

work demanding reason in education was a 'bit mundane and unexciting' (p. 90). O'Hear minutely analyses recent conservative economic and political thought as exemplified in the writings of von Hayek and Scruton and suggests provocatively how each theory depends upon non-rational themes. These theories based on a lack of reason (so opposed to Peter's own position) conjoined with a conservative political machinery spell, so O'Hear adroitly suggests, trouble for education. One of the most trenchant yet—as an American football quarterback is known to say—'right on the money' passages in the book attacks current educational policy and priorities:

Given that in our cities particularly, we tolerate large groups of people being written off as superfluous to economic needs, it is hardly surprising that school is seen as itself part of the machinery whereby people are processed as superfluous or not, and I think that this view of school is going to be only reinforced by the current emphasis on education for work, the idea that the installation of computers in classrooms is going to be some sort of panacea and all the rest of the trashy thinking of businessmen dabbling in education and educators reinforcing the prejudices of the very people who have despoiled our town centres and our lives. If school is for work, and there is no work ... (pp. 90–91)

O'Hear strongly suggests that the ideals Peters has stood for so long are neither mundane nor unexciting; rather, given the political climate, their articulation, defense and reinforcement are needed more in the 1980s than earlier.

Mr Cooper is to be congratulated for assembling a fine anthology honouring Professor R.S. Peters. These essays are, for the most part, essays in which philosophy is done and done well. This fact alone is certainly a tribute to Professor Peters, the person known in both Britain and America as the leading exponent and practitioner of analytic philosophy of education.

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DOES GOD CHANGE? by Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap.. Still River MA: *St Bede's Publications*, 1985 Pp. xxii + 212. £15.25.

PROCESS THEOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION by Illtyd Trethowan, Still River MA: *St Bede's Publications*, 1985. Pp. xii + 124. £10.15.

Wittgenstein's aphorism 'theology as grammar' (P1, 373) becomes the more telling as we link it with his insight into grammar embodying distinctions forged by the 'natural history of language'. Weinandy's careful elaboration of the history of a doctrine in *Does God Change?* reveals with startling clarity just how the positions taken interact with one another to reveal in an emerging fashion the distinctions needed to answer Arius' taunt: 'How could he (Logos), being God, become man' (16)?

All of the pressure concentrates on the verb 'become', which cannot bear its ordinary meaning, for if God were to change into man, then the result would not answer to the growing faith in Jesus' divinity. For the articulation of that faith must meet three interlocking requirements: 'God truly *is* man, that it is truly *God* who is man, and that it is truly *man* that God is' (82). Were the becoming to alter either term—divinity or humanity—the last two items would be sacrificed, so one must discover how truly to predicate of God all that Jesus did and suffered without confounding divinity with humanity. Put another way, the simple identity reading of Christian faith in the incarnation (God = man) which provoked charges of idolatry from Jewish and later from Muslim religious thinkers, fairly defined what Christian theologians sought to avoid.

Clearer hindsight can already discern the lineaments of Chalcedon's 'One and the same Christ, Son ... (is) made known in two natures (which exist) without confusion, without change, without division, without separation ... concurring into one *prosopon* and one

hypostasis' (64). It was that matter of concurrence which divided Antioch from Alexandria in the wake of Nicea's insistence that the Son is 'from the *ousia* of the Father ... begotten not made, *homoousios* with the Father' (10), for the proto-trinitarian understanding of the divinity revealed in Jesus secured orthodox faith in the face of the philosophical challenge of Arius, but left the manner of understanding Jesus' identity quite unresolved. Weinandy threads the tortuous route of alternative conceptualizations—where one was often proposed in reaction to another—so deftly that we are allowed to discern the conceptual developments emerging from the archaeological strata. What results is sheer wonderment at the fine discriminations required to articulate a robust faith, and a parallel admiration at the author's capacity to interweave historical expertise with philosophical acuity in rendering so clear a story to us.

His further discriminations among kenotic, process, and three distinct contemporary Christologies (Kung, Rahner, and Galot) show the fruit which historical clarification can bring. In fact, where these modern attempts at articulation fall short of their mark is precisely in failing to assimilate the lessons learned in the long march to Chalcedon, and for the latter two: misinterpreting 'what it means for God to be logically related' to the world as well as the 'role God's immutability plays in the Incarnation' (190). The conceptual highpoint of Weinandy's analysis lies in his elucidation of 'mixed relations' (where one term is logically related and the other really so) as the key to relating the distinct ontological orders of creator and creature, as well as clarifying ambiguities remaining from Aquinas' usage and examples which have bedevilled subsequent treatment of the matter. In fact, his treatment of Arius and the new sense of divine oneness which resulted in a fresh sense of God's transcendence—more biblical than hellenic (16)—confirms Robert Sokolowski's contention that it was the Christological controversies which forced Christian theologians to a crisper sense of 'the distinction' of God from the world than has been available to others who also insist on creation, notably Jews and Muslims (in his *God of Faith and Reason* (Notre Dame, 1981)).

That fresh sense of divine transcendence transformed the classical conviction of God's immutability into *actus purus* or *ipsum esse* (in Aquinas), which both asserted that all that is derives from God and 'that whatever is related to him is related to him as he is in himself ... (for) God as *actus purus* has no relational potency' (188). So discriminating an historical and conceptual study underscores how indispensable it is to philosophical theologians to assimilate the pathways carved by the shaping controversies, and offers a model for theological education as well. Nothing, it seems, can dispense with the labours involved in assimilating the manner in which crucial distinctions have emerged, as the author demonstrates in his ability to pinpoint contemporary confusions as stemming from failures in just such appreciation.

Trethowan's essay in post-Vatican II thinking processes quite a few of those confusions in the works of several contemporaries who style themselves as 'process theologians', variously acknowledging parentage to Alfred North Whitehead. Their philosophical allegiances, however, are less clear than their common dissatisfaction with the immutable God of the tradition. And the sources of this malaise are even more religious than philosophical, though their shared polemic against this feature of a 'classical' divinity seems to have been pronounced quite independently of any scrutiny of the tradition. Trethowan uses W. Norris Clarke's irenic *Philosophical Approach to God* (Winston-Salem NC: Wake Forest University Press, 1979) to remind us that 'traditional theology in general, and that of St Thomas in particular, cannot be rightly charged with presenting to us a God who is indifferent to what goes on in the world' (84). For the rest, however, he is content to canvass the work of Charles Hartshorne, Schubert Ogden, and more recently Keith Ward and Margorie Hewitt Suchocki, with a view to making their work better known in England. The presentation is genial and fair, interspersed with critical comments though generally without incisive engagement. Readers of Weinandy's clarifying encounter with history can themselves bring to this more dialectical exercise, however, a keenly honed eye and ear for the dissonance peculiar to ahistorical conceptual confusion.

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