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Providing more information about the intraorganizational efforts that gave rise to these party platforms would have been worthwhile. Interestingly, the greatest detail that Janda provides on this front involves the Democratic Party—in particular, the Democrats’ 2020 platform, which took shape through a process created by the putative nominee Joe Biden and by Biden’s most successful primary challenger, Sen. Bernie Sanders. These leaders thus brought together parts of the Democratic Party coalition, marking a clear contrast to how Republicans proceeded in 2020. As Janda argues at the end of the platform analysis section, “To fully understand how platforms, planks, and principles originate and perpetuate, one must consider the politics and politicians of the times” (155). Admittedly, explaining the politics behind all aspects of the GOP’s platform development during these three periods would be quite a tall order.

The second section of the book analytically reviews Republican politics from its earliest days through to the Southern Strategy of using resistance to Black civil rights to appeal to this region, up to (roughly) reactions to the January 6 insurrection. Moreover, it gives great attention to how the GOP has changed as a political organization. Janda discusses largely chronological shifts in the Republican Party in operating as a principled political party, an electoral team, a political tribe, and a personality cult. Starting about one hundred years ago, individual presidential candidates primarily used the party infrastructure to put together an effective electoral team. Janda contends that it was during Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign that Republicans started operating less like an electoral team focused on winning and more like a principled political party. At the same time, Goldwater began the Republican Party’s turn to ethnocentrism as an orienting principle, leaving behind commitments to the provision of public goods and support for national sovereignty at the expense of state powers. Richard Nixon (to some extent) and then Ronald Reagan built on this suite of changes, each appealing to white voters in the once firmly Democratic South.

Janda argues that the Republicans began functioning as a tribe and a cult much more recently, the former largely in response to changes in media and the latter due to the personalistic appeal of Donald Trump. He sees this version of the Republican Party as posing “a danger to American democracy” (230) by disparaging government and by sowing distrust, including undermining trust in elections. Here, Janda misses the opportunity to link his organizational analysis to his earlier analysis of the party platform: he might have shown that the Republicans’ 2020 decisions to simply reissue their 2016 platform, alongside praise of Trump, and to cancel the state primaries were both indicative of its tendency to act as a cult.

In the last section of *The Republican Revolution*, Janda provides advice to today’s Republicans. His recommendations include rejecting Donald Trump’s view that the 2020 presidential election was stolen and instead buttressing the legitimacy of US election systems, recovering the GOP’s interest in using government to solve problems, and heralding the role of immigrants in American society. Janda also suggests that Republicans determine to what extent the party embraces libertarian ideas. How hard his recommendations would be to achieve, however, is suggested by Janda’s own historical analysis, which recognizes the long arc that gave rise to the party’s current state. In some respect, there is no going back to the “Party of Lincoln.” For instance, Janda notes, “Once a champion of national authority and political equality, the Republican Party in 1964 deliberately reversed its positions, advocating states’ rights and defending racial inequities” (244). Obviously 1964 is 60 years ago, and so most Republicans have lived most or all their adult lives after this shift. Another change difficult to turn back would be what he describes as a cult-like relationship between the party and Donald Trump. Although, as he notes, some current and former Republicans are distressed by the party’s move to define itself by Trump’s statements and actions, Trump remains the clear front-runner for the GOP’s presidential nominee, at least at the time of this review.

Janda’s sweeping historical review of the GOP’s transformations and his careful analysis of platform planks demonstrate how much a political party can change over the decades. Whatever happens with this iteration of the Republican Party, this book will prove to be an invaluable resource for scholars of American political parties, campaigns, and elections far into the future.

The Power of Partisanship. By Joshua J. Dyck and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. 250p. \$99.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.
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The Power of Partisanship, by Joshua J. Dyck and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, is essential reading for students of politics who share James Madison’s hope that the American people would have sufficient knowledge to hold their elected officials accountable. Madison did not want political parties to be the vehicle through which voters filtered their views of policy and politicians because he feared they would be divisive forces in the new democracy. Instead, he envisioned a political system where multiple groups and sets of politicians would set forth policies designed to compete for support from voters, who would then consider the potential impact of those policies and

subsequently make their choice. Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz have produced a rigorous and comprehensive twenty-first-century test of Madison's expectations using a sophisticated theoretical approach and original survey and experimental data.

At the start of the book, the authors tackle the assumption that individual policy preferences underlie one's choice of partisan affiliation. If those days ever existed, the authors argue, they are long gone now. Not only do most voters pick a partisan side but they also are rarely inclined to seek information outside partisan sources, and they ignore objective truths if they conflict with their party's policies. In the authors' words, "The power of partisanship ultimately makes partisans unable to respond to information not gained through partisan channels" (3). Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz go on to show, quite convincingly, that in multiple issue areas, voters do not express opinions held independently of their party affiliation. In turn, the twentieth-century sources that were counted on to give them the tools to assess their government—a nonpartisan media, for example—have been transformed into purveyors of frequently incorrect and partisan-slanted information. According to the authors, there is literally nowhere to turn in our current democracy to find the "truth," and increasingly fewer voters are actually seeking out perspectives outside their party walls. Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz powerfully challenge rational choice theory—and the retrospective voter evaluation model, in particular—by suggesting that the core premise of the median information-processing voter no longer applies. Today, politicians do not have to produce policies that they believe voters will like because they can substitute policy output with rhetorical partisan messaging.

Where it gets trickier for the authors is in their discussion of the role that political parties play in providing cues to voters about government performance. The argument they want to make is that voters cannot hold parties accountable for policy, partly because they are so blinded by party loyalty and partly because they have few resources to accurately assess what constitutes government policy success. The authors claim that "party identification in the modern era serves as a *misinformation shortcut* more than an information shortcut" (116). But scholars such as Joseph Schumpeter, E. E. Schattschneider, and V. O. Key each argued that political parties would always seek to fill the informational vacuum and that the partisan system, when combined with regularly scheduled elections, would be the best that American democracy could achieve in terms of holding elected officials accountable for government performance. In other words, party messaging did not have to be accurate, but it did have to be clearly distinctive from the opposite party's stance so that voters could make the simple choice of which party they preferred. The more distinct the parties, the better off the system would be. Without clear and competitive party

competition, the forces of oppression would go unchecked, as they had in Europe before World War II or in the American South for the 100 years following the Civil War, as V. O. Key describes in his 1949 book *Southern Politics in State and Nation*.

The authors, however, challenge this depiction of the benefits of a strong two-party system. In chapter 2, they argue that negative partisanship has caused the general demonization of the opposite party and led voters to ignore how government performance affects their lives in favor of being on the winning team. Elected officials are fully aware of these effects, so they feel freer to reject compromise with their legislative colleagues in favor of a status quo filled with gridlock and brinkmanship. Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz use an original experimental design and survey data in chapter 3 to show that voters reject policies that they would otherwise support when they are endorsed or put forth by politicians from the other major party. Moreover, voters appear to punish elected officials who show an inclination to compromise with their opposite-party colleagues. The authors also include chapters that focus on how partisanship can condition the impact of interpersonal interactions on attitudes on racial equality, how partisanship can affect one's willingness to take on risk, and how partisanship interacts with external factors such as crime rates to influence attitudes on gun control. The authors use a range of different methods to analyze these relationships and clearly lay out their findings, which produces a strong mix of normative inquiry with quantitative analysis. As such, this book can be a valuable teaching tool for both graduate and undergraduate students in the social sciences.

The authors also caution the reader not to rely too heavily on independent voters to remedy the polarization problem, as they discuss in chapter 7. They do a very good job of surveying the key literature on what distinguishes a "true independent"—that is, a well-informed nonpartisan—from a "disinterested" voter who has a less-than-average interest in politics and is not persuaded by partisan messaging. The peril in relying on disinterested voters to moderate the worst of partisan tendencies is that they express higher levels of distrust in government and elected officials, and are less inclined to vote.

The Power of Partisanship is a rich and highly relevant work of political science, and like any piece of good scholarship, it answers important questions while producing new ones. One question I would like to see these authors explore is why, despite this clear lack of electoral accountability, American democratic government keeps chugging along in producing policy. David Mayhew in his 2005 book, *Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946–2002*, and James Curry and Frances Lee in their 2020 book, *The Limits of Party: Congress and Lawmaking in a Polarized Era*, make the case that Congress is actually quite productive. To say that

Congress still passes legislation and creates new programs is not to say that all policies are beneficial to all voters, and we can even acknowledge that most voters are not well informed about who passed what and why or how a given policy benefits or hurts them. Why then does it matter if voters misplace their credit or blame? Can voters be trapped inside their own partisan restraints and still get a reasonably responsive government?

Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz conclude their book by writing, “Today we live in a society that is everything Madison feared” (176). It might be more accurate to say that modern US society is more complex, diverse, and participatory than Madison anticipated. It is possible that the authors are setting the democratic bar too high, but they are very persuasive in demonstrating that the implications of setting it too low are risky indeed.

Dynamic Democracy: Public Opinion, Elections, and Policymaking in the American States. By Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2022. 248p. \$95.00 cloth, \$30.00 paper. doi:10.1017/S1537592724000707

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By allowing state officials to respond to the disparate preferences of their constituents in a large and diverse republic, the American federal system opens the door for policy experimentation and significant spatial and temporal variation. However, polarization and the nationalization of state-level partisan politics superficially appear to have bifurcated most of the country into two monolithic blocs—one red, one blue—with policy nuance and democratic responsiveness the likely collateral damage. In such an environment, can state policy making still reflect the will of the people? Thirty years ago, empirical research showed evidence of robust responsiveness. More recent critiques paint a decidedly darker picture of state governments, warning of a democratic deficit, highly unequal responsiveness, and democratic backsliding that rivals or even exceeds concerns at the national level.

Dynamic Democracy boldly pushes back against such claims. Even in an era of nationalized parties and intense polarization, Devin Caughey and Christopher Warshaw find compelling evidence of strong, if imperfect, policy responsiveness at the state level. To be sure, when controversial issues emerge onto the public agenda, considerable disconnects between policy and preferences are common. However, over time, policy makers routinely bend to the popular will.

The book’s core innovation is the coupling of a Herculean original data-collection effort with sophisticated methods, which permits causal estimates of the effects of

changes in mass preferences on changes in public policy outcomes. Data limitations greatly complicate efforts to measure public preferences across issues over time. Most issues emerge and then drop off the policy (and therefore polling) agenda, and the resulting time series are limited and fragmentary at best when measuring public policy preferences at the national, let alone the state, level. Accordingly, many analyses rely primarily on cross-sectional data. However, this approach inevitably fails to capture the dynamic element of democratic responsiveness and greatly complicates efforts to make causal estimates.

To overcome these limits, Caughey and Warshaw marshal an impressive original dataset by combining data from standard benchmark surveys, such as the ANES, GSS, and CES, with policy-relevant questions from hundreds of public polls housed at the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. Using sophisticated methods, they carefully construct estimates of mass conservatism and issue-specific policy preferences across states over time. Armed with these measures, Caughey and Warshaw show that changes in mass conservatism do indeed produce more conservative policies, and vice versa, and although the immediate effects of even large shifts in preferences are modest, over time they can be transformative as the effects cumulate. Perhaps more surprisingly, they offer evidence that state governments, particularly on economic policy, are even more responsive in recent decades than in previous eras.

To be sure, this responsiveness is far from perfect. In their analysis of 72 issue areas, state-level policy aligns with majority opinion roughly 60% of the time—better than a coin flip but still far below normative ideals. Southern exceptionalism persists as southern states continue to embrace economic policies that are more conservative than their publics. Historically, both Jim Crow laws and legislative malapportionment undermined democratic responsiveness in the region. And although the gap in responsiveness between white and Black voters closed in the South from the 1960s through 2000, there is at least suggestive evidence that it may have begun to widen again. Similarly, partisan gerrymandering has also had modest but meaningful adverse effects on policy representation in the states. Yet, Caughey and Warshaw’s holistic assessment of democratic representation in the states is decidedly rosier than most recent accounts.

The puzzle, then, is why and how states remain relatively responsive to mass preferences, despite broader political trends that would seem to suggest the presence of important barriers to responsiveness. The first half of the book offers two main explanations. First, polarization itself may have strengthened policy responsiveness in important ways. The ideological gaps between Democrats and Republicans at the state level have grown dramatically over the last 40 years, while intra-partisan differences across states have shrunk. This mass-level polarization,