SUBNATIONALISM AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
A Comparative Analysis of Indian States

By PRERNA SINGH*

THE quality of life that a person leads depends critically on where it is led. Even taking into account levels of economic development, the chances of an individual surviving infancy, growing up literate, or living a healthy, long life vary dramatically across regions of the world, in different countries, and within the same country. What are the causes of such variations in well-being? This is a question of urgent relevance. Millions of children die annually from malnourishment and vaccine-preventable diseases and over one-fifth of the total world population cannot read or write. Moreover, it is now acknowledged that expanding human capabilities trump capital accumulation as a driver of economic growth.

This article points to a factor that has been virtually ignored in the vast scholarship on social welfare and development—the solidarity that emerges from a sense of shared identity. A sense of oneness with a political community can be a key driver of differences in social policy and welfare. Such an argument marks a radical departure from the traditional emphasis on the role of class[1] as well as from the dominant view of the negative implications of identity in the scholarship on welfare.[2] I

delineate this novel theoretical framework for how affective identification can foster collective welfare through a subnational research design. An influential body of scholarship attributes variations in social welfare policies and outcomes to differences in regime type;[3] to the nature of state institutions, specifically to constitutional structures of decision making that disperse political power and offer multiple points of influence on the making and implementing of policy;[4] and also to the nature of the bureaucracy.[5]

But what of the often stark variations in social policy and welfare outcomes in states within a country characterized by a singular regime; by virtually identical legal, financial, and electoral institutions; and by a centrally trained and recruited bureaucracy? This article employs a combination of statistical analyses and historical case comparisons to show how the strength of solidarity at the subnational level, what I call subnationalism, can be a key driver of the subnational differences in social policy and welfare outcomes. Subnational variation in welfare outcomes is an important topic of study both in itself and because country-level welfare outcomes are not only aggregations of subnational outcomes but also frequently a product of subnational social policies.

THE SOLIDARITY ARGUMENT FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

While recognizing that there can be different sources of solidarity, this article focuses on the solidarity that arises out of a sense of identification with, or aspiration for, a self-governing homeland. The ideology and movement of such a territorially rooted identification incorporate both cultural and political dimensions. People with a belief in a shared past and a common culture often, but not necessarily based on language, identify with or desire the creation of and control over a political administrative unit that corresponds to a historic homeland.[6] The argument is applicable to nationalism, but it is developed here for subnationalism. Distinguished from nations that necessarily seek sovereign statehood, subnations either explicitly aspire to have or are willing to settle for a political administrative unit within a sovereign state. While the boundaries between nations and subnations are necessarily perme-

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[3] The scholarly consensus that democracies outperform autocracies (Boix 2001; Brown and Hunter 2004; Brown and Mobarak 2009; Besley and Kudamatsu 2006; Lake and Baum 2001) has recently been challenged (Shandra et al. 2004; Rothstein 2011; Gerring, Thacker, and Alfaro 2012).

[4] Immergut 1992; Huber, Ragin, and Stephens 1993; Gerring and Thacker 2008.

[5] Heclo 1972.

[6] Weber 1946; Deutsch 1966; Anderson 1991; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1992.

able, this distinction is useful for two reasons. First, it is useful empirically because the contemporary international system, with established nations that have entrenched external boundaries, appears to be more conducive to the existence of subnationalism.[7] Second, it is useful analytically because recognizing subnationalism as a distinct phenomenon allows for an understanding of the potential differences in the consequences of movements for autonomy versus separatism. Interestingly, the past decade has witnessed a surge of scholarly focus on subnationalism, or substate nationalism, as it is also often termed.[8] In line with constructivist theorizing about identity, I find that subnationalism is created by the elite, in this case as an instrumental calculation in the process of competing for political power, and that in doing so, they often recover and reinvent long-standing cultural symbols. Subnationalism percolates to the broader population through the activities of sociopolitical movements and organizations, and stands strongest when it is entrenched in state institutions or popular institutions or, ideally, both.

Social development outcomes are determined primarily by the nature of and popular access to social services. Across most of the world, the provision of social welfare is primarily a state responsibility.[9] The question is why some states prioritize the social sector and others do not? For an issue such as social policy to make it onto a state's policy agenda, it must be supported by the political elite.[10] I draw on scholarship across the disciplines of social psychology, political philosophy, comparative politics, and economics to argue that the solidarity that stems from a collective, affective identity like subnationalism constitutes a powerful cognitive and motivational basis for the political elite to support a progressive social policy.

The microfoundations of my argument rest on laboratory and field experiments in social psychology that consistently and robustly demonstrate the powerful effects of a shared identity.[11] The Common In-

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[7] An analysis of the Minorities at Risk database shows that today there are empirically at least as many movements for political-institutional units within a sovereign state as there are groups engaged in a struggle for sovereignty.

[8] Moreno and McEwan 2005; Béland and Lecours 2008; Catt and Murphy 2002; Forrest 2004; Keating 2009.

[9] A recent review of the influential body of scholarship that has followed the seminal work of Olson 1965 and approached the distribution of public goods as a collective action problem, shows that bottom-up processes of groups acting collectively to promote their interests are in fact less important than top-down interventions, notably by the state. Banerjee, Iyer, and Somanathan 2005. While there is increasing privatization of education and health care provision across the world, and especially in India, a vast majority of citizens, especially the poor, continue to rely on state provision of essential social services.

[10] Kingdon 1984.

[11] Tajfel and Turner 1985.

Group Identity Model (CIIM) has gone a step further to show that "if members of different groups are induced to conceive of themselves more as members of a single, superordinate group, attitudes toward former out-group members will become more positive through processes involving pro-in-group bias."[12] In a series of experiments, Roderick Kramer and Marilynn Brewer found, "Inclusion within a common social boundary reduces social distance among group members, making it less likely that individuals will make sharp distinctions between their own and others' welfare. As a result, outcomes for other group members, or for the group as a whole, come to be perceived as one's own."[13] Within such groups there is a perception of common interests and goals and a prioritization of collective, rather than purely individual or sectional, welfare.[14] These positive behavioral effects for the group-identity manipulation have been found to occur consistently even when the basis for superordinate group identification was "seemingly trivial."[15] In-group favoritism is likely, then, to be even stronger when, as is the case for subnations, the basis for the superordinate group identification is a set of powerful emotional symbols, such as a common history, culture, or language.

While the CIIM leaves the nature of the superordinate identity open, studies in political theory in the liberal-nationalist paradigm emphasize how a shared national identity can foster support for collective welfare through an additional channel: ethical obligations. When individuals perceive themselves as members of a nation or subnation, they prioritize and work for the common good because of the "deep and important obligations [that] flow from identity and relatedness."[16] The crux of the argument is the power of what Yael Tamir calls the magic pronoun, "my."[17] The obligations we have to those we consider "our own" are different from and more wide-ranging than the obligations we have to others. A sense of belonging together leads to a transcending of purely reciprocal compromise, on which interpersonal relationships in general are loosely based, and triggers prosocial behavior. Individuals who view themselves as compatriots belonging to a national or subnational group meet "not as advocates for this or that sectional group, but as citizens whose main concerns are the pursuit of common ends."[18]

[12] Dovidio and Gaertner 1999, 103.
[13] Kramer and Brewer 1984, 1045.
[14] Tajfel and Turner 1985; Brewer 1979.
[15] Kramer and Brewer 1984, 1056.
[16] Tamir 1993, 99.
[17] Tamir 1993, 95.
[18] Miller 1995, 48.

Bringing together and building on this diverse body of scholarship, I argue that attachment to an overarching subnational identity encourages a perception of shared interests and a sense of mutual commitments on the part of individuals from divergent subgroups. I also argue that these individuals are therefore more likely to support policies that further the collective good of the subnational community as a whole and have an inherently redistributive element. Education and health policies are examples of these, in so far as government schools and health centers are most likely to be used by the poor and marginalized, especially in developing countries. Political elite bound by shared subnationalism are more likely to push to include education and health on the policy agenda. If subnational identification has taken root among the masses, their constituents are also likely to be in favor of public goods, which is likely to serve as an additional, though not necessary, impetus for the political elite to back social policy.

In contrast, in states that are not characterized by the presence of a superordinate subnational identity, the positive effects of in-group bias extend only to members of their subgroup, for example, coethnics, and not to all members of the subnational community. Individual perceptions continue to be structured in "us" and "them" terms; there is little conception of the more inclusive "we." In such states, the political elite are unlikely to push for social welfare for the subnational community. If and when social policies are introduced, they are likely to be targeted toward the elite's ethnic groups and not be universal in nature.

The formulation that elite are motivated by a shared subnational solidarity to prioritize social welfare policy might strike some as a much too rosy view of them, and more generally, of individual motivations and behaviors. Yet it is important to point out that we are surrounded by situations where people accept the costs of behaving prosocially. For example, many, even most, people pay their taxes honestly despite the very low probability of detection and small expected penalties for doing otherwise; vote even though the probability of casting the decisive vote is miniscule; contribute generously to a range of charitable causes and/ or volunteer often substantial amounts of their time; and mail back wallets with the cash intact.[19] Interestingly Adam Smith, who is most prominently associated with his advocacy of self-interest in his book, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, did not believe that human beings are driven only by selfish motives. In his first book, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he wrote, "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his

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[19] Meier 2006.

nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it."[20] Moreover, the subnationalism argument I propose may be seen as building on and contributing to the growing research in social science and neurology on the centrality of affect in decision making.[21] In so far as the solidarity generated by subnational identification is an affective process that incubates a set of ideas about the importance of the welfare of the subnational community as a whole, my argument is also in line with the so-called ideational turn in political science that argues for ideas as an important primary source of political behavior.[22] Further, the perception and prioritization of the common good that a sense of subnational identity is hypothesized to generate is by no means irrational when we broaden our conception of rationality. Max Weber, for example, famously set out a conceptualization of different forms of rationality making a distinction between formal rationality and substantive rationality. While formal rationality refers to a simple means-ends rational calculation—one has a goal and takes rational steps based on past experience, observation, logic, or science to attain that goal—the concept of substantive rationality refers to goal-oriented rational action within the context of ultimate ends or values. In my argument, the latter would be promotion of the welfare of the subnational community as a whole. In a different but analogous way, one might think of working for the collective welfare in terms of self-interest, but a shared sense of belonging leads to a shift in identity "from the personal level towards the higher, more inclusive group level ('me' becomes 'we'-identity)," and consequently to a "transformation of motivation" whereby self-interest at the personal or subgroup level is redefined at the collective level.[23] Favorable outcomes for other group members are related to favorable outcomes for oneself.[24] The notion that the welfare of the collective enters into an individual's utilitarian calculus is akin to the move away from the long-standing divide between idealist and materialist theories toward recognition of the interplay between ideas and interests, specifically that the ideas held by individuals affect how they define their interests in the first place.[25]

To summarize, as Figure 1 presents, in states with powerful subnationalism, governments are more likely to prioritize the social sector, a

[20] Smith 1759, 3.
[21] Peters et al. 2006; Gigerenzer 2007; Damasio et al. 1994.
[22] Béland and Cox 2010.
[23] De Cremer and van Vugt 1999.
[24] Tyler and Smith 1999.
[25] Campbell 2002; Blyth 2002.

FIGURE 1
HOW SUBNATIONALISM LEADS TO SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

necessary condition for and primary driver of social development. Societal involvement with public services might also, as the figure indicates, augment the developmental efforts of an active government. Studies with very different theoretical leanings have shown that shared identity, in particular, attachment to a superordinate political identity, such as a nation, can foster emotional arousal and/or an interest in politics, and consequently, a propensity toward political action.[26] Such popular involvement is supplementary to the primary channel of state action.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The argument I present is developed in the empirical context of India, a large, developing, multiethnic federal democracy that provides an ideal setting to examine the factors that affect social policy and development, operationalized in this article in terms of education and health. Under the Indian constitution, the primary responsibility for developmental policies rests with the state (or provincial), rather than the national government. States play the key role in the formulation and execution of policies regarding both education and health, and account for about 90 percent of total government expenditure on these issues.[27] Further, Indian states are characterized by striking variations in social welfare policies and outcomes. Some Indian states have managed to secure for their citizens social services and outcomes that are

[26] Huddy and Khatib 2007; Rahn 2004; Miller 1995, 10; Abizadeh 2002; Mason 2000, 117.
[27] Mehrotra and Panchamukhi 2006, 32.

equivalent to those enjoyed by individuals in middle-income industrialized countries, while citizens in other states have fared worse than those in countries in sub-Saharan Africa. To analyze this puzzle, I employ a nested research design[28] that combines a statistical analysis of all Indian states from the 1960s to the 2000s with a historical case comparison from the mid-nineteenth century to the present time of two Indian provinces that were chosen to maximize variation on the primary independent variable, the strength of subnationalism.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

My main hypotheses are:

> –H1. States with a more powerfu subnational identity are likely to be characterized by better social development outcomes than states with a weaker subnational identity, all other things being equal.
>
> –H2. States with a more powerful subnational identity are likely to institute more progressive social policies than states with a weaker subnational identity, all other things being equal.[29]

MEASURING THE OUTCOME

The primary outcome variable of social development is measured through the two most prominent and widely used indicators of the educational and health status of populations globally: *literacy rates*, that is, the percentage of people who can read and write; and *infant mortality rate* (IMR), that is, the number of deaths of infants under one year of age per one thousand live births.[30] Social policy progressiveness is measured by social expenditures—*education expenditure* and *health expenditure* (per capita spending on education and health, respectively).

MEASURING THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLE

The most common way to measure the strength of an identity like nationalism has been through large-N representative surveys based on random samples. Yet some of the foremost scholars of nationalism have expressed doubts about the reliability of such a measurement strategy.[31] Even those who are sympathetic to the idea of capturing nationalism through attitudinal surveys have acknowledged severe weaknesses in

[28] Lieberman 2005.
[29] An additional hypothesis is that citizens in a more subnationalist state are more likely to be involved with and monitor the social services provided by the state, but we are unable to test this hypothesis directly because of a lack of adequate data.
[30] Infant mortality rate (IMR) is regarded in development circles as a highly sensitive proxy for a number of other indicators of health and well-being. Pol and Thomas 2001, 216.
[31] Smith 1991.

the specific measures of identity that have been deployed in the major, repeated cross-national surveys of values and of social and political attitudes since the early 1980s.[32] Responses to identity questions in surveys have been shown to be highly sensitive to question wording, response structure, and sequencing. These concerns and the absence of appropriate survey data on the strength of subnational identification across Indian states led me to instead develop a relatively novel but arguably more theoretically rigorous, valid, and reliable measure of subnationalism. To construct this measure, I return to the conceptualization of subnationalism based on the four components laid out above. The first component is language, which has been long theorized as a core element of nationalism[33] and is powerfully associated with nationalist and subnationalist movements across the world and in South Asia.[34] The key dimensions that have been hypothesized to link language to nationalism are internal homogeneity and external differentiation.[35] The language indicator is therefore operationalized through data on the existence of a single, common and distinctive language. Following the emphasis in the literature that for nationalism to exist, people must be conscious of themselves as a nation,[36] the subnationalism measure includes three observable indicators of subnational consciousness. The first two indicators, which are respectively the second and third components of the overall subnationalim index, are the existence of popular mobilization in support of the creation of the province

[32] Sinnot 2006.

[33] von Herder 2002; Smith 1991; Connor 1993; Gellner 1983; Laitin et al. 1992.

[34] The most striking historic illustration of the close relationship between language and nation is found in Western Europe where linguistic boundaries led to a redrawing of the map of the region after the First World War. Of all ethnonationalist groups in the Minority at Risk project, over 70 percent are language groups. Language forms the backbone of some of the most prominent contemporary subnationalisms—the Quebecois, Flemish, Walloon, Basque, Catalan, and Kurdish movements, for example. "Linguism," anthropologist Clifford Geertz noted, has "been particularly intense in the Indian sub-continent," underlying the successful nationalist movement in Bangladesh (literally "the homeland of the Bengali-speakers"); the Tamil nationalist movement and associated civil war in Sri Lanka; and the Baluchi, Sindhi, and Pashto movements in Pakistan. Geertz 1973. Language has been the basis for powerful subnationalist movements in India, which prompted the redrawing of the country's provincial boundaries along linguistic lines in the 1950s.

[35] This is brought out particularly nicely by Noah Webster's case for American spelling of English a decade after the American Revolution: "*A general uniformity through the United States* would be the event of such a reformation. All persons, of every rank, would speak with some degree of precision and uniformity. Such a uniformity in these States is very desirable; it would remove prejudice, and conciliate mutual affection and respect. But a capital advantage of this reform in these States would be, that *it would make a difference between the English orthography and the American.* Such an event is of vast political consequence. Besides this, a national language is a band of national union. Every engine should be employed to render the people of this country national; to call their attachments home to their own country; and to inspire them with the pride of national character." Webster 1789, emphasis added.

[36] Renan 1990; Anderson 1991.

as a political homeland and the presence of a subnationalist political party. Both of these are indicative of a more cohesive subnationalism. The third observable indicator of subnational consciousness (and the fourth component of the index), the absence of a movement for the division of the province, signals a more fractured subnational identity. See Tables 1 and 2.[37]

In Table 3, I use confirmatory factor analysis to examine the empirical relationships between these different indicators and find, based on the widely used Kaiser criterion, that there is indeed a single common factor underlying the different indicators. The four indicators are characterized by a "family resemblance structure" that is best defined as "a rule about sufficiency with no necessary condition requirements."[38] No

TABLE 1
MEASURING SUBNATIONALISM: THE LANGUAGE COMPONENT OF THE
SUBNATIONALISM INDEX

Indicator	Measurement/Coding Rule	Data Sources
Single language	code as 1 if there is a single official language in the state code as 0 if there is none or more than one official language in the state	text of official language acts and relevant amendments passed by the respective state governments 41st Report of the National Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (2001), available at http://nclm.nic.in/shared / linkimages/23.htm
Common language	proportion of people in the state who speak the official/dominant language (0–1) difference between the proportion of people in the state who speak official/dominant language and the second most commonly spoken language (0–1)	calculated from language tables from the Census of India (1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001) calculated from language tables from the Census of India (1951, 1961, 1971, 1981, 1991, 2001)
Distinctive language	code as 1 if the official/dominant language of the state is not the official/dominant language of any other state in the Indian union code as 0 if the official/dominant language of the state is also the official/dominant language of another state in the Indian union	text of official language acts and relevant amendments passed by the respective state governments 41st Report of the National Commissioner for Linguistic Minorities (2001), available at http://nclm.nic.in/shared / linkimages/23.htm

[37] Two research assistants and I coded these based on the rules specified in Tables 1 and 2. There was a very high degree of correlation between our codings (0.96).
[38] Goertz 2005.

TABLE 2
MEASURING SUBNATIONALISM: THE BEHAVIORAL COMPONENT OF THE
SUBNATIONALISM INDEX

Indicator	Measurement/Coding Rule	Data Sources
Subnational Mobilization		
Has there been mobilization in favor of creation of the state at any point of time since 1900?	code as 1 if there is evidence of substantial mobilization in favor of creation of the state in the States Reorganization Commission (SRC) Report code as 0 if there is no evidence of mobilization in favor of creation of the state in the SRC Report or if there is evidence against the formation of the state in its present form in the SRC report[a]	1. primary document: SRC Report (1955) 2. secondary documents: (a) documents and books related to the integration of princely states (b) histories of states (c) books on language movements in India (d) books on regionalism/federalism in India
Subnationalist Parties		
Did a subnationalist party receive greater than 5% of the total vote share in the last State Assembly elections?	determine whether a party is subnationalist or not based on:[b] 1. manifestoes of parties, speeches of leaders 2. newspaper descriptions of party/party platforms 3. secondary literature code as 1 if a subnationalist party gets over 5% of the vote code as 0 if no subnationalist party gets over 5% of the vote	code based on statistical reports of the most recent elections to the legislative assembly of the state issued by the Election Commission of India, New Delhi[c]
Absence of Separatist Movement		
Has the state witnessed a separatist movement?	code as 1 if there is evidence of national or state government "recognition"[d] of a separatist movement and/or if a party based explicitly on the separatist cause gets over 1% of the total vote in the last state assembly elections code as 0 if there is no evidence of national or state government "recognition" of a separatist movement and if no party based explicitly on the separatist cause gets over 1% of the total vote in the last state assembly elections[e]	1. SRC Report 2. national and regional newspaper reports 3. secondary literature 4. statistical reports of the state assembly elections issued by the Election Commission of India, New Delhi

TABLE 2 *cont.*

[a] For many states we also examined the petitions submitted to the SRC but the incomplete nature of the records in the National Archives of India, New Delhi, prevented a coding based on a formal content analysis of these petitions.

[b] It is important to note that the coding of a party as subnationalist varies over time and across states. A party could be counted as subnationalist in a state in one election cycle but not in a prior or later election cycle. Similarly, the same party could be counted as subnationalist in some states but not in others.

[c] Reports available at http://www.eci.gov.in.

[d] Recognition of a separatist movement can occur through the state's negotiation with, publicized explicit refusal to negotiate with, or armed action against the separatist movement.

[e] To ensure that only subnationalist separatist parties that have some popular support are included in the data set, I limit my analysis to those parties that have secured at least 5 percent of the total popular vote in a province. This is admittedly an arbitrarily set cutoff, but it is important to note that in constructing the subnationalism index, I have varied the threshold (1 percent,10 percent) for the share of popular vote and the positive association between subnationalism and social development indicators is maintained in both the cross-tabulations and regression analyses.

TABLE 3
CONFIRMATORY FACTOR ANALYSIS OF THE INDICATORS OF SUBNATIONALISM[a]

Factor	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Factor1	2.04236	1.27113	0.5106	0.5106
Factor2	0.77123	0.13928	0.1928	0.7034
Factor3	0.63195	0.07749	0.1580	0.8614
Factor4	0.55446		0.1386	1.0000

Factor Loadings (Pattern Matrix) and Unique Variances

Variable	Factor1	Uniqueness
Language 2	0.7476	0.4412
Absence of separatist movement	0.6477	0.5805
Subnational mobilization	0.7469	0.4422
Subnationalist parties	0.7115	0.4938

[a] Method: principal-component factors, $N = 122$. LR test: independent vs. saturated, $\chi^2(6) = 71.22$; Prob $> \chi^2 = 0.0000$.

single indicator is necessary, but all four indicators together are sufficient for a sense of belonging and solidarity. In line with this structure, I used the "substitutability relationship" (or the theory of functional equivalence), which is tied to the logical operator OR (the concept of union in set theory), as the central organizing tool for the subnationalism index.[39] For comparability, I first undertook a linear transformation of the aggregate scores for the language indicator. This meant that each of the four indicators ranged from 0 to 1. In line with the substitutabil-

[39] Goertz 2005.

ity relationship, I then summed the scores for each of the four indicators to arrive at a subnationalism index, which ranges from a theoretical minimum of 0, indicating a deeply fragmented subnational identity, to a maximum of 4, indicating very powerful subnationalism.[40] Figure 2 shows the strength of subnationalism measured by this index across major Indian states from 1960–2000.[41]

CONTROL VARIABLES

As noted at the outset, there is a rich body of scholarship that points to a number of factors that may affect social welfare and public goods provision. To accurately identify the effects of subnationalism, the analyses control for these variables.


FIGURE 2

STRENGTH OF SUBNATIONALISM IN INDIAN STATES, 1960–2000

[40] It is important to note that I experimented with putting together the subnationalism index in a few different ways and examined each component of the indicator individually. The positive relationship between subnationalism and social spending and outcomes in the cross-tabulations and the different regression analyses remains mostly unchanged. See Singh 2015b, the supplementary material for this article, Tables 1.4.1–1.4.4.

[41] To check for criterion validity, I examined the relationship between the scores for Indian states on the subnationalism index and the percentage of respondents by state who agreed with the statement, "We should be loyal to our own region first and then to India," in successive national election studies since they began to be conducted on a regular basis in the 1990s, and found a strong, positive association, see Singh 2015b, Figure A1. This question is far from ideal, but is the only one that might in any way be seen as pointing to the strength of subnational identification.

ECONOMIC CONTROLS

Conventional wisdom holds that states with higher levels of economic development will have more resources available for investment in public goods and will be characterized by higher social outcomes. The analysis therefore controls for the level of *economic development,* measured by per capita state domestic product, as well as *poverty*, measured by the rural headcount index for the province. In addition, the analysis controls for *inequality*, which has been argued to be negatively associated with the provision of social services and development.

POLITICAL CONTROLS

Analyses based on Western Europe[42] and the developing world[43] establish a link between the strength of working-class mobilization, represented by the rise of social democratic parties, and more progressive social policy and higher welfare outcomes. Another set of studies, less concerned with the nature and ideology of political parties, focuses on the competitiveness of the political system as a whole. Pradeep Chhibber and Irfan Nooruddin, for example, argue that because political parties must build broad cross-cleavage coalitions, parties engaged in two-party competition are more likely to provide public services accessible to all groups than those that exist in a multiparty environment where parties can appeal to small "vote banks" through the distribution of club rather than public goods because the percentage of votes needed to win a seat is lower.[44] Relatedly, V. O. Key's[45] influential formulation that political competition induces all parties to cater to the needs of the have-nots triggered an active research agenda, albeit one without clear conclusions. Some studies find a strong positive relationship between electoral competitiveness and public goods provision,[46] while others find no discernible association.[47] My analysis therefore includes variables for *left-party rule*, *two-party competition,* and *closeness of political competition*.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

My analysis also controls for ethnic diversity,[48] which has been shown to negatively impact various measures of public goods provision[49] be-

[42] Hibbs 1977; Korpi 1983.
[43] Heller 2005; Herring 1983.
[44] Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004.
[45] Key 1949.
[46] Hiskey and Seligson 2003.
[47] Moreno and McEwan 2005; Cleary 2007.
[48] While the political economy scholarship on the relationship between ethnic diversity and public goods provision tends to measure ethnicity in terms of language, I adopt the conceptualization by Horowitz that is more widely used in the social sciences and that classifies all groups based on ascriptive identities—race, language, religion, and tribe or caste— as ethnic groups. Horowitz 1985, 41.
[49] Alesina, Baquir, and Easterly 1997; Miguel and Gugerty 2005.

cause of its dampening of collective action between different ethnic groups.[50] In so far as this is more likely to occur when there is a history of conflict between the groups in question, and religion has been shown to be the most divisive cleavage in India, I measure ethnic diversity in terms of *religious diversity*.[51]

All the variables in the analysis are summarized in Table 4.

ANALYSIS

It is useful to begin by presenting descriptive statistics to clarify the relationship between subnationalism and social development and social policy observed in the data. From 1966 to 2006, the Indian provinces[52] characterized by a weaker subnationalism than the mean for all Indian states, are also characterized by literacy rates below the Indian average (see Table 5). With the exception of Gujarat and Haryana, infant mortality rates are higher in these provinces than the all-India average (see Table 6). Figure 3 indicates an overall positive relationship between the strength of subnational identification and education and health expenditures.

I estimate the effect of subnationalism on social development outcomes and expenditures across Indian states using the following seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) equations:

$$SD_{it}^k = a^k + \beta^k X_{it-1} + \tau^k SN_{it-1}^k + \mu_{it}^k, \text{ and} \tag{1}$$

$$SE_{it}^k = a^k + \beta^k X_{it-1} + \tau^k SN_{it-1}^k + \mu_{it}^k . \tag{2}$$

In equation 1, *SD* is the social development outcome measure, where *k* may denote literacy or infant mortality rates. In equation 2, *SE* is the social expenditure measure, where *k* may denote state spending on education or health. X_i refers to economic development in province *i*. *SN* refers to the subnationalism measure, where *i* denotes the province. To run this equation, I collapse the independent variables to their means over every five-year period between 1971 and 2006. The independent variables are lagged by one time period. Therefore, *t*–1 denotes a lagged variable whose value is the within-province average during the previous five-year period.

Table 7 presents results of the analysis of Indian states during six different five-year periods from 1971 to 2006. Holding economic de-

[50] Habyarimana et al. 2007.
[51] Wilkinson 2008.
[52] The analysis in this section includes sixteen major states of India that constitute over 95 percent of the population.

velopment constant at its mean, a standard deviation increase in the strength of subnationalism generates an increase from 9.45 percent to 9.46 percent (in 1971–76 and 1996–2001, respectively) in literacy rates and a reduction from 24.13 to 14.90 (in 1971–76 and 1996–2001, respectively) in infant deaths per one thousand live births. A one standard deviation increase in subnationalism increases the log per capita spending on education and health by an average of INR 0.126 and INR 0.117, respectively. These represent an approximately 4 percent increase over mean education and health expenditures across all Indian states over this time period.

While the equations above capture the dynamics of subnationalism at a particular point in time, the relationship between subnationalism and social development is one that develops over time. I estimate the effect of subnationalism on social development outcomes and expenditures across Indian states over a thirty-year period from 1971–2005 using the following equations:

$$SD_{it}^k = a^k + \beta^k X_{it-1} + \tau^k SN_{it-1}^k + \gamma^k D_t + \mu_{it}^k, \text{ and} \qquad (3)$$

$$SE_{it}^k = a^k + \beta^k X_{it-1} + \tau^k SN_{it-1}^k + \gamma^k D_t + \mu_{it}^k . \qquad (4)$$

I estimate the effect of social expenditures on social development outcomes using the following equation:

$$SD_{it}^k = a^k + \beta^k X_{it-1} + \tau^k SE_{it-1}^k + \gamma^k D_t + \mu_{it}^k. \qquad (5)$$

In equations 3 and 5, SD is the social development outcome measure, where k may denote literacy or infant mortality rates. In equations 4 and 5, SE is the social expenditure measure, where k may denote state spending on education or health. X_{it-1} refers to a vector of economic, political, and ethnic diversity controls, all lagged by one time period. In equations 3 and 4, SN refers to the subnationalism measure where i denotes the province; again this is lagged by one time period. D_t is a vector of decade dummies. Following Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz[53] and other recent studies that use similar data on Indian states,[54] the models in Table 8 present the results of ordinary least squares regressions with panel-corrected standard errors.

Models 1 and 2 in Table 8 show that holding all other variables constant at their mean, a standard deviation increase in subnational-

[53] Beck and Katz 1995.
[54] For example, Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004; Sáez and Sinha 2010.

TABLE 4

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS

	Measure	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Dependent Variables					
Literacy	percentage of people who have the ability to both read and write in any language	42.748	18.962	7.13	90.86
Infant mortality	number of deaths of infants under the age of 1 year for every 1,000 live births	82.56	34.923	6.8	202
Education expenditure	logarithm of per capita education spending on the revenue account (INR per capita)	3.464	0.642	1.674	4.98
Health expenditure	logarithm of per capita health spending on the revenue account (INR per capita)	2.566	0.645	0.655	3.787
Independent Variables					
Subnationalism	subnationalism index (see Tables 1 and 2)	2.169	1.203	0	4
Economic development	net state domestic product deflated by the consumer price index for agricultural workers (INR per capita)	1220.27	569.721	390.56	3546.923
Left-party rule	coded as 0 or 1 depending on whether or not a Communist Party controls the state government	0.064	0.246	0	1
Two-party competition	coded as 0 (two-party competition) or 1 (multiparty competition) on the basis of the effective number of parties holding seats in the state assembly using $ENPV = \dfrac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$ where p_i is the proportion of seats received by each party in the state assembly elections	0.116	0.32	0	1

Closeness of political competition	margin of victory (seat share of victorious party – seat share of runner-up party) in the last state assembly elections	41.691	22.089	0	85.27
Religious diversity	ethnolinguistic fractionalization index $$ELF = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{I}\left(\frac{n_i}{N}\right)^2$$ where N is the population, I is the number of religious groups, and n is the population in the ith group	0.398	0.275	0.048	1
Inequality	Gini coefficient for rural India	3.337	0.366	0.46	4.56
Poverty	poverty headcount index for rural India (%)	50.034	14.342	11.052	81.13
Nondevelopment expenditure	nondevelopment spending on the revenue account as a proportion of total expenditure	35.228	7.572	17.953	62.923

TABLE 5
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBNATIONALISM AND LITERACY
ACROSS SIXTEEN MAJOR INDIAN STATES FROM 1966–2006

	Literacy below or Equal to Indian Average	*Literacy above or Equal to Indian Average*
Subnationalism below or equal to mean	Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh	
Subnationalism above or equal to mean		Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Kerala Punjab Tamil Nadu West Bengal Maharashtra

TABLE 6
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBNATIONALISM AND INFANT MORTALITY ACROSS
SIXTEEN MAJOR INDIAN STATES FROM 1966–2006

	Infant Mortality above or Equal to Indian Average	*Infant Mortality below or Equal to Indian Average*
Subnationalism below or equal to mean	Andhra Pradesh Assam Bihar Madhya Pradesh Orissa Rajasthan Uttar Pradesh	
Subnationalism above or equal to mean	Gujarat Haryana	Himachal Pradesh Karnataka Kerala Punjab Tamil Nadu West Bengal Maharashtra

Education Expenditure, 1960–2000
(a)

Health Expenditure, 1960–2000
(b)

FIGURE 3

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBNATIONALISM AND EDUCATION AND
HEALTH EXPENDITURE, 1960–2000

TABLE 7
SEEMINGLY UNRELATED REGRESSIONS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES AND
EXPENDITURES IN INDIAN STATES, 1971–2001

	1971–76	1976–81	1981–86	1986–91	1991–96	1996–01
(Mean) Literacy						
Subnationalism	7.855***	7.034***	7.085***	6.417**	6.452***	7.816***
	(3.021)	(2.660)	(2.741)	(2.552)	(2.190)	(2.310)
Economic	−0.007	−0.023#	−0.006	−0.005	0.000	−0.003
development	(0.018)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.006)
Constant	26.055*	38.043***	32.104***	34.649***	39.778***	40.305***
	(14.759)	(12.063)	(9.874)	(10.606)	(9.480)	(7.661)
(Mean) Infant Mortality						
Subnationalism	−20.055***	−14.787**	−14.714**	−12.754***	−9.410**	−12.386***
	(6.841)	(6.530)	(6.237)	(4.918)	(4.201)	(3.699)
Economic	−0.012	0.022	−0.003	−0.002	−0.000	0.006
development	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.019)	(0.015)	(0.009)
Constant	169.794***	127.018***	133.793***	115.211***	91.468***	83.678***
	(33.417)	(29.613)	(22.464)	(20.440)	(18.187)	(12.266)
(Mean) Education Expenditure						
Subnationalism	0.109**	0.122***	0.114***	0.096***	0.075**	0.114***
	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.030)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.030)
Economic	0.000	0.000	0.000**	0.000***	0.000	0.000#
development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	2.587***	3.059***	3.096***	3.424***	3.686***	3.903***
	(0.233)	(0.200)	(0.109)	(0.098)	(0.140)	(0.099)
(Mean) Health Expenditure						
Subnationalism	0.079**	0.097***	0.092*	0.087**	0.094***	0.134***
	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.052)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.038)
Economic	0.001***	0.000*	0.000**	0.000*	0.000	0.000
development	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Constant	1.582***	2.211***	2.215***	2.595***	2.839***	2.829***
	(0.177)	(0.083)	(0.186)	(0.150)	(0.124)	(0.126)
N 12	13	14	14	15	15	

# $p < 0.15$, * $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

ism leads to a nearly 4 percent increase in literacy rates and a decrease
of around seven deaths per one thousand live births. The analysis also
shows that subnationalism fosters greater state commitment to the so-
cial sector, which is found to be an important determinant of social
development outcomes. Models 3 and 4 show that holding all other
variables constant at their mean, a standard deviation increase in sub-
nationalism increases per capita spending on education and health by

roughly INR 0.10 and 0.13, respectively. This is a roughly 3 percent increase over mean education expenditure and about a 5 percent increase over mean health expenditure across all Indian states over this time period.[55] Models 6 and 7 show that education expenditures have a positive and statistically significant impact on literacy, and that health expenditures have a negative and statistically significant influence on IMR. A standard deviation increase in per capita education expenditure increases literacy by 6.3 percent and an increase in per capita health expenditure decreases IMR by 8.8 per one thousand births. In addition, Table 8 confirms the corollary that states with more fragmented subnational identities tend to focus on nondevelopment issues. In model 5, holding all other variables constant at their mean, the move from a very cohesive to deeply fragmented subnational community leads to an approximately 2.1 percent decrease in nondevelopment expenditure, measured as a proportion of total state expenditure. This is an approximately 6 percent decrease over the mean nondevelopment expenditure across all Indian states over this period of time.[56]

In terms of other explanatory factors, economic development is, unsurprisingly, shown to be a statistically significant predictor of social development outcomes and spending, though the size of its effect on social expenditures is small.[57] Rule by a communist party has a generally positive but not statistically significant, effect on social outcomes and expenditures. I find some support for the hypothesis that the nature of political competition, specifically an imperative on the part of the ruling party to reach out to a broader coalition to secure a majority, for example, in two-party competition and in close electoral races, boosts social expenditures and outcomes. Interestingly, the statistical

[55] As noted in Table 4, we focus on expenditure on the revenue account because this constitutes an overwhelming share (over 90 percent) of the expenditure on education and health in India. The results remain unchanged if we operationalize social expenditures in terms of expenditures on the capital account.

[56] Government expenditure in India is classified as development and nondevelopment. Development expenditure is broadly defined to include all spending designed "directly to promote economic development and social welfare." Nondevelopment expenditure includes "expenditure pertaining to the general services rendered by the Government such as preservation of law and order, defense of the country and the maintenance of the general Government organs." At www.rbi.org.in.

[57] As what would appear to be further evidence of the limited association between economic and social development, levels of rural poverty have a positive and statistically significant impact on literacy rates and a negative and statistically significant impact on IMR. This admittedly surprising result appears to be because in the initial postindependence decades literacy rates tended to be higher and infant mortality rates lower in poorer states (Datt and Ravallion 1997). This relationship is driven to a large extent by the state of Kerala but holds even when we exclude it. In later decades poverty is negatively associated with human development outcomes. Further, inequality measured by the Gini coefficient for rural areas is negatively associated with literacy but this is not a statistically significant relationship.

TABLE 8

TIME SERIES CROSS-SECTIONAL OLS ESTIMATES OF DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND EXPENDITURES ACROSS INDIAN STATES, 1971–2001[a]

	1 Lit	2 IMR	3 Edu exp	4 Med exp	5 Non–dev exp	6 Lit	7 IMR
Subnationalism	3.861***	−6.766***	0.085***	0.104***	−2.088***		
	(0.399)	(1.382)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.387)		
Economic	0.005***	−0.010***	0.000***	0.000***	0.003***	0.004***	−0.010***
development	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.004)
Left-party rule	1.107	−3.712	0.018	0.016	−0.045	1.689	−5.538*
	(1.627)	(3.137)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(1.096)	(1.558)	(3.267)
Two-party	−0.695	1.568	0.052**	0.031	−0.985*	−0.723	1.235
competition	(0.641)	(1.974)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.573)	(0.637)	(2.026)
Closeness of	−0.029*	0.128***	−0.001**	−0.001*	−0.005	−0.01	0.109**
pol. comp.	(0.015)	(0.045)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.046)
Ethnic diversity	45.267***	−104.828***	0.377**	−0.465***	13.232***	49.723***	−123.221***
	(5.082)	(11.409)	(0.153)	(0.160)	(4.046)	(5.350)	(11.096)
Inequality	−1.54	1.001	0.083	0.228**	−4.452***	−0.616	−1.138
	(1.637)	(4.630)	(0.092)	(0.097)	(1.535)	(1.618)	(4.704)
Poverty	0.103***	−0.289***	0	−0.001		0.053#	−0.229**
	(0.033)	(0.103)	(0.001)	(0.001)		(0.033)	(0.105)
Edu exp.						9.755***	
						(1.433)	
Health exp.							−13.704***
							(4.518)
Decade '70s	2.864***	170.357***	0.157***	0.277***	−2.824***	−1.697#	196.546***
	(0.950)	(16.538)	(0.039)	(0.040)	(0.891)	(1.173)	(20.792)
Decade '80s	9.546***	153.409***	0.529***	0.649***	−5.584***	1.846	185.766***
	(1.160)	(16.146)	(0.047)	(0.049)	(1.067)	(1.503)	(21.074)
Decade '90s	15.349***	136.769***	0.723***	0.787***	−4.127***	3.904**	172.778***
	(1.394)	(15.716)	(0.057)	(0.059)	(1.291)	(1.841)	(20.820)
Decade '00s	27.669***	133.653***			−2.142	12.044***	173.977***
	(2.498)	(15.238)			(1.760)	(2.868)	(20.166)
Constant	8.113		2.138***	0.978***	50.481***	−11.848*	
	(6.018)		(0.333)	(0.350)	(5.182)	(7.101)	
N	491	370	482	482	538	492	371
R^2	0.823	0.654	0.856	0.785	0.444	0.814	0.629

#$p < 0.15$, *$p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$

[a] Figures in cells are Prais-Winsten regression coefficients. Figures in parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors with first-order autoregressive correction. Time dummies included.

analysis shows a large, strong, and positive relationship between religious heterogeneity and the provision of public goods.[58] This conforms to a number of studies that buck the dominant view of a negative relationship between linguistic heterogeneity and public goods provision and find that religious diversity does not dampen, and might even be positively associated with, social services and welfare outcomes.[59] This finding is also in line with a small but growing body of scholarship that challenges the overall diversity-development deficit thesis by showing that ethnic diversity, variously measured, need not undermine public goods provision.[60] In consonance with Rachel Glennerster and associates and Edward Miguel, I believe, as I have argued in detail in earlier work,[61] that one of the conditions under which objective ethnic diversity need not dampen public goods provision is when there is a subjective sense of a superordinate identity, such as nationalism or subnationalism. Experimental studies shed light on the microfoundations of such a dynamic by showing that a shared national identification triggers prosocial attitudes and behavior between members of different, even rival, ethnic groups.[62] In a recent study, for example, my coauthors and I found that recategorization within a shared Indian identity was found to make members of a majority ethnic group (Hindus) less likely to discriminate in altruistic giving toward a rival ethnic minority (Muslims).[63] It is important to clarify that there is no necessary relationship between national or subnational identities and the underlying ethnic composition of a country or region.Following the seminal work of scholars such as Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner, nationalism is imagined and invented and can occur under very different ethnic demographies. The homogenizing nineteenth-century French-style model of the monocultural nation state might be expected to reduce ethnic diversity,[64] but an alternate and equally influential model of the multicultural "state nation,"[65] exemplified by eighteenth-century

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[58] This is driven to a great extent by Kerala, the most religiously diverse Indian state, where, as is discussed in the next section, a shared sense of Malayali subnationalism has united different religious communities and has been an important driver of social development. It is important to emphasize that religious diversity continues to have a statistically significant, albeit much smaller, positive effect on social development outcomes and spending even after Kerala is dropped from the regression analysis.

[59] Alesina et al. 2003; Mirza 2014; McQuoid 2011.

[60] Gerring et al. 2013; Rugh and Trounstine 2011; Glennerster, Miguel, and Rothenberg 2013; Boustan et al. 2010; Miguel 2004; Singh 2011; Wimmer 2013. For a conceptual challenge, see also Singh and vom Hau 2014.

[61] Singh 2011.

[62] Sachs 2009; Transue 2007; Gibson and Gouws 2005.

[63] Charnysh, Lucas, and Singh 2013.

[64] Weber 1976.

[65] Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011.

Britain[66] and contemporary India, Belgium, Spain, and Canada,[67] recognizes that individuals can hold multiple identities and that ethnocultural identification is not a threat to and might even strengthen superordinate allegiances.[68] This unity-in-diversity model of nationalism would thus not be expected to reduce ethnic diversity, but it might encourage it.

In tables included in the supplementary material, I undertake a range of robustness checks that confirm, and therefore increase confidence in, these results.[69]

COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SUBNATIONALISM AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN KERALA AND UTTAR PRADESH

This section juxtaposes two Indian states, the southern province of Kerala with the north-central province of Uttar Pradesh (UP). The two cases are selected to exemplify variations on the explanatory variable, the strength of subnational identification (see Figure 2).[70] To supplement the empirical relationship between subnationalism and social spending and development shown in the section above, I delineate the sequence and mechanisms by which a subnational solidarity leads to differences in the progressiveness of social policy, which in turn contributes to highly divergent levels of social development. Such subnational solidarity began to emerge in the late nineteenth century in Kerala but has remained persistently absent in UP. Currently, Kerala, demographically the size of Canada, is globally acclaimed as a model of social welfare while UP, demographically the size of Russia, is widely considered a basket case, characterized by development outcomes that are worse than many countries in sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note that this was not always the case. I show that in Kerala progressive social policy was introduced and an increase in education and health indicators occurred only after and as a consequence of the emergence of a sense of subnational community.

EQUIVALENT STARTING POINTS: NO SUBNATIONALISM, LOW SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

In the mid-nineteenth century, neither of the regions that correspond to the present-day states of Kerala and UP, Travancore and the North-

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[66] Colley 2005.

[67] Stepan, Linz, and Yadav 2011.

[68] Guibernau 2008; Kincaid, Moreno, and Colino 2010.

[69] Singh 2015b.

[70] It is also important to note that in terms of the three variables that are found to be significant in the regression analysis (Table 8), Kerala and UP are roughly equivalently matched on levels of economic development and closeness of political competition. As noted earlier, Kerala is characterized by higher levels of religious fractionalization.

Western Provinces, respectively, had experienced the emergence of a subnational identity.[71] The two regions were characterized by broadly similar linguistic landscapes (see Table 9), and there was little linguistic mobilization in either region at the time. The subnational community in Kerala was far more deeply divided along caste lines than it was in UP.[72] At the time, the North-Western Provinces and their successor, the United Provinces, were widely hailed as "model province[s]," among the "best governed of all Indian states,"[73] while Travancore was characterized by recurrent debt, poor infrastructure, and was seen as "misgoverned."[74] Social welfare did not figure prominently on the agenda of either of the two states. Statistical abstracts show that from the 1850s to the 1880s, the North-Western Provinces spent less than 0.1 percent of their total revenue on education. Similarly, analyses of budgetary data show that until the 1870s, the princely state of Travancore took "little interest in the education or health of the people" and "spent practically nothing on the social services."[75] According to some scholars, Christian missionaries played an important role in Travancore's development achievements[76] and undertook important social initiatives beginning in the early decades of the century, but these were contingent on government support[77] and restricted in scope and, as such, only led to limited gains. In the mid-to-late nineteenth century, both Travancore and the North-Western Provinces were characterized by broadly similarly low levels of social development. As Figure 4 shows, the female literacy rate in Travancore during the mid-1870s and early 1880s was virtually as minuscule as it was in the North-Western provinces—less than 0.5 percent. In addition, medical reports from Travancore during the 1870s note a very high rate of mortality in the region as compared to other Indian provinces.[78]

[71] During the colonial period, the present-day state of Kerala comprised two princely states, Travancore and Cochin, and the northern district of Malabar, which was a part of the neighboring Madras Presidency. In so far as Travancore constitutes the bulk of Kerala today, most of my analysis of the colonial period refers to Travancore, but developments in Cochin followed a very similar pattern. The region that now constitutes UP comprised the directly ruled North-Western Provinces and Oudh, which was known after 1902 as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and after 1935, simply as the United Provinces.

[72] By all accounts, the caste system in Kerala was the most orthodox and oppressive of all Indian states, with rigid rules of pollution based not only on touch, like in the rest of India, but also on proximity and strictly enforced injunctions on the use of public facilities by lower castes. During his visit to Kerala in the late nineteenth century, the social reformer Swami Vivekananda famously termed it "a madhouse of caste." Chasin and Franke 1991, 75; Desai 2005, 463.

[73] Pai 2007, xvi; Crooks 1897, 3.

[74] Jeffrey 1976, 64; Tharakan 1984, 1961.

[75] Singh 1944, 9.

[76] Gladstone 1984; Mathew 1999.

[77] Kawashima 1998, 99.

[78] Singh 1944, 342.

Female Literacy
(a)

Total Literacy
(b)

FIGURE 4
LITERACY IN KERALA, UTTAR PRADESH, AND INDIA

TABLE 9
ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF KERALA AND UP IN THE COLONIAL PERIOD[a]

	Religion 1881 (%)	*Language 1881 (%)*	*Caste 1931 (%)*
Kerala (Travancore)	Hindus 73 Muslims 6 Christians 21	Malayalam speakers 81	Fractionalization index 0.9 Brahmins 1.1
Uttar Pradesh (North-Western Provinces)	Hindus 86 Muslims 13 Christians 1	Hindustani speakers 98	Fractionalization index 0.8 Brahmins 11

[a] Religion and language figures are from the Report on the Census of India, 1881; caste fractionalization index is from Banerjee and Somanathan 2001, calculated on the basis of caste population totals from the 1931 census.

SUBNATIONALISM IS PRODUCED IN KERALA BUT NOT IN UP

In line with constructivist theorizing, I trace the emergence of subnationalism in Kerala and its lack of emergence in UP to the instrumental actions of the elite that were shaped by the exigencies of political competition and were unrelated to the underlying ethnic demographics. Subnationalism was evoked if it was a useful tool for challenger elite in their attempt to confront the power of the dominant elite; it was a strategic decision unrelated to levels of ethnic fragmentation. Nothing about the underlying ethnic composition of either state made the espousal of a subnational appeal more or less attractive for challenger elite. Instead, as I will detail, a subnational identity was evoked if it allowed the challenger elite to present themselves as a single front clearly distinct from and opposed to the dominant elite.

In the mid-nineteenth century, the socioeconomic and political scenes in both Travancore and the North-Western Provinces were dominated by a minority elite—non-Malayali Brahmans in Travancore and Muslims in the North-Western Provinces. At roughly similar points in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, these regions witnessed key exogenous changes—a combination of a challenge to the caste system, changes in agriculture and trade, and limited opportunities for Western-style education. In Travancore, the Protestant Christian missionaries who had arrived in the region in the early 1800s played an important role in triggering a challenge to the rigid and deeply hierarchical caste system there, both ideologically, through their propagation of the idea that all are equal in the eyes of God, and materially, through their support of lower caste movements and campaigns to reduce state-sanctioned discrimination against lower castes. The region witnessed three important changes in agriculture—the abolition of caste-based agrestic slavery, the granting of predominantly lower-caste tenants ownership rights over 200,000 acres of state-owned land, and the swift move from subsistence to commercial farming. It also witnessed important changes in trade, including a massive increase in coconut product exports due to rising European demand that led to unprecedented affluence among lower castes, in particular the Izhavas, whose traditional caste occupation is the tending and tapping of coconut palms. Similarly, in the North-Western Provinces, the massive expansion of trade triggered by the growth of the railways created an increasingly wealthy class of middlemen, predominantly from the Hindu merchant castes. Around this time, the two regions also saw the emergence of the first opportunities for citizens to gain some literacy in English, the official language of the administration, through missionary schools in

Travancore and select government schools and colleges opened on the initiative of colonial officers in the North-Western Provinces. As a result, upwardly mobile elite began to surface from politically nondominant groups—Nairs, Syrian Christians, and Izhavas in Travancore, and Hindu merchant castes in the North-Western Provinces—that came to demand political power commensurate with their improved socioeconomic status.[79] Administrative reforms that emphasized merit as a criterion for recruitment to government service, instituted in Travancore in the 1860s and the North-Western Provinces in the 1870s, presented such opportunities.

As the challenger elite took advantage of these opportunities, they came into conflict with the dominant elite who sought to maintain their hegemony over political power. At this time, Travancore and the North-Western Provinces were characterized by equivalent levels of linguistic, religious, and caste fractionalization (see Table 9). The challenger elite in both states had access to similar sets of symbols and identities. From these, they selected and emphasized the ones that were most likely to advance their position by allowing them to come together in a united front that was distinguished from and in opposition to the dominant elite. In Travancore in the late nineteenth century, these elite united around a subnational identity; in the North-Western Provinces, the challenger elite united around religion. In Travancore, a subnational identity allowed the Nair, Syrian Christian, and Izhava challenger elite to come together as native Malayalis in clear opposition to the "foreign" non-Malayali Brahmans.[80] The espousal of a Malayali subnational identity, which drew on ancient myths of a shared origin, common heroes, and culture, was a purely instrumental calculation. Once it was evoked, however, it took on a powerful emotional valence. Regional newspapers throughout the 1880s bring up the forging of a "glorious" Malayali identity in explicit contradistinction to the "deceitful and treacherous" foreign Brahmans who "devoted all their energies to surpassing and exploiting Malayalis" and were "sucking the life blood of the country."[81] One of the

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[79] In light of any potential concerns about endogeneity, it is important to clarify that access to English education was very limited—in 1891, less than 0.1 percent of the population of both Travancore and UP had any knowledge of English.

[80] It is important to note that the Nair, Syrian Christian, and Izhava elite did not give up their caste or religious identities; they continued to look at their caste brethren and coreligionists as natural allies but they calculated (correctly) that adopting a shared, linguistic identity and mounting a single, united Malayali challenge was likely to be a more effective strategy in their competition with a common, powerful enemy rather than each group acting on its own. Jeffrey 1976, 147, 168.

[81] Jeffrey 1976, 111, 114.

most striking examples of the growing Malayali subnationalism among challenger elite is the "Malayali Memorial" from 1891, a powerful, emotionally worded united protest for greater native representation in public services that had over ten thousand signatories and claimed to embody the grievances of the Malayali community as a whole.[82]

In the North-Western Provinces the adoption of subnational symbols was not an appealing strategy for the Hindu merchant challenger elite. Rather than distinguish them, the strategy would have brought them into the same subnational in-group as the dominant Muslim elite whom they were seeking to displace from political power. Religion was the identity that was more useful to them. It is important to clarify that while the two main religious groups, Hindus and Muslims, are characterized by fundamental differences, they are also connected by a shared symbolic repertoire. Historians have stressed that divisions *within* these communities during this period were often greater than differences *between* them.[83] The impetus to advance their stakes vis-à-vis the dominant Muslim elite, however, pushed the Hindu challenger elite to undermine unifying symbols, notably the common spoken language, Hindustani, and instead delineate Hindi written in the Devanagri script as a means to define and coalesce the inchoate Hindu community. The anxious Muslim elite retaliated by championing Urdu written in the Persian script as the exclusive language of the "the Muslim nation" and berating Hindi as nothing but an inferior form of Urdu.[84]

The diffusion of elite identities to the population at large is contingent on their espousal by a sociopolitical movement or association. In Travancore, for example, the Aikya Kerala (United Kerala) movement to consolidate all Malayalam-speaking regions into a single united province, which emerged in the 1920s, proved essential for the transmission of Malayali subnationalism to the masses. Beginning in the late 1930s, cadres of the Communist Party, which was founded on an explicitly subnationalist ideology, took over as the vanguard of the Aikya Kerala movement and facilitated the spread of popular Malayali subnationalism. In a parallel process in the United Provinces, political-religious organizations like the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League played a critical role from the 1920s onward in the mass dissemination of the mutually reinforcing and divisive religious-linguistic identities of Hindi-Hindu versus Urdu-Muslim.

[82] Koshy 1972, 31–32.
[83] Robinson 1975, 33.
[84] Das Gupta and Fishman 1971, 93.

CONTINUED DIFFERENCES IN THE STRENGTH OF SUBNATIONALISM
CONSOLIDATE DIVERGENT DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORIES

Malayali subnationalism served as an important trigger for the introduction of a progressive social policy and the beginning of social gains in Kerala. An analysis of important local newspapers, such as the *Malayala Manorama*, which were controlled primarily by upper castes, and the proceedings of the Sri Mulam Popular Assembly, a partially representative but predominantly upper-caste body established in the early 1900s, shows how the growing "Kerala-wide consciousness of a shared community"[85] served as a powerful affective frame that fostered the emergence of consensus on the part of upper-caste elite regarding the importance of equal social rights for all Malayalis.[86]

Figures 5 and 6 show how the Travancore government's expenditure on education as a proportion of its total expenditure, as well as the number of state educational institutions, increased sharply in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, shortly after the emergence of Malayali subnationalism among the elite. The change is also evident in the content of social policy. By the early 1900s, the government opened up state schools and introduced vaccination programs to children of all castes. In the 1920s and '30s, a range of affirmative-action policies, including fee concessions and scholarships for lower castes, were introduced. In the 1940s, 25 percent of Travancore's total medical expenditure was allocated to stem the outbreak of diseases like cholera and smallpox. The latter was one of the main causes of high mortality, particularly among the depressed castes, in the previous century.[87]

In the United Provinces, the absence of subnationalism impeded the emergence of a strong social policy agenda and consequently, developmental gains. Corresponding to the lack of subnational solidarity, the elite had little conception of the collective welfare of the people of the state as a whole. An analysis of local newspaper reports shows that in the context of primed antagonistic religious attachments, demands for the extension for social services were framed almost exclusively in ethnic terms. Hindu and Muslim elite invariably mobilized and petitioned

[85] Chiriyankandath 1993, 650.
[86] Koshy 1972, 45. This is not to deny the considerable sociopolitical conflict in the region during this period. The states of Travancore and Cochin were characterized by continued competition between different castes, notably Izhavas and Nairs. Malabar, which was a part of Madras Presidency, witnessed the Moplah rebellion, an uprising by Muslim peasants against British rule and Hindu Nair landlords. During the 1930s and 1940s, left mobilization and militancy intensified as illustrated by the Punnapra-Vayalar uprising, a struggle led by the Communist Party against the Travancore government in which over 150 people were killed.
[87] Singh 1944, 434.

SOURCE: Based on data in Singh 1944.

FIGURE 5
INCREASE IN NUMBER OF STATE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN
TRAVANCORE, 1873–1930

SOURCE: Based on data in Singh 1944.

FIGURE 6
EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION AND HEALTH AS PROPORTION OF TOTAL
EXPENDITURE IN TRAVACORE, 1884–85 THROUGH 1944–45

the government for the exclusive advancement of their own religious
community and against concession to the demands of the other.[88] So-
cial policy, as a result, did not occupy a prominent place on the policy
agenda.[89] The limited initiatives in education and health that were ad-
opted were a result either of the personal, progressive instincts of a
few British administrators[90] or the efforts of Christian missionaries.[91]

[88] At the close of the nineteenth century, for example, the *Hind Pratap* (Allahabad), adverting to
the memorial of the Muhammadan Association of Calcutta, wrote, "[I]t would be as unwise to do
anything to improve the condition of the Mussalmans as to feed a serpent. If they attain to power, they
will only oppress the poor Hindus." British Library 1942.

[89] Robinson 1975, 317.

[90] *Imperial Gazetteer of India* 1907–09, 139.

[91] Varma 1994, 9.

These differences in state social policy resulted in Travancore gaining a steadily growing developmental lead over the North-Western Provinces. By the 1940s, Travancore and neighboring Cochin had established themselves as frontrunners among Indian provinces.

Despite its relative lead, the absolute levels of social development in Travancore at the end of the colonial period were quite low. More than half the population was illiterate and on average, a person was expected to live less than thirty years.[92] UP's levels of social development, while abysmal in absolute terms, had not yet fallen below those of other Indian provinces as they would in subsequent decades. The postindependence years mark a critical period in the developmental trajectories of both provinces.

Subnationalism in the regions that would constitute the new state of Kerala intensified in the 1950s during the time of the linguistic agitations. An examination of the petitions submitted by the Aikya Kerala campaign to the States Reorganization Commission (SRC), a body appointed by the Indian government to assess the demands for linguistic states, shows that Malayali subnationalism had been inextricably linked to the collective welfare of all Malayalis. In petition after petition submitted to the SRC, the creation of a United Kerala State was presented as an essential condition for "the development of the Malayalis." Petitions submitted by organizations and individuals in Malabar were flush with the idea that the government of the newly constituted state of Kerala, composed of "conationals," would be obligated to look after their welfare, which had been neglected by "foreigners" in the Madras government who had meted out "stepmotherly treatment" to the Malayali district.[93] The campaigners for a united Kerala from Travancore-Cochin, in turn, seemed more than willing to take up the responsibility of Malabar's development and vehemently refuted the not empirically unfounded argument that the region's relative backwardness would constitute a costly liability for a state already in a relatively precarious socioeconomic position. They argued that "Malabar has immense possibilities for development, this is possible only in an Aikya Kerala."[94]

Malayali subnationalism remained strong and was a key driver of social spending and development through most of the postindependence decades. This is particularly evident in an examination of the activities of the Communist Party, which was defined by its leader,

[92] Ramachandran 1997, 225.
[93] Nair 1954; Pocker Sahib 1954; Wynad Taluk 1954.
[94] Communist Party of India 1954, 3.

E. M. S. Namboodiripad, as Kerala's "national party."[95] The embodiment of a subnational consciousness has been an important factor in the success of the Communist Party.[96] Scholars such as Victor Fic emphasize the significance of a subnational identity to the victories of the communists almost to the negation of Marxist ideology.[97] Similarly, Selig Harrison argues that the party's popular support and electoral victories, especially in the early years, can be explained, "above all, by its ability to manipulate the regional patriotism of all Kerala."[98] The communists' subnationalism was inextricably intertwined with a focus on Malayali welfare and exemplified by their "Development-defined ideal vision of a unified Malayalee people."[99] In the state's very first elections, the party's manifesto pushed voters to choose "A Government That Will Take Care of the Malayalee Nation."[100] The role played by a shared subnational solidarity in the Communist Party leaders' prioritization of social welfare was also strikingly apparent, both as an overall goal and in key social schemes, in the communist government's evocation of an important subnational hero, the ancient Malayali king Mahabali. As legend has it, Mahabali ruled over a united, solidaristic Kerala with great concern for the well-being of his people. At the time of the creation of Kerala in the mid-1950s, Namboodiripad had explicitly characterized his vision of the state as "the Mavelinadu (the land of Mahabali) of the future."[101] One of the most significant social initiatives in the state was the opening of "Maveli stores," which sell grain and other essential items at controlled prices. Interestingly, social programs, especially those that are more difficult to implement, such as the state's family planning program, have been couched "in terms of the national interest."[102] In addition, the promotion of Malayali welfare figured prominently as a justification for the Communist Party's periodic demands for increased autonomy from New Delhi.[103] The link between a vigorous subnationalism and progressive social policy in Kerala appears to be epitomized by the fact that subnationalist occasions are celebrated with the institution of new social policies. In 2006, for example, Chief Minister V. S. Achutanandan announced, "The 50th an-

[95] Harrison 1960, 195.
[96] Nossiter 1982.
[97] Fic 1970.
[98] Harrison 1960, 193.
[99] Devika 2002, 53.
[100] Harrison 1960, 193.
[101] Devika 2002, 57.
[102] Devika 2002, 51.
[103] Nossiter 1982, 265.

niversary of the formation of Kerala is intended for launching the most comprehensive developmental programs in the history of the State."

It is important to point out that in Kerala, the communist governments' commitment to the social sector, which is part of its broad and deep commitment to redistribution—made apparent with the institution of land reforms in the 1960s and 1970s[104]—is far greater than the commitment of Communist Party governments in other Indian states, such as West Bengal, where, incidentally, the left has enjoyed longer and more stable tenures than in Kerala. Moreover, the Indian National Congress, the other major political player in the state, has retained a distinct subnational identity, and functions, in stark contrast to UP's Congress, more like a regional party than a wing of the central Congress.[105] It is also committed to the social sector and has attempted to match and even outdo the communist governments in providing social services.[106]

Despite Kerala having lower levels of economic development than the national average for most of the postindependence period, state expenditures on education and health have been consistently higher than the average for all other Indian states.[107] The state's commitment to the social sector is apparent in the fact that despite endemic social unrest during the 1960s and 1970s, political turmoil and instability,[108] periodically precarious financial situations through the 1980s, and New Delhi's liberalizing market reforms of the 1990s, no government has ever reversed a major public service or redistributive program in Kerala.[109] In addition, social policy has had a distinctly redistributive edge and an overwhelming emphasis on the provision of primary education and the initiation of schemes for the more deprived sections of Malayali society.

In contrast, in UP, identification with the national sphere through the 1980s and with religion and caste since the 1990s has impeded the emergence of a subnational developmental agenda. With the found-

[104] These reforms were not only successful—Kerala is today characterized by one of the more egalitarian patterns of landholding found in most developing countries—but also relatively peaceful. Herring 1983; Herring 1991.

[105] In the seventy-plus years since the institution of elections, all but one chief minister of Kerala from the Congress Party have devoted their political careers entirely to state politics.

[106] Venugopal 2006.

[107] It is important to acknowledge that foreign remittances in the form of money sent by Malayali workers in the Gulf have provided an important fillip for the economy of Kerala, but also to clarify that these remittances became substantial only in the mid-1980s and began to assume a significant share of state income as recently as the 1990s.

[108] The average span of government from the 1950s through the 1990s was two-and-a-half years; John 1992.

[109] Heller 2005, 82.

ing of Pakistan in 1947 and the associated decrease in activity and relevance of the Muslim League, the Hindu-Muslim cleavage receded but by no means disappeared from postindependence UP politics. The void, however, was not filled with the rise of a subnational solidarity. Instead, drawing on the province's historic importance as the birthplace of Hinduism and the nerve center of some of the most influential ancient and medieval empires; its demographic weight, which gave it the single largest number of seats in the newly constituted national legislature; and its strategic geographic location, the elite in UP successfully portrayed their province, as depicted humorously in Figure 7, as the "heartland" of India.[110] UP legislators, for example, proposed to name the province "Aryavrat" or "Hindustan," terms synonymous with India as a whole, and designate Allahabad, the capital of UP, as the national capital.[111] The political elite in UP tended to envision their careers not as being devoted to working in and for the state, but instead saw their time in UP as waiting in the wings to play a role on the national stage. From the time of prominent UP politician B. D. Pant, who had been at the helm of the state from 1937 but relinquished the chief ministership to take up a post in the national cabinet in 1955 (incidentally leaving the state's politics in disarray), Congress chief ministers in UP have tended to be heavily involved with national politics. Eleven out of twenty also held a position in the national government at some point in their career. In short, UP politics were dominated by the national Congress Party to the extent that it was seen as a *jagirdari* or fief.[112] From the 1950s to the 1980s, and especially under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, UP chief ministers were selected by the center rather than from within the state. Reflecting this political intertwining, by the 1960s there was a familiar saying: "India, that is Bharat, that is UP."[113] National election survey data from 1971 show that in line with the preoccupations of the elite, the nonelite of UP also expressed far greater interest, especially when compared to people from Kerala, with the actions of the national government (36 percent versus 19 percent, respectively) than with the state government (13 percent versus 41 percent, respectively). In successive elections, the UP electorate tended to

[110] Kudaisya 2007, 10.

[111] This close identification with the national sphere was explicitly and often positively contrasted with the absence of subnational identification in UP. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, wrote that the state had "less provincialism than in any other part of India. For long they have considered themselves, and looked upon by others, as the heart of India" (cited in Kudaisya 2007, 10). B. D. Pant, the first chief minister of UP, declared UP as "unaffected by either linguism or provincialism;" Lok Sabha Secretariat 1955, 1504.

[112] Ramesh 1999, 2127.

[113] Sharma 1969, 181.

FIGURE 7

IDENTIFICATION OF UP WITH THE NATION: UP POLITICAL ELITE SELF-VIEW
IN POSTINDEPENDENCE INDIA[a]

[a] Kudaisya 2007.

vote on national rather than state issues. In 1984, for example, "vot-ers self-consciously rejected local considerations to cast a vote for the party, the Congress, which was perceived as the best party for the good of the country."[114]

This close identification with the nation led to a preoccupation with the national good and effectively blocked the emergence of any sort of subnational developmental agenda in UP.[115] During debates over the state's reorganization, for example, in stark contrast to the arguments of the elite in Kerala, the UP political elite who did counter the many

[114] Brass 1986, 661.
[115] Zerinini-Brotel 1998, 79; Kudaisya 2007, 24.

and powerful proposals for the division of the state and argued for the maintenance of the province's boundaries, did so less in terms of how it would benefit the people of UP and more in terms of how it would benefit the Indian nation.[116] Through the early postindependence decades, the UP elite remained preoccupied with furthering national interests, notably the implementation of Hindi as the national language of India, placing this at the top of their policy agenda to the relative neglect of the critical developmental issues facing the state.[117] Election campaigns in UP almost entirely eschewed the issue of the state's development to focus almost exclusively on questions of all-India relevance. During the 1960s, for example, the Jan Sangh ran against the ruling Congress Party and succeeded because of its opposition to that party's perceived failure to secure just treatment for the Hindu minority in Pakistan.[118] Similarly, elections in the 1980s focused "nearly exclusively on the dangers to the country, posed by internal and external enemies and on the need for Indians to close ranks to save the country."[119] The grave developmental cost to UP of the complete subservience of its state agenda to national politics is apparent in an examination of its budget through these decades. UP prioritized the sectors emphasized by New Delhi irrespective of whether or not they represented its own most urgent needs. For example, social development was clearly needed in UP, yet, as late as the mid-1980s and in line with central policies, it spent up to 43.5 percent of its total budget on economic services and just over 3 percent on social services. Even this limited social expenditure was overlaid by central directives—the most egregious example was the funneling of large proportions of health outlays to family planning activities, which took a heavy toll on the provision of essential health services in the state.[120] Since the early 1990s, the locus of elite and popular identification in UP has shifted from the nation to ethnic groups. The rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 1990s is associated with the increased salience of and competition around religious identity.[121] The resurgence of religious identity in UP has been

[116] The SRC Report noted, "One of the commonest arguments advanced before us by leaders in Uttar Pradesh was that the existence of a large, powerful and well-organized state in the Gangetic Valley was a guarantee for India's unity; that such a state would be able to correct the disruptive tendencies of other states, and to ensure the ordered progress of India. The same idea has been put to us in many other forms such as that Uttar Pradesh is the 'back bone of India.'" Lok Sabha Parliamentary Debates 1955, 246.

[117] Kudaisya 2007, 378.

[118] Masaldan 1967, 282.

[119] Brass 1986, 663.

[120] Drèze and Sen 1996, 55.

[121] Hasan 1996, 97.

accompanied and arguably overshadowed by the development of powerful caste allegiances associated with the emergence of lower caste movements. Among these are the Dalit movement under Kanshi Ram in the 1980s; the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) headed by the charismatic Mayawati in the early 1990s; and the rise of the backward castes under Mulayam Singh Yadav, who founded the Samajwadi Party (SP) in 1992. The emergence of caste-based movements and parties has been, on the whole, a divisive process. In its early years, the Dalit movement was directed explicitly against the upper castes, who constitute approximately 20 percent of the population of UP.[122] Moreover, various lower castes also tended to mobilize in antagonism rather than in alliance with each other. The BSP's initial claim to stand for social justice for the *bahujan samaj* (the majority community), defined to include scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, other backward castes, and minorities quickly narrowed to the claim of standing exclusively for the Dalits.[123] In fact, in the wake of the bitter breakup of the BSP-SP coalition, the interests of the Dalits and backward castes came to be seen not only as separate but also in opposition to each other.

The shift of popular identification away from the nation in UP is evidenced by the more than 50 percent decline (from 36 percent in 1971 to 16 percent in 1996) in those reporting more concern with the actions of the government in New Delhi than with the actions of the state government.[124] The increased salience of caste is evident in the 1996 national election study.[125] Forty-six percent of respondents in UP reported voting the same as other members of their caste or religious group compared to 5 percent of respondents in Kerala and 26 percent of respondents across all-India. In addition, 26 percent of UP respondents said that there existed a political party that took special care of their caste or religious group's interests, which is substantially higher than the 16 percent in Kerala at the same time and the 17 percent in UP who had expressed the same sentiment in 1971. By the early 2000s, the depth of caste fragmentation in the state was such that even the BJP felt compelled to seek support along caste lines. Badri Narayan Tiwari notes that the general elections of 2004 witnessed a critical change in the BJP's "language of political discourse." From the use of "one uni-

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[122] Campaign slogans of the BSP exemplify the intensity of the Dalit animosity against upper castes: "Tilak, Tarazu, Kalam, Talwar; Inko maaro jute chaar" [forehead mark, scale, pen, and sword (the occupational symbols of the four upper castes), thrash them with four shoes]. Pai 2007, 263.

[123] Pai 2002, 121.

[124] Center for the Study of Developing Societies 1971; Center for the Study of Developing Societies 1996.

[125] Center for the Study of Developing Societies 1996.

form language" across all castes, the party tried to reach out to different castes by focusing on their "caste glory through references to their caste heroes; it sought to consolidate their caste identity by exhorting them to take pride in their caste-based professions."[126]

This polarization led to the conceptualization of welfare in narrow, sectional terms. Political elite from different castes pushed for goods and services for the exclusive benefit of their own group. Such behavior tilted the social agenda of UP heavily toward targeted policies and away from universal policies designed to benefit all residents of the state.[127] The schemes of the BSP have been the most striking in this regard. In addition to symbolic policies designed to valorize Dalit heroes and inculcate Dalit pride, the party introduced policies aimed exclusively at the socioeconomic development of Dalits. The largest and most prominent of these was the Ambedkar Village Program (AVP), which targeted a number of welfare schemes to villages with Dalit majorities. While it is important not to undermine their significance in the ideational empowerment of Dalits, these schemes have had only a limited effect on their material welfare and have arguably taken a toll on the social development of the state as a whole.[128] Mayawati's "iconography spree"[129] drained the state's already depleted coffers and left precious little for investment in "key sectors such as education, infrastructure and health," which was especially harmful for "the poorest sections of the population, which includes a substantial section of *dalits*."[130] Social schemes such as the AVP involved the siphoning of funds away from and/or suspending developmental schemes meant for the entire state and concentrating them in small Dalit enclaves.[131] This led to the neglect and alienation of other residents of UP, most egregiously the non-Dalit rural poor, who in some areas are more impoverished than Dalits.[132] The social sector in UP has also been marked by "resilient governmental inertia,"[133] not only reflected in some of the lowest allocations to education and health of all Indian states through the postindependence decades, but also in the UP government's massive underutilization of grants from the center and international agen-

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[126] Tiwari 2007,138.
[127] Drèze and Gazdar 1997, 63, write, for example, of "the absence of a well-accepted consensus on the need to universalize primary education in Uttar Pradesh."
[128] Mehrotra 2007.
[129] Zerinini-Brotel 1998, 99.
[130] Pai 2006, 5.
[131] Pai 2002, 129–30.
[132] Srivastava 2007, 348.
[133] Drèze and Gazdar 1997, 53, 88.

cies, and the generally lackadaisical implementation of social schemes
sponsored by these groups.

Kerala and UP have been distinguished in the postcolonial period
not only by starkly contrasting social policies but also by the extent and
nature of societal involvement with the services provided by the state.
In Kerala, subnational identification has contributed to a significantly
higher degree of interest in, consciousness of, and proclivity to partici-
pate in the public life of the state than in UP (see Table 10).

Politically aware Malayalis bound by ties of solidarity tend to act
collectively on a range of issues, including monitoring how schools
and health centers are functioning.[134] Separate ethnographic studies by
Kathleen Gough and Joan Mencher describe local agitations that have
erupted over lapses in the delivery of social services.[135] Social and po-
litical associations in Kerala frequently submit demands for improved
educational and health care facilities to higher officials[136] and failure to
meet those demands often results in *gheraoes* where protesters surround
politicians and do not allow them to leave until a suitable commitment
has been made.[137] In contrast, consistently low levels of political aware-
ness and participation and the "highly divided nature of the rural soci-
ety" in UP "seriously constrained" collaborative public action to ensure
the effective functioning of the social services provided by the state
and resulted in a long-standing pattern of popular indifference and in-
ertia toward those services.[138] In my interviews with more than thirty
bureaucrats who served as district collectors—civil servants in charge
of the overall administration of the district—in different districts of
UP at various points from the 1960s to the 2000s, not one recalled
petitions or demonstrations protesting the malfunctioning of social
services.[139] Public vigilance has been essential to ensuring the effec-
tive functioning of health centers and primary schools in Kerala.[140] In

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[134] Ramachandran 1997; Cherian 1999; Franke and Chasin 1997.

[135] Gough 1974 recounts an incident in 1962 when angry neighbors dragged a physician from a
cinema and forced him to go to the hospital to deliver the baby of a woman who was in great pain
(cited in Franke and Chasin 1989, 45). Similarly, based on her fieldwork in the state in the 1960s and
1970s, Mencher notes that in Kerala, "[I]f a PHC was unmanned for a few days, there would be a mas-
sive demonstration at the nearest collectorate [regional government office]"; and the death of a child
due to perceived physician neglect would prompt "an enormous procession and a big demonstration
outside the PHC the next day. Articles would have appeared in the newspapers, and questions would
have been raised in the state assembly." Mencher 1980, 1782.

[136] Nag 1989, 418.

[137] Franke and Chasin 1989, 46.

[138] Drèze and Sen 2002; Drèze and Gazdar 1997; Sinha 1995.

[139] Author interviews conducted from August 2006 to December 2008.

[140] Drèze and Sen 2002, 92. A UNICEF educational survey conducted in 1999 found that Kerala
had one of the lowest rates of teacher absenteeism in the country. Mehrotra 2007, 264. A study of
health centers in Kerala in the 1980s found that "all the staff were regularly at work." Franke and
Chasin 1989, 46.

TABLE 10
POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS IN KERALA AND UP

	Year	Kerala	UP	India
Respondents with "Somewhat" or "Great deal of interest" in election campaign (%)	1967	49	21.6	32
	1996	73	47	35
	2004	53.4	34.2	43
Respondents with "Somewhat" or "Great deal of interest" in politics and public affairs (%)	1967	53	22.8	34
	1996	50	47	35
	2004	49	37	43

SOURCE: Center for the Study of Developing Societies, national election studies 1967, 1996, 2004.

contrast, the failure of village communities to discipline teachers and doctors has contributed to the "chaotic functioning" of social services in UP.[141] An especially egregious example of this is the Palanpur village school, which Jean Drèze and Haris Gazdar found to be "virtually non-functional" due to systematic absenteeism on the part of the local teacher for a decade (1983–93). Incidentally, the UP government itself highlights "public apathy" as one of the main causes for the disarray of social services in the state.[142]

The differences in top-down state policies supplemented by bottom-up social activism have generated stark variations in the levels of social development between Kerala and UP. Kerala has made remarkable gains in the postindependence years and attained educational and health levels equivalent to the top 30 to 40 percent of countries across the globe, while UP is characterized by some of the worst human development indicators in the world.[143]

CONCLUSION

Access to basic public goods and services has a profound influence on quality of life. In a world in which millions of people, particularly in developing countries, continue to be dogged by illiteracy and ill health, understanding the conditions that promote or hinder social welfare is of critical importance to scholars, activists, and policymakers alike.

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[141] Drèze and Gazdar 1997, 92.
[142] See http://up.gov.in/upecon.aspx.
[143] What is even more striking is that even UP's Dalits, the primary beneficiaries of social schemes in recent years, remain far more socially deprived than their brethren in Kerala and virtually all other Indian states, most of which have instituted far fewer social policies targeted explicitly toward Dalits. The relative extent of UP's underdevelopment is brought out by the fact that Dalit women in Kerala have, for the most part, better social indicators than upper-caste women in UP.

This article advances a new theoretical argument for the ways in which a shared subnational identity has influenced public goods provision and social welfare across Indian states over time and combines statistical and comparative historical analyses to specify them. I am not suggesting that social welfare policies and outcomes are products only and/or entirely of a province's strength of subnationalism. Indeed, the statistical analyses bring out the importance of factors like economic development, electoral competition, and religious diversity. My aim is to spotlight subnationalism, a relatively novel and underexplored variable that, even after taking into account a range of plausible alternative explanations, provides an additional significant and substantial fillip to social expenditures and development.

Such an argument makes a number of important theoretical contributions. For a start, it pushes us away from the dominant scholarly view of the destructive implications of collective identities. If, following Samuel Huntington,[144] "[W]e know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against," then all identities are based on some exclusion and animosity. Nationalism, in particular, has come to be strongly associated with such odious tendencies as intolerance, xenophobia, and chauvinism,[145] with a distinguished political theorist going so far as to call it "the starkest political shame of the twentieth century."[146] This article marks a radical departure from these pejorative understandings. Instead, in emphasizing the constructive potential of nationalism, it seeks to recover an argument whose provenance extends at least as far as back as Friedrich List and John Stuart Mill who, although divided on a number of other issues, emphasized a sense of national solidarity as an important determinant of economic prosperity[147] and representative democ-

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[144] Huntington 1996.

[145] Kedourie 1993; Hroch 1995; Snyder 2000; Pavkovic 2000; Saideman and Ayres 2008; Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011; Schrock-Jacobson 2012.

[146] Dunn 1979, 55.

[147] List outlined a critical role of the national economy, which was the outcome of national ideas, national institutions, and people's desire to belong to a nation, in a country's industrial and economic development. Specifically, according to Levi-Faur 1997, 170, for List, national solidarity was a key factor in an individual's long-term investment decisions: "An individual is not simply a producer or a consumer; he is a member of a national community and this fact has crucial significance to his willingness to invest in the future. Individuals who are not members of such communities are more liable to make short-term decisions, since mere individuals do not concern themselves for the prosperity of future generations—they deem it foolish to make certain and present sacrifices in order to endeavor to obtain a benefit which is as yet uncertain and lying in the vast field of the future (if events possess any value at all); they care but little for the continuance of the nation." List 1885 [1841], 173.

racy,[148] respectively. Interestingly, Mancur Olson also described patriotism as "the strongest non-economic motive for" allegiance.[149]

Most directly, this article builds on studies that have shown an empirical association between national identification and social welfare in different parts of the world at various points in time. A number of scholars have, for example, drawn a link between the "societal cohesion"[150] and "aura and practice of social solidarity"[151] generated by World War II and the establishment of welfare states in Europe. Nicola McEwen and Richard Parry summarize such positions writing, "During the Second World War, explicit associations were made between the solidarity and national consciousness engendered by the war, and the task of constructing a post-war welfare state."[152] Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka write, "[C]itizens have historically supported the welfare state, and been willing to make sacrifices to support their disadvantaged co-citizens because they viewed these citizens as 'one of us,' bound together by a common identity and common sense of belonging."[153] Analyses of surveys in the US and Canada cross-nationally show that a sense of national attachment fosters support for public services such as schools and health care[154] and for redistributive preferences more generally.[155] In addition to these studies that support the general causal logic of the argument that I propose, the generalizability of the specific thesis that subnationalism promotes social welfare is brought out most strikingly in recent work by Daniel Béland and André Lecours that shows how Quebecois and Scottish subnationalism claim strong collective bonds and a solidaristic ethos among members of their respective political communities that is used to demand and justify uniquely progressive social policies.[156]

[148] According to Mill, a common national culture was necessary for the working of representative institutions. He wrote: "It is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. . . . Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist." Mill 2004 [1861], 298.

[149] Olson 1965, 13.

[150] Wilensky 1975.

[151] Furniss and Tilton 1977.

[152] McEwen and Parry 2005, 45.

[153] Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 11.

[154] Transue 2007; Johnston et al. 2010.

[155] Shayo 2009.

[156] In both Quebec and Scotland, demands for greater institutional autonomy, at times including independence, have been framed in terms of the need to enact more generous social benefits than elsewhere in Canada or the UK, in line with the special sense of shared obligations that Quebeckers and Scots feel toward each other's welfare. Indeed, the Quebec government has been known for seminal

Another theoretical contribution of this article is to focus a new analytical lens on traditional class-based arguments about welfare. It is important to note that class formation, especially in the tradition of E. P. Thompson, has been seen as a process of forging new solidaristic identities.[157] Class mobilization has been argued to be most successful in pushing for universalistic welfare policies when it is based on an encompassing solidarity.[158] In India, the success of class-based mobilization in Kerala is explained in terms of its peculiar solidaristic nature, which has led it to be peaceful for the most part, and to support "cooperative and inclusionary social policies."[159] So the question is, under what conditions is class mobilization likely to be more solidaristic? My historical analysis traces the "encompassing" and "universalistic" nature of class politics in Kerala[160] to its embeddedness in a broader Malayali subnationalism.[161] Seen in this light, the solidarity associated with a unifying superordinate identity like subnationalism might be seen as the missing element in overly deterministic accounts of class mobilization.

The subnationalism argument also has important policy implications. One significant implication is that a judgment about the relative merits of centralization versus decentralization for social development cannot be made in isolation from the question of which political administrative unit commands the primary allegiance of the people. Constitutional structures like federalism, which disperse political power and offer multiple points of influence on the making and implementation of policy, have been argued to be inimical to social welfare provision.[162] I suggest that if the primary locus of citizen identification is subnational, devolution of power might in fact foster the provision of

social policies including $5 per day childcare, the universal prescription drug insurance plan, and the lowest university tuition rates in North America. Just over a decade after devolution, Scotland has become the "happening place" for social policy in the UK (Béland and Lecours 2008, 129), with the Scottish Parliament's decision to abolish up-front tuition fees in higher education and the enactment of a universal personal long-term care program for the elderly. Strikingly, the campaign for Scottish independence, which became prominent in the run up to the 2014 referendum, was called the 'Common Weal.' It sought a fairer Scotland through a move from a politics of "me first" to "all-of-us first," and emphasized a range of social policies including, in an interesting parallel with Quebec, subsidized childcare. See http://www.allofusfirst.org.

[157] Thompson 1963.

[158] Esping-Andersen 1987, 81–3; Fantasia 1989.

[159] Heller 1996, 1060, 1066; Heller 2000 515, 519.

[160] Heller 2000, 494.

[161] The left movement emerged historically in the early twentieth century in the context of a growing Malayali identification. Trade union and student movements were from their very inception organized on a pan-Kerala basis. Left groups played a critical role in the Aikya Kerala movement that organized massive public meetings and submitted petitions to the SRC. Left writers penned emotive paeans to their motherland, which became subnational anthems. As noted earlier, the Communist Party was established on an explicitly subnationalist basis and has retained a strong Malayali identity.

[162] Immergut 1992; Huber, Ragins, and Stephens, 1993.

social welfare. Decentralization of state welfare need not lead to a race to the bottom, as Europeanists tend to fear, but might allow substate regions to tap territorial solidarity and identity and thereby strengthen social policy and bring distributional questions into the consideration of development policy.[163] Innovative social policies instituted in Indian states like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Rajasthan were later adopted by the central government, suggesting that federal structures might stimulate social policy innovation by serving as an arena for policy experimentation and a vehicle for change at the national level. A substantial body of scholarship suggests that decentralized governments are more effective at social welfare provision because they are closer to the needs of the people and more agile and innovative than centralized governments, which are often distant and rigid.[164] In this article I caution against such a doctrinaire commitment to a policy of decentralization and suggest instead that decentralization is likely to be more successful if the political administrative unit to which power is being devolved is a focus of resident allegiance. If the political administrative unit has no affective meaning for the people and they feel no sense of belonging to it, decentralization might not lead to significant gains in social development. In addition, my research points to the potential merits of encouraging popular allegiance to the unit of social policy-making, opening up a novel and entirely distinct realm of possible policy interventions for improving social welfare. The promotion of a state language, designation and celebration of state days and festivals, and glorification of state heroes are likely to foster subnationalism and can further social policy and development.[165] By highlighting potential interlinkages between different policy arenas, such as initiatives in arts and culture and social policies, this article encourages policymakers not to approach social policy in isolation.

It would be unrealistic to deny the existence of feedback between subnationalism and social development, especially in recent history. Kerala's internationally hailed social achievements have likely fed into and bolstered Malayali subnationalism while UP's backwardness might have served as a check on the emergence of subnational identification or pride.[166] It is important to note in defense of the hypothesized di-

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[163] McEwen and Parry 2005, 34.

[164] Taylor-Gooby 2008.

[165] The recent developments in the Indian state of Bihar, which include state sponsorship of an extensive set of celebrations on the occasion of "Bihar Diwas" and the promotion of a range of cultural and literary activities, is an importance instance of this. See Singh 2015a.

[166] Interestingly though, even in the late colonial period, by which time Travancore had established a distinct lead in social welfare over all other parts of India, Malayalis themselves appeared to be

rection of causality that subnationalism emerged historically at a point when both provinces were characterized by similarly low levels of social development and through a process of elite competition for political power that was exogenous to overall education and health policies and outcomes. A progressive social policy is instituted and social development outcomes improve, as I have attempted to show in the case studies, after and as a consequence of the emergence of subnational identification.

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL

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anything but proud of their achievements, describing their state as "a body that was seldom washed and was full of dirt and filth." Koshy 1972, 53. In the 1930s, in a work entitled the "The Future of the Malayalees," noted Malayalam journalist Kesari A. Balakrishna Pillai wrote, "the Malayalee's position, when compared to that of others, is very backward. . . . There is the possibility that in independent India of the future, Malayalees may . . . gradually decline, becoming slaves to other peoples." Cited in Devika 2002, 55.

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