book condemns everything that recent theology has found seductive, be it post-liberal, non-realist, deconstructionist or Radical Orthodox. Williams may accept the premises of postmodernism, but its various conclusions are specifically rejected. Even those theological works which display a knowledge of Williams' own field are unlikely, one suspects, to please him. Bruce Marshall's Trinity and Truth (2000) is the most sophisticated recent theological work on the subject of truth, aware of Tarski, Davidson, Rorty, et al, but it's doubtful that, in using the Christian experience of God as Holy Trinity as basic for the justification of belief, Marshall is employing one of Williams' preferred "methods" for drawing nearer to the truth.

If Williams offers comfort to anyone, it's likely to be the liberals. His ideal of truthfulness is "both/and" not "either/or": both questionable and robust; both confident of its value, and aware of its diversity. It's this sort of balance which liberal theologians have long recommended in approaching the truth. But if recently the liberal balance has been neglected, it's only because it no longer looks capable of doing justice to the kind of truth theology seeks; and that stands as a criticism for Williams' treatment of truth in general. The balance of care and passion required for Williams' "Truthfulness" seems impossible to achieve. When we're passionate for the truth, how can we stop to be careful? When we're careful with the truth, how can we communicate a passion for it? Williams says that we should resist any demand for a definition of truth, "principally because truth belongs to a ramifying set of connected notions..." But is that why Pilate's question to Jesus remained unanswered?

GRAEME RICHARDSON

LAW AND THEOLOGY IN THE MIDDLE AGES by G.R. Evans, *Routledge,* **London, 2002, Pp. viii + 259, pbk.**

This is a courageous book. The author sets out to examine the tension between church law and secular law in the Middle Ages. She tells the reader that she will be primarily concerned with the 12th and 13th centuries, but, in fact, she ranges much more widely than that, from Cicero and the Roman jurists, from Augustine and Boethius to Baldus in the 14th century. The span is so wide that it would be impossible even to attempt a summary of the argument of the book. It examines the tensions between ecclesiastical and secular authority in medieval Europe. It discusses the relationship between the legal and theological responses to concepts such as justice, mercy, fairness and sin.

Themes, such as the difference between virtue and keeping the law, and sin and breaking the law, are used to illustrate a wide range of practical and theoretical areas of dispute. How does one balance God's justice and God's mercy? Medieval thinkers saw law as needed for the protection of the common good. Yet, everywhere there is a tension between practice and the ideals of justice, equity and fairness. How

does one get a balance between *rigor iuris* and mercy, between justice and equity? These are a few examples of the many questions discussed in this book.

The author also discusses the different branches of law elaborated by academics and practitioners. Was there a hierarchy in medieval theories of law: from unchanging and universal to the variable and the particular? She also examines carefully the terminology used: *ius* and *iustitia*, among many others, and provides a wealth of documentation from all periods of the Midle Ages and earlier.

Evans provides an informed discussion of the law-schools of medieval Europe and of the methods used in teaching both civil and canon law, and she describes the functioning of the court system. There is a section on theology and the teaching of law, where the development of the law schools is discussed. However, it has now been shown that the tradition that Irnerius was teaching Roman Law at the beginning of the 12th century is based on flimsy evidence and the attribution of glosses to him is very dubious. Scholars now argue that the development of Roman Law was achieved by the Four Doctors in the *middle* of the 12th century. This is an important point in discussing the place Roman Law had in the first version of Gratian's *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*.

The book is copiously documented; 63 pages of notes out of a total of 238. The sad thing is that these are all *end-notes*. How a reader is expected to get the full value of a work of scholarship with this system of documentation is beyond my comprehension; especially when the computer today does all the work for you!

The author takes it for granted that her readers will be familiar with all the writers she frequently refers to. I suppose this is inevitable in this type of book. The most frequent text quoted throughout the book is Gratian's *Concordia Discordantium Canonum*, yet only two paragraphs (pp.56-57) are dedicated to this masterpiece of medieval canonical writing, and it is inadequately described. Gratian did in fact produce a unique collection (*pace* Dr Evans) and what made it unique was the way he used his *dicta* to bring harmony into the law. Gratian was the first to combine systematically with the canons a comprehensive commentary that aimed at showing how to resolve contradictions and so produce a harmonious body of legislation. *The* important thing about the *Decretum* is the function of these *dicta Gratiani*. Evans, however, never adverts to this, and in her references it is never clear whether she is referring to Gratian's own commentary (his *dicta*) or to his *auctoritates*.

This is the only serious criticism, apart from the horrid system of end-notes,that I have of this interesting and thought-provoking book. There is an extensive bibliography with a very impressive list of primary sources.

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