

and well known about issues like land reform. The military exploits and even the physical appearance of some of the White soldiers attract his attention.

However, in a book about the Civil War the author cannot help but reveal some of his views about the working of history. He seems to believe that the Russian Revolution was caused not by class struggle, not by the collapse of a weak government at a time of great stress, and not even by the work of foreign agents, but rather by the wickedness of some politicians, notably Guchkov, who, for reasons known only to himself, sowed dissension between the tsar and his chief of staff, General M. V. Alekseev. The Kornilov mutiny occurred not because of the political ambitions of the general, but because V. N. Lvov enjoyed mischief for its own sake, and because of the activities of the "morphine addict" Boris Savinkov.

Luckett's complete lack of comprehension of the political context allows him to make some strange assertions. He believes that Kornilov was named commander of the "St. Petersburg" military district because of his "known revolutionary sympathies." This is unlikely, since it was the tsar who approved the appointment and since Kornilov during the war frequently expressed the desire "to string up all these Miliukovs" (Victor Chernov, *The Great Russian Revolution*, New Haven, 1936, p. 325). Luckett also imagines Denikin as something of a revolutionary. He maintains that Denikin's "military career was not an easy one, since he gained the reputation of being politically unsound and was regarded by his seniors as a dangerous radical." This assertion is a figment of Luckett's imagination.

It is hardly worth noting factual errors. But it is interesting that the transliteration of names is not only inconsistent but that the same name appears in different transliterations. Sometimes we hear of Krivoshein, sometimes of Krivochein, presumably depending on whether Luckett's source was English or French. His confusion of the Western and Russian calendars makes him say that the Bolsheviks captured the majority in the St. Petersburg (!) Soviet before the Kornilov mutiny. At one point Luckett creates the fictitious character S. S. Krymov out of the names of the Kadet politician S. S. Krym and General A. M. Krymov. If only the resolution of the military-civilian conflict among the Whites could have been so easy!

The White Generals is a book written by an amateur historian who has not done his homework. It is full of mistakes, and without redeeming virtues. The book should not have been published.

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OT GUMANIZMA K KHRISTU: VOSPOMINANIJA, PIS'MA I ZAPISI.

By *D. P. Konchalovsky*. Collection "Les Inédits russes," vol. 3. Paris: Librairie des Cinq Continents, 1971. 350 pp. 28.50 F., paper.

Konchalovsky's book contains his autobiography and a vivid narrative of his observations and impressions from contemporary life. The author was born in 1878 in Kharkov. In 1902 he was graduated from the Istoriko-filologicheskii Fakultet of Moscow University and began his career as teacher and scholar specializing in the history of the ancient world, particularly the social history of Rome. Scholarship was the main purpose of his life (p. 12). He was a "normal" Russian intellectual:

he hated autocracy, liked freedom, loved the common people, and had nothing but contempt for "bourgeois Philistinism." A positivist and rationalist, he believed in progress and in a humanistic civilization which would make mankind happier and morally better. As a scholar he evaded political turmoil and did not belong to any political party.

During World War I Konchalovsky served as an artillery officer at the front. He paints a tragic picture of the decay of the army at the front in 1917 under the influence of defeatist propaganda, and the steadily growing chaos at the rear where the people endlessly "celebrated" the coming of the "new regime" but did nothing to consolidate it.

After the October Revolution Konchalovsky could not continue as a university professor of history, because he would not accept the compulsory ideology of Marxism-Leninism. He eked out a scanty living for himself and his family as a translator and teacher of foreign languages. But by remaining close to university circles he could observe and describe the gradual suppression of academic freedom at Russian universities. The atmosphere of moral and intellectual oppression created by the dominant materialism, and especially the martyrdom of confessors of the persecuted Orthodoxy, turned Konchalovsky's mind to religion and to the Orthodox Church (p. 339). During World War II he left the Soviet Union, and in 1947 came to Paris, where he died in 1952. But he did not find his beloved France as he had expected. He was disappointed and saddened by Western democracy, which in his opinion differed little from communism and was guided by the same principles of materialism and expediency (pp. 328, 332).

Such was Konchalovsky's life, and such are the essential contents of his book. It does not reveal any entirely new or unknown aspects of contemporary historical events, but it does have historical value as a testimony on a tragic period of Russian and world history, offered by a cultured and thinking witness who lived and suffered through that period.

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LENIN AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION. By *Harold Shukman*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1967. 224 pp. \$5.95.

DIE RUSSISCHE REVOLUTION: HISTORISCHE PROBLEME UND PERSPEKTIVEN. By *Dietrich Geyer*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1968. 163 pp. DM 13.80, paper.

THE KREMLIN'S HUMAN DILEMMA: RUSSIA AFTER HALF A CENTURY OF REVOLUTION. By *Maurice Hindus*. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. x, 395 pp. \$5.95.

In many ways Professor Geyer and Harold Shukman cover the same ground—Russia from the late nineteenth century through the Revolution and Civil War—but in quite different ways. Mr. Shukman attempts "to set out the main course of the events which broadly constituted the revolutionary situation . . . in Russia during the last twenty years or so of Tsarist rule" (p. 7). The narrative of these events is concise and clear, and is notable for its critical balance. The author finds the tsarist government guilty of "an overweening propensity to govern solely through a centralised bureaucracy at a time when modernisation was synonymous