

CONSENSUS AND DIVERGENCE:
THE STATE OF THE LITERATURE
ON INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS
IN THE 1970s

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INTRODUCTION¹

"We went to visit neighbors and found brothers."² So began the text of the Rockefeller report on United States-Latin American relations in 1969. The phrase captures not only a part of the governor's personal style, but also some themes of inter-American relations. Many scholars and public officials in the United States start their analyses and their policies from the following premises: there is a special relationship between the United States and Latin America, a positive, cooperative, warm, quasi-familial bond quite beyond the ordinary interstate bond; and there is a mutuality of interests among these countries of the Western Hemisphere that resembles family ties in the best sense. In case these premises are not self-evident, it is appropriate to use a rhetorical style more positively effusive than perhaps the facts may warrant.

"We would sum up, as follows, our aspirations for victory: destruction of imperialism by means of eliminating its strongest bulwark—the imperialist domain of the United States of North America."³ So wrote Ernesto (Ché) Guevara in his public statement to the Organization of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America in 1967. This statement, too, captures not only a part of Guevara's style but also other themes of inter-American relations. The premises of these alternative policy prescriptions and analyses could be thus summarized: there is a special relationship between the United States and Latin America, because the latter has suffered the brunt of oppression and aggression from the former, but there is no hint that Latin America may have benefited from its long association with the United States; the cause is larger and broader than merely inter-American relations, for what is at stake is the future of imperialism as a global phenomenon, where the Latin American connection is but the first step in a course of action; and the times require speed of execution, courage, and commitment. Here too, in case the premises are not self-evident, there is a rhetorical style more gripping and demanding than perhaps the facts may warrant.

The thoughts and styles of scholars are often couched in different language, pursuing different objectives, and relying upon different methods. But

the abyss between the assumptions of Rockefeller and Guevara is frequently in evidence in the world of scholars writing about Latin America. This is perhaps best illustrated within the pages of a volume, edited by Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, with regard to the Alliance for Progress. As Cotler and Fagen themselves note, there is no consensus among the authors of their volume on the intentions, implementation, and consequences of that endeavor.⁴ If scholars on inter-American relations cannot agree on that, a reasonably important item in the collective modern history of the Americas, can they agree on anything?

Indeed, there are some important elements of consensus in the analysis of inter-American relations among people who often emphasize their disagreements and who, in fact, disagree on important questions. Such agreement can help to chart both research and policy attention. The presence of agreement cannot be exaggerated, nor is it the purpose here to foster the view that scholars and public officials generally agree, within and between each set. Moreover, notwithstanding useful efforts to formalize and synthesize "schools" or approaches employed in the study of inter-American relations, there is more variety in approach and in substantive findings within all identifiable schools, and within Latin America and the United States, than is often recognized.⁵ The awareness of variety should avoid premature pigeonholing of scholars and scholarship in a field that can benefit from collaboration and criticisms among many who disagree in part, but not absolutely.

The first section of the essay explores elements of consensus among scholars studying inter-American affairs, and considers consensus on three broad questions. First, what are the stakes in inter-American relations? This requires an exploration of the composition of the international agenda in the hemisphere, including the ranking of issues within the agenda. Second, who acts to affect the stakes in inter-American relations? This requires not only an identification of participants in setting the agenda and setting policy, but also a consideration of the degrees of autonomy that participants may have from each other; if one actor is dominated or severely constrained by another, the form of its participation will be strongly affected. Third, who prevails in inter-American relations? There is need to know what are some of the outcomes of inter-American relations, and who benefits from them.

These are, of course, classic questions: what are the issues? who governs? what difference does it make? The inter-American relations literature poses common tentative answers to these questions to a degree that is not often recognized. The answers may not be entirely correct; some of the questions pertaining to the validity of the answers are considered in this essay, but most are not. The principal purpose here is to describe in a somewhat ordered fashion the state of the literature. The testing of the propositions emerging from this literature is beyond the scope of the present work.

The literature on inter-American relations, however, is better known for its divergences than for its consensus, as noted in the opening phrases of this essay. Thus, the second section explores this subject. Eight perspectives on inter-American relations are sketched. The questions explored in the section on consensus surface once again, but additional questions are considered to facilitate

the delineation of the perspectives. Any effort to classify scholarly work includes an element of arbitrariness. It is plain that the boundaries among these perspectives are fuzzier, in practice, than may appear from the reading of this essay. Although the perspectives are presented as if they were mutually exclusive, they are not, of course. At the end of the essay, a hierarchy of commendable approaches is suggested, drawing from five of the eight perspectives. Such an eclectic use of these different perspectives is possible precisely because some of the boundaries among them are not so sharp. Moreover, they can be applied at different levels of analysis: the inter-American system or the government of each nation-state. Thus scholars employ different perspectives depending in part on the level of analysis. Yet it remains useful to consider the eight perspectives separately also; they are not identical; they are not merely subcategories of other perspectives; there are disagreements on approaches, hypotheses, and conclusions; and there is often confusion when scholars are lumped together at a very high level of aggregation as if they all agreed—this has happened particularly to writers on dependency.

A joint discussion of consensus and divergence within a scholarly literature concerned with a similar set of issues suggests a hypothesis on the sociology of knowledge. Contact across perspectives and national boundaries, leading to scholarly agreement, is often identified with specific individuals of considerable subtlety and intellectual reach. Most scholars within a given perspective may emphasize their orthodoxy, while the leading scholars within that perspective are moving toward coincidence with the leading scholars of other perspectives. These processes may be an ordinary part of social scientific life, where most scholars engage in their normal, orthodox scientific pursuits, while the leading scholars, who established that orthodoxy in times past, are edging toward heretical innovation.

This is not an exhaustive bibliographic study of pertinent works on inter-American affairs, on their impact on development, or on international relations and foreign policy. Items were selected for discussion that meet five criteria (though they do not exhaust the universe within the criteria): they deal with the post-1970 political world in inter-American relations (except as noted in the text); they are broad in scope, and deal with a variety of countries; they are explicitly international, dealing with relations across national boundaries, rather than with the impact of international relations on internal development; they have some public policy implications for governments; and they are examples of high-quality scholarship.

CONSENSUS

Stakes

There is virtually universal agreement that the stakes of inter-American relations include a very high economic content. This consensus has existed for a long time. In the context of general studies of world politics there had been at times a need to justify discussions of international political economy (often called “low politics”) on the same plane as the politics of security, war, force, and threats

(often called "high politics").⁶ That distinction has not been at the forefront of research on inter-American affairs. Recent empirical research, relying upon quantitative methods, has also supported the long-standing view that economic stakes are a principal factor explaining U.S. foreign policy behavior in Latin America, though not the only factor, because politico-military stakes are also important.⁷ However, there is discussion on a related subject: how much importance should be accorded to "high politics"? The Linowitz Commission report notes: "In the past, broad U.S. policies toward Latin America, such as the Alliance for Progress, often reflected concern over possible threats to U.S. security from Latin America." The commission report goes on to argue: "At present and for the foreseeable future, Latin America poses no such threat. Military security, therefore, need not be the overriding goal and ordering principle for U.S. policy in Latin America. Economic issues instead will be the critical ones during the coming years."⁸ The main substantive recommendations of the commission report in the political realm aim to brush away the debris of decades of U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, the Panama Canal, regional organizations, economic sanctions, and general political-military world view.⁹

That prescription, however, does not yet reflect the facts. Though there is some policy movement in the U.S. government on some of these questions, there is also evidence of considerable continuity. The Rockefeller report had outlined a rationale and a set of policy recommendations on military and security matters very much linked to the assumptions and concerns of the cold war.¹⁰ While the conventional wisdom suggests that the Rockefeller report was not implemented (and indeed much of it was not), this underlying rationale was still in evidence in one of the major issues in inter-American relations of the early 1970s. It is now clear that U.S. policies, hostile to the Allende government, were implemented prior to, and somewhat independent from, U.S.-Chilean disputes over the takeover of Anaconda and Kennecott copper mines. The rationale for those policies was anti-Communism (the absolute independence from copper socialization cannot be demonstrated in full, nor is it likely; presumably Secretary Kissinger and his associates anticipated such a takeover from the kind of government they foresaw). There were varieties of hostility to the Allende government; there was considerable bureaucratic dispute within the U.S. government about what should and should not be done, but there was hostility. The ideological and security elements, although not identically shared, not fully coordinated, and mixed with economic elements, retained not only substantial importance, but also autonomy as an important rationale for U.S. policies. Thus political and economic elements are both independent from each other and sources of contamination for each other. Though these assumptions are not shared unanimously either within the executive branch or in the Congress of the United States, they are rather widespread.¹¹ The touchstone of these attitudes in the Congress has been the Panama Canal: to a substantial degree, opposition to a new treaty is fanned by the same cold war rationale, though not exclusively by it, as well as by concerns related to the economic and social importance of the Canal for the U.S. government, private enterprises, "Zonians," and others.¹²

An interesting twist added by the Linowitz Commission report, with

scholarly support, would further intermingle economic and political relations. The commission report recommends that the political-security rationales for arms transfer policies be downgraded or eliminated: thus they recommend the termination of grant military materiel assistance programs in Latin America, and the discouragement of arms purchases. The commission report also recommends that legislative restrictions on arms transfers that discriminate against Latin America be repealed: "Conventional military equipment should be available to Latin American countries on a competitive, commercial and non-discriminatory basis."¹³ While the arguments for this position carry persuasiveness, and while this may be the "best" policy under the circumstances, the attempted depoliticization of a highly political "transfer," and its subsequent commercialization, may have the effect of contaminating politics and trade even more. The probable outcome would be to increase the economic elements of arms transfers without eliminating the political content, because arms transfers are inherently political.

On the Latin American side, there has never been much doubt that economic issues rank high on the inter-American agenda and that politics and economics are joined. Nevertheless, the point is often forgotten that Latin American scholars have explicit political-military dimensions in their analyses, typically integrating the economic and the political. They do not just emphasize economic aspects. For example, Osvaldo Sunkel, who has written extensively about the transnational economic trends and forces linking central and dependent countries, has also written about differences in political ideologies and interests within the United States, which could be used to Latin America's advantage. In this case, there is not only substantial political content to the analysis, but also a set of specific policy suggestions for maneuver for dependent countries aware of political competition in a central country.¹⁴ Helio Jaguaribe's analysis of inter-imperial politics links changes in political, economic, and military global constellations to their consequences for Latin America. He explicitly discusses the degree of political maneuverability for dependent Latin American countries afforded by both the political and military characteristics of the international system, and by the political competition within the United States.¹⁵

A third, and last, example of the contamination of politics and economics is the redefinition of national security by some Latin American military to include the internal and the international, the military, the political, and the economic. The Peruvian armed forces may have gone furthest in this direction, but elements of this view have become very widespread. Thus, retired General Juan Guglielmelli put forth three different but linked propositions about the role and function of the armed forces in Argentina, and presumably in other countries, in the founding two issues of *Estrategia*. Guglielmelli argued first, that "no country can foreclose the possibility of armed conflict with neighboring countries"; second, that "the most typical form of external aggression in Latin America has been economic aggression"; and, third, that though the armed forces should preserve internal order, they ought to "pay attention to the kind of order they are preserving, because an order without change" leads to the status quo, underdevelopment, and violence as a consequence thereof; "repression can only suppress the external forms of discontent, but not their bases"—development is required to

do that.¹⁶ In this view, a national security policy requires a policy linkage between internal and international levels, and between political and economic scope. The presence of economics does not wash out the role of force, even the role of international war. The issues are important and contaminated.

Participants

There is a consensus that states can act in international affairs, autonomous both from foreign countries and from social and economic class and group pressures; this is an emerging consensus, not a fully crystallized one, and it is only about the present, not about the past. Anibal Quijano argues that, for internal and international reasons, military-technocratic regimes have achieved a larger margin of relative autonomy. "At the same time, the state—controlled by these social forces—was increasing its relative autonomy with respect to the basic classes of the national society." This is, in Quijano's view, a relatively recent phenomenon.¹⁷ The new state is also more autonomous because it is stronger and more competent to govern, that is, to make certain that its policies are implemented. Fernando Henrique Cardoso has also stressed both directions of a possible and relative state-society autonomy: just as the state, especially in military technocratic hands, has a degree of autonomy relative to the society, there are also elements of society that managed to escape the state's control, even under authoritarian conditions, facilitating a substantial degree of pluralism.¹⁸

This stress on the possible and relative autonomy of the state does not mean that Latin American scholars, in particular, have abandoned the view that the state responds to the interests of the elites, national and transnational. A useful formulation of the emerging view is provided by Marcos Kaplan. He finds the Latin American state "emerging and affirming itself" and argues that:

The state and its bureaucracy tend to be converted into a separate social conglomerate with its own interests and an appreciable degree of independence, a conglomerate that assumes a role as arbitrator among classes, factions, and groups. Its action is dual and ambiguous: on the one hand, it operates as an expression of the system and an instrument of the dominant classes, and its action corresponds, *in the final instance*, to their interests; on the other hand, there is not total identification between the state bureaucracy and a given class, nor is the former mechanically or instrumentally subordinated to the latter (Kaplan's stress).¹⁹

Until fairly recently, the predominant view among scholars of U.S. foreign policy was that states mattered the most and, in more extreme form, that only states mattered in international affairs. Most of them, therefore, do not have to be persuaded that it is possible for states to have relative autonomy from social and economic forces, nor is it necessary to elaborate on their views here. What is somewhat newer is the clear perception by U.S. scholars that Latin American states are not only autonomous but also much stronger than in the past. This is

best reflected in the subtitle of the book edited by Luigi Einaudi: Latin America takes charge of its future.²⁰

It is also useful to rely upon U.S. studies to note another rather recent change in scholarship, supporting a different aspect of an emerging consensus: though states matter and can have autonomy, they are not the only significant actors. Transnational forces and organizations—trade, multinational enterprises, churches, guerrilla organizations, etc.—have a significant impact upon international relations.²¹ Einaudi notes how U.S. corporations often gain their influence over foreign policy by manipulating the symbols of nationalism within the United States.²² Einaudi, Michael Fleet, Richard Maullin, and Alfred Stepan have written about transnational relations within the Roman Catholic Church, discussing both intra-Latin American and inter-American Catholic relationships, especially attending to the impact of religious beliefs upon international and national politics and economics.²³ David Ronfeldt and Einaudi have also continued to pay attention to transnational violence from guerrilla and similar groups, though stressing a much more sober and analytical perspective on these organizations and processes than had been the case in this literature.²⁴ Herbert Goldhamer's comprehensive study of non-Latin American powers in Latin America pays considerable attention to economic stakes, participants, and instrumentalities.²⁵ And Henry Landsberger has written about relations among international labor organizations in the Americas.

Outcomes

There is also an emerging consensus that private interest groups, especially business groups, do not always prevail in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. This underlines the tension among actors and actions in foreign policy. Quijano has argued that, in more recent times and only then, the "national-imperialist state" (e.g., the United States) finds that "the mere defense of the interests of each North American imperialist firm operating in these countries could aggravate the contradictions and the political-social conflicts within these countries." Thus imperialism "must inevitably tolerate the sacrifice of the interests of this or that individual imperialist firm."²⁷ In addition, private influence does not always prevail in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy in the client state. For example, Carlos Estevam Martins calls the government of Brazil, under Castelo Branco, "subimperialist" within a more general "liberal-imperialist" framework. This subimperialist liberal-imperialist government, among other things, systematically set aside the protests formulated by the Center for Industries of the State of São Paulo against the making of rules more favorable to foreign capital.²⁸ To be sure, the Castelo Branco government is described as subimperialist, in part, because it is responsive to international private enterprise even at the expense of national private enterprise. But in that process of response and rejection, the Brazilian state acquired a substantial degree of autonomy as an intermediary among competing private interests. It is not simply responding to private pressure.

The behavior of multinational enterprises in Latin America has been receiving increasing public and scholarly attention in the United States. The U.S. Senate helped to expose the activities of ITT in Chile. However, though good studies are not abundant, they begin to suggest possible lines of inquiry consistent with the proposition that private business interests do not always prevail. Theodore Moran's study of multinational copper enterprises in Chile shows that Anaconda and Kennecott had lost most important political allies within Chile years before they were expropriated by the Allende government. These enterprises gradually lost their ability to prevail over the Chilean state as their bargaining leverage eroded; the foreign enterprises thus were decreasingly able to prevail and decreasingly able to find local political support. On the home front, the United States government was hostile to Chile, but it did not use all of the possible pressures it could have brought on Chile after the socialization of Anaconda and Kennecott and, in particular, it did not apply the "mandatory" legal sanctions of the Hickenlooper Amendment. Franklin Tugwell's study of the sanctions of petroleum in Venezuela reaches similar conclusions, notwithstanding clear differences between Chile and Venezuela. Tugwell himself notes that both the Venezuelan and Chilean cases "demonstrate the danger of automatically assuming a united front among private powerholders in Latin America." In Venezuela, as in Chile, there was a growing estrangement between the multinational petroleum enterprises and the Venezuelan private sector, so that the former stood alone as the Venezuelan state proceeded to take them over in the mid-1970s. More generally, Tugwell writes about the "degenerative instability" of the relationship between the Venezuelan government and the multinational petroleum enterprises. This results not only from the mistrust and uncertainty built into the system of concessions, but also (as Moran would concur) from "the shift in bargaining power to the state that occurs as foreign companies sink their capital in extractive enterprise and become more vulnerable to government demands for a greater share of profits."²⁹

Charles Goodsell's study of U.S. enterprises in Peru is congruent with this view. Standard Oil of New Jersey's bargaining leverage gradually eroded, culminating in state takeover. Though the United States government applied pressure on Peru over a long time, as it would on Chile, the more extreme legal sanctions were not applied and a settlement was eventually reached. Within Peru, the U.S.-based multinational enterprises did not agree among themselves about a specific strategy, nor did the U.S. embassy agree with them in many instances.³⁰

If private business does not always prevail, the other side of the coin is that, in crisis situations, the United States government attempts to defend its hegemonial preeminence within the inter-American system. This "defense of the system" hypothesis specifies that the U.S. government will act to constrain the foreign policy behavior of Latin American countries if, but only if, either one of two thresholds is crossed. One threshold is the possible establishment of a close alignment with an enemy, whether the Axis powers in World War II, or the Soviet Union or China since then. Another threshold is a violation of the property principles in international capitalism. The first points to U.S. behavior in Guate-

mala (1954), the Dominican Republic (1965), Chile (1970–73), and, of course, Cuba since 1959. The second threshold points to U.S. government behavior in virtually all instances of the takeover of foreign-owned property by Latin American governments; the principle that *some* compensation must be paid has been adhered to by the U.S. government, even if a great many compromises have been made on the amount, the timing, and the form of compensation. A Latin American country need not fear a serious impairment of its relations with the United States if it does not pay prompt, full compensation in cash; but relations will be impaired if no compensation is forthcoming. In instances of these violations, the U.S. government has acted strongly in inter-American affairs to defend the “rules of the game” according to its own norms. If these two thresholds are not crossed, the behavior that the U.S. government is willing to allow within the boundaries of the inter-American system is quite diverse. Thus this hypothesis seeks to specify both the presence and the absence of U.S. foreign policy “aggressive” behavior under certain conditions.

Quijano places this proposition at the core of his analysis. The United States, in his view, though willing to sacrifice individual firms for tactical reasons, will attempt to defend the system of international capitalist production.³¹ Some of the evidence of “moderate” U.S. government behavior is consistent with this hypothesis. For example, though the United States government did not intervene militarily or even invoke economic sanctions, supposedly mandatory in U.S. legislation, to intervene in the investment disputes with Peru in the 1960s and Chile in the early 1970s, it applied substantial pressure on both countries to force them to settle on acceptable terms with the expropriated firms (or, in the case of the Belaúnde government of Peru, to influence the pre-expropriation bargaining). The pressures were more severe in the Chilean case. The Peruvian case led to a compromise settlement in 1974 (as a result of the Greene Mission), which upheld both the Peruvian expropriations and the principle of property compensation.³²

The Linowitz Commission report suggests that the “defense of the system” hypothesis is broadly shared, even by persons not then within the U.S. government. Though the commission report is, ordinarily, a very conciliatory and noncoercive document, it changes tone concerning investment disputes: “arbitrary and unilateral disrespect of contractual obligations by any government must not be condoned,” though the commission report does not want to apply automatic sanctions and prefers that the U.S. government become directly involved as little as possible. Yet, the commission report is not at all prepared to abandon U.S. government intervention in investment disputes: “It is not enough to assert that ‘international law’ protects foreign investors, nor can we realistically urge U.S. or other foreign companies to accept without any diplomatic recourse, the application of host country laws and practices to their companies when those practices contradict prevailing international norms.”³³ The things the commission is not prepared to accept or to ask others to accept have, of course, politicized inter-American investment disputes over time. The ability to “take the longer view,” including the willingness to rise above the interests of an individual U.S. firm for the sake of defending a “good investment

climate," is not unique to the U.S. government. Other organizations, including the Council of the Americas (an organization of U.S. enterprises operating in Latin America), show evidence of similar behavior.³⁴

A somewhat open question in the literature is whether the "defense of the system" hypothesis is peculiar to a capitalist state, such as the United States, or whether it is common to the behavior of all major powers. In an inter-American context, the issue pertains primarily to the Cuban-Soviet relationship. It has been argued that both the United States and the Soviet Union attempted to "defend the system" in their relations with Cuba, before and after 1960, though in different ways and for different purposes.³⁵ More generally, Jaguaribe's writing suggests that this kind of behavior is, indeed, shared by all major powers.³⁶

Another important outcome on which there is substantial consensus is that private economic interest groups do prevail often enough in the formulation of government policy. The immediately previous discussion is evidence of substantial, though not unlimited, private influence on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. R. Harrison Wagner has also shown how the influence of private interests on governmental economic policy has been effected in the United States. The institutionalization of a decentralized U.S. foreign economic policy allows interested nongovernmental groups and individuals to participate in policymaking.³⁷ Moreover, though single enterprises do not systematically block the will of the executive branch of the U.S. government, they have done so at times by using their leverage within the U.S. Congress to block legislation that is necessary to implement important foreign policy decisions. For example, Stephen Krasner has shown that the General Foods Co. was able to prevent the effective adherence of the United States to the International Coffee Agreement, pending the resolution (to General Foods' satisfaction) of a dispute over the importation of soluble coffee from Brazil into the United States.³⁸ There is also evidence that private economic interest groups prevail at times over the formulation of foreign policy by Latin American states. Krasner has also shown the substantial weight of private producers on Brazil's foreign coffee policy.³⁹ David Bushnell has noted the same behavior in Colombia, where coffee producers are the principal interest group affecting Colombian foreign policy and inter-American relations.⁴⁰ Similarly Robert Clark has shown that the private business sector's organization in Venezuela, FEDECAMARAS, had a very substantial effect in shaping Venezuelan policies toward Latin American integration in the 1960s, sabotaging prointegration efforts.⁴¹ And Olga Pellicer de Brody has shown the impact of Mexican private entrepreneurs on the formulation of a policy that was not of direct material importance to them (Mexican policy toward Cuba) but was perceived to affect the general climate of U.S.-Mexican relations, itself of substantial importance to Mexican entrepreneurs.⁴² The latter instance is relatively rare (and, indeed, this article is cited again and again, not only for its quality, but also, apparently, because it is difficult to find other instances). On the whole, entrepreneurs seek to influence foreign policy primarily when it is in their clear and evident interest to do so. There is, therefore, a fairly generalized consensus that states—both in the United States and in Latin America—are

“penetrated” by private interests, some national and some transnational, and that these do prevail over policy formulation often enough.

There is also an emerging consensus that there is no easy “mutuality of interests” between the United States and Latin America. There is, at the very least, a problematic response to the question: Who benefits in inter-American relations? Those who believe that the United States is an imperial power perceive no broad mutuality of interests. However, even some who may believe that there is a mutuality of interests have come to appreciate the difficulties in implementing policies yielding joint gains that may be perceived to be equitable for all participants. Let us focus on the views of liberal elite members in the United States who have held government office. Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William D. Rogers, testified that “this Hemisphere has a long relationship built on unique and common, cultural and historical experiences. The relationship is an uneasy one now. The nations of Latin America are extremely sensitive to what they think they see as threats to their developmental aspirations.”⁴³ The report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations states that “the United States should no longer assume, as it often has, an easy or permanent mutuality of interest between ourselves and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean. Common interests do indeed exist, but they need to be nurtured. At the same time conflicts and points of tension cannot be ignored.”⁴⁴ Conservative nationalists in the United States have also come to the view that confrontation, rather than shared interests, is the norm and the fact of inter-American relations. The views of former Secretary of the Treasury John Connally on U.S.-Latin America relations and the Nixon administration’s decisions on expropriation of U.S. property illustrate this emerging nationalist perception in the United States.⁴⁵

If the old argument about mutuality of interests has little life left in it, an emerging hypothesis is that there is a mutuality of interests between particular classes. The modified mutuality of interests hypothesis suggests that joint interests in the integrated development of factors of industrial production in both Latin America and in the United States are perceived by industrial entrepreneurs in *both areas*.^{*} In the short run, there may be specific policy differences; certain enterprises and even certain economic sectors will feel threatened by either national or international actions. In the long run, the modern industrial sectors

*I do not agree entirely with this consensus. While it may be true that Latin America and the United States may realize joint gains in the integrated development of their industries, a good deal more needs to be said about the characteristics of that integration. Will Latin America produce high technology products, too? Second, I am unpersuaded that all industrial entrepreneurs perceive those common interests; scattered data from several large Latin American countries—which I expect to analyze further in the future—suggest to me, at least provisionally, profound divisions among national entrepreneurs concerning attitudes toward multinational enterprises. Those national entrepreneurs who oppose multinational enterprises within the borders of their countries (and they are not an insubstantial number) put forth views that go well beyond short-term policy differences: they suggest strong long-term opposition to multinationals. They do not like competition from multinationals and they do not perceive how their own firms can survive faced with foreign penetration of their markets.

in Latin America and the United States perceive that they may realize joint gains. The consensus breaks down, however, in specifying the distribution of those gains, not only between the United States and Latin America, but also among social classes within particular countries. This consensus also excludes natural resource industries. Tugwell's study of Venezuela, Moran's of Chile, and Goodsell's of Peru show that there was little solidarity between the multinational natural resource enterprises and the national business enterprises. This lack of solidarity was evident not only when the multinational subsidiaries were taken over by the respective government, but also for a number of years prior to that time.

Sunkel has argued that the spread of transnational capitalism has led to the integration of the modern sectors in industrialized and in less industrialized countries and, consequently, to internal disintegration, particularly within the latter. This is not a stagnant or static situation; on the contrary, it is inherent in transnational modernity that there is considerable dynamic change. Sunkel has drawn specific policy implications from this transnational structural analysis. Thus he has analyzed the Alliance for Progress policies as a transnational modern industrializing elite coalition between the United States and Latin America.⁴⁶ Gustavo Esteva's analysis of the international context of Mexico's development and planning leads to similar conclusions. He argues that Mexico has overcome the more "obvious and hateful" forms of direct dependence; nevertheless, the roots of the new economic dependence are so profound that cutting them off would tear out a fair part of otherwise desirable conditions: "to confront foreign interests means often to confront our own interests. It is not a simple matter that foreign relations would block development, rather, the problem is that the former and the latter are so intertwined that it is impossible to conceive their independent paths."⁴⁷ Octavio Ianni, in a more formal Marxist framework, has also argued that inter-American relations emphasize the transnational and hierarchical class interests of the international and national bourgeoisie in the United States and Latin American countries.⁴⁸

A long-standing hypothesis about the process of U.S. policymaking is quite congruent with this modified mutuality of interests hypothesis. The Latin American Bureau of the Department of State (ARA) ordinarily engages in trans-governmental coalitions with Latin American foreign offices and embassies in Washington. There is a transgovernmental bureaucratic mutual interest in (a) reducing conflict between the United States and Latin America; (b) combatting the usurpation of the foreign policy fields by secretaries of the treasury or ministers of finance or other non-foreign policy bureaucrats; and (c) asserting the primacy of politics over the interests of particular private enterprises. Thus the Department of State acts as a broker on behalf of its Latin American bureaucratic colleagues. The department may be neither adept nor successful, but there is a general consensus about the main features of its behavior. These are, of course, old themes in the study of inter-American relations; they were documented by Bryce Wood in his study of the Good Neighbor policy.⁴⁹ The rise of the bureaucratic politics mode of analysis among social scientists in the United States has brought forth many case studies that support this generalization. Latin Ameri-

can diplomats prefer to strengthen the hand of the Department of State within the bureaucratic and executive-legislative milieu of the U.S. government and, in turn, the Department of State behaves as a broker for Latin American governments before the Congress and other agencies within the executive branch, albeit often unsuccessfully.⁵⁰ Thus a modified mutuality of interests hypothesis, though with different content, is broadly shared now in analyses of inter-American relations.

A corollary from the argument that the Department of State is often unsuccessful in the performance of its brokerage role on behalf of its transgovernmental clients—Latin American foreign policy bureaucracies—is that other agencies and private interests within the U.S. government are likely to prevail. The same literature documents the weaknesses of the State Department before congressional committees, particularly when private interests are very active, and before other agencies within the executive branch such as the Treasury Department.

More generally, there is also ample consensus that U.S. dominance prevails in inter-American relations. This hypothesis is particularly persuasive because scholars have reached it from different premises, using different approaches and world views. Christopher Mitchell has argued “that both dominance and fragmentation have characterized U.S. hemispheric policy, and that the latter has helped cause the former.” Lack of coordination within the U.S. government gave many private bureaucratic interest groups “nearly direct access to fragments of governmental power.” In addition, “poor coordination helped preserve the policy of dominance by obscuring the vision of the President and by placing political obstacles in his path.”⁵¹ The politics of fragmented decision, with considerable private weight, were difficult to change. Faced with the statement that the U.S. has exercised dominion in Latin America, Jorge Graciarena, criticizing Mitchell, asked “of what importance is the discovery that North American policy in the region has at times been implemented in an incoherent or contradictory manner?” Instead, Graciarena argues that “the fundamental interests of the United States as a nation and leader of the capitalist world rarely enter into the debates of the political functionaries and bureaucrats, since these interests are shared among them as a common assumption.” There may be tactical disagreements over policy implementation, but the fundamental characteristic is the execution of a policy of domination, based on shared interests and values, by the ruling elites in the United States. The U.S. prevails precisely because it is the dominating power over subordinate client countries.⁵² Note, however, the common finding among scholars who disagree sharply and directly with each other, that the U.S. has exercised dominion and that it has benefited disproportionately from inter-American relations over time and into the present day. Opposing approaches arrive at the same conclusion, though in different ways.*

*Although the argument of U.S. dominance is quite pervasive in the literature, and broadly shared even among scholars who otherwise disagree, there is a curious lack of effort to relate these arguments about general U.S. dominion to particular policy outcomes. It was stated earlier, for example, that the U.S. government does not defend the interests of every firm based in the United States which may be engaged in a dispute with a Latin

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A paradigm is a universally recognized scientific achievement “that for a time provides model problems and solutions to a community of practitioners.” A paradigm structures the questions to be asked, the methods to be followed, and the probable answers to be expected.⁵³ It is debatable whether there are paradigms in social science, strictly speaking, because there is no universally recognized high order theoretical achievement to provide the necessary substantial prior agreement in social scientific endeavors. Social science, for this and other reasons, differs from the natural sciences. Instead, a part of the apparent chaos of social science stems precisely from the absence of a paradigm. Proponents of different clusters of ideas set forth claims as if they were paradigms, but these ideas are rarely sufficiently comprehensive, or rigorous, or persuasive, to lead to their universal recognition as theoretical scientific achievement. The subfield of the study of inter-American relations shares this debilitating condition with the rest of social science. There are several clusters of ideas seeking to be born as paradigms; they coexist, and they compete.

Liberal, Orthodox Dependency, and Bureaucratic Perspectives

Abraham Lowenthal summarized three “perspectives” on inter-American affairs, and particularly on the Alliance for Progress, which he called “liberal,” “radical,” and “bureaucratic.” The liberal perspective has accepted the general and unmodified mutuality of interests hypothesis outlined earlier because it assumes that values are shared in the Americas. Outcomes could, in principle, benefit all, although there are short-term losers. It has argued a strong case for the autonomy of the U.S. government over and at times against private interests, whose role is minimized within the perspective; and it has argued that the U.S. government has the competence to define and implement the national interest rationally, coherently, and autonomously from particular private interests across issue areas. Domestic politics are moderately important in policymaking. Disputes between Latin America and the United States arise from confusion and misunderstanding.⁵⁴ There is often considerable strategic concern with the policies of the U.S.S.R. and China, and there is a generally widespread ideology of anticommunism (a subject recently analyzed in particular by Yale Ferguson).⁵⁵

The radical perspective is premised on a basic conflict between “the U.S. aim to dominate Latin America and the Latin Americans’ urge to achieve sov-

American government. Yet, if a U.S.-based firm “loses” in its relationship with a Latin American government, should one modify the U.S. dominion hypothesis in any way? If the United States changes its views—as it has over the years—on such issues as the need for an Inter-American Development Bank, or for an international coffee agreement, or the return of Chamizal to Mexico, or Brazilian soluble coffee exports to the United States, to adopt a position closer to Latin American views, does one need to modify a hypothesis about U.S. dominion in policy outcomes? I am, therefore, not sufficiently persuaded that consensus hypothesis has been specified or proven. At a minimum, one would need to separate the “defense of the hegemonial system” hypothesis, which seems persuasive, from others, and scrutinize these latter hypotheses more carefully.

ereignty." This perspective has argued for a rather weak autonomy of the state relative to private economic interests, who role is stressed. It rejects the mistake-and-misunderstanding argument because values are not shared, and posits in its place a rational, coherent, continuous, long-term pattern of intended domination. Some dependency writers, however, prefer to say little about how U.S. policy is made; instead, they focus on the consequences of imperialism/dependency for Latin America which, they claim, exhibit a structural continuity, notwithstanding short-term disputes among policymakers.⁵⁶ This perspective stresses the dependence of Latin America, economically, politically, militarily, and culturally on the United States, and it relies heavily on Marxist analyses. Imperialism dominates outcomes. Robert Packenham has noted four core propositions in dependency theories: (1) a very low degree of client autonomy; (2) some elites in the client states fully collaborate with the dominating state and make dependency possible; (3) capitalism is the motive force behind dependency; and (4) the consequences of dependency are negative for the dependent country.⁵⁷

Lowenthal has also noted that the liberal and radical perspectives have a number of points in common. In particular, many authors from both perspectives assume that "policies are made by unitary, rational actors (analogous to individuals) choosing instruments in accord with established purposes."⁵⁸ Instead, Lowenthal argues—following Graham Allison and others before him⁵⁹—for a bureaucratic perspective that "treats U.S. policy not as the choice of a single rational actor, but rather as the product of a series of overlapping and interlocking bargaining processes within the North American system, involving both intra-governmental and extra-governmental actors." Lowenthal further notes that "although these processes take place within established parameters and are importantly affected by extra-bureaucratic constraints, including shared values, their products are also very much influenced by events and procedures internal to governmental organizations and often minimized (or overlooked) by liberal and radical observers."⁶⁰

Two criticisms can be made of Lowenthal's helpful systematization. First, there are bridges across these perspectives, including shared findings. It is inherent in an effort to systematize perspectives that important differences among them are correctly highlighted; but one may be misled into overlooking the points of contact, not only between liberal and radical perspectives (the latter will henceforth be called the orthodox dependency perspective), but also between these and a bureaucratic perspective. Moreover, by emphasizing some of the principal features of each, and giving weight within each to what is common to it, Lowenthal has downplayed the degree of variation within each perspective. The shifts within and among perspectives are consistent with the sociology of knowledge hypothesis outlined in the introduction.

Lowenthal's three perspectives are also found at two different levels of analysis. The bureaucratic perspective addresses issues at the nation-state governmental level; it seeks to shed light on decision-making processes. The orthodox dependency perspective addresses issues at the systemic level; it seeks to shed light on structural, system-wide processes, and especially their conse-

quences or outcomes. The liberal perspective addresses issues at both levels; although the principal orientation is toward the inter-American system as a whole, mistakes and misunderstandings are often explained at the nation-state governmental level, relying on methods that are quite similar to those of the bureaucratic perspective.

One can specify some further divergences, particularly between the liberal and the orthodox dependency perspectives, which set some clear limits to the consensus outlined earlier concerning stakes and participants; there are also substantial methodological differences.

The basic difference concerning the stakes of inter-American affairs is that some scholars, most of them from the United States, insist on the primacy of politics. Though virtually all scholars concede that there are important economic issues that are a part of the stakes of inter-American affairs, some have argued, and sought to demonstrate empirically, that politics and political stakes have prevailed and that economic issues are on a secondary plane. There is a long tradition of scholarship in this vein. Let us cite three scholars, writing about different events, who agree on the specific emphases concerning inter-American stakes. Dana G. Munro concludes his study of inter-American relations at the beginning of the twentieth century with the generalization that "as we look back on the story, however, it seems clear that the motives that inspired its [U.S. government] policy were basically political rather than economic." Munro argues that this proposition applies across presidencies, issue areas, countries, and time; as a liberal, in Lowenthal's definition, he acknowledges that "many of the American government's actions were ill-judged and unfortunate in their results."⁶¹

Bryce Wood's study of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy reaches similar conclusions. After studying a number of U.S.-Latin American disputes of unquestionable economic content, Wood concluded that political considerations—particularly the perceived need in Washington for Latin American collaboration in war—overrode economic considerations and led to the sacrifice of the interests of U.S. private enterprises in Latin America whenever the interest of these enterprises collided with political priorities.⁶² And, more recently, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. has criticized "the latter-day theory that the Alliance was cunningly devised by United States capitalists to protect their investments and enlarge their markets south of the border." Instead, Schlesinger quotes Lowenthal approvingly that "far from reflecting big business domination of United States foreign policy, the Alliance for Progress commitment emerged in part because of the unusual (and temporary) reduction of corporate influence in the foreign policymaking process."⁶³ Other scholars would not choose to emphasize the primacy of politics. On the contrary, they would emphasize the primacy of economics. Yet another group of scholars, moreover, might argue that disputes about the primacy of politics over economics, or vice versa, are not entirely illuminating. Instead, they would emphasize their contamination as a long standing feature of inter-American relations. Emphases, however, do vary, and no vision of the field is complete without a full awareness of them.

There is also a substantial difference of opinion concerning the degree of

autonomy of the state, though it has been argued that there is an emerging consensus that states have substantial autonomy from social and economic forces. Not all scholars agree. The alternative hypothesis is the "vanishing state." Not only do economics have primacy over politics, but the autonomy of politics disappears altogether. Dale Johnson has written that "foreign policy flows naturally, and by and large rationally, from the structure described. The basis of United States foreign policy is a conception of national interest as inherently involved in the strengthening of international capitalism against the threats of socialism and nationalism."⁶⁴ In addition, he has also argued that "United States private investment, aid program, foreign policy, military assistance, military interventions, and international agencies, under the influence or control of the international business community, are interwoven and oriented toward the promotion and maintenance of influence and control in other countries. These are the dimensions of imperialism."⁶⁵ This is as clear a statement of core orthodox dependency propositions as one can find. This view does not agree with the emerging consensus discussed earlier; it does not fit what will be called the unorthodox dependency perspective. It is important, nevertheless, to take into account arguments such as Johnson's as evidence of dissent from an emerging scholarly consensus.

Throughout this essay, there is evidence of substantial methodological differences, whether consensus or divergence has been discussed. In a broad sense, these are differences between Marxist and non-Marxist approaches (including liberal, bureaucratic, and others to be discussed). Marxist approaches tend to emphasize more the importance of economic stakes, participants, and outcomes, and they tend to emphasize economic factors in the explanation of politics. Non-Marxist approaches do not have so much of a common core; they are generally more likely, however, to emphasize the autonomy of political stakes, participants, and outcomes, and of political factors in the explanation of politics, than Marxist approaches. Though methodologies differ in these important respects, and they magnify the divergences, this does not prevent a degree of consensus on important points. For example, as discussed in the first part of this essay, Mitchell and Graciarena disagreed on the degree of coherence or fragmentation of U.S. policy, on the degree of policy rationality, on the weight of economic factors, and related issues, but they agreed on the fact of U.S. dominance in inter-American affairs. Quijano and Kaplan, to cite another previously discussed set of authors and writings, agree with those who emphasize bureaucratic approaches concerning the increasing relative autonomy of the state in its relations with social forces, even though there are wide divergences in the stress on the class interests represented by the state, the degree of social and economic autonomy of the bureaucracy, and related issues. The methodological differences, in sum, are important, but they do not altogether prevent substantive agreement on important questions.

Strategic, Unorthodox Dependency, Organizational Ideology, Presidential Politics, and Political System Perspectives

There are at least five additional perspectives identifiable in the literature of inter-American relations. Because of space constraints, these will only be sketched and illustrated briefly here, without attempting to match the intellectual rigor of the original authors, or of those who have systematized these or other approaches. They can be found at different levels of analysis, and are discussed below with these levels in mind. The five perspectives are called: strategic, unorthodox dependency, organizational ideology, presidential politics, and political system. Perspectives at a "high" or systemic level of analysis (e.g., liberal, strategic, and both types of dependency) can accommodate—with limits—perspectives at a lower level of analysis. A liberal may explain a mistake or misunderstanding in terms of bureaucratic factors or political conflict; an unorthodox dependency writer could admit the same further specifications at a lower level of analysis. Orthodox dependency writers often admit analyses at a "lower" bureaucratic or interest-group level, though they may say these are not terribly pertinent to the truly important questions of structural continuity. Thus the perspectives that focus on system-wide, often structural concerns, may be permissive toward perspectives operating at lower levels of analysis (government of a nation-state), because these can contribute to fill in the details; however, the former tend to deny the sufficiency of these lower-level-of-analysis perspectives. Similarly, perspectives operating at a low level of analysis (bureaucratic, political) tend to deny the necessity of using those operating at a higher level. These lower-level perspectives come close to suggesting that the "higher" perspectives are fallacious: findings at a higher level of analysis can be considered a spurious correlation because, though they appear impressive at first, they have in fact ignored all the truly necessary and pertinent intermediate variables.⁶⁶

There is no clear way out of the level of analysis problem. Unorthodox dependency and liberal authors, in particular, operate often at both levels of analysis. Orthodox dependency authors seem most scornful of the lower levels of analysis; bureaucratic politics authors, at the other end of the spectrum, seem most resistant to contemplating the possible necessity of higher levels of analysis. In this essay, authors are classified according to what seem to be their principal intellectual proclivities; yet readers should not be surprised to find an unorthodox dependency writer, or a liberal, traversing levels of analysis.

Strategic / This perspective is the oldest of all: strategic, rational, calculating, cost-and-benefit conscious, unified actor analysis, with a stress on international conflict. There is a surface methodological similarity with Lowenthal's liberal perspective, including a rational, unified state actor assumption, and descriptions of policies assuming a high order of coherence. However, while the liberal perspective assumes a conclusion—mutuality of interests—the strategic perspective does no such thing. It is in the mainstream of the old orthodoxy of international relations studies, based on the expectations of conflict and low value sharing, prior to the emergence of dependence and bureaucratic politics approaches in the 1960s as perspectives competing for paradigm status. Al-

though the strategic perspective had been the orthodoxy of international relations studies in the United States, as Lowenthal points out, many who held to this approach in the context of inter-American relations became "liberals" because they tried to insist upon the mutuality of military, political, economic, and cultural interests between the United States and Latin America. The single most important feature of the inter-American uses of the strategic approach is that economic and politico-military stakes are considered inherent in high politics, intimately linked, and hence appropriate for aggregated strategic analysis across issue areas. Conflict, not harmony, is at the heart of the analysis. The international system is the focus of the analysis in part because it is considered the principal source of policy change. States can act autonomously, although private interest groups play a moderate role. In the long run, outcomes are not predetermined; they are shaped by skillful manipulation of the international system.

Most of the genuine strategic thinking in inter-American relations has not been done by U.S. but by Latin American social scientists. Among works of U.S. social scientists, the chief recent exceptions are by David Ronfeldt, Luigi Einaudi, Herbert Goldhamer, Robert Swansbrough, and Thomas Skidmore.⁶⁷ Because the general approach in the U.S. is so well known, little will be said about it here, except to highlight its specific inter-American aspects. Moreover, we will focus on Latin American social scientists—Marxists and non-Marxists—because they have been the principal contributors to the approach in the inter-American context.

A number of Argentine authors are extraordinarily conscious of this approach and use it repeatedly. They are linked to the journal *Estrategia*. One crucial focus of Argentine strategic analysis is the balance of power in southern South America, and particularly between Argentina and Brazil. Although many of these authors propose cooperative measures as an alternative to Brazilian-Argentine competition, the underlying theme of the discussion is an acute awareness of political conflict and of the utility of strategic thinking.⁶⁸ Similarly, this journal has paid considerable attention to Argentine boundary disputes and to the conflict with the United Kingdom over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands.⁶⁹

Within the context of this perspective, it is striking to consider the evolution of scholarly writings in *Foro internacional*. The articles in the journal's first volume were overwhelmingly "liberal" in Lowenthal's sense, that is, the authors were aware of conflicts with the United States that were perceived as a bad thing, which rational people of good will could solve.⁷⁰ In the spring of 1964, Maria Elena Rodríguez de Magis was the first author to break out of the liberal mold of *Foro's* articles in a discussion of the emergence of international coimperialism between the United States and the Soviet Union.⁷¹ The crisis of the liberal perspective in *Foro* was perhaps best exemplified by Mario Ojeda's article in a special 1966 issue on Mexican foreign policy. Ojeda, a perceptive analyst within the strategic perspective but in contact with the liberal perspective, analyzed difficulties of Mexican foreign relations, particularly of relations with the United States. He concluded: "It is difficult to decide to what extent they [problems in Mexican foreign relations] are deficiencies of the system, or of political

economy, or even the logical consequences of the stage of development through which the country is passing and which are solvable in the long run.”⁷² As the liberal perspective came under challenge, various aspects of the dependency perspectives became more important. María del Rosario Green, Oscar Moreno Toscano, and Lorenzo Meyer, among others, began to emphasize dependency perspectives. These tended to be hospitable, however, to strategic analyses (with political and economic content) in addition to dependency analyses.⁷³ Moreover, authors such as Ojeda and Pellicer de Brody continued to blend heavy doses of strategic analyses with economic considerations in the early 1970s.⁷⁴

The trajectory of the journal, *Estudios internacionales*, in turn, differs from that of the two previous ones. If articles in *Estrategia* remained strategic, and if those in *Foro* evolved from liberal to strategic and dependency perspectives, articles in *Estudios internacionales* had these latter two perspectives at and after its founding in the late 1960s. The writings of Sunkel, which appeared there, have already been cited; they stress the dependency perspective, but with hospitality to strategic approaches. By the mid-1970s, however, articles in *Estudios* seemed to have moved away from dependency studies toward more strategic analyses of the role of middle or small powers in international affairs, and the possibility of organizing counterblocks in international affairs to advance Latin American interests.⁷⁵ Thus the strategic perspective—including political and military aspects, long of interest to students of international relations, along with economic aspects—is alive and well in inter-American relations, thanks more to the efforts of Latin American than U.S. social scientists.⁷⁶

Unorthodox Dependency / This perspective results from a division of opinion among dependency authors. Is hegemony not only an objective condition but also intentional and subjective, on the part of the hegemonial state acting rationally and as a unified actor in monolithic fashion? Or is it more an objective condition, no less real and no more trivial, but permitting substantial autonomy for the dependent state, precisely because hegemony is not so rational, unified, or monolithic? Jaguaribe has tended to argue the second view. Only the first view, however, is fully within the scope of the orthodox dependency perspective. Jaguaribe has argued that “because of the pluralistic character of the American society and the multilinear relationships existing among its subsystems and their integrating social groups, the American hegemony over the Latin American countries tends to be very broad, all pervasive, internally co-opted by several domestic groups, but not externally unified, except in moments of crisis or over issues concerning very relevant strategic interests.” Thus U.S. domination “involves a minimum content of pluralism and contradictions that tends to keep open a margin of international permissibility.” The U.S. empire, therefore, according to Jaguaribe, has a “tolerance of . . . the existence of areas of autonomy within the empire.”⁷⁷

This perspective of a U.S. with a fuzzy but no less real design, tolerant of, though not eager for, client autonomy, objectively characterized by client dependence and subordination but subjectively neither greatly rational, unified, nor monolithic, reeking with pluralism and contradictions among often incoherent

policies, is an important bridge between the orthodox dependency perspective and others. Nongovernmental private actors, and domestic politics generally, play important roles. All states enjoy at least moderate autonomy. Stakes are both economic and political. In the long run, outcomes are not predetermined, but are shaped by the skillful manipulation of structures of international dependence. This perspective, therefore, requires analyses at several levels, national and international.

Unorthodox dependency also differs from the orthodox version concerning outcomes. In particular, is development possible within the context of dependency? André Gunder Frank answers in the negative. His thesis is that "capitalist contradictions and the historical development of the capitalist system have generated underdevelopment in the peripheral satellites whose economic surplus was expropriated, while generating economic development in the metropolitan centers which appropriate that surplus—and, further, that this process still continues."⁷⁸ In fact, says Frank, "no country which has been firmly tied to the metropolis as a satellite through incorporation into the world capitalist system has achieved the rank of an economically developed country, except by finally abandoning the capitalist system."⁷⁹ Presumably Frank would argue that no country, under those conditions, is likely to do so in the future, either.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, perhaps the grandfather of dependency theorists, has explicitly rejected this view. Thus, paradoxically, he too now belongs in the unorthodox dependency perspective. Cardoso has argued, for the case of Brazil, that "associated-dependent development" has been occurring and is likely to continue. Cardoso argues that the international capitalist system has changed: "Thus, to some extent, the interests of the foreign corporations become compatible with the internal prosperity of the dependent countries. In this sense, they help promote development." The view that "extractive exploitation perpetuates stagnation," however accurate or inaccurate it may have been, must now be rejected for the present and future, in Cardoso's view. Foreign investment in manufacturing "is consistent with, and indeed dependent upon, fairly rapid economic growth in at least some crucial sectors of the dependent country." In sum, associated-dependent development is "dynamic." This kind of development, Cardoso notes, entails a number of serious costs, economic, political, and social.⁸⁰ It is not an optimal type of development, it may not even be good enough, but it is the real thing.

Some readers may question the classification of Cardoso as an "unorthodox" dependency writer because he has been so central to the original formulation and spread of dependency ideas. There are two reasons for the classification. The first is that Cardoso has hinted that he perceives himself in an "unorthodox" mold. Concerning associated-dependent development, he has noted that the "phrase was chosen deliberately to combine two notions that traditionally have appeared as separate and contradictory: development and dependence." What Cardoso means by "traditionally" has been called "orthodox" in previous pages. Moreover, Cardoso underlines that his description of associated-dependent development as dynamic is considered a "controversial, revisionist assertion" in some intellectual circles.⁸¹ There is, therefore, testimony from Cardoso himself

concerning his unorthodoxy. The second reason is that it does appear that a majority of writers in the dependency mold have been attracted to the concept because they perceive it as useful to explain underdevelopment. Others who have attempted to synthesize the writings of dependency authors have also reached the conclusion that the "school of dependency," if one does not disaggregate it further, is principally characterized by the emphasis on the contradiction between development and dependence. Thus it seems plausible to describe as unorthodox someone such as Cardoso who dissents from the majority view.⁸²

A different objection to classifying Cardoso as unorthodox is that one should pay less attention to reinterpretations and revisions, and more attention to the original formulations. Presumably those original formulations were orthodox. To answer this argument, one must turn to that original work on dependency and development in Latin America written with Enzo Faletto in the mid-1960s. In fact, it is arguable that Cardoso's alleged revisionism of the 1970s has clear roots in that earlier work and that those who have thought that Cardoso had emphasized the absolute contradiction between development and dependency have misread the earlier work. Cardoso and Faletto (writing in 1966–67) used the term "dependent development"; they noted that their work was intended to "overcome the traditional opposition between the concepts of development and dependence" because it is possible to increase development while maintaining and redefining the terms of dependence.⁸³ That original collaborative work has often been rightly read for what it says about the distortions on development posed by dependency; but it should also be read as an essay on the simultaneous changes in development and dependency over time, leading not only to structural distortions in the former, but also to structural changes in both.

Cardoso has long held a view of the relationship between development and dependency that he himself regards as controversial, and which appears to characterize only a minority of the dependency literature. Yet Cardoso's unorthodoxy is also related to trends in the sociology of social science knowledge. Cardoso's thinking has been influential, in part, because he has not been wedded to a scholarly orthodoxy, but has been able to sketch out an intellectual position that can be helpful to other scholarly perspectives, while benefiting from them. Cardoso's theoretical innovations could thus be described as permanent heresy—both a heresy from the developmental or modernization orthodoxy which crystallized in the 1950s and from the dependency orthodoxy which appeared in the 1960s.

Organizational Ideology / Guillermo O'Donnell has noted that, as scholars who emphasize bureaucratic politics would assert, "governments are not omniscient or consistent optimizers of transitively ordered goals. But this does not mean that dominant goals do not exist (that is, goals that are hierarchically ordered with respect to others, goals that, whether consistent or not among themselves, profoundly influence the decisions under study)." O'Donnell usefully points out that the bureaucratic politics approach "gives the impression that all that is at stake in the relations between organizations and in the decision they make is

the satisfaction of interests that are strictly organizational—as if common, overriding goals did not exist.”⁸⁴

The bureaucratic politics approach at times appears to suggest that there is little that binds the various agencies and individuals of the government; each agency (in the U.S. government, State and Treasury Departments) is described as if it has its own ideology, with low ideology sharing across agencies. On the contrary, dominant shared goals can be identified within organizations, and among them, in and out of government.⁸⁵ This perspective, too, serves as a possible bridge between the dependency and the bureaucratic politics approaches. Dominant, shared goals structure and limit the context of the bureaucratic politics debate; the dominant, shared goals are not often involved in explicit discussion precisely because they are assumed. The hegemonial outcome, therefore, is not entirely accidental, because it is supported by these basic beliefs; nor is it entirely intentional, rational, or monolithic (consistent with Jaguaribe’s arguments) precisely because there is ample room for bureaucratic politics to occur.

The organizational ideology perspective is in agreement with the bureaucratic one on a number of questions. Neither one assumes a rational unified state actor and neither one is principally concerned with outcomes. They are both concerned with the process of decision-making at the governmental level of analysis. Their principal difference is that organizational ideology writers perceive a high degree of value sharing across governmental agencies and between them and nongovernmental actors, whereas the bureaucratic politics authors do not. There are also differences of degree. An organizational ideology perspective (compared to a bureaucratic politics perspective) is more likely to perceive at least a moderate degree of policy coherence, more likely to perceive the importance of domestic politics beyond the bureaucracy, more likely to assign at least moderate weight to economic stakes, and more likely to be hospitable to Marxist methods of analysis and more concerned with the medium rather than the short term. Similarly, it is less likely to perceive the state as fully autonomous, less likely to assign full priority to political stakes, and less likely to disaggregate across issue areas.

Presidential Politics / In the United States, this has been presented recently as an alternative to bureaucratic politics approaches. Although the presidency has also become a bureaucracy, in addition to an individual, the presidential politics perspective emphasizes the differences in kind between the presidency and all other bureaucracies. Presidential politics arguments emphasize the central role of the presidency in shaping politics, in constraining and manipulating the bureaucratic debate, and in setting the agenda for governmental goals and action. The presidency shapes the recruitment of top bureaucrats above the civil service and structures the disputes among them.⁸⁶ The presidential politics perspective is related to the organizational ideology perspective. Both emphasize hierarchy of goals shared within and across organizations, rather than the balance-of-power politics of bureaucratic politics; both assign considerable importance to domestic politics; both are concerned with the medium term and focus on the

governmental level of analysis; both are relatively unlikely to disaggregate across issue areas, and are more concerned with decision-making processes rather than outcomes; both are hospitable to Marxist methods. However, presidential politics emphasizes the unique role of the presidency; organizational ideology includes that role as a mechanism to structure a hierarchy of organizational goals, but it is not limited to that. The presidency sets the value hierarchy in one approach, where it is only one of several value sources in the other approach.

Presidential politics emphasizes distinctly political and intragovernmental characteristics; it is similar to the bureaucratic politics approach in downgrading the role of nongovernmental actors. The presidential politics perspective (in contrast to organizational ideology) is more likely to perceive a rational, unified actor in decision-making, more likely to perceive policy coherence and state autonomy, and more likely to consider political stakes; it is less likely to consider economic stakes. Organizational ideology is more of a bridge linking the internal political system and its foreign policy, because private nongovernmental actors, besides the presidency, may structure organizational goals and norms. The presidential politics perspective is not the same as that of a strategist acting to maximize gains in the international system. In the strategic perspective, change either does not occur (because the international system has not changed) or it occurs because the international system changes. A presidential politics perspective predicts change will coincide with presidential terms of office. Change will thus be relatively independent of both international systemic factors and internal political and bureaucratic pressures.

In inter-American affairs, studies emphasizing a distinct U.S. presidential politics approach are rare. One is a dissertation-in-progress, by Donald Herr, on the Nixon administration's policies toward Cuba.⁸⁷ Students of Latin American foreign policies, however, have emphasized this approach far more. This is consistent with a long held hypothesis in the comparative study of Latin America that presidents matter, for domestic and foreign policy. Thus, for example, Edith Couturier argues that, in Mexico, "the President leads; the legislature accepts; the bureaucracy implements." She has indicated that there are substantial foreign policy variations in Mexico from president to president.⁸⁸ Pellicer de Brody has argued similarly, in a tour de force including strategic and unorthodox dependency perspectives, about links between internal and international politics but, above all, about presidential dominance over Mexican foreign policy as a way to explain its changes.⁸⁹ While international strategic considerations and conditions of dependence, objective and subjective, may contribute to explain lasting foreign policy phenomena, a presidential politics perspective may help to explain changing foreign policy phenomena.

Another study of presidential predominance is Martins' analysis of recent Brazilian foreign policy. Martins identifies each phase of Brazilian foreign policy in the 1960s and 1970s with a particular president. The Quadros-Goulart administrations were the antiimperialist years, or the years of independent foreign policy. The Castelo Branco presidency was the subimperialist phase. Brazil incorporated itself as a close ally of the United States, and the latter, simultaneously, yielded special benefits and recognized a special international regional role to

the former. Brazil's subordinate role also meant that the interests of international capital would at times predominate over the interests of Brazilian capital.⁹⁰ The preimperialist phase coincides with the Medici presidency. "The principal objective of a preimperialist foreign policy (which makes it more aggressive than independent) is not a frontal attack on imperialist domination, but on the contrary, the gradual improvement of the country's relative position within an international order characterized by the omnipresence of imperialist relations."⁹¹

Brazil, therefore, has opposed the freezing of world power relations, whether in the United Nations, or against the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, or in the efforts to impose environmental controls over industrial growth. Brazil broke with the United States over law-of-the-sea questions. It has preferred a more substantial stress on national sovereignty, rather than interdependence as in the subimperialist phase. It has conducted an active regional and bilateral foreign policy with "buffer" states, such as Uruguay, Bolivia, and Paraguay, as well as more generally in South America.⁹² Martins' study shows that it is possible to combine structural analysis of foreign policy with a strong Marxist orientation and, at the same time, to be subtle enough to include distinct, independent political variables, such as presidential predominance, to explain short-term and medium-term foreign policy change.

Political System / This perspective emphasizes characteristics of entire political systems as they affect the foreign policies of those systems; that is, this perspective stresses the link between domestic and international politics.⁹³ This differs in application, though not necessarily in intent, from the bureaucratic politics approach. Both of these approaches seek to disaggregate the alleged single, rational actor, to study who, in fact, makes foreign policy. Both stress bargaining in decision-making in a context of low shared values among government agencies; both perceive low policy coherence and high political stakes; both focus on the short term and at the governmental level of analysis; both are more concerned with process than with outcomes; and both disaggregate across issue areas. However, the bureaucratic politics approach tends to concentrate exclusively on coalitions and disputes within and among bureaus of the executive branch that affect foreign policy. Lowenthal's statement of the bureaucratic politics case includes a consideration of extragovernmental actors, but he is faithful to the bulk of the work done by underlining the special concern with "events and procedures internal to governmental organizations." This narrow focus of the bureaucratic politics approach characterizes not only the more general works in the field, but also several that are specifically applied to inter-American relations.

A concern with the entire political system, on the other hand, pays special attention to the role of the Congress, and to the role of interest groups and private enterprises that act either on their own or through the fissures of the Congress and bureaucratic politics to affect the process and the content of foreign policy. Therefore, state autonomy is low, while the role of nongovernmental actors and of economic stakes are high in a political system perspective. This perspective also assigns greater weight to domestic politics and is more hospitable to Marxist methods. This approach considers bureaucratic politics alone to be insufficient to understand either U.S. foreign policy toward Latin

America, or how it is made. On the whole, a lot of the good, recent research on inter-American relations falls under this category, not under bureaucratic politics. Indeed, Lowenthal's recent study is one of the best examples of this type of work; his own shift away from a bureaucratic politics to a political system perspective is yet another example supportive of the sociology of social science hypothesis outlined in the introduction.⁹⁴

Studies of "linkage politics" in internal and international affairs are also prominent in explanations of the foreign policies of Latin American states, including their behavior in inter-American affairs. However, studies of linkage politics done by U.S. social scientists—as in the case of most dependency studies, too—focus mainly on the impact of international on internal affairs. To consider the impact of the latter on the former, one needs to turn mostly to Latin American authors.⁹⁵ Celso Lafer has argued in a study of Brazilian foreign policy that "there is a relationship between the internal political situation and the foreign policy of Brazil."⁹⁶ When internal Brazilian social forces were relatively quiescent and elite politics predominated internally, Brazilian foreign policy was primarily concerned with boundary consolidation, balance-of-power politics in southern South America, and the promotion of the interest of the coffee elites, in the context of an alliance with the United States where Brazil played a passive role. With the coming of industrialization, mass political mobilization, and the rise of internal political, economic, and social demands, Brazilian foreign policy in the 1950s was reoriented to serve internal developmental needs to satisfy internal demands.

At that time, Brazil played an active role, though still within an alliance with the United States. The acceleration of political mass mobilization and the economic crisis in Brazil in the early 1960s led to a further foreign policy change. Brazil experimented with an independent foreign policy, seeking alliances among underdeveloped countries, as well as with Brazil's former ally, the United States. The 1964 military coup handled the internal political demands by blocking channels of political communication, compressing tensions, and reducing political demand making by force.⁹⁷ This gave Brazilian foreign policy, for the first time probably since World War II, substantial autonomy from internal political, social, and economic forces. Foreign policy would still be used for developmental economic purposes, but the objectives and methods would be defined autonomously by officers of the government. This analysis, notwithstanding different methods, is similar to that of Martins outlined earlier; indeed, the more presidentially dominant a political system is, the closer the presidential and political system perspectives will be.

An important qualification to this argument is that it is intrinsically diachronic. A cross-national analysis at a single point in time, performed by John Petersen and Jon Eley, shows that there is no relationship between the level of per capita gross national product and a variety of foreign policy behavior indicators for the Latin American states, in a cross-sectional analysis for data in the 1960s. Per capita GNP does not affect the volume of Latin American states' foreign policy activity or their policy orientations toward conflict and cooperation or their international alignments. On the other hand, population size was

significantly and positively related to most measures of the volume of foreign policy activity. Big countries are internationally active.⁹⁸ Thus this analysis does not support the political system perspective for a single point in time across nations, but it does not actually test the core of the argument: change in a country over time.

Vera Villalobos has also emphasized political factors to explain the collapse of Argentine foreign policy in the early 1970s. He argued that "three presidents, and innumerable ministers, secretaries, governors and high bureaucrats have succeeded each other in the five years of military rule. This permanent instability in the ranks of the government has made coherent and effective planning and governmental policy coordination impossible. This has occurred notwithstanding the incredible proliferation of security and development plans, national policies, courses of action, strategies, laws, and decrees with which a myth has been created to compensate for the absence of real governmental action."⁹⁹

Finally, the same perspective has been used, in a related fashion, to explain the success of Chilean foreign policy in the 1960s. Orville Cope has noted that "Chilean foreign policy was effective in acquiring specific internal objectives that would assist internal economic development." Why? Because "such a democratic political system and its resultant political and diplomatic leaders served as prime capabilities to enable Chile to maintain as much influence as she did in international politics." The lack of success of Chilean foreign policy after the 1973 military coup, consequently, is explained as the result of "the internal political crises, the deterioration of the nation's economic capability, and the negative reactions of certain nations and international financial agencies in the international political system."¹⁰⁰ The democratic/authoritarian variable may apply best, and perhaps exclusively, to countries which have been very much at one end or the other of the spectrum—as is the case with pre- and post-1973 Chile; degrees of democratization are statistically independent from a variety of indicators of the foreign policy behavior of Latin American states in the Petersen-Eley cross-sectional analysis for the 1960s.¹⁰¹

Analyses that stress the internal characteristics of political systems, as those affect foreign policy, are of course, hospitable in many cases to other perspectives. Nevertheless, the link between the internal and the international assumes a decisive, central role in foreign policy analysis which is quite different from the other perspectives, and can make a substantial contribution to our understanding.

CONCLUSIONS: A HIERARCHY OF COMMENDABLE APPROACHES

The state of the literature is not well. The study of inter-American affairs exhibits scholarly agreement only at a very high degree of abstraction. There is considerable disagreement about what are the important questions, how they should be studied, and about specific substantive findings. It would have been beyond the scope of this paper to discuss disagreements in detail; suffice it to say that they are many. For the purposes of facilitating the study of national public or private policies toward international affairs, the degree of scholarly consensus is grossly insufficient.

Nevertheless, the state of the literature is not hopeless. There are some important elements of consensus in the analysis of inter-American relations, even among those who intend to emphasize their disagreement and who, in fact, disagree on important questions. Though this consensus is too abstract, it is nonetheless real. It can begin to structure certain kinds of research and it can begin to answer some important questions. The consensus can also facilitate picking among perspectives to guide more specific bits of research.

If the description of the consensus in this essay is correct, then the three possibly most popular approaches or perspectives in the study of inter-American relations are not the wave of the future, namely, the orthodox version of the dependency perspective, the liberal perspective, and the bureaucratic politics perspective. The orthodox version of the dependency perspective emphasizes a high degree of rationality, a high degree of policy coordination, coherence and overt purposiveness within the public and the private sectors, a very low degree of state autonomy from social forces, the preeminence of economics in terms of stakes, participants, and outcomes, and the incompatibility of dependency and any form of development worthy of that name. The liberal perspective assumes a degree of benevolent mutuality of interests between the U.S. and Latin America that finds declining support among scholars and, to inject a personal note, that I believe is not supported by the evidence. The bureaucratic politics perspective emphasizes the balance of power among bureaus of the executive branches of governments, as well as the organizational standard operating procedures of those bureaus. These politics have a high degree of autonomy from social forces; suggest very low sharing of ideology or of rationality; an extremely low degree of policy coordination, coherence, and overt purposiveness within either public or private sectors or between them; and the preeminence of governmental politics in terms of stakes, participants, and outcomes.

There are also problems of ethical responsibility. One should not confuse the analytical perspective of a scholar with explicit public policy or ethical preferences; knowledge derived from all these approaches, if used with caution, can improve ethical accountability. Nevertheless, the two perspectives that may have now the most adherents among scholars in the study of inter-American relations—the more orthodox versions of dependency perspectives and bureaucratic politics—present serious problems of ethical misuse. They both can be used by public officials to erode the criteria by which they may be held accountable; they both can provide self-serving arguments. Indeed, this is already happening. A public official may argue that nothing can be done because the bureaucracy lives on forever; a democratic president cannot implement the policies the voters supported; a military president is hemmed in by entrenched civil servants, unless an extraordinarily high degree of repression against civil servants is instituted. Alternatively, nothing can be done because the problem lies abroad, in the structure of dependence in international affairs, rather than in decisions that can be taken by each country. The problem lies in our stars, not in ourselves. Under either approach, the public official may find it easier to excuse incompetence and inaction. There is a divergence on the nature of the ethical problem, but there is a convergence in the fact that one may arise if public officials were to

take seriously the arguments of scholars. Fortunately for public responsibility, that is not yet the norm, though the problem is growing. The liberal perspective simply assumes away the ethical problem.

The present and emerging consensus is more subtle than these perspectives. The unorthodox versions of the dependency perspective (Jaguaribe, Cardoso, elements of Kaplan, Quijano, and others) indicate that there is more room for national statesmen to decide and to maneuver; that the state is more autonomous; that there are degrees of rationality, coherence, coordination, and purposiveness; that there is contamination between politics and economics, where each retains some substantial autonomy; and that some forms of development (though less desirable than others) are possible for dependent countries. The bureaucratic politics approach, in turn, is much less subtle than the political system approach, which emphasizes the interplay between the public and private, the economic and the political, far more. Some who once called for more use of a bureaucratic politics perspective, such as Lowenthal, in fact, have themselves abandoned it and are engaged in studies emphasizing the richer complexities of political systems, including bureaucratic politics but not limited to that. Moreover, whereas bureaucratic politics tends to emphasize primarily the inputs into policy decisions, other approaches are more sensitive, too, to inputs and outputs of policy decisions, and more importantly, to outcomes at the national and international levels.

Therefore, in terms of the formulation of a useful research policy on inter-American affairs, greater attention should be paid to the unorthodox dependency perspectives and to political system perspectives (all of the latter's variants are important). Within the study of political systems, the organizational ideology and presidential perspectives, barely studied, need more attention, particularly for those who emphasize conflicts among bureaucrats, legislators, and private interest groups. The unorthodox dependency perspective includes a discussion of the contamination of politics and economics, thus, consequently, a "rational policy" analysis of politico-military factors. The strategic perspective probably needs more emphasis on its own to add to the clarification of politico-military issues in addition to economic issues. Though there are often sharp disagreements among scholars, and though there are significant substantive and procedural differences among these perspectives, one need not think of them as mutually exclusive and alternative approaches to the study of inter-American relations; some perspectives are more useful for certain purposes than for others, depending on the level of analysis.

Thus a hierarchy of commendable approaches may be established. At the top, seeking to explain the structure of inter-American affairs and the place of particular countries in it, one would emphasize the unorthodox dependency and strategic perspectives. In the middle, seeking to explain the degree of order or of disorder in policies formulated by nation-states as they approach each other, one would emphasize organizational ideology and presidential politics perspectives, and those political perspectives that emphasize long-term trends. At the bottom, one would emphasize the political system perspectives that emphasize actual policy formulation, and hence short-term trends. Political sys-

tem perspectives would thus be used at both middle and bottom levels. One would not emphasize the liberal, radical, or bureaucratic politics perspectives.

This hierarchy should make it possible to study both inter-American affairs as a whole, and the particular policies of national states within that framework. This essay has emphasized U.S.-Latin American relations rather than relations among the latter; in principle, this hierarchy of approaches is applicable to both subjects. It is also commendable because it sets aside the two perspectives that are most likely to erode the ethics of public responsibility, orthodox dependency and bureaucratism, while retaining their best insights, and the one perspective—liberalism—that systematically fails to come to grips with the ethics of international asymmetrical relations. There are ethical problems with the hierarchy of commendable approaches but, if used together, they would neither erode ethical criteria nor assume them away.

There are a number of nontopics in this essay, which are worth highlighting, albeit briefly. There has been no discussion of the vast literature of Latin American integration because this is an essay on the literature on inter-American affairs. The integration literature is rarely addressed to relations with the United States. There are notable exceptions, such as the work of Felix Peña. Peña has explicitly conceptualized the Andean bloc as an exercise in international political bargaining with the United States and other countries. Nevertheless, on the whole, this important literature falls outside the scope of this essay. Second, though there has been a discussion of the bureaucratic politics approach, much less has been said of Graham Allison's organizational process approach, because it has been used very rarely in the literature on inter-American relations, with few exceptions, principally the works by Ernest May and Randall Woods.¹⁰² The essay's purpose has been to be faithful to the existing literature on inter-American relations, not to survey the entire menu of international relations approaches. Third, for similar reasons, little has been said about cognitive or related psychological approaches to the study of foreign policy decision-making in inter-American affairs, because there is so little of them. A number of these cognitive and psychological issues are part of the assumptions in the liberal approach, but they have rarely been the object of scholarly research.

Fourth, little has been said about the gradual spread of quantitative methodologies in the study of inter-American affairs: that would have required a discussion of techniques far beyond the scope of this work. Instead, work relying on those techniques has been incorporated into the main text of this essay. Fifth, the study of transnational relations has not been considered an approach, but a set of related subjects of study that, in turn, can be studied through liberal, orthodox dependency, unorthodox dependency, organizational ideology, political, or strategic approaches. This appears to be far more fruitful than considering it an approach; there is so much variation among students of transnational processes and institutions in inter-American affairs that it defies the imagination how they could be considered a single approach. And last, very few studies discussed in this essay have disaggregated not only governments and political systems, but also issue areas, while retaining intellectual interests that go beyond a case study. Issue disaggregation is not so rare, but its presence

alongside extra-issue-area concern is. The systematic analytical disaggregation of issue areas, and their subsequent analytical reaggregation for generalizations, along with the study of international regimes for the various issue areas, would further enrich the study of inter-American affairs.¹⁰³

APPENDIX

In order to facilitate comparisons among the perspectives, a numerical exploration was made (table 1). The categories summarized above were coded, excluding lines 7 and 15 for which no codes could be devised; Pearson product-moment correlations were performed for the eight perspectives treated as variables and the remaining 14 observations. The results are presented in table 2.

This analysis shows three pairs of perspectives that are strongly and positively related to each other: orthodox dependency and unorthodox dependency, organizational ideology and presidential politics, and liberal and presidential politics. Two pairs of perspectives are strongly and negatively related to each other: orthodox dependency and bureaucratic politics, and political system and strategy. Three pairs of perspectives are entirely independent of each other, showing both elements of similarity and difference: liberal and orthodox dependence, bureaucratic and organizational ideology, and orthodox dependence and political system.

The discussion in the text, and the summary of the perspectives above, facilitates the comparison. The highlights are reported here. The two dependency perspectives clearly derive from the same intellectual sources and continue to have common methods and concerns; their differences are similar to a family quarrel, not a divorce. The organizational ideology and presidential politics perspectives agree to emphasize the sharing of values and their hierarchical structure for decision-making processes. The liberal and presidential politics perspectives agree on strong unified rational actor assumptions and a stress on the primacy of politics. Orthodox dependency and bureaucratic politics disagree on their methods, level of analysis, orientations toward the state, the role of nongovernmental actors, the importance of politics and the policy process, and their outcome concerns. Political system and strategic perspectives disagree in their orientation to the state, the policy process, nongovernmental actors, outcome concerns, and level of analysis. The peculiar relationship between liberal and orthodox dependency orientations was first pointed out by Lowenthal; notwithstanding the different worldviews of the authors in each perspective, they share enough so that the results are statistically independent, rather than negative toward each other. Organizational ideology is an effort to modify the bureaucratic politics perspective, while using some of its insights; thus they remain statistically independent of each other. Orthodox dependency and political system perspectives are independent of each other because they agree on certain things—nongovernmental actors, low autonomy of the state, mixed stakes—but disagree on others—rationality, policy coherence, outcome versus process concerns.

T A B L E 1 Eight Perspectives on Inter-American Affairs at a Glance

	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Strategic</i>	<i>Orthodox Dependency</i>	<i>Unorthodox Dependency</i>
Rational, unified state actor	yes	yes	yes	no
Level of analysis	mixed	int'l system	int'l system	mixed
Issue area disaggregation	low	low	low	medium
Marxist methods possible	no	yes	yes	yes
Autonomy of state	high	high	low	medium
Policy coherence	high	high	high	medium
Source of policy change	improve understanding	int'l system power shifts	transform structure	client elite initiative
Role of nongovernmental actors	low	medium	dominant	high
Importance of domestic politics	medium	low	medium	high
Economic stakes	low	medium	high	high
Political stakes	high	medium	medium	medium
Time horizon	medium	medium	long	long
Value sharing	high	high	high	medium
Outcome concerns	medium	high	high	high
Who wins?	everyone and no one	the clever	imperialism	the clever
Ethical utility	low	high	low	medium

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	<i>Bureaucratic</i>	<i>Organizational Ideology</i>	<i>Presidency</i>	<i>Politics</i>
Rational, unified state actor	no	no	yes	no
Level of analysis	government	government	government	government
Issue area disaggregation	high	low	low	high
Marxist methods possible	no	yes	yes	yes
Autonomy of state	high	medium	high	low
Policy coherence	low	medium	high	low
Source of policy change	bargain within government	value change	new head of government	bargain within political system
Role of nongovernmental actors	low	high	low	high
Importance of domestic politics	medium	high	high	high
Economic stakes	low	medium	low	high
Political stakes	high	medium	high	high
Time horizon	short	medium	medium	short
Value sharing	low	high	high	low
Outcome concerns	low	low	low	low
Who wins?	bureaucrats	value bearers	president	interest groups
Ethical utility	low	medium	high	low

T A B L E 2 Pearson Product-Moment Correlations Performed on Data in Table 1

	Liberal (1)	Strategic (2)	Orthodox Dependency (3)	Unorthodox Dependency (4)	Bureaucratic (5)	Organi- zational Ideology (6)	Presidency (7)	Politics (8)
(1)	—							
(2)		.42	.04	-.26	.27	.12	.61	-.40
(3)			.18	-.20	-.37	-.10	-.20	-.78
(4)				.48	-.63	.27	-.39	.01
(5)					-.15	.39	-.31	.37
(6)						-.06	.24	.32
(7)							.47	.30
(8)								-.24

NOTES

1. I am grateful to the Organization of American States and to the Transnational Relations program (funded by the Rockefeller Foundation) of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, for support in the preparation of this essay; an earlier version was presented to the Seminar on Inter-American Relations of the Organization of American States. I am also grateful to William Glade, Abraham Lowenthal, and Alfred Stepan for comments on an earlier draft.
2. *The Rockefeller Report on the Americas* (The New York Times edition; Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1969), p. 17.
3. *Ché Guevara Speaks: Selected Speeches and Writings* (New York: Merit Publishers, 1967), p. 158.
4. Julio Cotler and Richard Fagen, eds., *Latin America and the United States: The Changing Political Realities* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 10–11.
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6. See, for example, Stanley Hoffmann, "Obstinate or Obsolete: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of Western Europe," in Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ed., *International Regionalism* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 190–91, 219; and Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion," *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), especially pp. 722–29.
7. John H. Petersen, "Economic Interests and U.S. Foreign Policy in Latin America: An Empirical Approach," paper presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Madison, Wisconsin, 3–5 May, 1973, pp. 31–32.
8. Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The Americas in a Changing World* (New York: Quadrangle Books, 1975), p. 23.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 24–41.
10. *The Rockefeller Report*, pp. 57–65.
11. See especially, Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende," *Foreign Affairs* 52, no. 2 (January 1974); and Richard R. Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs* 53, no. 2 (January 1975), and the "Correspondence" section in this same issue, pp. 375–77 for an exchange between Sigmund and Fagen.
12. For a flavor of the melange of views and interests in the Panama Canal issue, see, for example, U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Panama Canal of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, *Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations: Hearings, and Addendum to Hearings*, Ninety-second Congress (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972); see also the sections on Panama in U.S., Congress, House, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Cuba and the Caribbean: Hearings*, Ninety-first Congress, second session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970).
13. Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The Americas*, p. 35; see also David Ronfeldt, "Future U.S. Security Assistance in the Latin American Context," *ibid.*
14. See the following three examples of Osvaldo Sunkel's work, all published in *Estudios*

- internacionales: "Política nacional de desarrollo y dependencia externa,"* 1, no. 1 (April 1967); "Esperando a Godot: América Latina ante la nueva administración republicana en los Estados Unidos," 3, no. 1 (April-June 1969); and "Capitalismo transnacional y desintegración nacional," 4, no. 16 (January-March 1971).
15. Helio Jaguaribe, *Political Development: A General Theory and a Latin American Case Study* (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 371–80.
 16. See the following two examples of Juan Gugliamelli's work, in *Estrategia: "Función de las fuerzas armadas en la actual etapa del proceso histórico argentino,"* 1, no. 1 (May-June 1969), pp. 13–14; and "Fuerzas Armadas y subversión interior," 1, no. 2 (July-August 1969), pp. 13–14.
 17. Aníbal Quijano Obregón, "Imperialism and International Relations in Latin America," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, p. 89.
 18. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "O estado e as políticas públicas," paper presented at the Conference on Public Policy in Latin America, sponsored by the Social Science Research Council and the Instituto Torcuato Di Tella, Buenos Aires, August, 1974, especially pp. 1, 9.
 19. Marcos Kaplan, "Commentary on Ianni," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 64–65.
 20. Luigi Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba: Latin America Takes Charge of Its Future* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., 1974).
 21. See the special issue of *International Organization* 25, no. 3 (Summer 1971), edited by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., on transnational relations.
 22. Luigi Einaudi, "Latin America's Development and the United States," in Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba*, p. 220.
 23. Luigi Einaudi, Michael Fleet, Richard Maullin, and Alfred Stepan, "The Changing Catholic Church," *ibid.*, pp. 88–94. For a related, Latin American view, see Víctor Alba, "Vatican Diplomacy in Latin America" in Harold Davis and Larman Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1975).
 24. David Ronfeldt and Luigi Einaudi, "Prospects for Violence," in Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba*.
 25. Herbert Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 32–50, 90–96, 159–94, 275–88.
 26. Henry A. Landsberger, "Linkages to World Society: International Labor Organization," in Yale Ferguson, ed., *Contemporary Inter-American Relations: A Reader in Theory and Issues* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972).
 27. Quijano, "Imperialism," pp. 81–82.
 28. Carlos Estevam Martins, "Brazil and the United States from the 1960s to the 1970s," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, p. 277.
 29. Theodore H. Moran, *Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence: Copper in Chile* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), pp. 212–15; Franklin Tugwell, *The Politics of Oil in Venezuela* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 143, 162.
 30. Charles T. Goodsell, *American Corporations and Peruvian Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 139, 217.
 31. Quijano, "Imperialism," pp. 81–82.
 32. See George M. Ingram, *Expropriation of U.S. Property in South America: Nationalization of Oil and Copper Companies in Peru, Bolivia, and Chile* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1974), chapters 2 and 4.
 33. Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The Americas*, pp. 53–54.
 34. See Marie Thourson Jones, "The Council of the Americas and the Formation of American Foreign Policy," in Abraham F. Lowenthal, et al., *The Making of U.S. Policies toward Latin America: The Conduct of Routine Relations*, vol. 3, appendix 1, of the Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976).
 35. Jorge I. Domínguez, "Cuba, the United States, and Latin America: After Détente," *SAIS Review* 19, no. 1 (1975): 20–22, 24.
 36. Jaguaribe, *Political Development*, pp. 371–77.

37. R. Harrison Wagner, *United States Policy toward Latin America: A Study in Domestic and International Politics* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. 106–25.
38. Stephen D. Krasner, "Business-Government Relations: The Case of the International Coffee Agreement," *International Organization* 24, no. 4 (Fall 1973): 507–16.
39. Stephen D. Krasner, "Manipulating International Commodity Markets: Brazilian Coffee Policy, 1906 to 1962," *Public Policy* 21, no. 4 (Fall 1973).
40. David Bushnell, "Colombia," in Davis and Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 402–10.
41. Robert P. Clark, Jr., "Economic Integration and the Political Process: Linkage Politics in Venezuela," in Ferguson, ed., *Contemporary Inter-American Relations*.
42. Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Los grupos patronales y la política exterior mexicana: las relaciones con la revolución cubana," *Foro internacional* 10, no. 1 (July–September 1969).
43. See U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, *U.S. Relations with Latin America: Hearings, Ninety-fourth Congress* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 140.
44. Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, *The Americas*, pp. 20–21.
45. Jessica Pernitz Einhorn, *Expropriation Politics* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1974), pp. 69, 91–121.
46. On Sunkel's work, see note 14.
47. Gustavo Esteva, "El comercio exterior de México en el proceso de planeación," *Foro internacional* 6, nos. 22–23 (October 1965–March 1966), p. 352.
48. Octavio Ianni, "Imperialism and Diplomacy in Inter-American Relations," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 49–50.
49. Bryce Wood, *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 288–89, 294–95.
50. Papers documenting this hypothesis have been published in Lowenthal, et al., *The Making of U.S. Policies*. They are: Donald Wyman, "Summary: U.S.-Latin American Relations and the Cases of the Countervailing Duty"; Marie Thourson Jones, "The Council of the Americas"; Roger Sack and Donald Wyman, "Latin American Diplomacy and the United States Foreign Policymaking Process"; Abraham Lowenthal, "U.S. Policymaking toward Latin America: Improving the Process"; Robert A. Pastor, "Congress's Impact on Latin America: Is There a Madness in the Method?"; Robert A. Pastor, "U.S. Sugar Politics and Latin America: Asymmetries in Input and Impact"; Gregory Treverton, "United States Policymaking toward Peru: The IPC Affair"; and Edward Gonzalez, "United States Policy and Policymaking in the 200-mile Fisheries Disputes with Ecuador and Peru." See also the previously cited works by Moran, Goodsell, Ingram, Domínguez, Wagner, Krasner, and Einhorn. See also one of the more widely read and praised unpublished pieces on the subject, Richard J. Bloomfield's "Who Makes American Foreign Policy? Some Latin American Case Studies" (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, 1972), especially pp. 99–114.
51. Christopher Mitchell, "Dominance and Fragmentation in U.S.-Latin American Policy," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 202–4. For a related argument, see Irving Louis Horowitz, "United States Policies and Latin American Realities: Neighborliness, Partnership, and Paternalism," in Ronald Hellman and H. Jon Rosenbaum, eds., *Latin America: The Search for a New International Role* (New York: Sage Publications, 1975).
52. Jorge Graciarena, "Commentary on Mitchell," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 207, 209.
53. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. x, 3–7.
54. Abraham Lowenthal, "'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and 'Bureaucratic,'" pp. 215–21. Lowenthal presents extensive bibliographic citations for the three perspectives that, therefore, need not be repeated. For other good recent efforts to survey important aspects of the literature of inter-American affairs, see Edward S. Milenky, "Problems, Perspectives, and Modes of Analysis: Understanding Latin American Approaches to

- World Affairs," in Hellman and Rosenbaum, eds., *Latin America*; and Yale H. Ferguson, "Through Glasses Darkly: An Assessment of Various Theoretical Approaches to Inter-American Relations," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, February 1976.
55. For a discussion of the role of ideology and its relationship to the unified rational actor assumptions underlying the liberal perspective, see Ferguson, "Through Glasses Darkly," pp. 7–16; and Yale H. Ferguson, "The Ideological Dimension in United States—Latin American Policies," in Morris Blachman and Ronald Hellman, eds., *Terms of Conflict: Ideology in Latin American Politics* (Philadelphia: ISHI Publications, 1977). For the same role of ideology with opposite policy consequences, see W. Raymond Duncan, "Cuba," in Davis and Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 160–70.
 56. Lowenthal, "'Liberal,' 'Radical,' and Bureaucratic,'" pp. 221–25.
 57. For an excellent formalization and assessment of dependency writings, see Packenham, "Latin American Dependency Theories."
 58. Lowenthal, in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 225–27.
 59. Graham Allison, *The Essence of Decision: Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1971).
 60. Lowenthal, in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, pp. 227–33.
 61. Dana G. Munro, *Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900–1921* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 530–31.
 62. Wood, *The Making*, pp. 332–33.
 63. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Alliance for Progress: A Retrospective," in Hellman and Rosenbaum, eds., *Latin America*, p. 66.
 64. Dale Johnson, "Dependence and the International System," in James D. Cockcroft, André Gunder Frank, and Dale Johnson, *Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1972), p. 98.
 65. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
 66. These ideas owe much to discussions with Professor James Kurth, Political Science, Swarthmore College.
 67. See Ronfeldt and Einaudi, and Einaudi, in Einaudi, ed., *Beyond Cuba*; Goldhamer, *The Foreign Powers*; Robert H. Swansbrough, "Peru's Diplomatic Offensive: Solidarity for Latin American Independence," and Thomas E. Skidmore, "United States Policy toward Brazil: Assumptions and Options," in Hellman and Rosenbaum, *Latin America*.
 68. Dirección, "Las Relaciones Argentina-Brasil," *Estrategia* 1, no. 5 (January-February 1970): 56–57, and the rest of this special issue.
 69. *Estrategia* 1, no. 1, was a special issue on the Uruguay-Argentina border problem in the River Plate; 1, no. 6, was a special issue on Argentine-Chilean border conflicts; 1, no. 3, was a special issue on the conflict over the Malvinas or Falkland Islands. See also, for the same perspective, Marcelo Aberastury, "Análisis de un caso internacional: el conflicto entre El Salvador y Honduras," 2, no. 10 (March-April 1971).
 70. Antonio Carrillo Flores, "Cooperación económica interamericana"; José Garrido Torres, "El imperativo urgente de la cooperación interamericana"; Antonio Gómez Robledo, "El tratado de Río"; Alfredo Navarrete, "Una política financiera continental," all in *Foro internacional* 1 (1961).
 71. María Elena Rodríguez de Magis, "Una interpretación de la guerra fría en Latinoamérica," *Foro internacional* 4, no. 4 (April-June 1964).
 72. Mario Ojeda, "México en el ámbito internacional," *Foro internacional* 6, nos. 22–23 (October 1965-March 1966):263.
 73. María del Rosario Green, "Inversión extranjera, ayuda y dependencia en América Latina," *Foro internacional* 12, no. 45 (July-September 1971); "Deuda pública externa y dependencia: el caso de México," 13, no. 2 (October-December 1972); "Las relaciones de Estados Unidos y América Latina en el marco de la dependencia," 13, no. 3 (January-March 1973). Oscar Moreno Toscano, "El turismo como un factor político en las relaciones internacionales," 12, no. 45 (July-September 1971). Lorenzo Meyer,

- "Cambio político y dependencia mexicana en el siglo XX," 13, no. 2 (October-December 1972).
74. Mario Ojeda, "¿Hacia un nuevo aislacionismo de Estados Unidos? Posibles consecuencias para América Latina," *Foro internacional* 12, no. 4 (April-June 1972); Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Cuba y América Latina, ¿coexistencia pacífica o solidaridad revolucionaria?," 12, no. 3 (January-March 1972) and "Cambios recientes en la política exterior mexicana," 13, no. 2 (October-December 1972); see also Ruy Mauro Marini and Olga Pellicer de Brody, "Militarismo y desnuclearización en América Latina: el caso Brasil," 8, no. 1 (July-September 1967); and Jorge Arieh Gerstein, "El conflicto entre Honduras y El Salvador: análisis de sus causas," 11, no. 4 (April-June 1971).
 75. Among the articles using a strategic perspective in *Estudios internacionales*, see Horacio Godoy, "La integración de América y el proceso del poder mundial," 2, no. 3 (October-December 1968); Mercedes Acosta y Carlos Vilas, "Santo Domingo y Checoslovaquia en la política de bloques," 2, no. 4 (January-March 1969); Félix Peña, "El grupo andino: un nuevo enfoque de la participación internacional de los países en desarrollo," 6, no. 22 (April-June 1973); Carlos Pérez Llana, "América Latina y los países no alineados," 6, no. 24 (October-December 1973); José Luis de Imaz, "Adiós a la teoría de la dependencia? Una perspectiva desde la Argentina," 7, no. 28 (October-December 1974); Luciano Tamassini, "Tendencias favorables o adversas a la formación de un sistema regional Latino Americano," Carlos Pérez Llana, "¿Potencias intermedias o países mayores? La política exterior de Argentina, Brasil, y México," and Helio Jaguaribe, "El Brasil y América Latina," all in 8, no. 29 (January-March 1975).
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 77. Jaguaribe, *Political Development*, pp. 378-79.
 78. André Gunder Frank, *Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 3.
 79. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 80. Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-Dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical Implications," in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 149.
 81. *Idem.*
 82. See Lowenthal in Cotler and Fagen, eds., *Latin America*; Packerham, "Latin American Dependency Theories"; Ray, "The Dependency Model." See also C. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James, "Dependency Analysis of Latin America," *LARR* 11, no. 3 (1976):5. Bath and James present a three-fold division of dependency writers. One difference between their classification and the one in the present article is that their "conservative" dependency authors (Prebisch, Pinto, and Wionczek) are partly included in the strategic perspective here, and partly excluded altogether. One reason for their relative exclusion is that their writing tends to be more technical and away from the more overtly political public policy questions in the inter-American system, which set the boundaries for inclusion in this essay. To the extent that they are included, their writings seem to be fairly distinct from the rest of the dependency literature and closer to the strategic perspective. A second difference between the Bath/James classification and the present one is that they stress the impact of dependency internally on Latin American countries, while this essay is more concerned with dependency as an approach to study international relations.
 83. Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependencia y desarrollo en América Latina*, 3rd ed. (México: Siglo XXI Editores, S.A., 1971), p. 164.
 84. Guillermo O'Donnell, "Commentary on May," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, p. 169.
 85. *Ibid.*, pp. 170-72.
 86. Amos Perlmutter, "The Presidential Political Center and Foreign Policy: A Critique of

- the Revisionist and Bureaucratic-Political Orientations," *World Politics* 27 (October 1974): 97–106; Stephen Krasner, "Are Bureaucracies Important (or Allison Wonderland)?" *Foreign Policy*, no. 7 (Summer 1972): 167–69; and Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences* 4 (1973).
87. Donald F. Herr, *Presidential Predominance: A Cuba Case Study* (New Haven: Yale University, dissertation-in-progress).
 88. Edith B. Couturier, "Mexico," in Davis and Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, p. 128.
 89. Pellicer de Brody, "Cambios recientes."
 90. Martins, "Brazil and the United States," pp. 269–84.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
 92. *Ibid.*, pp. 299–301. For a similar perspective, emphasizing presidential predominance in Brazilian foreign policy, see also Brady Tyson, "Brazil," in Davis and Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 234–42.
 93. See James Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1969).
 94. See the research directed by Lowenthal for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy; it falls, in fact, under this rubric, and not under bureaucratic politics. See especially the previously cited papers by Jones, Lowenthal and Treverton, Pastor, and Gonzalez. See also the previously cited works by Wagner, Krasner, and Bloomfield. In contrast, for excellent works using bureaucratic politics approaches, and strategic analyses, but not using a political system approach, see Ernest May, "The 'Bureaucratic Politics' Approach: U.S.-Argentine Relations, 1942–1947," in Cotler and Fagen, *Latin America*, and Randall B. Woods, "Decision-Making in Diplomacy: The Rio Conference of 1942," *Social Science Quarterly* 55, no. 4 (March 1975). These are good studies because the decisions made could, indeed, be analyzed successfully without going much beyond intrabureaucratic politics.
 95. Douglas A. Chalmers, "Developing on the Periphery: External Factors in Latin American Politics," in Rosenau, ed., *Linkage Politics*.
 96. Celso Lafer, "Uma Interpretação do sistema das relações internacionais do Brasil," in Celso Lafer and Félix Peña, eds., *Argentina e Brasil: no sistema das relações internacionais* (São Paulo: Livraria Duas Cidades, 1973), p. 114.
 97. *Ibid.*, pp. 114–19.
 98. John H. Petersen and John W. Eley, "An Approach to the Comparative Study of Latin American Foreign Policy," paper presented at the Fourth Meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Madison, Wisconsin, May 1973, pp. 11, 16–17, 21.
 99. Enrique Vera Villalobos, "Realidad y ficción en la política exterior," *Estrategia* 2, no. 12 (September-October 1971):7.
 100. Orville G. Cope, "Chile," in Davis and Wilson, eds., *Latin American Foreign Policies*, pp. 312–13.
 101. Petersen and Eley, "An Approach," pp. 11–12, 17–18, 21–22.
 102. See note 94.
 103. For a study of this type, though not about U.S.-Latin American relations, see Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977). For an effort to analyze quantitatively the mix of concerns across issue areas, including interstate and transnational relations, see Richard W. Mansbach, Yale Ferguson, and Donald E. Lampert, *The Web of Politics* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1976).