

“subtle” formulations. What Kireevsky says, apart from the main theses, very often lacks logic and inner cohesion.

Müller, who obviously stands above his subject, makes Kireevsky into a far more interesting and consistent thinker than his own writings seem to justify. In some cases one would wish more criticism, and one would like a less serious attitude toward the verbose vagaries of Kireevsky’s pseudophilosophical parlance. Quite often Müller quotes an unprecise or doubtful statement from Kireevsky and elaborates on it with his own excellent understanding of the subject. The result is the impression that Kireevsky saw all this, which I am afraid is hardly true (see, for example, the section “Fichte, Schelling, Hegel” beginning on page 367).

The importance of the Slavophile ideology does certainly justify an incisive and detailed study of Slavophile writings. No doubt there was a tendency in Russian scholarship to dismiss Slavophile theories on the whole as untenable (mainly because thinking which started from presuppositions of faith was not considered to be “scholarly”). Yet one should be careful not to ascribe to these theories too solid a metaphysical background, especially in Kireevsky’s case.

This extremely circumstantial book by Mr. Müller (whose only stylistic deficiency is his unwieldy, somewhat Hegelian language), would have been still better if the author had kept more of a critical distance from his subject. But the book certainly is a substantial contribution to our knowledge and understanding of the development of Slavophile thought.

V. SETCHKAREV
Harvard University

THE BEGINNINGS OF RAILWAY DEVELOPMENT IN RUSSIA IN THE
REIGN OF NICHOLAS I, 1835–1842. By *Richard Mowbray Haywood*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1969. xvii, 270 pp. \$9.00.

In terms of far-reaching change, the laying of a railway network was one of the most important achievements of nineteenth-century Russia, yet neither in the USSR nor elsewhere has a really comprehensive history of the Russian railways been published. This book, dealing with the pioneer Tsarskoe Selo Railway and the decision to build the St. Petersburg–Moscow line, narrows the gap by eight crucial years.

Although an excellent summary is provided of transportation development before 1835, most of the book is necessarily devoted to the debates that preceded each of the empire’s hesitant steps into the railway era. The author rightly refrains from mockery of those who opposed railways, for in novelty and magnitude the decision to enter the railway age in Nicholas’s day is comparable with a modern nation’s decision to enter the atomic age. Moreover, the antirailway arguments were often worthy: Russia did have climatic peculiarities, she did already possess a canal system which was the envy of other nations, she did lack private capital. Railway supporters could appeal only to the imagination, forecasting the cumulative benefits that railways would bring. Nicholas I was not unimaginative and, being an autocrat, could overrule the pessimists. And thus the railways were started.

In this book the most creditable character seems to be the builder of the Tsarskoe Selo Railway, Franz Anton von Gerstner (a Slav, according to the Pan-Slavists). Although allowed to build only a fraction of what he planned, he built well. Even if he failed to anticipate that passengers would catch fire when his engines were fueled with native birchwood, he did insist on the highest engineering

standards, and his proposals for a railway network foresaw future developments very clearly. Other foreigners do not emerge so creditably, and the author might have added that the American engineer G. W. Whistler's successful advocacy of the "narrow" 5-foot gauge was backed by an argument (that small units can carry traffic as economically as large units) which was technically unsustainable. The wiser von Gerstner had used the 6-foot gauge.

This is an informative and well-designed book, which incidentally offers useful insight into how decisions were reached in Nicholean Russia. Despite its fine and often fascinating detail the book is clearly written, and the author has evidently read practically all there is to be read on his subject.

J. N. WESTWOOD
University of Sydney

THE EXPANSION OF RUSSIA IN EAST ASIA, 1857-1860. By R. K. I. *Quested*. Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: University of Malaya Press, 1968. xxx, 339 pp. \$9.75.

Recent hostilities along the Sino-Soviet border lend great interest and timeliness to the present study. Certainly, current tensions between China and the Soviet Union may be far better understood with a knowledge of this crucial period. The seizure of the Far Eastern provinces, the subject of this volume, represents the biggest mouthful of the Chinese Empire that Russia was ever able to devour and digest. Though Professor *Quested* emphasizes the grievousness of this loss, she has found no evidence to reverse the well-established verdict of historians that the Russian seizure of these territories was one of the most bloodless and condonable of conquests. She does, however, indicate that Chinese sources reveal far more resistance from the Manchus than published Russian works have heretofore indicated. Yet without access to the Russian archives it is impossible to be sure about the full extent of that resistance or what motives lay behind the Russian incursions up the Sungari in 1859.

Russian policy during the years 1857-60 emerges as a striking example of the virtues and failings of secretiveness as a government weapon. This policy of suspicion may have benefited the Russians in their dealings with England, but when it was directed at the American traders on the Amur it delayed the development of the Amur region and inflicted unnecessary hardships on the Russian settlers. Although there is no close study of Russo-American relations during these years, Professor *Quested* offers convincing evidence of the naïveté of American diplomats in this period. Though clearly better informed about Russian progress on the Amur than Britain, the United States apparently did not pass on this information to the British or attempt to bargain with Russia to gain better treatment for its Amur traders in exchange for its silence and good will. Moreover, the discreet and half-veiled understanding that apparently existed between the French and Russian envoys in China seems not to have been fully realized by the British at the time. It also is clear that the attitude of Britain was completely, though unintentionally, conducive to the success of Russian aggrandizement.

Professor *Quested* has based her study upon many official documents—Russian, Chinese, British, French, and American. The period covered has not been comprehensively surveyed until now, even though the passing of this vast area to Russia was certainly one of the decisive events in the history of the Far East. Although the book encompasses a great deal of detail and frequently reads like a