

Finally, certain inaccuracies should be pointed out. It is untrue that "several candidates have usually been defeated in each election to the USSR Supreme Soviet." Although allegedly "now omitted from Soviet history books," there is a two-page article on the Bullitt Mission in 1919 in both the 1960 and 1971 editions of *Diplomaticheskii slovar'*. Finally, since 1965, comrades' courts have not possessed the power "to exile a person from his or her city or village for several years."

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BEYOND DÉTENTE: TOWARD AN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By Paul Eidelberg. La Salle, Ill.: Sherwood Sugden & Company, 1977. xvi, 255 pp. \$12.95.

PEACE ENDANGERED: THE REALITY OF DÉTENTE. By R. J. Rummel. Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1976. x, 189 pp. \$10.00.

The authors of these two books share a pessimistic view of the world. Both are convinced that America's drift toward military weakness, when contrasted to the build-up of Soviet power, has destroyed this country's will and reduced its interest in confronting the expansion of Soviet influence around the globe. The central issue facing the country, writes Paul Eidelberg, is the further "decline of the United States as a free and independent nation confident in the justice of its cause" (p. ii). For Eidelberg, the failure of U.S. policy lies in its moralism and pragmatism, one excessively sentimental, the other excessively calculating. He asserts that both approaches have placed the nation at the mercy of the ruthless by emphasizing the avoidance of war. To promote liberty while averting armed conflict, Eidelberg advocates an approach which he terms a tough-minded policy of magnanimity. Such a formulation, he hopes, will avoid the moral relativism of the past by recognizing the reality of enemy behavior. The author has gone to considerable effort to uncover the foundations of his views in the writings of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton.

Accepting without question the notion that the USSR seeks the destruction of all non-Communist governments in the world, Eidelberg reserves his strongest criticism for American intellectuals and officials who have refused to take the Soviet danger seriously. He considers the recognition of the Soviet government in 1933 a serious blunder because it led to a paralysis of will. He condemns the moral relativism that permitted Franklin D. Roosevelt to recognize both the German and the Russian governments, even after he saw that both were aggressors. But the author never makes clear what the breaking of diplomatic relations with either Berlin or Moscow would have achieved. Even Nikita Khrushchev's goals, he believes, were based on the principles of the Communist Manifesto, although the Kremlin could pursue them by means short of war. Thus, for the Soviets, peaceful coexistence meant diplomatic and economic war. Eidelberg blames the Soviets for the war in Vietnam, for OPEC's pricing policies, and for the Afro-Asian majorities in the United Nations. He condemns détente because it permitted the Soviets to gain on every front—in manpower and weapons, on land and on sea. He considers détente to be a war to the finish. "In short," he writes, "far from being a policy of peace, 'détente' is a policy of appeasement which cannot but enfeeble the forces of liberty while strengthening the forces of tyranny, thereby fostering international tension and violence on the one hand, and increasing the likelihood of nuclear war on the other" (p. 124).

Pointing to Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, Eidelberg asserts that détente has destroyed the will of the United States to protect the world against Soviet encroachments. In order to coexist without accepting or condoning Soviet behavior, the author advocates building strength in Europe and Japan, nego-

tiating alliances in the Middle East, extending economic aid to Asia and Africa to encourage republicanism, denouncing Marxism around the world, and reduced consumption of Arab oil. At the level of means, Eidelberg places great faith in recognition and nonrecognition, in words and attitudes; he assumes that power can control even where interests are secondary. On the matter of ends, he assumes that Soviet gains have been substantial, although the limitations which the world imposes on the United States apply equally to the USSR.

Rummel's study of U.S.-Soviet relations focuses on the military balance and its effect on American interests and will. For him, a successful deterrent requires the prevention of Soviet first-strike capability, power to cover all danger points, and conventional forces of sufficient strength to deter or win a local, limited war without resorting to nuclear weapons. Rummel believes that détente, as an effort to limit power and establish a web of transactions for the purpose of strengthening peace, was based on false assumptions. Cooperative efforts, he asserts, do not bring peace; nor does the restraint of power, because power, to be effective, requires capability, will or credibility, and interests. Power compels cooperation; any loss of strength, in time, reduces will and contracts interests. Thus peace requires political dominance—"a dominance not alone in military capacity, but also in the strength of a nation's interests and the force of its will" (p. 56).

Rummel fears that the USSR will soon have a dominant first-strike capability and a preclusive first-strike capability by 1981, by which time it will be able to confront the West with the choice of war or surrender. Therefore, by placing the United States in a position of military inferiority, détente has merely increased the danger of war. "When a nation's purposes become confused, its strength eroded, or its credibility questioned," he writes, "aggression against it is encouraged, and is likely to occur" (p. 149). Rummel's recipe for success in meeting the onrush of Soviet power and ambition, like that of Eidelberg's, requires that the United States assert a national interest in freedom, make clear to its people the dangers which they face, build the required levels of nuclear and conventional power to deter attack, stop aiding the USSR with trade and technology, and negotiate only on problems of mutual interest. In their plea for greater defense spending, these two authors have written books that will enhance the arguments of those leaders, in Congress and out, who share their fears and expectations.

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SOVIET STRATEGY IN EUROPE. Edited by *Richard Pipes*. New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1976. xvi, 316 pp.

ARMS CONTROL AND EUROPEAN SECURITY: A GUIDE TO EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS. By *Joseph I. Coffey*. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. 271 pp.

Soviet Strategy in Europe raises important questions in several arenas. First, what is the impact on professional standards of crash studies sponsored by the government on policy relevant matters with important budgetary consequences? The problem is how to get good advice and support basic research without skewing the outcome. It may be desirable for competent scholars to update their previous findings and revise them as necessary in light of recent developments, but scholarly standards can easily crumble when specialists mix their relatively well researched history with more speculative assertions based on events recounted in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* or doctrinal hints in *Voennyi vestnik*. This danger exists when policy implications extend only to proper management of retirement pensions, but it mounts precipitously when issues of war and peace intrude in East-West relations. After the authors' historical