

he need not be less of an individual. Mr Street goes on to assert that no countryman would dream of telling another countryman to hurry up. It is a pity to shatter such an illusion; but I am a countryman and have heard many farmers tell their employees, in emphatic and unbecoming Anglo-Saxon idiom, to get a particular sort of move on. There is no virtue, *ipso facto*, in the good fortune of country birth, or country residence.

In the reprint of his book, *Wessex Wins*, a series of autobiographical chapters, Mr Street is at pains to make it known that he has a poor opinion of literature as a profession; and that ploughing is a much more important matter than broadcasting. Yet in face of such reasoning he continues to write and broadcast as he elected to do of his own volition in the first place. Love of the countryside, respect for the farmer's labour and the solidity of his background, are no doubt admirable things, but they are not the only good things. Men labour also in the towns; and it is time to remind people like A. G. Street that the food for the mind produced by the conscientious author is as necessary as the farmer's products. It is a matter of values, and what is permissible in the full-time farmer may read like arrogance when it comes from the pen of a part-time writer.

E. W. MARTIN.

REVIEWS

FIRST PRINCIPLES OF UNDERSTANDING. By G. E. Ekbery. (Aquinas Paper No. 10, Blackfriars Publications; 1s. 6d.)

Every one of the Aquinas Papers so far published has gone out of print in a very short time, and the latest paper is not likely to prove an exception. Fr Ekbery's closely-argued essay concerns itself with the two fundamental principles, the principle of contradiction, and the principle 'which is frequently called the principle of sufficient reason'. The implications of these principles and their justification allow Fr Ekbery to sketch his theory of knowledge in an attractive and lucid manner, and to make many pertinent observations in doing so. He says, for instance, 'the correct answer to have given to supporters of Kant's theory would have been to point out that the division of judgments into analytic and synthetic assumes a false theory of thought because of its implication that the function of judgment must be either to clarify ideas or to construct objects of thought. For those who, like the scholastics, adopt a realistic theory of knowledge, the function of judgment must be above all to assert the conformity of apprehensions with the objects to which they refer. These objects are real things, not mere products of the mind'.

For the reader there remains only one regret—that he was not

present at the subsequent discussion. One supposes that some of the Society suggested revisions of the theory in the light of St Thomas's statement that it is neither the intellect nor the senses which know, but man by means of both. Since Fr Ekbery ends with a quotation from the *De Veritate* to show that 'every act of judgment essentially implies some reflexion' it is to be hoped that someone was able to continue with the rest of the quotation from Q.T., Art. IX, since the whole article is illuminating. Lastly, it is to be hoped that someone came away from the meeting resolved to translate the *De Veritate*, because an edition of the *De Veritate* with a commentary showing its bearing upon contemporary thought would be a great blessing.

D. NICHOLL.

REFLECTIONS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON. By A. D. Ritchie. (Cambridge; 2s.)

In the first Eddington Memorial Lecture, Professor Ritchie wisely leaves aside the question associated with Eddington's later work, that of *a priori* knowledge in physics, and touches rather discursively on some philosophical problems suggested by Eddington's general approach to the theory of physical science. He has much that is of interest to say about 'subjective' and 'objective', about mathematics, and about the differences between the laws of microscopic, man-sized, and cosmic phenomena; his learning is lightly worn, and a number of respected fallacies collapse at his touch. Perhaps the most interesting reflections occur in the final summary; of Eddington's Kantian or near-Kantian assumptions he writes: 'Truth is true because it conforms to reality, but knowledge is not passive recience and its conformity to reality is not to be discovered by inspection from without, since there is no "without" to inspect from'; and, speaking of Eddington's speculations about the number of particles in the universe, 'Whether you wish it or not, speculations of this kind cannot be avoided if there is to be synoptic physical theory, and that means if there is to be no respectable theory at all, not just scraps'. Though inconclusive, this is a stimulating and helpful essay.

E. F. CALDIN.

THE APOCALYPSE OF HISTORY. By E. Lampert. (Faber and Faber; 18s.)

Since Dr Lampert makes a boast of desiring no 'clarity' (p. 27), it is no wonder that his book is not easy to review. Pascal, he reminds us, made a similar boast, *qu'on ne nous reproche pas la manque de clarté, car nous en faisons profession*; but Pascal after all was a French Catholic trained from infancy in the Western doctrine of the supernatural. Before accepting the parallel between his thought and Dr Lampert's one needs to be sure that the two mean the same