given the marked interest in 'due process' and so on, the sections on processes seem underdeveloped. To leave canon 1606 without exposition is a real loss, for that canon allows the parties in a trial simply to entrust themselves in certain circumstances 'to the knowledge and the conscience of the judge', surely a provision needing comment as to its scope and desirability. Instead of listing detailed points of disagreement, it might be best to draw attention to the unexamined use of one major category of understanding. The Commentary points out that in the Code 'the terms used to name the pope vary' (e.g. bishop of Rome, Supreme Pontiff etc.). These titles in one sense express his various functions, while in another sense they represent the differing views of the relative position of the pope and the college of bishops as the subject of supreme power. Each title has its own history; only when taken as a whole do they present a comprehensive view of the role of the pope. These observations are illuminating. What is missing from the analysis is any explicit awareness of the fact that the Code itself never uses the (ancient and complex) title 'pope', and that although the Commentary makes extensive use of the term it gives us no idea why it has chosen to give it such prominence.

The final comment on the Commentary? As a large working-manual on the whole Code, designed for persons in various pastoral responsibilities, this Commentary is definitely a success and is not likely to be displaced in the English-speaking world for at least a decade. And Rome need not be anxious.

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HUME'S SKEPTICISM IN THE ***TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE*** **by Robert Fogelin. London,** ***Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985. P. xii + 195. £12.95.***

In a passage of the *Abstract* which is, perhaps surprisingly not quoted here Hume said of the *Treatise* "that the philosophy contain'd in this book is very sceptical". Fogelin's justification for his own book is "that most recent Hume scholarship has either neglected or downplayed this important aspect of Hume's position" (p. xi). Certainly Fogelin has an aggreeably astringent way with some of the nowadays infrequently examined skeptical arguments: thus Hume has, Fogelin says, "in general, ... a bad head for questions concerning infinity" (p. 17); and, again, "Hume's second argument, ... obviously pleased him, and it is, in fact, perfectly awful" (p. 112).

In general, again, whereas some of us have argued that Hume's radical (as opposed to Academic) skepticism is logically incompatible with (what surely are supposed to be) his rational commitments to scientific inquiry and to the proportioning of belief to the evidence, Fogelin propounds the seemingly contrary contention that "it coheres with Hume's naturalistic program" (p. 146). Whether it really is contrary becomes less clear when a little later Fogelin writes: "The mitigated skepticism that Hume recommends is the causal product of two competing influences: Pyrrhonian doubt on the one side, natural instinct on the other ... In this way Hume's skepticism and naturalism meet in a causal theory of skepticism itself" (p. 150).

By emphasizing throughout that interest in the causes as opposed to the grounds of belief Fogelin claims for Hume his rightful but rarely recognised position in the development both of the historiography of ideas and of the sociology of 'knowledge' (pp. 80ff.). Unfortunately Fogelin is himself impatient of those who want to "draw a sharp distinction between logical and psychological considerations" (p. 147).

Perhaps even more unfortunately, he regularly introduces such terms as 'empiricism', 'naturalism', 'subjectivism', 'foundationism', and the like, without the essential parenthetic explication of the senses in which they are to be employed. Apart from the present confusion about what and how much is involved in Hume's naturalism, it really is much too late in the day to be asking, without first distinguishing broader and narrower sense of that word, whether his moral philosophy was subjectivist. In the former the subjectivist

maintains that there are no moral primary qualities. In this understanding Hume is the paradigm subjectivist. But in the latter the subjectivist's contention is that moral words are definable in terms of the reactions of those who employ them.

Fogelin very properly insists that the oft-quoted passage beginning "So that when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious you mean nothing, but that ... " is not to be construed as a premature contribution to the journal *Analysis* : Hume is not, that is, really offering a definition. Here, as in putting forward two incompatible "definitions" of "cause", Hume is presenting an epitome of the findings of what are psychological rather than logical investigations—an epitome expressed, appropriately to Hume's *Language, Truth and Logic,* in a favourite debunker's idiom. He therefore "seems wholely indifferent to the niceties of present meta-ethical discussions" (p. 137). Certainly Hume's main concern is to establish subjectivism in the broader sense. Nevertheless it is worth adding that in both the *Treatise* and the *Second Enquiry* we can find hints of such fashionable doctrines as emotivism and prescriptivism.

In Chapter VIII 'The Soul and the Self" Fogelin addresses the question of what it was about personal identity which forced Hume to confess total bafflement in the Appendix to the *Treatise.* Fogelin concludes that there is no satisfactory answer decisively determined by the text. Well, maybe not decisively. But, since the whole problem arises from a section entitled "Of personal identity", the presumption, surely, must be that what Hume cannot tell us is what it means to say that this at time two is the same person as that at time one. So, when Hume notes that "Most philosophers seem inclin'd to think, that personal identity *arises* from consciousness ... " the most natural reading takes him to be thinking of Locke, and of Butler's totally decisive objection to any such Lockean account: "And one should really think it self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity". Certainly there is no contradiction between the two principles which Hume says he is neither able to renounce nor to render consistent. Nor is there between the claims that God is both omnipotent and perfectly good. The possibly insoluble problem in both cases is to reconcile with apparently incompatible facts two principles, neither of which the protagonists feel able to renounce.

Fogelin seems prepared to go along with Hume's insistence that ideas and impressions are distinct existences occurring loose and separate, and apparently finds nothing odd in an inquiry "Of personal identity" which mistakes people to be something other than creatures of flesh and blood. He therefore fails, like almost everybody else to bring out that Hume's starting point, shared by almost all the successors of Descartes until well into the present century, was the position which Descartes himself reached at the end of the second paragraph of Part IV of the *Discourse.* All that the skeptical Cartesian subject is or can be immediately aware of is "perceptions of the mind". But this subject has also already raised and answered the question "What am I?" The answer was: "a substance the whole essence or nature of which it is to think, and that for its existence there is no need of any place, nor does it depend on any material thing".

Although Fogelin remarks, truly, that Hume "hardly seems to have thought *about* the foundations of this viewpoint at all" (p. 3) Fogelin's actual reference is only to the first element, which he characterizes as empiricism (without explanation) or "British Empiricism" (pp 2—3). But Fogelin's remark could apply just as well to the unnoticed second element. For it is, surely, one of the most striking indices of the enormous influence of Descartes that even Hume's radical skepticism went no further than to challenge the idea that perceptions of the mind must inhere in an incorporeal substance. Nor, despite his desire to reach mortalist conclusions, did it ever occur to him that it makes no sense to speak of "perceptions of the mind" save as what occurs to a special kind of creatures of flesh and blood.

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