9   P. Hindemith, *The Craft of Musical Composition*, quoted in Skelton, pp. 145–146.
10   Hindemith's attacks on 'atonal' composers have themselves been severely criticised:
     see, for example, D. Mitchell, 'The World of Paul Hindemith,' in *Cradles of the
     New: Writings on Music 1951–1991* (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 70 ff.
11   Hindemith, *A Composer's World*, p. 102.
12   Hindemith, *A Composer's World*, pp. 220–221.
13   Skelton, *Paul Hindemith*, p. 257.
14   See, for example, M. Fuller, 'Some Expressions of Spirituality in Contemporary
     British Opera' (*Modern Believing*, January 1994, p. 6 ff): 'Spirituality in Post-War
     British Opera' (*New Blackfriars*, November 1994, p. 524 ff).
15   All quotations from the libretto of 'Mathis der Maler' are taken from the translation
     by T. Ashley (Royal Opera Texts, 1995).
16   A. Clements, 'Peter Sellars' (*Opera*, November 1995, p. 1262).
17   Interview with Peter Sellars, *The Independent*, 18th November 1995.
18   ibid.
19   T. Ashley, 'An Act of Necessity,' in Royal Opera House programme book for
     'Mathis der Maler' (1995), p. 27.
20   Peter Sellars, in an interview broadcast on BBC Radio 3, 28th November 1995.
21   Newspaper reviews almost without exception commented negatively on Sellars'
     staging. A more sympathetic view was expressed by John Allison in *Opera*, January
     1996, pp. 104–109: 'The updating of Hindemith's opera does nothing to undermine it
     ... [Sellars' updatings] are the work of someone who believes passionately in the
     power of opera and its ability to comment on the human condition.'

Writing of(f) Victims: hors texte

Paul Fletcher

Introduction

Particular thinkers and their work seem to create significant intellectual
waves at particular times and thus determine and define subsequent
inquiry. We all know of the powerful consequences of Kant's reading of
Hume, but even more startling is the effect that Hegel had on the
seventeen year old Ernst Bloch: 'I read the *Phenomenology of Spirit*
erotically—as I wrote at the time "the spiritual nightingale is singing
within" in this park, this wilderness—and that is how I understood the
Phenomenology as I have never understood it since'.[1] One could
respond to Bloch's experience of the *Phenomenology* with the
suggestion that he would have been better off reading Freud, but there is
no doubting the excitement of an intellectual encounter that transforms
our way of seeing the world. While Jean-Luc Marion's book, *God
Without Being*[2], cannot be placed in the same league as Hegel's

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Phenomenology, it has nevertheless, in recent years, attracted much attention in English-speaking theological circles and for good reason. *God Without Being*, the first of Marion's books to be translated into English, is a beautifully written book that blends a postmodern concern to overcome the impasse of ontotheology with a sensibility for things premodern—especially negative theology and the mystical tradition. This intellectual fusion of metaphysical and post-metaphysical themes is evident in one question which summarises Marion's study: 'Does God give himself to be known according to the horizon of Being or according to a more radical horizon?' (xxiv) Thus the quest for a God without Being; a journey which Marion undertakes in order to expose that more radical horizon which is characterised by God's 'most theological name—charity'. (xxi) The title itself gives a significant clue to Marion's project. Indeed, in his (partial) reply to Marion's work, 'How to Avoid Speaking: Denials', Jacques Derrida provides an excellent introduction to *God Without Being's* ambiguity with regard to the conceptual status of God. In relation to the 'magnificent' title of Marion's book (*Dieu sans l'être*), Derrida writes:

> This title remains difficult to translate. Its very suspension depends on the grammatical vacillation that only French syntax can tolerate—precisely in the structure of a title—that is, of a nominal or incomplete phrase. *L'* may be the definite article of the noun *être* (*God without Being*), but it can also be a personal pronoun—object of the verb to be ... *God without being God*.[3]

In this paper I intend to interact with Marion's God without Being (or, God without being God) in order to explore a number of his central themes and to assess their importance for the present moment in theological investigation. This I hope to do in four steps. Firstly, and most obviously, I will outline the major themes of Marion's thesis. Secondly, I will discuss the work of the early Martin Heidegger[4] and apply his radical appropriation of Paul, Luther, and Kierkegaard in a critical appraisal of Marion's study. Thirdly, I will highlight the subtle yet decisive ethico-political implications of Marion's theology and, finally, I will develop these implications through a consideration of René Girard's understanding of the place of the 'victim' in Christian thought.

Dieu sans l'Être

In the opening chapter of *God without Being*, Marion outlines the 'conflict between two phenomenologies'—that of the 'idol' and the 'icon'. (7) The idol is defined as that which 'presents itself to man's gaze in order that representation, and hence knowledge, can seize hold of it'. (10) With the idol the gaze can go no further; it is fixed, frozen

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and exhausted in the object. Thus, the idol 'acts as a mirror'. (12) Its divinity is constituted by the measure of the onlooker. The icon, on the other hand, 'does not result from a vision but provokes one'. (17) In contrast to the idol in which the gaze comes to rest, the icon 'attempts to render visible the invisible as such'. (18) It is, therefore, the inversion of the idol; it is not that we have here a consideration of two different aesthetic objects but two different perceptions. As Graham Ward puts it, What differs is one's perception of the object—the play between the self's constitution *of* the object and the self's constitution *by* the object'.[5]

Marion's next move is to extend his consideration of the aesthetic to the conceptual. His definition of the conceptual idol takes, in its wake, most of the history of philosophical theology: 'the conceptual idol', Marion contends, 'has a site, metaphysics; a function, the theology in onto-theo-logy; and a definition, *causa sui*'. (36) This idolatry consists of reducing the distance between God and being(s) so that God is a reflection of that being; held, frozen in its gaze. This conceptual idol Marion marks as "God": a construct of human, fallible, reductionist metaphysics. This "God" is also, one must remember, the "God" who is dead and buried in the madness of Nietzsche's *Gay Science*.[6] Ironically, it seems, the 'dispute between classical metaphysical theology and Nietzschean atheism is', as John Caputo suggests, 'a lover's quarrel about an idol'.[7]

It is worth noting, at this point, that Marion's foremost intellectual source is the work of Martin Heidegger. Heidegger represents, in his consideration of the ontological difference, i.e. between Being and beings, a point of departure for Marion's exploration of conceptual idolatry. For Heidegger thinks Being and, yet, even thinking God in terms of Being belongs to the category of conceptual idolatry:

> 'By definition and decision', claims Marion, 'God, if he must be thought, can meet no theoretical space to his measure [*mesure*], because his measure exerts itself in our eyes as an excessiveness [*demesure*]. Ontological difference itself, and hence also Being, become too limited... to pretend to offer the dimension, still less the "divine abode", where God would become thinkable'. (45)

Consequently, we must think God under erasure as God crossed through and crossed out, in case we think the unthinkable, say the unsayable and give in to the unbearable temptation to blaspheme. Must we then remain silent, or is it too late?[8] Marion assures us that one option is still open to us. There is a term that remains 'unthought enough to free' the thought of God from the idolatry of the concept (47)—that is, of course, love, a love given as gift: 'as a gift for thought', Marion argues, 'as a gift that gives itself to be thought'. (49) Let us not forget, however, that the God who is crossed, crucified, cannot be known, said or thought as Being.

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We must rid ourselves of our concepts and destroy them in the face of the unmediated gift. (81)

Primal Christianity

Marion's thesis is given theological texture through his reading of negative theology—especially that of Denys the Areopagite—which he contrasts with the ontological obsession of much of the theological tradition and, more especially, Heidegger. This dialogue with the latter is limited to a consideration of the post-1927 Heidegger who consistently characterised philosophical inquiry as atheistic by nature. This is not, however, the only Martin Heidegger—for there are many—and I would like to explore the radically Christian, and, until recently, largely ignored, features of the hidden, yet significant, early period of Heidegger's intellectual development.

With the publication in 1995 of Heidegger's lectures and seminars of 1920 and 1921—entitled 'Phenomenology of the Religious Life'—the centrality of a decidedly Protestant Christianity in the formation of his thought has become evident.[9] Renouncing his Aristotelian-Scholastic background and attempting a 'destruction' of its Greek philosophical heritage, Heidegger turned, in 1919, to the 'primal Christianity' of the New Testament. It was now, as John van Buren suggests, that he 'emulated the more direct return to the eschatology and kairology of Pauline *theologia crucis* that he found in Luther's virulent attack on the *theologia gloriae* of Aristotelian Scholasticism and in Kierkegaard's critique of modern speculative thought'.[10] It is this Heideggerian reading of Paul via Luther and Kierkegaard that I wish to place beside, and, to a certain extent, against, the demand for a return to the *via negativa* so evident in Marion's book. This wish arises from two important considerations. Firstly, Heidegger's enthusiastic appropriation of a Lutheran theology of the cross is framed by a rejection of an onto-theology configured in medieval Scholasticism as *summum ens*/contemplation/presence. With this dominant theoretical paradigm, the historical, factical experience of the *Deus absconditus*, revealed in the Incarnation and Crucifixion is objectified and abstracted through the pre-eminence of ethereal ontology. This 'Christian' Heidegger is just as concerned as Marion with the necessity for a 'destruction' of the ontotheological tradition—the avenue through which this end is reached, however, is unmistakably different. The young Heidegger was more concerned with a theology of the cross than a theology of glory which safeguarded the integrity of the God of metaphysics. There was, for this Heidegger, 'no starting point in "the humility and shame of the cross" for ontotheological speculation to move from the visible to knowledge of the invisible, because what is given here is not the eternal, power, glory, the kingdom, but the very opposite: time, weakness, suffering,
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exile, the death of the King on the cross'.[11] Secondly, and concomitantly, is the historical and factical reality of the cross which, for the early Heidegger, establishes the need to understand knowledge of God as in some way practised in the daily immersion in a life *not* in which one 'has' God, or rests in him, but in which one questions after and seeks God in historical situations. Consequently, for Heidegger, the 'ultimate content-sense of Christian faith, namely God',[12] is not 'enjoyed' as an exalted, radiant presence through quietistic, ocular-aesthetic contemplation but is lived in the experience of the Incarnation in and through the historical experience of kairological time.

Of Being and Non-Being

The radical disjuncture between the concerns of these two figures, Marion and the early Heidegger, is forcefully exemplified in their divergent treatments of the theme of being (*ta onta*) and nonbeing (*ta me onta*) in Paul's first letter to the Corinthians. Let us consider, first, the passage in question and then the readings offered by, respectively, Marion and Heidegger. Paul contends that,

> God chose what is foolish in the world to shame the wise, God chose what is weak in the world to shame the strong, God chose what is low and despised in the world, even things that are not [*ta me onta*], to bring to nothing things that are[*ta onta*], so that no human being might boast in the presence of God (1 Cor. 1:27–29 RSV.)

Marion utilises this text to promote his claim that God is wholly indifferent to the difference between being and nonbeing: God is beyond being, without being and indifferent to being. Thus, 'for God, that which is nothing is as it were'. Furthermore, 'that which is can be, for God, as if it were not; the fact of being a being...in no way insures against the nothing: just as nonbeing, once chosen, is discovered as if it were, so being, once annulled, is discovered as if it were not.' (89) However, after considering Heidegger's appropriation of Luther, the obvious question we must ask with regard to 1 Cor. 1 radically challenges Marion's reading. That is, does the very choice by God of *ta me onta* (nonbeing, that which is not) indicate a God of pure indifference? For the Luther of the 'Heidelberg Disputation' the answer is that God is anything but indifferent: God chooses nonbeing over being. For Luther (and, consequently, Heidegger) being signifies glory, power and wisdom whereas God, in choosing nonbeing, is aligned with the lowly in the historical reality of factical experience.

This detour into Pauline territory was designed to highlight that the early Heidegger was as eager as Marion seems in *God without Being* to overcome the impasse of ontotheological speculation in which Being enjoys a pre-eminent status. Interestingly, with regard to Luther, van Buren suggests that, 'Long before Nietzsche, Luther had already killed

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the ontotheological God of western metaphysics'.[13] It seems that in Heidegger's reading of him we have an example of the desire to overcome the metaphysical fetters of medieval Scholasticism while at the same time leaving room for the fact of the acceptable nature of our mediated knowledge of God. This knowledge comes via the Incarnation and the Cross—the facticity of which affirms ' *"ta me onta* in order to bring to nothing *ta onta"* and thus make an object which is *nothing*, i.e., the poor and needy person" prior ontologically'.[14] One could contend, therefore, that rather than securing a God without Being who is indifferent to being, we have a God who chooses those (non)beings who are under erasure, forgotten, no-thing. Paul has, in this passage, inverted the economy of being which suggests that those who glory in themselves are now *me onta*. In the place of another mode of abstract thinking, as in Marion, the early Heidegger presents us with the God of what he called 'primal Christianity' whose concrete historical commitment to nonbeing(s) makes all the difference in the world. Even in a later work, Heidegger uses the same text from Paul, 'that God has chosen the things that are not to annul the things that are, to show that "world" means not simple cosmic or entative presence but the "how" of being-in-the-world'.[15] Indeed, Marion could do well to take heed of the motto that Heidegger took for his 1921 course on Aristotle. It comes from Kierkegaard's *Training in Christianity*:

> From both a Christian and an ethical point of view, the whole of modern philosophy is based on thoughtlessness and easygoingness.... as abstract, philosophy floats in the indefiniteness of the metaphysical. Instead of admitting this and so directing human beings (individual human beings) to the ethical, the religious, the existential, philosophy has aroused the illusion that human beings could, as one prosaically says, speculate themselves out of their own good skin and into pure light'.[16]

Or is it, in Marion's case, into pure gift?

Power and Mediation

It is this emphasis on and attachment to purity which provides further puzzles regarding the implications of Marion's study. The desire to save God from the clutches of language, thought and the contingent raises serious questions which directly pertain to the human/divine relationship. John Caputo has recently outlined a series of such questions and his appraisal of Marion's urgent demand—that we refrain from compromising God—deserves attention.

Caputo's reflections are inspired by Derrida's remarks on the 'politics', if you like, of those who would have us escape the boundaries of mediation. The criticism of Derrida concerns those who 'on the

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pretext of delivering you from the chains of writing and reading'
proceed to 'lock you in a supposed outside of the text, the pre-text of
perception, of living speech ... of real history .... And it's also with
supposed nontext, naked pretext, the immediate, that they try to
intimidate you, to subject you to the older, most dogmatic, most
sinisterly authoritarian of programs, to the most massive mediatizing
machines'.[17] Taking Derrida's reflection on the unmediated as his point
of departure, Caputo senses in Marion's thesis something quite sinister.
Broadly speaking, Caputo is worried about saying anything about God
because, after Marion, this would be tantamount to doing violence to
God. Yet there is a note of suspicion which, supported by Derrida's
scepticism, cannot remain silent:

> Somehow this absolutely absolute always ends up with a particular
> attachment to some historical, natural language, a particular nation,
> a particular religion. To disagree with someone who speaks in the
> name of God always means disagreeing with God. Be prepared to
> beat a hasty retreat. The unmediated is never delivered without
> massive mediation.[18]

The mediation with which Caputo is preoccupied concerns not Marion's
imperative—avoid speaking—but that this command is dangerously
supplemented. For, 'it turns out that Marion's desire to tell us how *not* to
speak—speak *without* Being, God does not need it—means that he has a
lot to say about how *to* speak and furthermore *who* should do the
speaking'.[19] We will return to the point concerning *who* it is that should
speak in God's name in due course. In the meantime let us consider
Marion's rejection of the horizon of Being by which to think and speak
of God. In its place, as we saw earlier, God can 'give himself to thought
without idolatry only on his own terms', namely, as love, as giving, as
gift. (49) Yet, as Caputo asks, does this move to the horizon of love
ensure that Marion attains an understanding of God 'without condition'
as he claims? (70) Does not this passage beyond Being to the horizon
(or horizonless horizon) of love simply mark a substitution of
hermeneutical tools—from Greek and Heideggerian ontology to biblical
agape, 'from Athens to Jerusalem'?[20] In other words, is this agapeic
horizon not simply *another* example of conceptual mediation? For when
we think of God as love, we are thinking aren't we? As Caputo argues,

> The God without Being is the God with (of) love, and so it is love
> that provides the mediation, the condition of possibility, the
> horizonality, within which God can be thought and experienced
> properly as God. It is love that lets God be God, that thus grants
> God permission to be God. Is that not to reproduce the gesture that
> submits God to an anteriority, but this time a more adequate
> anteriority?[21]

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Returning to the question of *who* it is that might speak in God's name, Caputo suggests that this is where Marion's desire for the unmediated becomes dangerous. Marion unfolds a hermeneutic which attempts to annihilate the problematic gap between the text and *hors texte*. This strategy, that Marion calls an 'absolute' or 'Eucharistic hermeneutic', is outlined in a discussion of the story of Jesus on the road to Emmaus. (149) Caputo contends that,

> In this story, Jesus, the one who is proclaimed, explicates the proclamation; the unity of subject and object, *interpretans* and *interpretandum*, is absolute. From this we learn, Marion suggests, that all interpretation of the Scriptures undertaken by theology must reinstate that primal hermeneutic ideal. Christians thus do not have to submit to the limitations of textuality that others do, for the reference of their texts is ever present to them—in the Eucharist.[22]

Thus far one could only question Marion's dismissal of the problematic status of textuality and *hors texte*. However, this 'absolute', 'Eucharistic' hermeneutic is a site that is marked with power and sanction. This should not be surprising, and it is certainly no shock to Caputo who, elsewhere has argued that, 'Every time an event is treated as a Meta-event, there is a power play afoot and the police are not far behind.'[23] In this case the police are wearing Bishop's purple—for he—the bishop—is, according to Marion, the theologian 'par excellence', the only person who '*merits, in the full sense, the title of theologian.*' (153) Indeed, Marion warns us that,

> In the same way that the priest who breaks his communion with the bishop is not able to enter into ecclesiastical communion, so a teacher who speaks without, indeed against, the Symbol of the apostles, without, indeed, against, his bishop, is no longer able absolutely to conduct his discourse in an authentically *theo*logical site. (Ibid.)

Marion's absolutising of episcopal power is evident in an extraordinary gloss that he gives to the well known aphorism at the end of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus: 'Only the saintly person knows whereof he speaks in theology, only he that a bishop delegates knows wherefrom he speaks.'* (155) Thus, theology must be controlled, regulated and policed. For this reason, the theme of our inability to speak of God—which Marion attempts to overcome through an absolute hermeneutic—is inverted by Caputo in order to emphasise the ethico-political implications of Marion's thesis. The book 'does indeed', Caputo stresses, 'have a great deal to do with how not to speak, with theological silence, namely, with silencing Dutch and Latin American theologians; it has a great deal to say about how not to speak about

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God, namely, in disagreement with the bishop. God may evidently do without being, but not without the bishop'.[24]

Victim or Truth?

The unmediated character of the eucharistic hermeneutic is further explored in Marion's consideration of the Christian Logos. For Marion, 'Jesus is the *Logos* of the Father, the Word he has been speaking through all eternity. He is the perfect unity of word and Word, speaker and spoken about, proclaimer and proclaimed, sign and referent'.[25] Leaving questions of the nature and status of the import of Greek terms into Christian thinking aside, I would like to consider Marion's theological conclusions pertaining to the status of the *Logos*. He asserts that,

> one can well attempt (in fact, though one cannot) to do "theologies" of labor, of nonviolence, of progress, of the middle class, of the young, and so on, where only the complement of the noun changes; but one could not do a "theology of the Word", because if a *logos* pretends to proceed the *Logos*, this *logos* blasphemes the Word (of) God. (143)

Fearful at the prospect of being accused of blasphemy I would like to tentatively suggest, with reference to the work of René Girard, that a "theology of the Word" is anything but impossible. Moreover, it would be blasphemous, even idolatrous, not to try. By blasphemous and idolatrous, however, I do not want to play the same ecclesiastical politics (in the name of *theo*logy) as Marion. Rather, after Girard, it seems that a "theology of the Word" provides a much needed viewpoint from which to survey the human/divine relationship. Girard's concern is that unless one attends to the Word, the Logos, and its expulsion, then humanity cannot hope to overcome the violence that is part and parcel of our human situation and upon which human cultures are founded. Contrary to other texts which chart the development of culture (and conceal its violent origins), the gospels, according to Girard, reveal the *fact* of victimage. Here—in the gospels—there is no violent God who is ultimately responsible for violence itself, but the *revelation* of the human recourse to violence in societies which, up to that point, had succeeded in concealing its efficacy through designating the victim as cause. Thus, contends Girard, 'the gospels, and more especially, the prologue to John shows 'the whole Bible being *recommenced* from the point of view of the Logos as victim'. In contrast to the story of Adam and Eve where '*God manipulates and expels mankind*' we are presented, in the prologue to John, with the fact that '*it is mankind who expels God*'.[26] It is this Word as victim who acts as the hermeneutical principle in our encounter with the word.

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From the Viewpoint of the Victim

An example that I would like to briefly explore is the parable of the Good Samaritan. Before we turn to the majority of the story itself, let us first reflect on the opening verse. 'And behold, a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying, "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?"' (Lk. 10:25). The lawyer, as Andrew McKenna suggests, 'is a man charged with knowledge of the law, which for Jesus' hearers is knowledge as such, all that is worth knowing, all that passes for knowledge'.[27] One could even suggest that the lawyer is, in Marion's terms, almost a bishop.

Jesus, replying to the lawyer, questions him concerning the demands of the law. Like all good lawyers, Jesus' interlocutor provides a fitting answer—that which we know as the great commandment. But, Luke tells us, the lawyer desired to justify himself, and he 'said to Jesus, "And who is my neighbour?"' This desire of the lawyer to *justify* himself takes us to the very (en)closure of the law—to the point at which we must question the status of things that are *(ta onta)* and things that are not *(ta me onta)*. Andrew McKenna reminds us that 'Justification as lawfulness, righteousness, acceptability to God bears on the limits, the boundaries, the confines of the law—literally on the definition of the law. What is the content, the referent of the law, what is the relation of words to things?'[28] What, we may furthermore ask, is the relationship between a negative *theology* (say nothing and you will be justified) and a *theology* which risks uttering the wrong words but cannot accept the comfort of totalising principles?

Jesus does not give a straight answer to 'who is my neighbour?' but puts another question to the lawyer, a question that does not require an answer in terms of the law but in terms of involvement with, and as, the victim. It is a question as story. How do we, you, I, respond to the passing of the Levite and the priest? How will Marion respond to the possible anti-clericalism of the Word in the word? More importantly, how do we respond to the approach of the Samaritan; our unclean, bastard half-brother? 'The story places us', as McKenna suggests, in a critical situation. 'With the approach of the Samaritan, with his drawing near or nigh, his neighbourliness, in symmetrical opposition to the crossing over by priest and Levite, sites us in a crisis of value. It is one constituted by a crisis of difference which is the matrix of value; and the matrix of difference is the victim'.[29]

In attending to the place of the victim, the position from which we understand the Word must shift. Our renewed perspective cannot be one that will not speak of God but one from which the demand for practice of the Word rings clear. For we may be asked, "Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbour to the man who fell among the robbers?" (10:36). The questioner—who asks, 'and who is my neighbour?'—is

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now the questioned. "The one who showed mercy on him" is the lawyer's answer; "Go and do likewise" is the Word's demand. The place of the victim is the site for a crisis of perspective and a questioning of priorities; of power, law and referent. 'To the reversal of roles of questioning subject and questioned object', contends McKenna, 'corresponds the reversal of the object and subject of love and the passage from theory to practice'.[30] This transformed perspective pivots on the victim.

Conclusion

The demand to attend to the victim is not, of course, a totalising one. Rather, it acts as a hermeneutic strategy that challenges the comfort of our thinking and requires an active conversion. Moreover, it problematises the simplicity of Marion's thesis where icon and idol are easily distinguished and interrogates any easily established conviction regarding the human/divine relationship. God may be saved from the clutches of mediation (and placed *hors texte*) in *God Without Being* and certainty may be achieved, but at what cost? In such a context the victim brings reflection back to earth. The victim, rather than God, is the one who is consigned *hors texte*. Yet, rather than the outside of the text ensuring the purity of the one of whom we cannot speak, here with the victim, the outside of the text represents a site of violence and concealment. Literally, *hors texte* is the unpaginated plates added to the end of a book. My wish in this paper was to present, however briefly, a supplement to the text of *God Without Being*, inscribed *hors texte*—in the unpaginated, unrecorded, unhistoricised margins where the victim is hidden until revealed in the Word that will not remain silent. And this, if McKenna is right, is truth. For:

> Truth is not before us, in the future, lying yet to be measured or mastered; it is not above us, in the empyrean, awaiting revelation, illumination or postsurvival representation; it is not behind us, either, in our past, awaiting Platonic recollection. Truth is not transcendental; if anything, it is transdescendental, for it lies beneath us, underfoot, in the victim.[31]

1   *Gespräche mit Ernst Bloch*. Hrsg. R. Traub u. H. Wieser. Frankfurt a. M. 1975. Quoted in Michael Rosen, 'The Spirit of Hegel' *Radical Philosophy* 22 (1979), 42-44.
2   Jean-Luc Marion, *God Without Being* trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991). All subsequent references to *God Without Being* will be made parenthetically in the text.
3   J. Derrida, 'How to Avoid Speaking: Denials' *Languages of the Unsayable: The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory* (eds.) S. Budick & W. Iser (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 64, n. 3
4   By the 'early' Heidegger I am following Theodore Kisiel's periodization of Heidegger's career. Kisiel places the early Heidegger between 1919 and 1929. See, T. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), xiii.

5   G. Ward, 'Introducing Jean-Luc Marion' *New Blackfriars* Vol. 76 No. 895 (1995), 319. My emphasis.
6   F. Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* trans.W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), esp. § 125.
7   John D. Caputo, 'How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology' *Prospects for Natural Theology* (ed.) Eugene Long (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1992), 132.
8   Cf. Ibid., 128.
9   Martin Heidegger, *Geamtausgabe* II. Abteilung: Vorlesungen 1919-1944. Band 60, *Phenomenologie Des Religiösen Lebens* (Frankfurt, a.M.: Klostermann, 1995)
10   J. van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 157.
11   Ibid., 160.
12   Ibid., 157.
13   Ibid., 163.
14   Ibid., 189.
15   John D. Caputo, 'How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology', 140. Cf. M. Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic* trans. M. Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 173.
16   S. Kierkegaard, *Training in Christianity* trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 83.
17   J. Derrida, *The Truth in Painting* trans. G. Bennington & I. MacCleod (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 326-327. Quoted in John D. Caputo, 'How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology', 130, n. 5.
18   John D. Caputo, 'How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology', 130.
19   Ibid., 135.
20   Ibid., 136.
21   Ibid.
22   Ibid., 145.
23   John D. Caputo, *Against Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 222.
24   John D. Caputo, 'How to Avoid Speaking of God: The Violence of Natural Theology', 147.
25   Ibid., 144. Cf. J-L. Marion, *God Without Being*, 139-144.
26   R. Girard, *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* in collaboration with J-M Oughourlian and G. Lefort (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987), 274-275.
27   Andrew Mckenna, 'Biblical Structuralism: Testing the Victimary Hypothesis' *Helios* 17:1 (1990), 79.
28   Ibid., 80.
29   Ibid., 82.
30   Ibid., 84.
31   A. McKenna, 'Postmodernism: Its Future *Perfect' Postmodernism and Continental Philosophy* (eds.) H.J. Silverman & D. Welton (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988), 238.