

This last point underscores Kawar's focus on the significance of lawyers' framing of immigration-related issues. This is particularly true in those states where human rights norms are explicitly invoked by lawyers because of incorporation through domestic statute (such as the UK's Human Rights Act, which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights into British law) or national Constitution. In such national contexts, lawyers can frame domestic court immigration litigation according to the human rights approach to asylum law, which forces courts to examine immigration disputes through a human rights lens. This raises an interesting empirical question going forward: are the radiating effects different—and ultimately more beneficial to noncitizens - when lawyers frame their immigration advocacy in terms of international human rights law rather than—as in the United States—a matter of domestic law.

One question which Kawar's research suggests is whether there is any difference between the radiating effects of litigation or other legal advocacy on behalf of immigrants who have already entered the country and thus have greater rights (at least in the United States) and those who have been stopped at the border. One wonders whether litigation has been more or less effective in affecting immigration in policy in either of these areas

In sum, Kawar's book is both a methodologically rigorous empirical study and an important source of context and perspective for immigration advocates. It will encourage such advocates to think about the radiating effects of their work, particularly at a time of significant rollback of immigrant and refugee rights. In exploring legal contestations as culturally productive processes, it can enlighten and inspire lawyers, particularly in countries with isolated or intimidated civil society actors.

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Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law: The Pyrrhic Constitutionalism of Sri Lanka. By Benjamin Schonthal. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2016.

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Buddhist monks have been newsworthy of late, not as practitioners of a self-abnegating tradition but as proponents of religious nationalism. Groups like the Bodu Bala Sena in Sri Lanka and MaBaTha

in Myanmar today crowd into the foreground of stories on legal and political projects to defend Buddhism against its ostensible enemies, as if each is iterative of a homogeneous, novel radicalism (see Schonthal and Walton 2016).

In the background, more nuanced but no less fascinating stories have waited to be told. Enter Schonthal's *Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law*, a book that turns a new page in comparative constitutional law by tracking how and explaining why the Buddhist clergy in Sri Lanka has since the 1940s been embroiled in disputes over the place of religion in national affairs.

For advocates of legal arrangements to manage and protect religious interests, the nub of Schonthal's message is: be careful what you wish for. "When it comes to matters of religion," he writes, "constitutional law has damaged, rather than promoted, harmony in Sri Lanka" (11). The damage is not due to legal failure. On the contrary, it is the outcome of what he calls "pyrrhic constitutionalism," a condition in which functioning constitutional law "has unwittingly aggravated the very grievances and tensions it was designed to mediate" (12).

The category of religion, Schonthal argues, is particularly susceptible to pyrrhic constitutionalism because of its "distinctive combination of legal weightiness and semantic lightness" (15). The normative significance and material presence of a constitutionally protected religion, he points out, is belied by definitional ambiguity and categorical flexibility, which give legal and political actors lots of leeway in dealing with religiously imbued demands for intervention.

The book pursues this argument in two Parts. The first offers a micro-historical account of Buddhist constitutionalism in Sri Lanka. It traces how religion obtained special political salience in the late colonial period (Chapter 2), became integral to debates over constitutional reform in the 1950s and 1960s (Chapter 3), and culminated in the drafting of a chapter in the 1972 Constitution to give Buddhism its "rightful place" (Chapter 4).

Throughout Part One, Schonthal demonstrates impressive abilities to locate, interpret and synthesize the contents of diverse archival materials in English, Sinhalese, and Tamil, including published and unpublished texts on constitutional drafts and revisions, reports of government bodies, letters from lobby groups, judges' personal notes, and a host of other ephemera. Reading these, he identifies three competing paradigms for management of religion in Sri Lanka through constitutional law: one, to prevent religious sentiment from influencing legislation; a second, to protect religious rights; and a third, to promote Buddhism specifically. The "preventative paradigm" of the 1948 Constitution met with strong critiques from the outset. These critiques contributed to a mode of constitutional politics that led to the charter of 1972.

In the second Part, the book moves from the religious politics of constitutional drafting to a study of “pyrrhic constitutionalism in action” (147). Supplementing findings from archival work with material from interviews, legal documentation and news reports, it explores Buddhist constitutional practice from below, rewarding the reader with a treasure trove of narratives, engagingly told, that together speak of the unintended consequences of protecting and promoting Buddhism through law.

Here, Schonthal takes a different tack from scholars of “constitutional theocracy” (Hirschl 2010) who concentrate on how courts moderate religious agendas. Instead, he asks how they serve as forums to raise the status and legitimacy of religiously motivated political claims. Through case studies of monastic education, a monk who wanted to practice law, an attempt to block resettlement of Muslims displaced by war, and the commercialization of Buddha images, he identifies four distinctive idioms of “Buddhist-interest litigation”: one concerned with Buddhist autonomy from the state; the other three with protection of Buddhist orthodoxy, places and symbols (Chapter 5).

Chapter 6 turns on the case of a monk who applied for a driving license and when denied it called on the courts to resolve the matter by reference both to the fundamental rights of citizens and the religious duties of the Buddhist clergy; Chapter 7, on anxieties over conversion, and the tension between freedom of conscience and the foremost constitutional place of Buddhism. In each, Schonthal illuminates the implications of secular courts having to resolve disputes argued on both legal and religious doctrinal terms, and points to the difficulties and ironies of professional judges having to decide on essentially religious questions.

Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law succeeds at a number of levels. Its contents are dense, but Schonthal organizes them well, all the while conveying a deep familiarity with—and enthusiasm for—his topic. He applies theory judiciously and engages with studies in comparative constitutional law productively. His schemas for analysis of Sri Lanka are neatly presented, and the three-paradigm model for constitutional management of religion is portable.

All in all, this is a book that stands as an exemplar of how a dedicated scholar trained in relevant languages and working across disciplines on a single country case study can produce methodologically and conceptually significant research. And it is a book that challenges socio-legal researchers seeking to contest rather than simply affirm the received wisdom on the religious politics of comparative constitutional law to take more seriously those places, like Sri Lanka, and traditions, like Buddhism, that are usually relegated to the literature’s margins. With *Buddhism, Politics, and the Limits of Law*, at least, Sri Lanka’s experiences with pyrrhic constitutionalism shall now not be left out of the conversation.

References

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Buying a Bride: An Engaging History of Mail-Order Matches. By Marcia A. Zug. New York: New York University Press, 2016.

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A book title with the phrase "buying a bride" implies that men still purchase women, as if the latter were commodities. *Buying a Bride* challenges this conventional wisdom by explaining why marriage, for immigration purposes, has always been contingent upon multiple factors far beyond the control of the participants. In doing so, this book articulates the logic of such marriage, particularly from the standpoint of a female marital immigrant, who believes that she has more to gain than lose from entering such a legal relationship.

Buying a Bride is about why popular attitudes toward the practice, ranging from extremely positive to extremely negative, and our laws and policies towards it, have changed over time. Marcia Zug organizes her narrative to reflect the fact that initially, mail order brides were not looked down upon the way that they too often are today. From the very beginning, such women were not passive. Rather, they used such marriage to improve their lives, despite the uncertainty of moving to a new land and the risks of marrying a stranger. In describing different cases in considerable detail, the author focuses on something that has been neglected: the benefits of being a female marital immigrant. In the Jamestown Colony, such brides could escape the tyranny of coverture in England (p. 23). Around the same time, in other colonies, they had more wealth and power than women in England (p. 28). For others, marital immigration enabled them to leave an unhappy marriage when divorce was not an option (p. 39). In a marriage market characterized by a low supply and high demand for female marital immigrants, women had considerably more bargaining power and used it to their advantage. Some of the women who left France for Quebec to marry decided to remain single after their arrival (p. 42).