

Pirates or Superpowers

Reading Augustine in a Hall of Mirrors

Robert Dodaro OSA

Recent just-war discussion over the Gulf Crisis has focused attention once again on what are, by now, the familiar mysteries of that particular rosary: just cause, last resort, proportionality, legitimate authority, right intention. Bishops and theologians who cite the theory in order to justify military actions consistently fail to recognise that the cultural vantage points from which they conduct their calculus cannot be guaranteed free of distortions which render their solemn judgments as erroneous on a moral plane as calculations of the position of the stars taken from within the earth's atmosphere are on a physical plane. In both cases observations vital for a correct analysis are 'refracted' through a medium which distorts the information without telling *prima facie* that it is doing so. The assumption that the just-war theory can always be adjusted to accommodate 'advances' such as in the technology of modern weapons systems or the status of the U.N. fails to take any notice of the complexities of modern communications and their impact on the set of perceptions and judgments crucial to the conditions of classical just-war theory.

There are numerous problems involved in trying to describe this dilemma: 'mass media' are by no means a trifling difficulty for just-war thinking, nor do they lend themselves to simple, hasty analysis. But even if only the contour of some of the issues can be described it may still become clear that what is required now is the application of a more critical hermeneutic to just-war theory. What I hope to accomplish in this essay is to set forth briefly some aspects of the question and to indicate how a more balanced reading of St. Augustine than those to which we are usually treated by just-war theorists provides a classical Christian source for appreciating a renewed theory's future potential for promoting a just peace.

A grave flaw in modern just-war debate is that it consistently overlooks a factor in society which St Augustine himself was profoundly aware of. To explain adequately what is claimed here we must begin not by turning again to the Augustinian texts (though we will be doing that later) but with a critical look at something happening in the world around us.

Inter Mirifica and Gaudium et Spes

Before launching into discussion of the technologies of deception, it might be helpful to situate the problem in the context of the Second Vatican Council and, in particular, of *Gaudium et Spes*, the Roman Catholic Church's source document for much of its critique of modern warfare and

of weapons technology. John Paul Szura, a theologian and psychologist, traces the Church's almost total lack of linkage between communication in the modern world and war/peace teaching to the failure of Vatican II to address the theological and psychological implications of mass media in any meaningful way.¹ He specifically criticises the Council's decree *Inter Mirifica* on the instruments of social communication (1963), as an early document, one which did not receive the same period of time for discussion amongst the bishops or attention from biblical and theological *periti* (let alone from social scientists) allotted to later documents such as *Gaudium et Spes* or the decree on religious freedom (1965). In part, the neglect of *Inter Mirifica* was due to the greater interest generated at initial stages in the Council by and for the documents on liturgy, ecumenism, and sources of revelation. The Council also lacked the participation of *periti* specifically knowledgeable about modern communications. For these reasons *Inter Mirifica* suffers from inadequate depth and, consequently, was not influential in later Council documents. The result, Szura argues, is that 'what *Inter Mirifica* dealt with poorly, *Gaudium et Spes* did not deal with at all.'² The sharpness of the Council document's condemnation of the mass destruction of cities and civilian populations, its critique of the arms race, its respect for nonviolence, pacifism, and conscientious objection, and its demand for conversion and new attitudes on war are unmatched by *and so* to a large extent undermined by its lack of insight into mass media as a hidden but serious, often pivotal element in modern warfare.

Modern war 'is more than war fought with modern weapons;' it is also, says Szura, 'war that is advertised, marketed, ... supported by shaped public opinion, public relations, propaganda, and disinformation.'³ Mass media issues with which Szura is concerned also extend to modern methods of enemy dehumanisation, techniques which he admits cannot be regarded as wholly new, employed as they were in preaching the Crusades. The crudeness of medieval rhetoric in relation to modern means of amplifying enemy dehumanisation finds its parallel in the more primitive destructive capabilities of the bow and arrow when compared with nuclear weapons. Yet, the same Church which gives so solid a foundation for a critique of modern weapons technology completely neglects to offer authoritative teaching capable of focusing attention on the degree to which the misuse of mass media distorts political reality, often providing thereby the pretext for war and its 'justification'. Szura warns that the ability of governments to employ state-of-the-art methods for shaping public perception of an enemy and of the 'threat' posed by that enemy is so potent that in the end it is capable of overpowering any Catholic opposition even to the use of weapons of mass destruction. Failing to take account of this dimension of warmaking is the most serious flaw in the Church's social teaching. It is also arguably the most serious defect in the strategies of the peace movements, which have been, not surprisingly, more prone to expend their energies on detailed explanations of 'throw weight' than they have been prepared to criticise the sort of highly popular cinema films likely to promote the

weapons' eventual public acceptance. A similar analysis could be advanced with respect to the Gulf War: the peace movements are more motivated to voice opposition to the use of military force in the Persian Gulf than they are sensitive to benign public attitudes toward the negative stereotyping of Arabs so prevalent in Western democracies.

Szura's analysis carries with it insights from that branch of social psychology which specialises in enemy dehumanisation, and leads him to yet another conclusion: ultimately, the enemy-dehumanising effects of certain media techniques will blind a nation to the symmetry between itself and its perceived enemy. Thus, in the case of the Persian Gulf (and of the Middle East in general), negative stereotyping of Arabs is pernicious not simply because it is racist but because its intended effect is to make the enemy seem so unlike the 'civilised' European or North American that the latter are, in terms of behavioural analysis, *less predisposed to look* at ways in which their own national behaviours mirror that of their 'enemy'. *Gaudium et Spes* missed the opportunity to prompt post-conciliar war/peace teaching into taking a critical view of enemy-dehumanisation techniques. As a case in point Szura notes that at the time of the writing of the U.S. Catholic bishops' pastoral letter *The Challenge of Peace* (1983), the U.S. was involved (as it still is) in fostering military conflict in Central America. Like many commentators, Szura was struck by the fact that the letter failed to criticise U.S. military, economic, or political intervention in Central America, yet it offered quite specific criticism of the Soviet Union for its involvements in Poland and Afghanistan. He faults the bishops for their inability to resist the lure of enemy-dehumanisation sponsored by successive U.S. governments and willingly promoted by the U.S. communications industry against 'Russian communism': Ronald Reagan's 'Evil Empire'.

Mass Media as Hall of Mirrors

Recent research within and across a number of scientific disciplines validates Szura's concern that Catholic social teaching's insensitivity to modern communications issues seriously impairs its analysis of war making in the modern world. Space limitations prohibit anything more than an indication of the contours of some of the relevant media issues and a suggestion of their interface with empire maintenance and, consequently, with social ethics. Readers will, however, find the published works cited in this essay a valuable resource for pursuing the topic in greater depth.⁴

Although they are not entirely meaningful if considered separately, structure and content offer two poles for examining the politicising effects of mass media within contemporary western culture. 'Structure' in one sense refers to what might be termed the 'rhetorical devices' of the media. David Paletz and Robert Entman list some of the more common rhetorical features of the mass media, among them the separation onto different pages of the newspaper of 'editorials' and 'news', a *device* which 'suggests' to the reader that only one conveys opinions whereas the other informs objectively.⁵ A second sort of device emerges from the manner in which politicians today

are coached into confining their media statements to that most novel of periodic structures, the 'sound bite'. Among numerous other devices which are normally hidden within the context of the media, the sound bite structures the manner in which an audience receives content, often by limiting the scope of the issues relevant to the matter under discussion. The sound bite also 'structures' the audience listening to the news, conditioning them to expect that the events occurring within larger, politically complex contexts (such as the Persian Gulf) can easily be resumed in a clear, summary fashion. Public officials who fail to observe this rubric are dismissed in the listener's mind for confusion or vacillation. Television news editors are compelled to take issues like audience attention spans into account, but remain unaccountable for the degree to which the sound bite conditions the same response which reinforces its use.

A similar structural issue restricting comprehension of the full scope of matters discussed by the news media concerns the limited stock of frames with which journalists normally explain political events. Paletz and Entman suggest that the range of explanations available to journalists for any given political behaviour is narrowly confined in order to correspond to a set of conventional themes which the public have come to expect. The theory contends that journalists who stray from this conventional stock of frames risk losing the appearance of objectivity which their role requires of them. As a result the boundary between these conventional themes or 'interpretative frames' (e.g., bureaucratic inefficiency, official corruption, or personal political ambition) and 'facts' becomes obscured. When the media portrayed the contest for the premiership between Michael Heseltine and Margaret Thatcher as a matter of 'personal ambition', the British public could not be faulted for accepting without hesitation the interpretative frame as a fact. As a further consequence to this conditioned response, neither journalist nor audience searches for other possible explanations for the particular political behaviour.⁶

As every good rhetorical theorist from classical times onward has realised, in order to understand any communications 'structure' one must look at its anthropological assumptions. By focusing his researches on cultural and structural issues concerned with television, Gregor Goethals has uncovered its sacramental function within secular society. He contends that secularism has witnessed the transfer of a sense of religious identity and community previously conveyed by traditional religious symbolism and churches onto ritual and iconic forms communicated by television.⁷ 'Secular culture,' he says, 'is popular, not because it is secular, but perhaps because it is sacramental. ... (the) shadowy myths of culture (offered there) satisfy our desire for community and for challenge.'⁸ Goethals argues that television in contemporary culture constitutes 'a substitute for sacraments', and that it fulfils a ritual role in secular society. He contends that television encompasses much of what Ernest Becker sees as the human being's need for a ritualised 'second world', a 'cultural illusion' providing an 'ideology of self-justification, a heroic dimension that is life itself to the symbolic

12

animal.⁹ It is impossible to separate this created world of meaning from the political reality in which members of western societies are immersed. Goethals indicates ways in which patriotism is incorporated into television ritual, nurtured as it is by the icon-like images flashing regularly across the television screen. For U.S. Americans the image of the flag (especially in conjunction with the opening of sporting events and the singing of the national anthem) represents one of the most potent among these 'religious' symbols which, along with the recurring televising of political functions, communicates 'a sense of peace or belonging in the cosmos as distinct from the impending threat of chaos' that is the modern world.¹⁰ It is within this modern anthropological structure that nightly television news broadcasts function as 'liturgy'. Such routine broadcasts, Goethals insists, 'do more than simply give the news.' He identifies the rhythms and interpretative patterns of such news broadcasts as 'ritualistic' and holds that they correspond to a de-emphasis of the sacramental for a ritually-deprived population.'

Paletz and Estman are also aware of the ritual form of television news and the consequences for its interpretation. They note that anchorpersons provide a sense of security which is constructed in part by their own continuity and stability in the position. They appear rational and sane, 'in control' in spite of the sometimes emotionally disturbing events which they announce. Audiences are able to absorb the shock of living in an unpredictable and chaotic world in part because the anchorperson, whom they have learned to trust, communicates the events in so authoritative, factual, and dispassionate a manner. Their credibility is enhanced by the 'formal way in which they are announced, their dress, their vocal inflection and resonance, the camera's respectful distance, and the concluding nightly benedictions they bestow.'¹¹

This combination of rhetorical device and ritualisation gives the structural component of mass media (in particular television news) considerable influence over the audience's organisation of the content. In reality structure and content are intertwined to such an extent that audiences are unaware of the 'hidden persuaders'¹² at work within mass media. Paletz and Estman are saying quite a lot when they admit that the format of nightly television news 'disguises the process of selecting, framing, structuring, contextualizing and linking stories; it conceals the reconstitution and reconstruction of reality.'¹³ If there is anything to what media analysts are telling us, it has to be taken as axiomatic that an extensive range of overlapping rhetorical and ritual structures in news presentation has resulted in a largely unrecognised and unintended media distortion of political reality *independent* of considerations stemming from propaganda and disinformation. If the latter disruptions are also taken into account (as they must be if we have learned anything about covert intelligence operations within the last two decades) it ought to be admitted that media representation of political reality is chimerical—nothing more or less than a hall of mirrors.

To begin with, intelligence services such as the CIA have themselves been forced to acknowledge manipulation of the media in multifold ways, and have described these processes in some detail.¹⁴ Carl Bernstein, who, with his journalist-colleague Bob Woodward uncovered the Watergate scandal, estimated in 1974 that over 400 journalists had had 'some kind of secret relationship with the CIA.'¹⁵ Loch Johnson, Stuart Loory, and others have catalogued and detailed the 'symbiotic' interrelationships between the Agency and media: journalists in varying degrees of voluntary service or paid employment with the CIA, covert planting of propaganda and disinformation through foreign correspondents, CIA briefings and debriefings with journalists, and the phenomenon of 'blow back' or 'replay' defined as "the return to the U.S. of Agency propaganda planted abroad—the brainwashing of the American people by one of their own secret intelligence agencies...".¹⁶ Recent revelations concerning 'Operation Gladio' demonstrate that the CIA, with the complicity of a number of Italian government officials, has been funding right-wing organisations for the purpose of dissimulating left-wing terrorist atrocities. The international news media were successfully duped.¹⁷ It can no longer be considered rhetorical bombast to assert the subversion of 'democratic liberties' or of a 'free press' in western societies.

The time has at last come for turning back to St. Augustine.

Pirates or Superpowers

Just-war theory is correctly represented as a tradition of medieval origin owing something for its inspiration to Augustine. Augustine, however, paid far more attention to the linguistic and social communications techniques at work in the politicisation process than do modern just-war theorists and the bishops and theologians whom the theorists influence. He realised that Roman society was founded upon an extreme patriotism, a love for the *patria* above all else, which was promoted by means of Roman education, folklore, literature, civil religion, and theatre. Trained as a professional rhetor, he was an expert in the classical art of communication contained in Roman oratory. Roman rhetoric, which provided training in the art of the eloquent lie, incorporated an incipient psychology of persuasion serving as the basis for a political 'propaganda'. Roman intellectuals understood this use of rhetoric as a means of shoring up popular support for a variety of political objectives including military exploits.

Augustine had personal experience of the power of rhetoric for the purpose of political propaganda. As a young man he won a competition for the distinguished post of *orator orbis* at Milan. Concomitant with his responsibility for teaching rhetoric to the sons of high-ranking court officials was the onerous duty of delivering public orations at the imperial court located in Milan at the time. These panegyrics were held on occasions such as the emperor's anniversary and were largely eulogistic in style. A carefully constructed speech consisted in a positive reading of current political events seasoned with sufficiently effusive flattery of all those involved in order to

inspire the aristocracy to accept the leader's future political programme and ambitions. Disenchantment with his secular ambition fuelled by disillusionment with the ideological falsehoods promoted by Roman political propaganda contributed in no small measure to Augustine's conversion in Milan during 385—386.¹⁸

When over ten years later Augustine wrote in *Confessions* about his disillusionment in Milan, he was careful to extend his analysis of the delusive process backward to his early education. It was as a young schoolboy that he was initiated by his teachers into the craft of deception for the sake of expedience. He referred to the purple cloth which hung at the doorway of the schoolroom as a 'covering for error'¹⁹, a metaphor capturing his experience of the educational process. Historical misrepresentations were casually passed on to students by teachers who were concerned only with highlighting the grammatical quality and literary style of ancient authors. His lessons in rhetoric taught him that it was more important to win an argument than to be concerned with the truth;²⁰ and he laments that some of his own students, when, later in life, they were barristers, may have used the skills which he taught them to have innocent people condemned to death.²¹ This gradual disenchantment with education led Augustine to focus on the conflict between the literary form and the truth content in the literature to which he was exposed. He was aware of the extent to which such teaching inculcated in students an uncritical allegiance to Roman political and religious mythology. Augustine's *Confessions* includes an account of how it is almost impossible for any student who wished to become a member of the 'establishment' as, for example, an orator, a lawyer, or a professor of literature, to resist the subtle indoctrination into establishment values and establishment 'theology'. The extent to which he attempted to expose this *politicisation* of youth via formal education is the measure of the capacity to which the *Confessions* can be read as a political critique.

He exhibited awareness of the same concerns when he wrote the *City of God*, a work which Rowan Williams has suggested establishes Augustine as 'a subverter of the values of the classical public and political realm.'²² In Book IV he set out to criticise the received 'history' of Roman imperial expansion. As a former teacher of rhetoric, Augustine was well aware that history was treated as a branch of rhetoric. He put his readers on notice that he intended to read Roman history critically, exposing all the rhetorical 'hidden persuaders' with which that history was normally composed.²³ He said, 'let us refuse to be fooled by empty rhetoric, to let the edge of our critical faculties be blunted by high-sounding words like 'peoples', 'realms', 'provinces'.' He then deployed a rhetorical strategy of his own, turning to the analogy of individual human beings as representatives of the ways that a political society behaves. 'Let us imagine two people; for the individual person is ... an element out of which a community or a realm is built up, however vast its territorial possessions.' He pictured two people, one extremely wealthy, the other of modest means, as metaphors for two political communities. He argued that wealthy people, like wealthy states,

normally suffer for their excesses, whereas the poor are often closer to true happiness.

With those two metaphors fixed in its mind, Augustine's audience had been primed for the more strenuous analogy he drew a little further on between an empire and a band of pirates. He insisted that in the absence of justice any empire is as guilty of savagery and plunder as is any criminal gang, but on a much greater scale; hence, it 'openly arrogates to itself the title of "kingdom", which is conferred on it in the eyes of the world, not by the renouncing of aggression but by the attainment of impunity.' Augustine's point is that the morally depraved behaviour of any 'superpower' differed from that of roving pirate bands (one might substitute 'terrorist groups') only in virtue of the scale involved. It is this greater magnitude of crime, Augustine suggested, which bestowed political legitimisation, the gloss of 'justification', upon the unjust undertakings of the empire. He illustrated his point with the tale of an encounter between Alexander the Great and a captured pirate. 'Questioned by the emperor, "What is your idea in infesting the sea?" the pirate responds, "The same as yours ... but because I do it with a tiny craft I am called a pirate—because you have a mighty navy, you are called an emperor."' ²⁴

By drawing this comparison between emperors and pirates and following it up with the story of the encounter between Alexander the Great and the pirate, Augustine led his audience into an experience of the key moral irony hidden within Roman imperial history. He unwrapped his reader from confinement within interlocking half-truths creating that always *partial* explanation of political reality constitutive of ideology. The *presumption* of justice encoded within Roman history was exposed as such. His listeners were left to continue wondering about the quality of 'Roman justice' while he went on in Book IV to confront them with an extended *catena* of inconsistencies characterising Roman history and its links with mythology.

He indicted the principal exponents of Roman ideology, men like Cicero and Varro, with charges of cowardice and fraud. They realised that Roman religious practice was superstitious but used their eloquence and learning in order to conceal their awareness from the public.²⁵ They were afraid to speak the truth for fear of rejection and death in dishonour. The consequence of this silence in the face of such falsehood on the part of the Roman *intelligentsia* was complicity in a deliberate policy of deception, a manipulation of the public through religion for the sake of public order.²⁶ Augustine understood that falsehood where religion was concerned served an essentially political purpose within the empire when it became the basis for moulding the civil community, thereby ensuring its cohesion. The rhetorical power of Roman religion was such that ordinary people who were defenceless and unlearned were unable to resist its seductive appeal.²⁷ A religion consisting of falsehoods supported by the rhetoric of history provided the Roman empire with popular legitimacy. Augustine was certain that political authorities were determined to guarantee that religion would

continue to consist of lies. State religion was therefore an extension of civil government intended to keep people superstitious and in line.

Augustine was the first Christian author to propose that a just social order cannot be constructed where manipulation of information for political purposes is carried out. It was his doctrine of original sin which enabled him to realise that human intelligence and will were structurally pliable enough to be exploited by language. He was sufficiently philosophical to be able to reach an appreciation of the profound power of language over human behaviour. His efforts to demonstrate that Roman education encapsulated a kind of political indoctrination went beyond the mere rejection of the pagan content of instruction. There was nothing novel in Augustine's day in identifying Roman education, history, culture, and religion as morally depraved from a Christian perspective. But Augustine's was not a critique of content; it was that, but it was also much more. It extended to an analysis of the hidden forces of social and political persuasion which exist in language in multiform contexts: poetry, drama, religious festival, political speeches, ritual, and ceremony, as well as historical and rhetorical textbooks.

Modern applications of just-war theory generally fail to recognise these 'hidden' cultural forces which, because they are amplified by mass media, easily distort public perception of political reality. Applying 'Augustinian' (or other) just-war criteria to any modern political situation without taking such distortion into account amounts to reading Augustine in a hall of mirrors, where much of the symmetry between pirates and superpowers is skewed beyond recognition. Failure to apply a hermeneutic of this order to just-war theory risks allowing it to be subverted by right-wing apologists in order to justify what are essentially 'crusades'. On the other hand, adjustments to the theory of the sort suggested by Szura and prefigured in Augustine could restore its critical peacemaking function in Christian thought.

- 1 John Paul Szura, OSA, 'Vatican II Foundations of the U.S. Peace Pastoral: Source of Strength, Source of Weakness,' *Biblical and Theological Reflections on The Challenge of Peace*, ed. John T. Pawlikowski, OSM, and Donald Senior, CP (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier) 1984, p. 123—134.
- 2 Szura 125.
- 3 Szura 126.
- 4 Mention should be made of Wesley Carr's book *Ministry and the Media* (London: SPCK) 1990, with its helpful bibliography.
- 5 David Paletz and Robert Entman, *Media, Power, Politics* (New York: Free Press) 1981, p. 3.
- 6 See Paletz/Entman 22.
- 7 Gregor T. Goethals, *The TV Ritual, Worship at the Video Altar* (Boston: Beacon Press) 1981.
- 8 Goethals 143.
- 9 Goethals 127, citing Ernest Becker, *The Denial of Death* (New York: Free Press) 1975, p. 189.
- 10 Goethals 129—130.
- 11 Paletz/Entman 24.
- 12 I am borrowing this term from Samuel Ijsseling, *Rhetoric and Philosophy in Conflict*.

- An Historical Survey, trans. Paul Dunphy (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff) 1976, p. 2.
- 13 Paletz/Entman 24. The authors offer a number of detailed explanations and examples similar to those which I have briefly mentioned. This section of the book merits close attention.
- 14 Loch K. Johnson's recent book, *America's Secret Power: The CIA in a Democratic Society* (New York: Oxford U.P.) 1990, provides an entire chapter on this issue (p. 182—203: 'The CIA and the Media'). Johnson is more valuable, however, as a source for information and references rather than as a critic. Important revelations of CIA involvement in the media were first disclosed by Stuart H. Loory, 'The CIA's use of the press: a "mighty Wurlitzer",' *Columbia Journalism Review* 13:3 (September—October 1974) 9—18. See also Daniel Schorr, 'The FBI and me,' *Columbia Journalism Review* 13:4 (November—December 1974) 8—14; Paletz/Entman 217—218; and 'The CIA's 3-Decade Effort to Mold the World's Views,' *New York Times*, 25 December 1977, p. 12.
- 15 Carl Bernstein, 'How America's Most Powerful News Media Worked Hand in Glove with the Central Intelligence Agency and Why the (Sen. Frank) Church Committee Covered It Up,' *Rolling Stone* (20 October 1977), p. 58, cited in Paletz/Entman 217. See also 'The CIA Established Many Links to Journalists in U.S. and Abroad,' *New York Times*, 27 December 1977, p. 1, 40; Bob Woodward, *Veil: The CIA Secret Wars, 1981—87* (New York: Simon and Schuster) 1987.
- 16 Johnson 197, 308—309 n. 92. See also Loory 12—13. An extraordinary report written in the course of a U.S. congressional investigation into the effects of CIA propaganda upon U.S. and foreign media reports is provided in the 'Aspin Hearings,' taking its name from Rep. Les Aspin, the subcommittee chairperson: U.S. Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Oversight, 'The CIA and the Media,' *Hearings* (Washington: Government Printing Office) 1979, especially p. 90—91 on 'blow back'.
- 17 See William Scobie, 'Secret army's war on the Left,' *Observer*, 18 November 1990, p. 11; Giovanni Maria Bellu, 'Era un esercito antidomunista,' *La Repubblica*, 16 November 1990, p. 2—3.
- 18 This theme has been skilfully treated by Claude Lepelley, 'Spes Saecvli: Le milieu social d'Augustin et ses ambitions séculières avant sa conversion.' *Atti del congresso internazionale su s. Agostino nel XVI centenario della conversione*, Roma 1987, 1:99—117. A general treatment of the panegyric is provided by Sabine Mac Cormack, 'Latin prose Panegyrics: tradition and discontinuity in the later roman Empire,' *Revue des Études augustiniennes* 22/1—2 (1976) 29—77. More specific studies of the political propaganda and enemy dehumanisation techniques employed in the panegyrics are provided by Marina Franzl, 'La propaganda costantiniana e le teorie de legittimazione del potere nei Panegyrici Latini,' *Atti delle Scienze di Torino, Classe di Scienze morali, storiche e filologiche* 115 (1981) 25—37; and Domenico Lassandro, 'La demonizzazione de nemico politico nei Panegyrici Latini,' *Contribui dell'istituto di storia antica dell'Università del Sacro Cuore* 7 (1981) 237—249.
- 19 *Conf.* 1, 13, 22: *tegmentum erroris*.
- 20 See *conf.* 3, 3, 6: *hoc laudabilior quo fraudulentior*.
- 21 See *conf.* 1, 18, 29; 4, 2, 2.
- 22 Rowan Williams, 'Politics and the Soul: a Reading of the *City of God*,' *Milltown Studies* 19/20 (1987) 55—72.
- 23 See *ciu.* 4, 3. English translation by Henry Bettenson, *Augustine, City of God* (Harmondsworth: Penguin) 1972.
- 24 *Ciu.* 4, 4.
- 25 See *ciu.* 4, 32; 5, 13.
- 26 See *ciu.* 4, 31, 1.
- 27 *Ciu.* 4, 32.