

as lithic unconformities and appearances and extinctions of species) in rock strata are records of catastrophic geologic events that have disrupted the generally stable conditions that have persisted throughout most of earth history. His key point is that "THE PERIODIC CATASTROPHIC EVENT MAY HAVE MORE EFFECT THAN VAST PERIODS OF GRADUAL EVOLUTION" (p. 50). In Ager's view, much of the stratigraphic record is episodic; and the Pleistocene itself (a period of one or two million years) is catastrophic, including as it does the rapid advance and retreat of continental ice sheets. This leads to a view Ager calls "event stratigraphy" in which geologic events and not merely rocks are correlated. The weakest part of his book is the section on "Marxist Stratigraphy" in which he muddies the fact that he, too, is an event stratigrapher. Ager does not argue against the principle of uniformitarianism as such, for all geologists now agree that the basic physical laws affecting geologic events today are either the same as or have evolved uniformly from the basic physical laws that affected geologic events in the past. However, there are still those who argue that not only are the laws the same, but also that the rates of change are the same throughout geologic history. Ager argues cogently for what he calls Catastrophic Uniformitarianism, the view that the major changes in earth history were lawful (natural) *and* catastrophic.

These two books should be read by all philosophers of science interested in the active evolution of concepts in a science undergoing a revolution. (The revolution in geology is based on plate-tectonics, which provides the first integrated explanation of such major events as continental drift, ocean basin spreading, and mountain building.) These two books show geologists thinking not only about rocks, but also about how geologists think about rocks.

A final note: It is outrageous of these publishers to produce these short monographs in hard covers at prices that deny them to that very audience of young scientists and scholars who would benefit most from owning, reading, and re-reading them. They could have been bound in signatures and published as quality paperbacks at half the cost. *Richard A. Watson, Washington University.*

ABSTRACTS FROM *INQUIRY*

Vol. 18 (1975), No. 1

ADAPTIVITY AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

AMELIE OKSENBERG RORTY

In this paper the view is presented that self-knowledge has no special status; its varieties constitute distinctive classes, differing from one another more sharply than each does from analogous knowledge of others. Most cases of self-knowledge are best understood contextually, subsumed under such other activities as decision-making and socializing. First person, present tense 'reports' of sensations, intentions, and thoughts are primarily adaptively expressive, only secondarily truth-functional. The last section sketches some of the disadvantages, as well as some of the advantages, of being the sort of animal that is capable of treating itself as an object, to be known as others are known.

MORAL BLACK- AND WHITEMAIL

H. J. N. HORSBURGH

'Moral Black- and Whitemail' is a study of those modes of action which involve what I propose to call 'a raising of the moral stakes.' Illustration: *A* wants *B* to do *X*, and *B* wants to do *Y*; so *A* creates a situation in which doing *Y* would either be morally objectionable or more objectionable than it would have been but for *A*'s intervention. Such modes of action include all the varieties of moral blackmail as well as such practices as those of returning good for evil, putting people on trust, and some kinds of non-violent resistance. I try to expose the distinguishing marks of moral blackmail, why it is thought so objectionable, and how it is related to these other practices that also involve a raising of the moral stakes. The study as a whole is intended to underline the ambiguous nature of human action.

MARX'S COMMODITY FETISHISM

TERRELL CARVER

Marx's work in the first chapters of *Capital* is sometimes taken to be 'metaphysical', since his remarks do not lend themselves to 'scientific' testing against quantitative data. I argue that Marx aimed to re-present the economic theory of his day in order to reveal the characteristic *presuppositions* of capitalist society, and—in the first instance—to rid the theory of *logical* confusions. Though his distinctions are ingenious and his arguments consistent, the enterprise fails in certain respects, because he relies on Ricardian propositions about value and labour, and because his use of certain methods and distinctions of nineteenth-century logic is no longer convincing. Hence he reaches conclusions about the meaning of value, and the nature of commodities and labour, that are wrong in principle. These conclusions were the logical basis for his most sweeping predictions about capitalist society.

GRAMMATICAL RULES AND EXPLANATIONS OF BEHAVIOR

ROBERT E. SANDERS AND LARRY W. MARTIN

Theories in the behavioral sciences are constrained so that stated relationships are empirically testable and explanations have predictive power. These constraints constitute the classical paradigm, and are trivial just when 'causal relationships' do not hold. It appears that such relationships do not hold for linguistic, and presumably other, behaviors, thus precluding study within the classical paradigm. This compels study of those behaviors in terms of the nontraditional approach to testability and explanation developed in Chomskyan linguistics. These constitute the grammatical paradigm. The existence of two paradigms requires that any inquiry begin by determining which paradigm is appropriate.

THE RANGE OF INTENTIONS

DONALD GUSTAFSON

Four groups of intentional action sentences can be distinguished. An intentional action sentence belongs in a given group as a consequence of the range of intentions, i.e. it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally do something in a particular manner, for a particular purpose, to a particular object, or it may record an action in which someone intends that he should intentionally

do something though he intends no particular manner or no manner at all and intends no particular object. Thus the *range* of intention affects entailments, compatibility and inconsistency among intentional action sentences. A fragment of a theory of the range of intentions is set out and some of its implications are examined.

DISCUSSIONS:

I. AGASSI ON RATIONALITY

ROBERT E. INNIS

Joseph Agassi in his 'Rationality and the *Tu Quoque* Argument' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 16 [1973], pp. 395-406) characterizes the Popperian and Polanyian approaches as rationalist and irrationalist, respectively. Such a characterization of Polanyi is only possible, however, if one ignores the most fundamental aspect of the whole problem: the factual question of the constitutive conditions for inquiry. It is suggested that an investigation along these lines would lead to a *normative* theory of rationality grounded in cognitional fact, the uncovering of which would be nothing less than a self-appropriation of our rational consciousness.

II. NIETZSCHEAN NOTES ON THE TENNESSEN-NAESS EXCHANGE

STANLEY PALUCH

Tennessen and Naess both assume that we can make meaningful judgments about the value of life but disagree with one another about whether it is obvious, as Tennessen believes, that the more men know the less reason they have to affirm life. It is their common assumption which Nietzsche would question and these notes try to bring out why.

REVIEW DISCUSSION:

POLITICS OF NON-VIOLENT ACTION

Gene Sharp, *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, H. J. N. HORSBURGH University of Victoria

Vol. 18 (1975), No. 2

ECOLOGY IN ANCIENT GREECE

J. DONALD HUGHES

This article investigates the characteristic attitudes of the Greeks toward nature, which formed the perceptual framework for their ecological thinking. Two major attitudes are discerned. One regarded nature as the theatre of the gods, whose interplay produced observed phenomena, but whose localization gave them particular, restricted roles. The other attitude viewed nature as the theatre of reason, and made the beginnings of ecological thought possible. The contributions of several Greek forerunners in the

field of ecology are characterized. The most consistent, balanced ecological writer in ancient Greece was Theophrastus, but his conception of an autonomous nature, interacting with man, was overshadowed in the history of ancient and medieval thought by the anthropocentric teleology of Aristotle.

ON THE HUMAN QUESTION,

BEING THE REPORT OF THE EREWHONIAN HIGH COMMISSION TO EVALUATE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY

EDITED BY JOHN RODMAN

Editor's Preface

Report

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A. The Teachings of the Erewhonian Anti-mechanist Philosophers

B. The Obsolescence of Man?

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(ii) Ellul, Mumford, and Social Technique

(iii) The Convergence of Satire and Theory

C. The Teachings of the Erewhonian Mechanist Philosophers

D. Sense and Non-sense: Electronic Mythology

E. The Technopolitan Religious Crisis

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The Dolphinic Diagnosis

Notes (supplied by the editor)

'SCIENCE.' THE MYTH AND ITS ROLE IN SOCIETY

PAUL FEYERABEND

The role of science in contemporary society is determined by the belief that scientific results are achieved with the help of a special, non-democratic process. It is this belief that is used in all arguments against state interference (the Lysenko affair!) and for the autonomy of science. The belief is shown to be false: the state must be prepared to interfere with science just as it must be prepared to interfere with other institutions that get out of hand. And the separation of state and church (education and church) must be complemented by the separation of state and science (education and science).

WHY NOT SCIENCE FOR ANARCHISTS TOO? A REPLY TO FEYERABEND

ARNE NAESS

TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY AND ITS COUNTER-CULTURE: AN HEGELIAN ANALYSIS

CLARK BUTLER

FROM APATHY TO SOCIAL ACTIVISM

REUBEN BITENSKY

The study of social change has neglected the dynamics motivating individuals to join mass movements. Particularly obscure is how apathetic people are transformed into social activists. Considering this problem the author suggests three stages of development through which the individual progresses in attaining a higher level of personal and social maturity. The first stage—dreaming—emerges when the individual aspires to change while wishing to avoid the risks involved. The second—the illusion of power—occurs when the hunger for power and the fear of it are mediated. The third—real power—is promoted by the yearning for self-respect and social acceptance and is manifested by competence in gaining supremacy and actual experience in struggle. As a consequence of this process the individual advances from a subjective self-image to perceiving himself as a social being; society is humanized by the greater participation of individuals.

REVIEW DISCUSSION:

PROFESSOR AYER'S GIFFORD LECTURES

A. J. Ayer, *The Central Questions of Philosophy*, PETER HEATH

Vol. 18 (1975), No. 3

SOME MYTHS ABOUT 'MENTAL ILLNESS'

MICHAEL S. MOORE

Radical psychiatrists and others assert that mental illness is a myth. The opening and closing portions of the paper deal with the impact such argument has had in law and psychiatry. The body of the paper discusses the five versions of the myth argument prevalent in radical psychiatry: (A) that there is no such thing as mental illness; (B) that those called 'mentally ill' are really as rational as everyone else, only with different aims; that the only reasons anyone ever thought differently was (C) because of unsophisticated category mistakes or (D) because of an adherence to the epistemology of sick society; and (E) that the phrase 'mental illness' is used to mask value judgments about others' behavior in pseudo-scientific respectability. Reasons are given for rejecting each of these versions of the argument that mental illness is a myth.

WITTGENSTEIN ON OSTENSIVE DEFINITION

P. M. S. HACKER

Wittgenstein's critical and constructive analysis of ostensive definition is examined. Nine fundamental logico-metaphysical errors stemming from misapprehension of ostensive definition are identified, most of which occur in the *Tractatus*. The Fregean holistic conception of meaning is applied to the special case of ostension. Ostensive definition is one rule among others. It is not unequivocal, it does not link language with reality, nor does it determine its own application. The role of samples in ostensive

definition of perceptual properties in analysed, and the affinities between samples and Tractarian simples stressed. Samples belong to the method of representation, and not to the substance of reality. The constructive analysis is brought to bear upon the previously identified errors. Finally, a further range of problems concerning ostensive definition is raised.

DOUBTS ABOUT MORAL PRINCIPLES

PETER MEW

Modern moral philosophy in the British analytic tradition has, with very few exceptions, failed to produce work of any moral significance. There are two main reasons for this. There is first a characteristic failure or refusal to do justice to the complexity and specificity of moral problems and second, a tendency to present the nature and goals of morality in highly general, abstract terms. The paper attempts to establish this by concentrating on the work of R. M. Hare and G. J. Warnock which may be taken as fairly representative of purely formal moral theories and substantive moral theories respectively. The paper argues for a return to the concrete and specific, and ends with a short fiction which, it is hoped, will give some support to the main points.

BILL WALLACE

(A CONVERSATION IN A BAR)

ALFRED DEWEY JENSEN

The dialogue is concerned to do two things. In the first place it seeks to display the extreme difficulty of discussing conceptual issues with students whose academic backgrounds are the social sciences. Its point is not to criticize any element of those disciplines *per se*, but to illustrate the sort of misunderstandings which many beginnings students appear to acquire from them. The second point is to offer a reminder that perhaps the part of philosophizing which requires the most care is the stating of just the question which one wishes to raise—the getting into position, as it were, to think to any end.

TOWARD A SPINOZISTIC MODIFICATION OF SKINNER'S THEORY OF MAN

CARL G. HEDMAN

B. F. Skinner argues in *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York 1971) that only his theory of man is compatible with a 'scientific' approach to human behavior. I argue that Skinner's entirely open-ended view of man is inadequate for his own purposes in that it leaves no room for the claim that certain value judgments are universally valid, something I argue Skinner is committed to despite an explicit avowal in one place of cultural relativism. I then go on to show that a modification of Skinner's theory of man which builds on Spinoza's notion of conatus would provide one with a theory-based rationale for universally valid judgments *without* involving one in a 'non-scientific' approach to human behavior. Specifically, I argue that such a Spinozistic modification would provide one with a theory-based guarantee that man will not evolve in such a way that a truly scientific observer would deem a totalitarian state *good*.

DISCUSSION:**WHAT IS THE ETHICAL IN *FEAR AND TREMBLING*?**

BRUCE RUSSELL

James Bogen misinterprets what Kierkegaard (or more accurately, Johannes de Silentio) meant by the ethical in *Fear and Trembling* (see *Inquiry*, 5 [1962], pp. 305–17). Kierkegaard did not intend to depict morality as a system of duties where moral duties derive from the particular position(s) one holds in society. Kierkegaard thought that moral duties were based on universal principles that were divine commands. Although Kierkegaard thought that it was necessary for an action to be moral that it be done in accord with such universal principles, he did not think that this was sufficient. In order to be a moral action, the action must be done not only in accord with certain universal principles but in a certain way. Kierkegaard notes the appropriate way by saying the agent must reveal himself in his action. Thus revelation by the agent and acting in accordance with certain principles are jointly sufficient and singly necessary conditions for an action to be moral.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:**I. GALILEO AND THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION**Dudley Shapere, *Galileo: A Philosophical Study*, PER STRØMHOLM University of Oslo**II. A KIND OF PHILOSOPHER: COMMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH SOME RECENT BOOKS ON KIERKEGAARD**

ALASTAIR HANNAY University of Trondheim

Vol. 18 (1975), No. 4**A BIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO SOCIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONALISM**

VERNON PRATT

The rationale for the common rejection of classical societal functionalism is that it entails treating a society as an intelligent purposer, capable of directing its own internal organization in furtherance of survival. But a more acceptable alternative account of the origins of a society's functional organization is conceivable: the individual unconsciously recognizes the needs of his group and directs his behaviour so that they are met. The plausibility of this explanation hangs on whether selection between *groups* occurs to any significant extent, however, and it is therefore on this question that the plausibility of classical societal functionalism itself depends.

NAESS'S PLURALISTIC METAPHILOSOPHY

INGEMUND GULLVÅG

The article begins by outlining Naess's pluralistic theory of philosophical systems and indicating its connection with Naess's semantics, i.e. his account of interpretation,

preciseness, definiteness of intention, and level of discrimination. Reference is also made to the indeterminacy relation which Naess claims holds between, on the one hand, philosophically relevant preciseness, definiteness of intention, and level of discrimination, and, on the other, comparability and philosophical neutrality of standpoints. Naess claims philosophical neutrality for his theory of systems, on the basis of its purported low level of preciseness with respect to philosophical issues. The correctness of this claim is questioned. Naess's semantics and theory of systems seem to involve commitment in relation to epistemological and ontological issues. His view of the relationship between objects (entities) and systems seems to be of a kind that might be called system-relativism. If Naess claims that he avoids such a commitment by remaining at a lower level of preciseness where a certain relevant distinction (between identification of an entity and conceptual delimitation, characterization, or description of it) is not drawn, this claim is exposed to logical problems. Hence either pluralistic metaphilosophy is not system-neutral or it is logically suspect.

GIVING THE SCEPTIC A GOOD NAME

ALASTAIR HANNAY

The word 'sceptic' usually refers to a theoretical figure whose philosophical importance lies exclusively in his challenge to any attempt to justify the belief in the possibility of knowledge. but the label was once applied to living persons—the so-called Pyrrhonists—whose scepticism encompassed a way of life. Following Sextus Empiricus's portrayal of the Pyrrhonists, Arne Naess has provided comprehensive arguments both in rebuttal of the frequent claims either that scepticism is logically inconsistent or that at least it is impossible to put into practice, and in support of scepticism as a fruitful philosophical attitude. The present essay attempts a critical consolidation of Naess's case for scepticism by drawing more explicitly than he does on his work in empirical semantics. The notion of degrees of preciseness is used to outline a philosophically interesting rationale for the Pyrrhonist's persistent abstention from any act or action that commits him to the truth of a proposition, and also to indicate why possible, or even inevitable lapses on the Pyrrhonist's part need not seriously prejudice either his status as a sceptic or the philosophical value of his sceptical ideal.

POPPER'S METAPHYSICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM FOR THE HUMAN SCIENCES

NORETTA KOERTGE

Popper has provided a model for the scientific explanation of human actions and a metaphysical theory of man which can guide scientific research. In this paper I discuss the problems of the empirical content and nomicity of the Rationality Principle and extend the method of situational analysis to the problem of explaining beliefs. The domain of applicability of the Rationality Principle is bounded on one side by cases in which behavior is determined by processes which can not be influenced by criticism and on the other side by the phenomenon of substantive creativity. However, a large part of human activity lies within its scope.

DISCUSSION:**DANTO'S REJECTION OF IMMANENT CAUSATION**

THOMAS E. WREN *Loyola University of Chicago*

Against Danto's recent argument that the causation internal to basic actions is not a special, immanent causation, it is objected that (i) he introduces a notion of truncated action that involves a fallacious use of the Equals-subtracted-from-equals axiom, (ii) his version of the Identity Thesis turns upon a misleading notion of co-referentiality, and (iii) he falls into what, by his own theory of meaning, amounts to a category mistake concerning intentions as causes within actions. hence Danto's arguments do not warrant his materialist claim that causation is a univocal concept.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:**I. FREGE AND THE RISE OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY**

*Gottlob Frege, *Conceptual Notation and Related Articles*, a Biography and Introduction by Terrell Ward Bynum, Michael Dummett, *Frege. Philosophy of Language*, HANS D. SLUGA

II. TESTING THE CEMENT: AN EXAMINATION OF MACKIE ON CAUSATION

J. L. Mackie, *The Cement of the Universe. A Study of Causation*, J. A. FOSTER