

Some parts of the book would be a good choice for upper-level undergraduate as well as graduate classes in security studies or game theory, if supplemented with some instruction in game theory itself. Both the cases and the deterrence topics are substantively interesting examples that can motivate the use of game theoretic models in the study of international relations. Zagare's detailed explanations of his choices also makes the book a useful "how-to" for people new to the idea of applying a model to explain a case. Some parts of the book explore esoteric concepts, however; for example, the first of two chapters on the Cuban Missile Crisis contains an extensive discussion of the theory of metagames.

While the book frames itself as, at least in part, an argument in favor of "analytic narratives," it is not crystal-clear about what it means by the term. The approach was developed by Robert H. Bates et. al. (e.g., *Analytic Narratives*, 1998). The version in this book uses game-theoretic models to understand particular historical cases, and in doing so to evaluate the usefulness of the models. Yet many works in the literature on international security combine game theoretic models with case studies for one or both of these same two purposes without using the term "analytic narratives" (see, e.g., another game-theoretic explanation of the July Crisis: Alexandre Debs, "Mutual Optimism and War, and the Strategic Tensions of the July Crisis," *American Journal of Political Science* 66[2022]: 271-284). It would have been interesting to hear Zagare's thoughts about the strengths and weaknesses of this alternative compared to other, similar approaches.

Another limitation of the book is that it does not tackle many of the thornier issues related to the development or choice of game theoretic models. One such issue is whether a game-theoretic model—or, indeed, any model—should, in the abstract, be able to explain any one historical case. Because there are few if any laws in the social sciences, social-science data always are scattered around a regression line, even when the statistical model is a good representation of good theory. Most of the time, the scatter, or error, comes from a number of unmodeled factors, rather than one or two. Moreover, game-theoretic models are typically quite simple; a model illuminates at most a few important aspects of a phenomenon. Scholars are aware that many additional facets of a situation besides the one(s) on which their model focuses affect the case (or even the phenomenon). Thus, on average, there should be considerable "scatter" around the explanation offered by a good game-theoretic model. Identifying all of the important unmodeled factors that constitute this theoretical error in a particular case is difficult, so that, in the abstract, the error should make it difficult to see the mechanism of the theory operating in many of the cases. This line of thinking reveals a conundrum: models are useful because they explain an important phenomenon, but it should be difficult to show that they do so for any

one data point or case. One answer to the problem is statistical work, though such work has its own limitations.

Of course, the combination of game-theoretic models and historical cases is extremely common, and often compelling in practice. As Zagare's book illustrates, a well-chosen game-theoretic model adds clarity and precision to any argument about the factors at play in a given case. Beyond this book, in-depth study of historical cases also can be useful for developing and refining models.

Overall, then, *Game Theory, Diplomatic History, and Security Studies* is a practical demonstration of the use and usefulness of game theory to understand crisis diplomacy and security. This useful demonstration serves as a synthesis of and addition to a portion of Zagare's prior work.

**De Facto International Prosecutors in a Global Era: With My Own Eyes.** By Melinda Rankin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 255p. \$110.00 cloth.  
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*De Facto International Prosecutors in a Global Era: With My Own Eyes*, by Melinda Rankin, examines how witnesses and victims emerge as leaders in accountability processes that undergird international criminal law. Her work illustrates how individuals support and maintain international law even when local investigative options and international tribunals remain unavailable. This well-written, engaging book will be of interest to scholars and students of international law, legal advocacy, human rights, transitional justice, and judicial politics. By linking individual efforts to transnational networks and state institutions, it also will be valuable for practitioners interested in international criminal law and mobilization.

Building on the work of Kathryn Sikkink, Emanuel Adler, Etienne Wegner, and Martha Finnemore, Rankin examines how witnesses and victims hold former heads of state accountable for torture in foreign courts pursuing universal jurisdiction. These individuals become "de facto international prosecutors," taking on activities typically associated with prosecutors, such as investigatory and evidence-gathering roles, legal analysis, drafting case briefs, and submitting criminal complaints. Rankin demonstrates how these individuals emerge as key leaders in accountability processes, offering a compelling counternarrative that rejects the notion that witnesses and victims are merely passive actors in the pursuit of justice. To achieve these goals, de facto international prosecutors work together to form "cooperative criminal accountability communities" that engage in coordinating investigations, gathering evidence, and legal argumentation. More than a mere network, these communities are communities of practice, demonstrating the active agency of witnesses and victims in collaborating with other practitioners.

Rankin's argument takes an interdisciplinary approach, weaving together political biography, political and legal analysis, and case analyses.

The book is organized into three sections. The first (chap. 1) consists of the theoretical framework for the research questions: How/when do particular interpretations of international law "win out" over others in court judgments, and what dynamics and mechanisms can we observe and theorize as effective in pursuing accountability? The second section (chaps. 2–5) offers empirical investigations through three case studies: Chile, Chad, and Syria. The third (chap. 6) describes how these individuals conceptualize international criminal law.

Rankin holds that international criminal law forms a unique subset of international law because it is inherently in tension with state sovereignty and immunity laws and it has evolved to resemble common law systems with the application of judicial jurisprudence. It is this uniqueness that explains why individuals can extend the reach of international criminal law. She demonstrates that *de facto* international prosecutors successfully argued that the crime of torture was an accepted and recognized peremptory norms (*jus cogens*), which implies a unique hierarchy because peremptory norms can void conflicting treaties (Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 53 and 64) and can supersede international rules governing immunity. Further, the Convention against Torture (CAT) bolsters this argument because it codified existing legal norms, generated a duty to exercise jurisdiction, and has no head of state exception—thereby reinforcing torture crimes as *jus cogens* and thus above international laws governing immunity.

For example, Juan Garcés, who is credited as the architect of the case against Augusto Pinochet, used these arguments to build a case and develop a cooperative criminal accountability community that spanned Chile, Argentina, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Following the Nuremberg model, they collected evidence linking the former head of state to torture crimes. The decision by the British House of Lords that Pinochet was not immune from prosecution confirmed, validated, and normalized the legal interpretations offered by Garcés.

The Pinochet case also directly informed the case against Hissène Habré in Chad. Souleymane Guengueng, a victim of torture and arbitrary detention, became a *de facto* international prosecutor who built a local criminal accountability community that worked to document crimes and record victim statements. His strategy shifted once he began to work with international NGOs. Rankin traces the tenacious, adaptive strategies of the accountability community as they sought evidence, legal opportunities, and political support. After decades of transnational efforts, Habré was tried and found guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity by the Extraordinary African Chambers.

In Syria, the ongoing prosecutorial action of Chief Investigator I from the Commission for International Justice and Accountability (CIJA) illustrates the formalization and institutionalization of criminal accountability communities. Rankin discusses the development of CIJA, which began with local Syrians working to document crimes followed by their training to become "citizen journalists," the formalization of the group as more transnational experts became involved and states began to fund their efforts, and its shift to analyzing evidentiary materials and drafting case briefs that would be ready once a domestic or international tribunal became available. CIJA reflects an innovative approach that relied on local and transnational expertise (and funding) to create a formal organization that could engage in *de facto* international prosecutorial activities while the crimes remain ongoing.

Through these cases, Rankin makes three main arguments. First, witnesses and victims of international crimes remain at the heart of the communities of practice undergirding international law. These individuals view and apply international criminal law as a universal legal standard, generated from multiple international and domestic sources, to form an "international unwritten constitution" that obligates states and individuals (p. 201). They thus use the law to conduct the tasks necessary to prepare materials for when state institutions do decide to participate.

Second, these individuals do not, and do not intend to, work alone. Instead, they form a community of practice with other actors to extend the application of international criminal law. These individuals identify sources of international law with the goal of having these acts validated by state legal officials in future domestic or international courts. Hence, these communities of practice include private, nonstate actors, as well as state officials.

Third, these individuals are not entrepreneurs in the sense of attempting to create new laws; rather, they emphasize that they draw from preexisting, established laws already recognized by states. These cases demonstrate that each case informs the subsequent case—often including the very same individuals and drawing on lessons learned. Hence, this results in the slow, intentional expansion and application of existing, recognized law.

At its core, this book shows how individuals can meaningfully have an impact on international law and achieve criminal accountability. These case studies provide a richer view of how international law operates, showing how it influences behavior by enabling and mobilizing certain actors and how international legal regimes are supported and maintained even when formal institutional options are unavailable. Rankin moves away from the standard focus on state behavior and compliance to add to the growing body of scholarship that situates domestic law and courts as enforcers of international law. Indeed, domestic legal systems—and their incorporation of international law—can offer the "preconditions for accountability" (p. 179).

The case studies offer astute observations that seamlessly navigate across levels of analysis, bridging individual experiences and beliefs with community-level strategies and practices, national politics and legal systems, and international politics and law. Rankin persuasively articulates how examining this broader range of actors, institutions, and avenues for accountability unveils the range of possibilities available to maintain the system of international criminal law and empower greater accountability through both official and de facto means.

**Great Power Strategies—The United States, China, and Japan.** By Quansheng Zhao. New York: Routledge, 2022.

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Quansheng Zhao's declared purpose for this book is to compare the foreign strategies of the United States, China, and Japan. This is an ambitious goal as it is not easy to analyze the evolution of and motivations behind just one country's strategic formulation and conduct, let alone three.

Professor Zhao argues for a "macro-micro" approach to understanding statecraft. He suggests persuasively that analysts should consider international constraints and domestic determinants (the macro level) as well as the views and motivations of decision-makers (the micro level). Moreover, he urges attention to the interactions among these variables in influencing a country's strategy (Model C on p. 25).

The core of the book consists of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, each taking on the foreign policy of the United States, China, and Japan, respectively. These chapters, however, do not follow a common analytic framework or organization. There is not any systematic attempt to compare how these countries' strategies are decided and implemented. It is also not always clear which international constraints and domestic determinants are most important for each country's strategy, and the extent of influence exercised by their decision-makers in the formulation and conduct of this strategy. Zhao does emphasize China's very different policies under Mao Tse-tung and Deng Xiao-ping, but he does not examine individual leaders' impact in the United States, such as Washington's foreign policy under Donald Trump and Joe Biden, answering questions such as why their China policy shows significant continuity despite their other policy differences.

Some parts of the book are fascinating, such as the discussion on the "troika" of officials/scholars who have influenced the United States–Japan alliance relationship. But similar analysis is not undertaken for China and Japan, thereby leaving the reader wondering whether the same phenomenon exists in these other countries. Similarly,

although Professor Zhao spends considerable time citing the literature on China's think tanks, he is silent on whether such entities have played a similar role in the United States and Japan and if so, how much influence they have had and in what issue areas. As another example, do the informal mechanisms attributed to Japan's policy processes have parallels in China and the United States?

Much of the book offers a descriptive narrative, and there are many tables presenting relative economic growth rates, military expenditures, foreign investment, and so on. It is not clear, however, how the contents of these tables are pertinent to the strategic formulation and conduct of each country being studied. For example, what is the effect of public opinion in each country?

Zhao discusses the major transformation in China's foreign policy, changing from a confrontational stance rejecting arms control agreements and multilateral institutions like the United Nations and avowing support for the violent overthrow of bourgeois governments abroad when Mao dominated the policy scene to the reforms under Deng to open China's economy and engage actively in multilateral diplomacy. But there is no similar treatment of the sea change in U.S. policy from fostering a liberal world order to rejecting some of its principal tenets and key institutions during Trump's America First administration. The traditional U.S. consensus on liberal internationalism, supported by both Democrats and Republicans, has collapsed in recent years—presumably a major change in domestic constraint on Washington's foreign policy. What can account for this development? Indeed, what can explain Washington's policy of engagement and collaboration with Beijing in the 1970s and 1980s and its policy of containment and competition today? Just as in the case of the major policy transformation for China from Mao to Deng, it would have been helpful to learn what international constraints and domestic determinants have brought about this change. Surely, some of the factors discussed by Zhao cannot account for such change. For example, as a constant, Confucianism cannot explain changes in China's foreign policy such as those from Mao to Deng. Confucianism was explicitly rejected by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. The reader is therefore left puzzling over Zhao's assertion that "with confidence, one can argue that Confucianism will continue to serve as a leading source of ideas in China for its efforts to pursue modernization" (p. 103). Nor can the same legacy of Meiji Restoration account by itself for an aggressive Japan in the 1930s and 1940s and its avowed pacifism today. Non-linear relationships and the interactions among several independent variables must be considered.

The major question confronting the reader of this book concerns the author's dependent variable—the strategies being pursued by the United States, China, and Japan. What are these strategies and why have they changed? As