

and values: 'The relationship between principles and values is undoubtedly one of reciprocity, in that social values are an expression of appreciation to be attributed to those specific aspects of moral good that these principles foster, serving as points of reference for the proper structuring and ordered leading of life in society' (197). I hope I'm not the only person who feels like Jim Hacker bamboozled by Sir Humphrey on reading this passage! Another problem in using the compendium is that the analytical index is one hundred and thirteen pages long, for a text that is just under three hundred pages. The index entry for 'Life' alone is three pages long.

Further difficulties in using the compendium relate to the nature of the subject area, for as the compendium itself notes: 'The Church's social doctrine is presented as a "work site" where the work is always in progress, where perennial truth penetrates and permeates new circumstances' (86). This means that although the compendium shows an admirable concern with present social realities, some of its presentation may date rapidly. Much of the general teaching contained will prove central for Catholic social thought for years to come, but with changing social circumstances new questions will arise and old ones may lose their prominence (see also 9). It is also worth mentioning that in the introduction to the document responsibility is given to Episcopal Conferences for adapting its principles to local situations.

Will the compendium assume its rightful place alongside its big sister the Catechism, or will it be consigned to dusty libraries, the preserve of specialists in social ethics? Only time will tell, but if we want to make known the Church's greatest secret there is no better place to begin than with consulting, with due assistance, the *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*.

DAVID GOODILL OP

**THE INSTITUTION OF INTELLECTUAL VALUES: REALISM AND IDEALISM IN HIGHER EDUCATION** by Gordon Graham, *Imprint Academic/St Andrew's Studies in Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 2005, Pp. 300, £25 hbk.

Early on in this excellent book, Gordon Graham wryly notes the influence that satirical novels such as *Porterhouse Blue*, *Lucky Jim* and *Changing Places* have had on the public's perception of our universities. Anyone who would like a more profound understanding of what these institutions are and ought to be about should read Graham instead. In particular, this volume ought to be compulsory reading for every government minister or civil servant with responsibilities in this area. Professor Graham teaches moral philosophy at the University of Aberdeen, and is thoroughly equipped to provide the imaginative, dispassionate and careful analysis that higher education so desperately needs.

More than half of the book consists of a revised version of the previously published *Universities: the Recovery of an Idea*. It begins with a brief history of the universities, which identifies in particular three types: the medieval university, an independent community of scholars dedicated to the pursuit of truth and the provision of a general education for future citizens, which includes training for certain professions; the Napoleonic university, which is entirely subject to political control and consequently heavily utilitarian in its curriculum; and the Humboldtian community of scholars devoted to the pure pursuit of knowledge. Since Newman lectured on 'the idea of a university' in 1854, there has been a tendency to defend universities *either* as useful *or* as seeking knowledge for its own sake. Graham argues that neither alternative captures the medieval model, which he prefers.

Graham provides a subtle exploration of the contrasts between 'training' and 'education' and between 'use' and 'value'. No subject is simply 'useful': useful means useful *for something*. If you want to read Homer then learning Classical

Greek is useful. Conversely, engineers are useful only if we need things like bridges; we need bridges in order to travel, and we travel in order to enrich our lives in some way. What are valuable are the things for which we travel. Universities are valuable insofar as they contribute to the enrichment of society, and society is enriched not only by material wealth and welfare but also by knowledge. Furthermore, Graham argues, bits of knowledge are not valuable in themselves, but have value insofar as they contribute to our wider understanding; it is understanding of ourselves and the world in which we live that should be the aim of 'study for its own sake'. That is why some subjects are worth studying in themselves rather than for their practical consequences or for any 'transferable skills' that they might develop.

Graham's clear sense of the purpose of university education enables him to make a series of penetrating observations about the mass of bureaucratic procedures that have in recent decades been introduced into universities with the professed aim of improving them. For example, both modularisation – which in theory allows the student to select discrete chunks of learning to make up a degree course – and evaluation by student questionnaires assume that the student, who is treated as a kind of consumer, knows better than the teacher how learning should be done. In particular, they assume that the student has a set of disconnected desires which the course ought to satisfy. On the contrary, Graham argues, an important part of serious study is, precisely, to educate the desire: one learns *how* to appreciate listening to Bach or reading Kant, and how the different parts of a subject hang together. Indeed, a lecturer deserves his salary only because he has the ability and experience to know and explain such things.

The student is not in fact a 'consumer', nor is learning a 'product'. Graham has a sharp eye for the misleading and often damaging application of the language of consumerism to education. To take one example, if research is valued for its 'output', there is no room to recognise the contribution of the scholar of deep and wide learning who publishes rarely, if at all. Indeed, as Graham shrewdly observes, the best scholars are likely to be the ones who publish least, because they have the most complete knowledge of what has already been said in their subject. Again, the distinctive nature of academic work is such that if those responsible for managing its resources see themselves as *directing* rather than *supporting* scholars and teachers they will inevitably frustrate their proper purposes. In other words, the language of 'line manager' and 'chief executive' is out of place in these institutions.

Professor Graham concludes this extended essay by reflecting on how to finance universities. He exposes the ambiguities in talk about 'universal access', and makes the important point that the burden of taxation used for funding universities will fall disproportionately on the poor rather than the rich. At the same time, he acknowledges the genuine social benefit of liberal as well as technical education. His conclusion is that fees charged directly by universities could supplement public funding in a way that would both be just and offer a much-needed measure of financial autonomy.

A series of short essays then explores topics such as electronic learning, the nature of humanities, the role of spiritual values in universities and the mistakes made in the recent and continuing efforts at reforming the universities. Graham's gift for combining theoretical clarity and precision with practical common sense consistently bears fruit. Above all, he shows how far policy has been confused by the lack of careful attention to concepts. At the same time, he points out that no serious attempt has been made to assess the impact of the very methods chosen to improve the universities; the evidence suggests repeatedly that they have, at the least, failed to be cost-effective. A further valuable feature of Graham's writing is his deliberate avoidance of polarisation: valuing medieval history does not require one to denigrate the study of hotel management; one can recognise the need for universities to be commercially viable without reinterpreting their aims as commercial; universities need both to adapt to new conditions and to recognise the value of stability and the costs of any large-scale change.

The study of humanities is valuable, Graham argues convincingly, not because it makes our lives more prosperous, but because it makes them more meaningful. It is perhaps ironic that this book shows how much we need good philosophy in order even to be prosperous. At the very least, the sort of patient, balanced and lucid analysis that the volume exemplifies, if it became the norm in political and administrative thinking, might avoid enormous costs of time, effort, money and anxiety. However, Professor Graham could never have become a fine philosopher had he tried to do so simply in order to think more efficiently about the running of universities; he could do that only by caring about philosophy for itself. More generally, good universities might turn out to benefit society in all sorts of unexpected ways; however, they will become good universities only if we value them for themselves, as institutions dedicated to enriching our lives through the pursuit of truth and understanding of whatever is important about human beings and the world in which we live.

MARGARET ATKINS

**CREED AND CULTURE: JESUIT STUDIES ON POPE JOHN PAUL II** edited by Joseph W. Koterski SJ and John J. Conley SJ, *Saint Joseph's University Press, Philadelphia PA, 2004, pp. xi + 256, \$35 hbk.*

Since the late 1980s, a group of North American Jesuits has met every two years for a *John Paul II Symposium*, whose purpose has been to promote scholarly discussion of the Pope's teaching, both across the various academic disciplines and open to differing interpretations of the meaning and pastoral implications of his thought. In the past, these Symposia have taken up such themes as ecclesiology, or moral theology, or applied ethics, each of these as they are found in the thought of John Paul II. So in this volume too a broad theme is addressed under the heading of Creed and Culture and incorporating papers from two Symposia, one on 'Priesthood, Religion and Culture in John Paul II' held in 1998 and the second on 'Pope John Paul II on Faith, Culture and the New Evangelization' held in 2000.

If on the whole the particular topics addressed here express broadly North American concerns for America's own cultural and political identity and its place in the western tradition, there are nonetheless some rich pickings here and from people with international experience and education. It is clear that the contributors understand their work to be a way of sharing in the teaching office especially in the context of institutions of higher education, both Roman Catholic and non-denominational, and they address their topics with a not-uncritical generosity. There are papers that take up the problem of relations between Church and state, relations that are uniquely and differently framed in Canada and the United States, and that consider the nature of the Church's own 'religious culture'. All of them are informed by an evangelical concern for the Church's mission in the contemporary world, being inspired by John Paul II's own sensitivity towards and respect for the plurality of cultures but also by his deeply felt critique of much that characterised contemporary western culture.

Two pieces are included by Cardinal Avery Dulles, the first of which speaks warmly of John Paul II as a theologian whose concern is for the transmission, enrichment and full expression of faith, and the second of which analyses his teachings on priesthood, inspired as they are by a desire to stir up the priestly vocation in the face of its cultured despisers and sometimes well-intentioned demythologisers. By firmly placing this vocation under both the general call of all the faithful to holiness of life and to prayer and under the special call to obedience of the evangelical counsels, the Pope's own personalism and thus his emphasis on the person of the priest, his style and his form of life, can be clearly seen. Such the