

CORRESPONDENCE

and the boundary between the two is always moving, and always in the same direction.

There is another passage in Professor Lloyd Morgan's article as to which I should like to ask a question. On p. 32 he says: "Now if there be a hierarchical order, and if this order be evolutionary, we seem to be justified in the *empirical* assertion that the order of nature has changed in the course of hierarchical advance. Does this imply any disorder in nature? When once for all we give up the notion, which some are so loth to surrender, of a static order of nature, fixed and irrevocable, does it follow that a changing order must be disorderly? We claim that, far from disclosing anything disorderly, emergent evolution discloses an orderly advance in a changing order of nature." Such an argument seems to me merely to postpone the difficulty. The whole of the earlier portion of the section implies that *within* any given order there is no emergence and events are predictable; emergence occurs in the change or advance from one order to another. But if order is thus defined, what is an orderly advance? I can give no meaning to it other than that the different *orders* are predictable or non-emergent, in which case an order could be known in advance, and therefore the events in the order. This would agree with the preceding argument. In other words, does not order in any sense imply in some way and at some point "static order, fixed and irrevocable"? Of course, any theory as to the nature and position of this static order, any suggestion that a claim to have discovered it is premature, is worth consideration, but the complete denial of it appears to me inconsistent with the idea of order in any sense.

There are many other interesting points suggested by Professor Lloyd Morgan's article, but the two which I have raised seem to me among the most important, and I shall be very grateful for further light on them from someone who has understood him better than I have done.

Yours faithfully,

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WHITETHORNS,
KING'S ROAD,
BERKHAMSTED.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

THE ONE AND THE MANY

SIR,

May I be permitted to call attention to what I believe to be a misrepresentation of Hegel by Mr. C. E. M. Joad in the January issue in his essay under the above title? The mistake is important and serious owing to the extent to which Mr. Joad relies upon it for his disbelief that the universe is a unity. He has chosen to criticize three schools of thought on this question, in which he has included Hegel, and has attempted to dispose of them. Whether or not he thinks that this disposes of all possible views of the unity of the universe he does not say, and I may wrong him if I surmise. He has a right to suspend his approval of any theory in the absence of cogent justification by other thinkers without going out of his way to seek more than three, and even in the absence of cogent reasons of his own against the theory. I would not say he can go any further, or have the right on such premises to assert a positive denial. But I will not say he has done that. He excuses himself through lack of space from explaining to quite what extent his incredulity is positive. But if Hegel did not think about the universe as Mr. Joad alleges that he did, there still remains one theory about the unity of the universe for Mr. Joad to examine, and that is Hegel's.

According to Mr. Joad, if there are many things in the universe its reality is not a unity, and Hegel for one is forced either to a contradictory and meaningless conception of what a unity is, or to hold that the appearance of many things is an illusion. Instead of contenting himself with examining the possibility of the first catastrophe. Mr. Joad assumes the second. It is precisely a choice which proves a catastrophe to itself. An ingenious demonstration that the existence of such illusion involves a dualism in Hegel has to go by the board for no other reason than that Hegel did not assert it. If I understand McTaggart, Hegel asserted that the unity which characterizes the whole of reality is differentiated into persons and he believed that they

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were real, and real in exactly the same sense in which the Absolute is real. Nor does this involve the postulation of a single substance of which these persons are composed, but of many substances of which each of these persons is composed. And their attributes are necessary to their differentiation, since without attributes all substances are indistinguishable. This plurality is necessary to the nature of the unity in which Hegel believed. It may be difficult to refute, because it is difficult to understand. Mr. Joad may be able to do both. But his argument that the existence of illusion in the world—and Hegel's acquaintance with philosophers was not likely to influence him to a denial of such a possibility—involves a dualism which destroys the unity is vain if Hegel confesses to a multiplism. The next thing to do is to convict Hegel of contradiction in his definition of unity, and to show that plurality is incompatible with unity. This would involve picking to pieces the whole of the Dialectic upon which it rests, or, what is equally arduous, finding the exact spot where it goes wrong. It may be possible, and even in spite of it the universe may still be a unity. But so far Mr. Joad leaves us guessing.

Yours faithfully,

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30, REGENT'S COURT,
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December 30, 1928.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE *Journal of Philosophical Studies*.

MR. JOAD'S REPLY

SIR,

In reply to Mr. Henson's letter: (1) He is right in thinking that I do not regard the three types of Monistic theory referred to in my article as exhaustive. I am aware that there are other thinkers besides those mentioned who have regarded the universe as a unity. As a matter of fact, I expressly say on the first page of the article, "I propose to consider three different forms of the view that the universe is really a unity." It is, I think, a plain implication of this statement that there are other forms of the view which I do not propose to consider, and I do not understand, therefore, why Mr. Henson should wonder whether I think that I have disposed of all possible views of the unity of the universe, since it is clear that I do not think anything of the kind.

(2) The special difficulty which confronts those who venture to controvert with Hegelians is well known. This difficulty arises from the fact that Hegel said so many things, and so many of them are so exceedingly obscure, that it is always open to a Hegelian to baffle criticism by simply affirming that Hegel did not say what the critic says he said, or that, if he did, he did not mean by it what the critic thinks he meant.

The fact is that not only are there a number of rather different doctrines in Hegel's philosophy, but of most of them there are a number of interpretations. The existence of these different doctrines and interpretations is very convenient for the Hegelian apologist, enabling him to select whichever of them is most useful for controversial purposes at the moment, affirming that this is what Hegel really said, or that that is the true interpretation of what Hegel said. When the enemy has concentrated his fire on the position thus affirmed, it is a simple matter to move on to another one for which an equal show of authority can be produced.

This, I submit, is what Mr. Henson has done in the present case. According to his interpretation of McTaggart's interpretation of Hegel, the unity of the real is a number of persons. These persons are real "in exactly the same sense in which the Absolute is real." Moreover, they are composed of many different substances and distinguished by attributes which are real and really different. Reality is thus the Absolute plus many real persons separated by real differences both from it and from one another.

Now, if Hegel really meant this, I have no more to say. The position seems to me to involve a thoroughgoing pluralism, and as my criticisms are directed against Monism, they fall to the ground.

(3) But did Hegel mean anything of the kind? It will, I am convinced, come