusive and get in the way of objective exposition; as I think happens in Copleston’s section on St Thomas, to which I will come presently. And occasionally, too, that readiness seems uncontrolled in another way; as when the question or objection put is rather too obviously inept: in such cases—they are not many—the voice is the voice of a learned Jesuit but the ‘thought’ is a half-educated teenager’s.

Apart from the section on the Arabs and the Jews, I found the first half of the book a good deal less interesting than the second, which begins with two chapters on, respectively, Bonaventure, with his fellow Franciscans, Bacon and Lull, and the Dominicans, Albert and Thomas. On Bonaventure, Fr Copleston agrees with Gilson, against Van Steenberghe, that he ‘is much more Augustinian than Aristotelian’; more surprisingly, that the Christian factors in Bonaventure’s thought gave this, in effect, a unity in ‘the *philosophical area*’ (my italics). This is an interesting judgment, for it combines with later passages in the book—especially in the chapter on Scotus and in a rather surprisingly detailed and appreciative one on Nicholas of Cusa—to suggest that Fr Copleston may have something interesting up his sleeve concerning the old Gilsonian idea of ‘Christian philosophy’. But the theme is not, in this book, developed explicitly. St Thomas gets 20 pages (as much as Ockham) which, as a sketch of Thomism, do something to inform the ignorant; but I found them flat and at times trivial. It is all very well to shoot down idols, but here one is sometimes left wondering who on earth is firing the shots. And sometimes when Fr Copleston intervenes to defend St Thomas he unwittingly makes things worse; as when, warding off a particularly gross swipe at the idea that Thomas was ‘original’, he goes on to say, ‘He was not, however, a striver after originality, in the sense of one who is at all costs intent on saying something new’—which appears to me like saying that someone is not *altogether* a charlatan. And there is a similar clumsiness of expression in the comments (p.

188) on Thomas’s effort to combine a psychology based on Aristotle with belief in personal immortality. But the whole section shows Copleston at less than his best—too much preoccupied, one suspects, by what he calls ‘all the fuss made by Thomists about their hero’. He does himself more justice in an ‘Epilogue’ at the end of the book, where *inter alia* he reconsiders, and now quite seriously, some characteristic Thomist positions.

By contrast, I found the chapter on Duns Scotus absorbing. On this great man I speak as a fool, but now at least as one who thinks he begins to understand why Scotus is a different kind of metaphysician from Aquinas; and how he is a turning point in the history of scholasticism, with his reduction of the range of reason *in divinis* and his initiating that ‘attempt to dehellenize Christian thought’ which Copleston sees as characteristic of the fourteenth century (‘dehellenize . . . in the sense of eliminating elements of necessitarianism derived from Greco-Islamic philosophy’). This anti-Greek and anti-Islamic reaction is evident in Scotus and later in Gerson, but in between it was the pugnacious Englishman who was the chief agent in the ‘growing separation between theology and philosophy’ which marked his century, as it has tended, within the Church, to mark ours during the past thirty years. This similarity gives a special interest to Fr Copleston’s analysis of the ‘crisis’ represented by Ockham; and some of his reflections thereon are exceedingly pertinent. How seriously he takes the fourteenth century may be gauged by the fact that he gives a good quarter of his whole space to it; the proportion in Gilson being about 18 per cent and in Knowles less than 5 per cent. He includes, as is customary, chapters on ‘speculative mysticism’ (chiefly Eckhart, of course) and ‘political philosophy’ (chiefly Marsiglio of Padua). Both are fairly useful, to say the least, apart from the brief section on Dante in the latter one. But the 20-page Epilogue which rounds the book off is more than just useful, it is full of intelligence; a worthy ending to a somewhat uneven but, on the whole, very remarkable work.

KENELM FOSTER, O.P.

MEDIAEVAL LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS: A Modern Introduction, by D. P. Henry. *Hutchinson University Library*, London, 1972. 133 pp. £2.75.

While sketches of the development of logic in the Middle Ages already exist in the works of Boehner, Bochenski and the Kneales, to replace the earlier and inadequate treatment by

Prantl, nothing like a comprehensive history is possible yet. Minio-Paluello and De Rijk have added to the knowledge of Abelard and the twelfth-century logicians; the thirteenth-

century introductions of William of Sherwood and Peter of Spain have been edited, and later writers such as William of Ockham and Walter Burleigh have received attention in texts and studies, but so much material, particularly the commentary literature on Aristotle and Boethius, remains unexplored and unedited, that the full picture has not emerged. The reader of this short book who expects more conscientious mapping of features and contours in the now familiar pattern of histories of medieval philosophy, moving sedately through the centuries from A.D. 500 to 1500, may be agreeably surprised to find that instead he is invited to learn a new logical system of this century and see it applied to eight topics treated by logicians at different times from the fifth to the fifteenth.

Dr Henry suggests that the further development of the history of medieval logic is of the highest interest in view of the current concern with language and meaning and the contribution that it can make to the appreciation of medieval thought whose logical complexion has often been neglected. As in some of his previous writings on St Anselm, use is made here of the logical system of Lesniewski (known chiefly in this country from the work of Professor C. Lejewski at Manchester) as an analytic tool in the critique of medieval theses. This has the advantage of being anti-formalist in enunciating theorems which are interpreted truths and not merely well-formed expressions in an uninterpreted notation. It also has the flexibility and precision to represent the sometimes highly artificial forms of speech devised in the Latin of the medieval logicians and neatly avoids the entanglement with existential import which dogs much present-day quantification theory. A preliminary survey of the themes to be treated indicates the strain imposed on ordinary language in discussing them, and to capture their intricacies more precisely the author devotes a second part to an elementary introduction to what Lesniewski called 'Ontology', a system presupposing propositional calculus which is concerned with names or name-like expressions. These thirty pages may be taxing for the reader, but they are needed to understand the applications which form the third part.

The application to Ockham's supposition theory shows the power of the interpretative system and its capacity to represent the semantical differences between subject and predicate, which Professor Geach finds in St Thomas and

Frege, as well as Ockham's dubious two-name theory of predication. A passage from St Anselm's dialogue on the denominative expression *grammaticus* illustrates the reach of ordinary-language analysis in revealing the verb-like uses of certain nominal expressions and the higher-order functors associated with them and also its limitations in obscuring an argument at cross-purposes. William of Sherwood is quite adroit in his handling of universals and the existential import of their specific and numerical parts, but the more refined technique used here exposes failures in his reasoning, and the analysis of negation in the fourth section lays bare the advance from St Anselm to Burleigh. Moving on to more metaphysical topics, since Duns Scotus' formal distinction between the common nature and its individual difference, between, for instance, Socrates and his 'Socraticity', making him this individual, has given rise to such severe criticism, it is interesting to see the suggestion here that Ockham has fallen into a category-mistake and confused two levels of distinction and identity in assuming that 'there can never be any extra-mental distinction apart from the case in which distinct objects are involved' (p. 94). Dr Henry exonerates Scotus from platonism, and proposes an interpretation which avoids the separate existence of two formal objects, Socrates' manhood and Socraticity. A modest effort to elucidate some of St Thomas's theses concerning *ens*, *esse* and *essentia*, also conveys something of the real complexity of a logic which claims to be an ontology, faithfully representing the indefinitely many levels of discourse in metaphysical talk about what is. A study of St Anselm's ontological argument makes sense of the relation of chapter three of the *Proslogion* to chapter two not as a further proof of God's existence, but as an attempt to demonstrate that the God whose existence has been proved in chapter two cannot be thought not to be, so that proofs of his non-existence are precluded; but the 'greater than' of the original proof may be otiose, and this section concludes with an ontological disproof which may not be precluded. Finally, with 'Abelard on increase', the author makes an amusing and instructive comparison between the logic of whole and part in the twelfth century and in Hume, using Lesniewski's Mereology, a logic of collective classes.

Some of these applications may make tough reading, but this is presented as a modern

introduction, and the description is warranted by the exacting use of a comparatively new interpretative technique which shows great scope for further development and application. Even when it exposes flaws in medieval reasoning, one can still respect the achievements of logicians who worked without such an aid. The definition of nominal negation, §4.3.15 (p. 37), lacks the functor of singular inclusion;

the thesis required for the final step of the proof of §5.7 (p. 41) is §4.3.4 and not §4.4.3; the definition of the higher-level 'and' in §5.10 (p. 91) apparently needs correction if the analogy with that of nominal conjunction is to be preserved. These are small blemishes in the type-setting of a difficult but original and stimulating little book.

OSMUND LEWRY, O.P.

THE CHRIST, by Piet Schoonenberg, S.J. *Sheed and Ward*, London, 1972. 191 pp. £2.25.

This book is a translation of *Hij is een God van Mensen* (1969) and stylistically it is not a very commendable one. The first fifty pages are so poor that serious doubts arise about the translator's complete familiarity with the English idiom. And though the rest of the book is an improvement, lapses are frequent and so serious that one is never completely disabused of that original impression. Thus, while the book is generally intelligible and never descends to the obscurity and illiteracy of, say, the English version of Otto Muck's *The Transcendental Method* (Herder and Herder), it lacks the clarity necessary for controversial theological writing.

The production of the book has been equally slipshod. There are inverted lines and numerous typographical errors—too numerous and too tedious to list here. The Greek text on page 148 is particularly poor: eight mistakes in thirteen words. An index of proper names has been added, which misses one in every fifteen references and places Teilhard de Chardin under 'C', shortening his family name to a middle initial (a common enough mistake, it appears so on his tombstone).

The first essay on the *de auxiliis* controversy observes that each side in the argument worked on the false presupposition that God and man stood, as it were, side by side and acted in competition. God rather acts immanently, letting each creature be fully itself; the action of God and the action of man, not being in the same order, cannot be in competition with each other.

The second and the main essay, on the Christological problem, is good in one way: the humanity of Christ is fully and unhesitatingly

affirmed and many of the implications of this are developed: the importance of the real historical existence and development of Jesus, his growth in knowledge apart from infused knowledge or beatific enlightenment, his struggle with difficulties and temptation, his factual sinlessness in preference to an impeccability. This investigation provides, thus, many fine if not altogether new insights.

The main thesis of the book, however, if I properly understand it, is confusing and incorrect. The author, in affirming the human reality of Christ, denies the divine hypostasis of the Word which he holds to be destructive of the human personhood. He is falling here into the same basic false presupposition that he has charged others with and it would seem that frequently he confuses hypostasis in the Chalcedonian sense with person in the modern sense. For Schoonenberg an anhypostatic human nature is not fully a human person; he prefers rather that the Word become a person in the humanity of Jesus and that the incarnation be expressed in terms of God's total presence within Christ. Hence, it would seem to follow that there can be no 'pre-existent' hypostasis of the Word and no Trinity transcendent as Trinity over salvation history. Rahner's identification of the immanent and the economic Trinity has, it seems, been misunderstood.

The book concludes with a rather beautiful creed summing up the main ideas of the book. Perhaps some day, if the confusion that reigns beneath the elegant turn of phrase can be eliminated, we shall be able to profess such a creed.

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