
Armed, and Dangerous (?): Motivating Rule Adherence Among Agents of Social Control

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A key concern within democracies is effectively regulating the behavior of societies' agents of social control, who have coercive power and considerable discretion over their use of that power. This can result in failures to adhere to the rules, policies, and laws dictating appropriate and lawful behavior. This article explores the effectiveness of motivating rule adherence among law enforcement officers and soldiers by focusing upon whether they believe that organizational authorities are legitimate or that rules and policies are morally right or wrong. The results suggest that both values have an important influence upon rule adherence. Further, aspects of organizational culture that encourage such values are identified and shown to be influential in this setting. Results show that the procedural justice of the organization is central to rule adherence. These findings support the argument that encouraging self-regulation via appeals to the values of law enforcement officers and soldiers is a viable strategy for minimizing misconduct, and they suggest how to effectively implement such approaches.

Recent evidence of prisoner mistreatment in Iraq and of human rights violations such as the burning of prisoner's bodies in Afghanistan reflect a new manifestation of recurrent problems of inappropriate conduct by agents of social control, in this case soldiers (Hartle 1989; Wakin 1979; Wasserstrom 1970). These examples point attention to the long-term question of how societies can effectively regulate the behavior of their agents of social control (Huntington 1957; Kelman & Hamilton 1989; Shapiro 1988). Rules, laws, and policies exist to prohibit inappropriate conduct by those engaged in order maintenance, and those identified as

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engaging in such conduct can be charged, tried, and punished for it. However, a preferable strategy would be to create a framework within which such conduct is minimized, or does not occur at all.

The issue of regulating agents of social control is not unique to the military. Research on policing similarly documents a wide variety of ways in which law enforcement officers sometimes abuse their power by engaging in unlawful activities (Brown 1981; Geller & Toch 1995; Goldstein 1977; Skogan & Frydl 2004; Skolnick & Fyfe 1993). Abuses of authority occur in street stops and arrests, in detentions, in interrogations, with searches and seizures, and in cases of the use of excessive nonlethal and lethal force. These practices, whether they involve soldiers or law enforcement agents, can reflect cases of the failure to effectively implement adherence to organizational rules and regulations. These failures illustrate why civilian and upper management control is needed to regulate the conduct of those involved in order maintenance.

An important reason for the persistence of problems in preventing misconduct among those responsible for order maintenance is the nature of the situation in which social control agents work, i.e., the nature of the tasks they perform and the institutional structure and dynamics that surround those engaged in these tasks (Fiske et al. 2004; Milgram 1974; Tyler 2006a; Tyler & Blader 2000).

As societies' primary formal instruments of social control, those responsible for order maintenance are given a great deal of power. They have the right to use coercion, even lethal force, for social control purposes. For example, in contrast to the elaborate legal procedures required before the state can impose the death penalty, law enforcement officers and members of the armed forces are authorized to make split-second life-and-death decisions. On a more mundane level, the police decide whether people are stopped and questioned, whether they are arrested, and whether they receive help with problems and in emergency situations, while the armed forces exercise widespread control over the everyday lives of civil populations during times of strife. Of course, in both groups such discretion is not total. Behavior is guided and influenced by law and public policy.

Society creates order maintenance agents to exercise social control by bringing the behavior of the people over whom they exercise authority into line with legal rules and regulations (Tyler 2003, 2006a; Tyler & Huo 2002). And the effectiveness of the actions of those authorities shapes the degree to which societies can effectively maintain social order. But how does society insure that the behavior of order maintenance agents themselves is consistent with the rules and laws societies creates to govern their actions? The issue of regulating those in charge of order maintenance is a

long-standing challenge to societies, and it is central to the relationship between societies and their various types of “armed forces.” In other words, the state claims a monopoly on the use of coercive force against its citizens, and, as a result, effective governance requires the state to have ways to regulate its agents of coercion by facilitating their adherence to rules, laws, and policies governing their actions.

The problems of regulating those involved in order maintenance are rooted in a central contradiction in the organizational structures of the military and law enforcement. Those structures are heavily dominated by command-and-control approaches to the management of subordinates, with an emphasis upon receiving and following directives from superiors. Such authority structures depend heavily for their success upon the effective deployment of systems of surveillance and on supervision by authorities. Authority structures of this type are of course not unique to order maintenance and are also found in other types of highly structured hierarchical work environments such as factories (Tyler & Blader 2000). They are pervasive in agencies of order maintenance.

Given their great power over others, it seems reasonable that those involved in order maintenance should work within a framework of close supervision and tight control. However, this is often not the case. The organizational problem is that while order maintenance organizations are typically organized in a hierarchical fashion, the tasks that those within them engage in often require them to exercise considerable unsupervised discretion. Because conditions vary widely across situations and individuals, and because success is viewed as being linked to the use of intuition and good judgment within a broad latitude for action, a great deal of discretion is given to decide whether to investigate suspicious activities, to determine how to manage contacts with civilians, and to decide when to intimidate or use force against others, all based upon interpretations of the exigencies of the situation and understandings of the rules, policies, and laws that govern their actions (Hawkins 1992). Such a situation is not unique to the police or soldiers—other authorities, such as forest rangers (Kaufman 1960), also work under conditions of autonomy.

Police work, like the work of many legal authorities (Hawkins 1992), inherently involves the exercise of large amounts of discretion based on the “reading of” situations. This widespread exercise of discretionary authority is basic to policing activities (Gottfredson & Gottfredson 1988). Laws are often ambiguous and require interpretation concerning how enforcement should take place (Calavita 1998; Edelman 1990; Hawkins 2002; Grattet & Jenness 2005). Far from being a problem, the recommendation of most policing experts is that improving police performance requires *increasing*

police discretion: “Decentralizing, reducing hierarchy, granting officers more independence, and trusting in their professionalism, are the organizational reforms of choice today, not tightening up the management screws to further constrain officer discretion” (Skogan & Meares 2004:68). This increased discretion should be coupled with the development of aids to better decisionmaking and to better selection and training of officers. In sum, everything about policing makes the regulation of both local and federal law enforcement agents difficult. These agents have power, they are given discretion in the use of that power, and it is difficult to consistently monitor their actions.

And, of course, the need for discretion is not unique to the police. These same dynamics generally describe the situation of the members of the armed forces. While many aspects of military life are highly regimented (Demchak 1991), performance in field settings such as combat involves the exercise of initiative (Cohen & Thompson 2001; Schmitt & Klein 1998). In fact, it is the “emphasis on individual initiative in democratic culture” that is credited with the superior military effectiveness of democracies during wars (Reiter & Stam 1998). Greater willingness to exercise initiative is one of two key combat advantages of democracies, the other being better leadership (Reiter & Stam 2002: Ch. 3). Effectiveness in highly fluid and rapidly changing situations, such as combat, requires the ability to improvise and adapt, quickly making decisions appropriate to unique and often dangerous situations. And, as with the police, the ability to exercise initiative, when properly exercised, is a key to military effectiveness (Lind 1985).

Hence, the structure of institutions of order maintenance involves an organizational contradiction. It involves the ability to perform tasks requiring the ability to act independently and to make discretionary tactical decisions about desirable behavior under conditions of uncertainty and novelty, but decisions about the appropriateness of actions must be taken by agents of social control who are typically trained and managed in highly regimented and structured ways that on an everyday basis involve acting under high levels of supervision and control. Problems arise when law enforcement agents or soldiers lack close supervision and, in that situation, exercise their discretion poorly. Since the power differentials between agents of social control and the civilians with whom they deal are enormous, and the agents carry with them the means of deploying deadly force, the consequences for civilians are often quite dire.

The issue raised by problems of the abuse of power by agents of social control is how society can encourage higher levels of rule adherence under such complex organizational conditions. Discussions of policing recognize the centrality of this concern, noting

that “controlling police behavior is a management problem . . . [but] to date, however, little research has examined the effectiveness of managerial strategies to secure officer compliance with department policies” (Skogan & Meares 2004:78). One example of such efforts to control police behavior is found in the area of police shootings, where management strategies are important (Geller & Scott 1992: Ch. 5).

This concern about how to create an effective set of regulations that will deter misconduct has again been heightened by recent public events showing both the propensity for misconduct in conflict settings, and the tremendous damage to the image of agents of social control and ultimately to the mission of order maintenance that such misconduct can cause. In the case of the army, for example, a particular advantage of democratic armies is that they are more likely to engage in ethical conduct. This has battlefield advantages, since enemies are more likely to surrender, believing that they will receive humane treatment (Reiter & Stam 2002). Similarly, recent research on the police emphasizes the value to the police of receiving active cooperation from the public. If the police can draw upon community cooperation, they are more effective in fighting crime (Sampson et al. 1997; Skogan & Frydl 2004).

The purpose of this article is to address the question of how to motivate rule adherence among agents of social control. This article uses data collected from two sources: law enforcement agents and combat soldiers. The law enforcement agents were drawn from two groups: large-city police officers and federal law enforcement agents. Soldiers were drawn from members of the U.S. Army stationed on active duty in Iraq. Members of each group responded to anonymous questionnaires concerning their job-related judgments and behaviors.

Our concern is with the organizational characteristics shaping rule adherence within these groups. In particular, we compare two strategies for achieving rule adherence: (1) an extrinsically oriented command-and-control model, and (2) an intrinsically oriented self-regulatory model. We explore the impact of these two strategies on three aspects of rule adherence: adherence to job specifications; adherence to organizational rules; and voluntary deference to organizational policies.

Approaches to Motivating Rule Adherence

The distinction between the command-and-control approach and the self-regulatory approach has deep roots within both the organizational and the psychological literature. The command-and-control approach is linked to extrinsic motivational models of

human behavior, in which people behave primarily in response to external contingencies in their environment. The self-regulatory approach, on the other hand, is linked to intrinsic motivational models of human behavior, which emphasize individuals' innate preferences and desires as the fundamental drivers of behavior. These innate preferences are conceptualized as operating independent of contingencies in the environment for the performance or nonperformance of particular behaviors. We elaborate on the fundamental theoretical distinction between these two approaches below.

The command-and-control model represents a traditional approach to encouraging rule-following, insofar as it operates via extrinsic forces and draws upon employees' instrumental concerns and utility maximization goals. It is based on the view that people follow rules as a function of the costs and benefits they associate with doing so. It is rooted in traditional economic theory, insofar as it assumes that employees are rational actors who are primarily concerned about maximizing their own outcomes in work settings (Blair & Stout 2001), and it embodies the principles of approaches such as agency theory that emphasize the influence of self-interested outcome maximization on employee behavior. The command-and-control approach argues that employees are instrumentally motivated and are thus primarily interested in the resources and outcomes they receive from their organizations. Therefore, organizations need to take an active role in enforcing rules by providing incentives (to encourage desired behavior) and sanctions (to discourage undesirable behavior) (Kohn 1999).

Do such techniques work? Studies generally indicate that instrumental strategies often, but not always, shape people's behavior (Nagin 1998; Nagin & Paternoster 1991; Paternoster 1987, 1989), with some studies supporting this argument in work settings (Huselid 1995; Jenkins et al. 1998). But such strategies also come with significant costs. For sanctions and deterrence systems to work, organizations must be able (and willing) to devote considerable resources to the surveillance needed to make the detection of rule-breaking sufficiently likely that people are deterred. The efficacy of command-and-control strategies has recently been questioned (Katyal 1997; Malloy 2002; Markell 2000; Sutinen & Kuperan 1999), particularly in the arena of legal regulation (Tyler & Huo 2002).

We empirically examine the influence of the command-and-control approach on rule adherence. We do so by examining perceptions about the connection between behavior and incentives/sanctions, by asking whether high performance is rewarded and misconduct punished. By considering both sanctions and incentives, we cover the breadth of instrumental or extrinsic motivations

that shape behavior. That is, we cover the range of cost/benefit analyses that may underlie decisions whether to adhere to organizational rules or not.

The Self-Regulatory Approach

The self-regulatory model represents an alternative approach to encouraging rule-following, because it focuses on intrinsic motivations. It identifies rule-following as originating within an individual's intrinsic desire to follow organizational rules, and not with external contingencies in the environment that are linked to rule-following. The underlying theoretical distinction of this approach from the command-and-control approach has its roots in prior social psychological research, in particular the work of Kelman (1958), which distinguishes between compliance based upon external contingencies and self-regulation linked to identification and internalization. This distinction has previously been extended to organizational arenas by Kelman and Hamilton (1989) and to work settings by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986).

The utility of such a self-regulatory model has been long advocated within discussions of legal regulation of business (Selznick 1969) and has been more widely advanced in recent years (Aalders & Wilthagen 1997; Darley et al. 2003; Gunningham & Rees 1997; King & Lenox 2000; Rechtschaffen 1998; Suchman 1995; Tyler 2001).

Given the organizational characteristics discussed in organizations focused on law enforcement and combat, self-regulation seems particularly relevant, since it provides a basis for behavior when agents are in situations where they are not being closely supervised. Past research on the exercise of discretion by soldiers and law enforcement agents has focused upon the issue of decision quality, i.e., the ability to manage uncertainty in stressful situations and perform well. The concern here is with the question of regulation of conduct under conditions of high discretion and low control/surveillance, i.e., organizational structures that lead agents to keep their behavior within the bounds dictated by the rules and policies of the organization.

In the studies presented here, we focus on an intrinsic desire to follow organizational rules that is rooted in value judgments regarding the organization, or those judgments of the organization that are related to agents' value systems. Our focus on value judgments reflects our interest in determining the characteristics of environments—as opposed to individuals—that may shape rule adherence. This emphasis has the potential to be of particular utility to leaders in their attempts to design organizational models that foster rule-following. Furthermore, the influence of value

judgments on behavior has garnered empirical support (Aalders & Wilthagen 1997; Gunningham & Rees 1997; King & Lenox 2000; Rechtschaffen 1998), for the role of both legitimacy (Suchman 1995; Wyatt & Gal 1990; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002) and morality (Paternoster & Simpson 1996) in shaping social behavior.

Based on this work linking legitimacy and morality to social behavior, we consider two specific ethical judgments regarding organizations: (1) the perceived legitimacy of the organization's rules and authorities, and (2) the congruence of those rules with an agent's moral values. Legitimacy refers to the view that "the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions" (Suchman 1995:574), and thus feelings of legitimacy are expected to be related to adherence to rules and policies (Tyler 2005, 2006a).

Congruence between rules and an individual's moral values should also motivate adherence, as people strive to follow their inclinations to do what they feel is morally right. For example, in legal settings an important motivation that encourages people to bring their behavior into line with the law is their belief that many behaviors that are illegal are also immoral (Carlsmith et al. 2002; Robinson & Darley 1995, 1997; Tyler 2006a). Conversely, in situations where behaviors are contrary to official policy but viewed by people as not being immoral, such as employee theft performed in an effort to restore equity, it is more difficult to bring people's behavior into conformity with the rules.

The self-regulatory approach argues that the concerns embodied in these two judgments can intrinsically motivate feelings of personal responsibility and desire to bring behavior into line with corporate rules and policies. While other factors and judgments may likewise intrinsically motivate individuals to follow rules, in these studies we operationalize the self-regulatory perspective by examining the impact of judgments that an organization (1) is led by legitimate authorities and structured around legitimate rules, and (2) has values consistent with that of the agent. We test the argument that the self-regulatory strategy represents a viable approach to shaping rule adherence behavior. Further, we compare the self-regulatory approach to the command-and-control approach to determine whether it is a more desirable way to approach issues of social control.

Several types of evidence suggest that ethical values may shape rule adherence behavior. Research suggests that ethical concerns motivate self-regulatory behavior in organizational settings (Aalders & Wilthagen 1997; Gunningham & Rees 1997; King & Lenox 2000; Rechtschaffen 1998). This includes studies focused on legitimacy (Human & Provan 2000; Suchman 1995; Tyler 2006a; Tyler & Blader 2000, 2005; Zimmerman & Zeitz 2002), on morality (Paternoster &

Simpson 1996; Tyler 2006a; Tyler & Blader 2000, 2005), and on the general role of fairness in shaping social behavior (Rabin 1993; Tyler & Blader 2000; Vandenberg 2003). Ethical values shape behavior when people believe that the rules of their organization are legitimate, and hence ought to be obeyed, or that the values defining the organization are more congruent with their own moral values, leading people to feel that they ought to support the organization.

At the organizational level, there is evidence of the importance of ethical values in studies showing that companies are reluctant to use their market power by lowering employee wages during recessions because they believe such an action will be viewed by employees as unethical (Bewley 1999), that companies often forgo opportunities to press their market advantages when dealing with their customers due to ethical concerns (Kahneman et al. 1986), and that ethical issues shape wage determination (Rees 1993) as well as other aspects of the employment relationship (Jolls 2002). These studies argue that private companies are motivated to respond to ethical issues because they believe that ethical judgments shape people's reactions and behavior (Estreicher 2002), an argument supported by studies suggesting that companies regarded as ethical by employees, customers, and other constituencies are more profitable (Huselid 1995; Margolis & Walsh 2001).

The findings of recent research support the argument that in work settings ethical values shape behavior and in particular rule adherence. One example is provided by Tyler and Blader (2005). Two studies are reported by Tyler and Blader, one of a sample of corporate bankers and another of a large and diverse sample of American employees. Analysis of both samples indicates that employee rule-following and policy adherence is strongly influenced by employee's ethical values. This includes distinct influences of legitimacy and moral value congruence.

And, ironically, there is support for the role of values in shaping behavior in the training programs developed within military settings (Grossman 1995). Military research has identified moral inhibitions against killing as a major impediment to effective combat performance, and military training is designed to use psychological conditioning to overcome such inhibitions. This process involves creating a conflict between legitimacy and morality. By legitimating the cause for which fighting is occurring, violence is viewed as authorized by authorities. This acts as a mechanism for overcoming moral inhibitions. When soldiers authorize others to determine the appropriate course of action, they regard their own moral values as not relevant to decisions about how to behave (Kelman & Hamilton 1989). The importance placed upon deactivating moral values in military training is itself a statement about their potentially powerful influence upon soldiers' behavior.

Forms of Rule Adherence

Two aspects of rule adherence are considered in this study: compliance and deference. Organizations first want their members to adhere to organizational rules concerning how to do their jobs. Organizational rules stipulate desired employee behavior, and the organization benefits when those policies are followed. Similarly, compliance with organizational policies is important. Such compliance facilitates coordination between employees and ensures the smooth functioning of the organization. This aspect of rule-following involves conformity to organizational rules, since it involves employee actions that bring their behavior into line with organizational rules.

We distinguish between compliance or conformity with organizational policies and voluntary *deference* to organizational policies. The roots of the distinction between compliance and deference lie in the literature on obeying the law, which distinguishes between compliance with the law and voluntary, willing acceptance of the law (see Kelman 1958; Tyler 2006a). The same distinction is important in work settings (O'Reilly & Chatman 1986).

The distinction between these forms of behavior lies in the conditions under which people indicate that they follow rules. With compliance, they indicate how often they generally follow rules, thereby showing their willingness to abide by or tolerate rules. But voluntary deference refers to more discretionary acceptance of rules, tapping into whether agents follow rules even when no one is around and when their behavior is not being monitored. It therefore includes that subset of situations where issues of detection are largely or completely irrelevant. Such situations, as has been noted, have been strongly associated with the occurrence of rule violations in the past.

In summary, the first issue addressed is whether legitimacy and moral congruence judgments shape three types of rule adherence. Those types of rule adherence are following job requirements, complying with organizational policies, and willingly deferring to those policies.

Organizational Characteristics

It is already generally clear from policing research that the policies and practices of organizations have some impact on the thoughts and feelings of those involved in order maintenance and influence their job performance (Bennett 1997; Bennett & Schmitt 2002; Crank & Longworthy 1992; Kappeler et al. 1994; Wyatt & Gal 1990). However, whether internal rules can be

effective in shaping rule adherence depends upon both the situation being studied and the type of rules that are the focus of concern (Edelman & Suchman 1997). The purpose of this study is to consider a particular set of organizational characteristics expected, based upon research findings in other areas, to shape rule adherence—those characteristics linked to the procedural justice of the organization.

Within work settings it has been shown that employees are more likely to view as legitimate and to comply with workplace rules and policies if they view the organizations within which they work as exercising their authority via fair procedures. This procedural justice effect is widespread and shows that procedural justice encourages legitimacy, commitment, and rule adherence (Tyler 2000, 2004, 2005; Tyler & Blader 2000, 2005). Such findings are consistent with the evidence within the legal literature that procedural justice promotes both compliance with legal regulations and the acceptance of third-party decisions (Tyler 2003, 2006a).

The self-regulatory model operates via the activation of employees' values and feelings of responsibility toward their company. The group engagement model (Tyler & Blader 2000, 2003) hypothesizes that factors such as values are shaped by employee perceptions of how fairly they are treated by management. As has been noted, the potentially important role of fairness in motivating positive work attitudes and behavior has been recognized by economists as well as by social and organizational psychologists. This approach is based upon a psychological model suggesting that an organizational environment characterized by fair procedures will activate strong employee organizational identification, thus leading them to engage in desirable workplace behaviors and to hold positive attitudes toward their work organizations.

This analysis does not explore the effect of social class or education on legitimacy, obligation, and rule-following behavior. However, other studies emphasize that social class and education are strongly connected to people's views about authority. Kelman and Hamilton (1989), for example, demonstrate that both education and social class shape people's views about their obligation to obey superior authorities. Hamilton and Sanders (1996) extend this exploration cross-culturally and show that the influence of social class and education upon views about obligation to authorities differs within Japan, Russia, and the United States.

Organizational Policies and Practices

Various aspects of an organization's policies, human resource practices, and culture may potentially influence rule adherence

and organization-related ethical values. One set of management theories argues that the primary organizational factor shaping reactions to the work organization is the distribution of outcomes in the work environment. According to these theories, attitudes and behaviors are responsive to judgments about the favorability of the outcomes (i.e., resources) provided by corporate rules and policies, as well as to the incentives and sanctions associated with behaviors on the job. These arguments flow from an instrumental model that views those within organizations as motivated to maximize the outcomes they receive from their work organizations.

Psychological models of equity and distributive justice also suggest that people within organizations are instrumentally motivated and focus on outcomes but that they focus on issues of distributive fairness (Adams 1965). They suggest that people are sensitive to whether they feel that they are receiving a fair level of wages and benefits. These models are based on the premise that agents recognize that no one can have all that they want, and subsequently shift the basis of how they react toward their organization to their judgment of whether they are receiving their fair share of workplace resources and opportunities (Walster et al. 1978).

An alternative set of management theories argues that reactions to work organizations of all types may be based on employees' judgments about the fairness of the *procedures* used in the workplace. Factors affecting these fairness judgments may include, for example, whether the procedures allow input into decisionmaking processes, whether they require that objective information be used in decisionmaking, whether efforts are made to reduce biased treatment, etc. (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler 2000, 2004; Tyler & Lind 1992).

Widespread evidence from all types of organizations attests to the importance of procedural fairness judgments in shaping the behavior of employees in private work settings (Colquitt et al. 2001; Cropanzano et al. 2001; Greenberg & Cropanzano 2001; Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler et al. 1997). Typical of this research is a study by Kim and Mauborgne, who demonstrate that procedural justice evaluations influence the willingness of subsidiaries to accept corporate strategic policy decisions in multinational work organizations (Kim & Mauborgne 1993). Other studies link the fairness of workplace procedures to employees' willingness to voluntarily help their work groups, to their intention to stay with their company, and to the quality of their job performance (Tyler & Blader 2000).

The procedural justice argument is based upon the belief that people's procedural justice judgments are distinct from their instrumental concerns. That is, their reactions to judgments about the fairness of the organization's procedures are not related to

judgments about the outcomes that they receive from their organization. Instead, they react to procedures because they make inferences about their relational connections and social identities based on the fairness of those procedures (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler & Blader 2000, 2005). This approach is based on the idea that people are influenced by the nature of the organizational environment in which they work, so that the “fit” between the practices of the organization and people’s impression of themselves (including their ethical values) is important (Chatman 1989, 1991).

The findings of procedural justice research lead us to hypothesize that procedural justice judgments will impact: (1) views about the legitimacy of corporate rules, policies, and authorities; (2) perceptions that employees’ organization’s values are consistent with their own; and (3) rule adherence behavior. In other words, fair organizational procedures and processes are hypothesized to foster a sense that corporate authorities are legitimate and that the organization itself possesses moral values similar to those of the individual. This activates internal motivations, and agents more voluntarily follow rules and policies, i.e., they become self-regulatory.

Note that this approach can be contrasted to one in which ethical values are shaped by instrumental concerns. That is, the two instrumental judgments discussed earlier—i.e., the favorability or fairness of outcomes received from the organization—may shape the extent to which organizations and authorities are viewed as legitimate and the organization itself possess moral values similar to those of the individual. This would be the prediction of instrumental models that emphasize the concern agents have over the outcomes they receive.

As noted, the findings of studies conducted in work settings suggest that one way that work organizations can motivate their employees is by exercising authority in ways that will be judged by those employees as fair. Tyler and Blader (2000), for example, find that procedural justice judgments are the central antecedent of rule-following and policy adherence. Those employees who feel that they work in a fair work environment are especially willing to take the responsibility to follow company policies upon themselves, with the obvious advantage that the company does not then have to compel such behavior. Studies show that procedural justice judgments have the potential to shape rule-related behavior, and that such influence is primarily explained by the impact that procedural justice has on ethical values. Hence, it is important for companies to be concerned about acting in ways that employees will judge to be fair. By acting fairly, companies motivate employees to both follow company policies and refrain from engaging in actions that undermine the company, actions ranging from theft to sabotage.

These actions are costly to the company, undermining efficiency and effectiveness, and make clear why companies should be motivated to understand and respond to employees' feelings about what is fair.

These findings have optimistic implications for the ability of organizational authorities to encourage rule-following behavior among their employees. Authorities are seldom in the position to expend excessive organizational resources on monitoring and punishing employee misbehavior. The procedural justice perspective suggests that people will comply with, and, more strikingly, voluntarily defer to rules when they feel that the rules and authorities within their organization are following fair procedures when they exercise their authority and make managerial decisions. This strategy similarly promotes the view amongst employees that organizational authorities are legitimate and that the moral values of the organization correspond with their own personal moral values. What makes such a finding optimistic from an organizational point of view is that the creation and implementation of procedures that all individuals perceive as fair is not restricted in the same way that allocations of resources are. Procedural fairness is not finite, particularly since it is based on ethical criterion.

Interestingly, the procedural justice perspective is consistent with emerging trends in law and the legal regulation of business. As command-and-control-based strategies of regulation have increasingly been questioned, government regulatory agencies have developed a variety of strategies for enlisting businesses and other "stakeholders" in the formulation and implementation of regulatory policy. These include negotiation to reach consensus on administrative regulations (Coglianese 1997), cooperative arrangements for delivering social services (Stewart 2003), and joint efforts to manage wildlife and wild lands (Karkkainen 2002; Lin 1996). These policies decentralize power to "enable citizens and other actors to utilize their local knowledge to fit solutions to their individual circumstances" (Dorf & Sabel 1998:267). All of these efforts involve procedures for decisionmaking that embody the procedural justice values of voice, participation, neutrality, and acknowledging the rights, needs and concerns of people involved in the decision. This does not mean that they involve wide employee participation, but rather that they reflect the values inherent in procedural justice perspectives on management.

The concern of this study is with the possibility that similar approaches can be effective in shaping the behavior of those involved in order maintenance activities. If law enforcement agents and soldiers are influenced by procedural justice judgments, then there is an organizational framework through which self-regulatory approaches can be developed.

What Is a Fair Procedure?

From an organizational perspective, procedural justice judgments are most useful to managers if those within the organization distinguish them from outcome judgments and rely on distinct procedural justice assessments when evaluating the actions of management. Based upon research in work settings, it is expected that views about the fairness of company procedures will, in fact, be heavily influenced by distinct judgments about procedural fairness that are not linked to the favorability or fairness of the outcomes that results from those procedures (Tyler & Blader 2000). These include, for example, whether the procedures allow input into evaluations, whether they require that objective information be used, whether they try to control the influence of bias, etc. (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler & Lind 1992). Recent research draws upon the four-component model of procedural justice and tests the importance of four potential procedural justice criteria (see Blader & Tyler 2003a, 2003b).

Understanding the nature of procedural justice judgments is central to efforts to design a culture that encourages supportive values and that enhances rule adherence behavior. The argument advanced here is that the potential impact of these procedural issues lies in the ability of organizations to design systems of management that are sensitive to procedural concerns, even when they cannot or do not provide those within the organization with the outcomes they desire. Several such efforts have already been made in police agencies by relying upon the ideas of total quality management, which include encouraging officer input into decision-making and the use of objective data analysis (Couper & Sabine 1991; Wycoff & Skogan 1993).

The four-component model of procedural justice identifies four procedural components, or evaluations, each of which contributes to overall procedural justice judgments. Those components are defined by (1) two distinct aspects of organizational processes, and (2) two sources of information about procedures. We discuss the influence of each of these four components on definitions of procedural justice.

One of the aspects of organizational processes considered in the model refers to the organization's decisionmaking procedures. Specifically, the model considers evaluations of the quality of decisionmaking in the organization. Consideration of these evaluations links to the elements of legal procedures and emphasizes issues of decision maker neutrality, the objectivity and factuality of decisionmaking, and the consistency of rule application (Lind & Tyler 1988; Tyler & Lind 1992).

There is a distinct but potentially equally important issue involving the quality of people's treatment by organizational authorities.

Quality of interpersonal treatment issues constitute the second aspect of organizational processes. Quality of treatment involves treatment with politeness and dignity, concern for people's rights, and other aspects of procedures that are not directly linked to the decisions being made through the procedure.

Each of these two aspects of procedures (quality of decision-making, quality of treatment) can potentially be linked to two sources of information. One source of information involves the rules of the organization. The formal rules and structures of the organization, as well as statements of organizational values, communicate information about organizational procedures. For example, organizations vary in terms of whether they have formal grievance procedures that allow people to voice complaints. They also differ in their statements of values ("vision statements").

The other source of information is employees' experience with their superiors. While they are constrained by formal institutions and procedures, organizational authorities typically have considerable discretion concerning the manner in which they implement decisionmaking procedures and how they make decisions regarding issues that have no formal procedures associated with them. Further, they have a great deal of flexibility about how they treat those with whom they deal. The same decisionmaking procedure can be implemented in a way that emphasizes the dignity of those involved, or employees can be treated rudely or dismissively. A similar situation is found with the law. There are formal laws and rules constraining the conduct of police officers and judges. However, those authorities typically have considerable latitude in the manner in which they exercise their authority within the framework of those rules.

The four-component model argues that each of the four components defined by these two dimensions has an important role in the definition of the fairness of procedures. While the four-component model provides a guideline for the types of evaluations that compose overall evaluations of an organization's procedural justice, the essential argument advanced here is that the nature of those evaluations is noninstrumental and nonmaterial. Neither of the aspects of organizational processes emphasized in this model of the antecedents of procedural justice (quality of decisionmaking, quality of interpersonal treatment) is directly linked to evaluations of the favorability or fairness of the outcomes people receive.

This psychological model of procedural justice suggests that formal and informal procedures will typically complement one another. However, it is important to acknowledge a sociological tradition suggesting that the interpersonal connections made within work groups may foster the development of separate norms and ways of doing business that facilitate rule-breaking. Bourdieu

highlights the possibility that work groups may create the organizational dynamics that support rule-breaking and corruption by creating separate social realities within which such practices are regarded as acceptable (Wacquant 2005).

Summary

The argument advanced here is for a broader view of the antecedents of rule adherence behavior among agents of social control, i.e., law enforcement agents and soldiers. We want to articulate and show the importance of a broader and more realistic picture of the motivation of those within order maintenance settings. This model looks at the influence of value-based motivations in shaping rule adherence behavior. The results presented suggest that values are useful in understanding the occurrence of rule-following.

Method

The total sample size was 419. Three groups were approached: city police officers and federal law enforcement agents ($n = 209$), and soldiers in a combat setting ($n = 210$). Within each group, questionnaires were made available within the organization and anonymous participation was invited. It was not possible to establish the size of the populations, so the response rate was unclear. Those who chose to participate completed their questionnaires anonymously.

Of the 419 respondents, 85 percent were male, and 40 percent had a bachelor's degree or more. The mean age was 35 years. The sample was somewhat heterogeneous with respect to race, with 67 percent Caucasian, 10 percent Latino, and 14 percent African American. More detailed demographic information is provided in Appendix A.

Law Enforcement

Questionnaires were distributed within two law enforcement agencies—a large federal law enforcement agency and one of the largest American metropolitan city police departments (for further details, see Frost 2006). With the cooperation of supervisors, who encouraged participation, voluntary participation was solicited, and those law enforcement officers who were willing completed an anonymous questionnaire. A “snowball sampling” technique was used, with officers encouraged to identify others possibly interested in completing a questionnaire. In addition, those local respondents who requested it received \$10 compensation. A total of 209

questionnaires were returned, 58 percent (119) from the federal law enforcement agency and 43 percent (90) from the large city police department. Because participation was informally solicited, a response rate could not be computed.

Military

With the approval and cooperation of field commanders in several units stationed in Iraq, soldiers were given the opportunity to anonymously complete questionnaires about their units and about the army. Again, a snowball technique was used, with those commanders willing to participate asked to invite participation by those in their units (for further details, see Callahan 2006).

Questionnaire

The questions are shown in Appendix B. The complete means and item correlations are available from the authors.

Three dependent variables were assessed: following job requirements, complying with organizational rules, and voluntarily deferring to organizational policies.

Two values were measured: legitimacy and value congruence. Their influence was compared to that of an index reflecting the incentives/sanctions associated with rule adherence.

Four organizational characteristics were measured: the procedural justice of the organization, the distributive fairness of organizational outcomes, the favorability of organizational outcomes, and the level of pay and benefits received.

The four elements of procedural justice were also measured. Those were the justice of organizational decisionmaking, the justice of organizational interpersonal treatment, the justice of decisionmaking by one's superior, and the justice of interpersonal treatment by one's superior.

Finally, demographic variables were measured. In both groups the agents' age, gender, education, and race were measured. For law enforcement agents, whether they were state or local and whether they were in the field were also measured. For soldiers, rank was measured.

Results

An examination of the means first suggests that law enforcement officers were more likely to rate their organizations as legitimate (law enforcement = 4.56 vs. military = 4.29) and as value-congruent (law enforcement = 4.55 vs. military = 3.95). Further, they were more likely to rate their organization to be

Table 1. The Antecedents of Behavior

DV = behavior	Law Enforcement			Military		
	Follow Job Requirements	Follow Organizational Rules	Defer to Policies	Follow Job Requirements	Follow Organizational Rules	Defer to Policies
Values Legitimacy	0.11	0.28***	0.34***	0.40***	0.55***	0.56***
Moral congruence	0.48***	0.14	0.24***	0.18*	0.01	0.15*
Instrumental contingencies	-0.09	-0.05	-0.02	-0.03	0.09	0.18**
Type of organization (local/federal)	0.22*	0.06	0.05	—	—	—
Type of work (active in the field?)	0.01	0.00	0.13	—	—	—
Years on the job	-0.14	-0.14	0.20	—	—	—
Military rank	—	—	—	-0.03	-0.07	-0.03
Race	0.00	-0.03	0.09	0.06	0.03	0.05
Gender	-0.14*	-0.18*	-0.15*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01
Age	0.09	-0.01	-0.12	-0.14	-0.17**	0.00
Education	-0.19**	-0.16*	-0.17*	-0.02	-0.01	0.06
Adj. R.-sq.	17%	12%	27%	29%	41%	49%

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

procedurally just (law enforcement = 4.17 vs. military = 3.46) and as distributively fair (law enforcement = 3.90 vs. military = 3.32). Law enforcement officers also indicated that they received more favorable outcomes (law enforcement = 4.17 vs. military = 3.58) and higher pay (law enforcement = 4.06 vs. military = 3.06). Law enforcement agents also rated their superiors as making decisions using fairer procedures (law enforcement = 4.07 vs. military = 3.56) and as treating them more fairly (law enforcement = 4.42 vs. military = 3.75). Ratings for institutional justice were similar, but the differences were smaller (decisionmaking: law enforcement = 3.67 vs. military = 3.52; treatment: law enforcement = 3.48 vs. military = 3.36).

Do Values Matter?

Regression analysis was used to test the relative efficacy of the command-and-control and self-regulatory approaches to promoting employee adherence to organizational rules, and in particular to determine whether the self-regulatory approach represents a viable and even superior strategy for gaining such adherence. In the analysis, the command-and-control variable was entered, as were the two self-regulatory variables (legitimacy and moral value congruence). These variables were regressed on each of the three types of rule-following (adherence to job requirements, compliance with organizational policies, and deference to organizational policies). The results of those regression analyses are presented in Table 1.

Table 2. Factors Shaping Values

DV = values	Law Enforcement		Armed Forces	
	Legitimacy	Moral Congruence	Legitimacy	Moral Congruence
Procedural justice	0.24***	0.29***	0.39***	0.42***
Distributive fairness	0.02	-0.09	-0.02	-0.02
Outcome favorability	0.10	0.24***	0.02	0.27***
Pay level	-0.04	-0.03	0.04	-0.03
Type of organization	-0.08	-0.21***	—	—
Active field officer?	-0.04	0.00	—	—
Rank	—	—	-0.10	-0.12
Race	0.10	-0.05	-0.05	-0.07
Gender	0.07	-0.11*	-0.02	-0.03
Age	0.11	-0.11	-0.09	-0.12*
Years on the job	-0.12	0.10	—	—
Education	-0.11	0.02	-0.02	-0.03
Adj. R.-sq.	11%	52%	19%	44%

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

The results presented in Table 1 confirm the hypothesized pattern of results. They indicate that self-regulatory variables such as employee views about legitimacy and value congruence both significantly shaped all three types of employee rule-following. Judgments about the legitimacy of organizational authorities significantly impacted following rules and deferring to policies among law enforcement officers, and all three forms of rule-following among soldiers. Moral value congruence was significantly related to following job requirements and deferring to policies among law enforcement agents and members of the military.

What Shapes Values?

The key hypothesis drawn from the prior literature is that assessments of the procedural justice of the organizations within which order maintenance agents work would significantly influence the degree to which those agents followed rules and policies in the workplace. In other words, like the members of the general public, who are widely found to react to the procedural justice they experience when dealing with legal authorities (Tyler & Huo 2002), order maintenance agents could react to the procedural justice they experience when dealing with their superiors and within their own organizations. This prediction is supported by the literature on private sector employees, which shows that procedural justice shapes both legitimacy judgments and rule-following behaviors (Tyler & Blader 2000, 2005).

Regression analysis, shown in Table 2, provides support for the procedural justice argument. The assessments of legitimacy made by both law enforcement agents and soldiers were found to be significantly influenced by procedural justice. Further, the degree to which

Table 3. Aspects of Procedural Justice

DV = procedural justice	Law Enforcement		Military	
Work group decisionmaking	0.24***	0.09	0.22*	0.18*
Work group interpersonal treatment	0.25***	0.36***	0.34**	0.24*
Organizational decisionmaking	0.21***	0.13*	0.19*	0.19*
Organizational interpersonal treatment	0.29***	0.10	0.20*	0.06
Type of organization	-0.05	-0.02	—	—
Type of work	-0.04	0.00	—	—
Rank	—	—	-0.03	0.03
Race	-0.08	-0.07	0.07	0.08
Gender	-0.05	0.00	-0.07	-0.05
Age	-0.05	-0.11	0.01	-0.01
Years on the job	0.08	0.14*	—	—
Education	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.04
Distributive fairness of outcomes	—	0.41***	—	0.39***
Adj. R.-sq.	70%	78%	66%	75%

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

procedural justice was judged to characterize their own organization was linked to the degree to which they evaluated the policies of their organization as consistent with their own moral values.

Three types of outcome judgment were included in the equation: the fairness of organizational outcomes, the favorability of organizational outcomes, and pay level. None of these three judgments influenced legitimacy, which was only found to be linked to procedural justice. Moral congruence was influenced by outcome favorability, in addition to the already outlined influence of procedural justice.

The congruence in the findings across the two samples is striking. While both law enforcement agents and soldiers are engaged in order maintenance, and both operate in similarly hierarchical environments, many aspects of their jobs are different. In particular, law enforcement agents deal with communities that are part of their own society, while the soldiers are involved in an occupation of another society and are dealing with civilians who are “foreigners.” Yet the psychological dynamics of the influence of legitimacy and moral value congruence upon rule adherence were found to be very similar.

Elements of Procedural Justice

The analysis of the meaning of procedural justice drew upon the four-component model outlined by Blader and Tyler (2003a, 2003b). Again, regression analysis was used to test that model. The dependent variable in this analysis was procedural justice. The independent variables were the four aspects of procedural justice, distributive fairness, and demographic controls. The results are shown in Table 3. The first equation examined procedural justice influences without controlling upon distributive fairness, while the second equation controlled upon distributive fairness.

Within the samples of both law enforcement agents and soldiers, the key issues defining procedural justice were similar. When distributive justice was controlled upon, the most important issue was the quality of the interpersonal treatment experienced from one's superiors. Those who experienced dignity, politeness, respect, and concern for their well-being rated the procedures of the organization to be just. A second factor important in both groups was the neutrality and factuality of organizational decision-making procedures. And finally, among soldiers the neutrality of work group decisionmaking procedures was important. In both groups, the fairness of outcomes was linked to procedural justice judgments.

Overall Analysis

Structural equation modeling was used to consider all three of the questions addressed via regression analysis at one time. The structural equation modeling was conducted using AMOS (Arbuckle & Wothke 1995). In the analysis, the four procedural elements, the two values, and the three aspects of rule adherence were treated as latent variables and other variables as observable indicators. The analysis considered the groups as separate groups. Overall, the model explained 17 percent of the variance in rule adherence among law enforcement officers (23 percent among local police officers and 13 percent among federal agents) and 54 percent among soldiers.

The results are shown in Figure 1. All possible paths were included, and all significant paths ($p < 0.01$) are shown. The first




Figure 1. Overall Model (CFI = 0.87). Three Coefficients are Shown: Soldiers; Law Enforcement Agents; Federal Agents. Significant Coefficients are Shown.

coefficient is for law enforcement officers, and the second, in parentheses, is for soldiers. The results indicate that values shape rule adherence, while procedural justice shapes values. Procedural justice itself is shaped by the four procedural elements and by distributive justice.

Discussion

The results from both the law enforcement agents and the soldiers confirm our central prediction that the self-regulatory approach represents a viable approach to fostering rule adherence among agents of social control who are involved in order maintenance activities. The social value judgments made regarding their organizations, embodied in their perceptions of the legitimacy of organizational authorities and the perceived congruence of their personal values with those of the organization, shaped rule and policy adherence. This was true across the three types of rule-following behavior examined—following job requirements, adhering to organizational rules, and voluntarily deferring to organizational policies. These results confirm that the self-regulatory strategy is a viable approach to attaining rule adherence.

These results support the argument that social value judgments shape behavior, and in particular rule-following behavior. Those judgments are a major motivation leading to adherence with organizational policies and rules. These results suggest that one promising way to bring the behavior of law enforcement agents and members of the military into line with codes of conduct is to tap into their social values—i.e., their motivation to defer to legitimate rules and authorities and to engage in actions congruent with their own moral values. To gain acceptance for rules and policies, organizations should activate employee values. These values are central to the self-regulatory strategy for achieving compliance.

Of course, the activation of values is not the only way to influence rule-related behavior. As is the practice in many organizations, organizational efforts to monitor and sanction/reward behavior may likewise motivate the following of organizational policies, consistent with the command-and-control approach. However, in the data analyzed here, the utility of that approach overall appears to be weaker than that of a self-regulatory approach. Although there were significant influences of the command-and-control approach in some instances, these influences were typically secondary in magnitude to the influence of the variables in the self-regulatory approach. Hence, we suggest that self-regulatory approaches are more than just another approach to regulation—they are a more effective approach.

These findings suggest that both law enforcement and military organizations have a great deal to gain by going beyond instrumental strategies of social control and focusing attention on the activation of values that are consistent with a self-regulatory strategy. Overall, the results presented here indicate the viability of such a strategy and, furthermore, the potential superiority of that strategy over the more traditional command-and-control approach. This alternative strategy leads to cooperation much more efficiently and effectively, since those in the organization become self-regulatory and take the responsibility of following rules onto themselves. Further, they do so without reference to the likelihood of being punished for wrongdoing or rewarded for acting appropriately.

The use of self-regulatory approaches is also important because it addresses the organizational issues outlined. If it is important for those involved in order maintenance to be able to act with discretion, then the solution to the problem of rule adherence must work within a discretionary environment. Because values are an aspect of self-regulation, they work in such an environment. If agents are following rules based upon their internal values, their behavior should continue to be consistent with the rules when they are not being controlled by direct surveillance by superiors.

As might be expected, those involved in training order maintenance agents to some degree already recognize the potential importance of value-based approaches. For example, the U.S. Army leadership training manual makes values a core part of leadership training and includes values such as respect and integrity (U.S. Army Field Manual 22–100 1999). That manual illustrates integrity by pointing approvingly to an incident in which a soldier in Vietnam protects civilians from his own comrades by threat of force (1999:2–10). On the other hand, the *Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control* (U.S. Army Field Manual 22–51 1994) emphasizes the need to prevent misconduct but does not discuss the role of values with either soldiers or officers. Rather, it focuses upon the importance of high unit cohesion and “competence, courage, candor, and commitment” among leaders (1994: Ch. 4). This alternative focus highlights the potential value to organizations of an emphasis upon the “sense of mission.”

An additional important issue is the relationship between the findings for local and federal law enforcement agents. Figure 1 separately examines the results from local police officers and federal agents. This model indicated that the data from both groups support the model. However, the model for local officers explained 23 percent of the variance in rule adherence, while the model for federal agents explained 13 percent. And, of course, the model worked most effectively for soldiers, for whom 54 percent of the variance was explained.

Overall, therefore, the model was most effective in explaining the actions of soldiers, and less effective in explaining the actions of federal law enforcement agents. Significant relationships were found among all three groups, but behavior was best explained among soldiers and least well explained among federal agents. When the three groups were considered as a continuum, the model was found to be most effective in those settings where those involved are the most likely to confront issues of regulating their use of violence. This problem is most central to the mission of soldiers, is an everyday issue among police officers, and comes up most selectively among federal agents, who are involved in more specialized law enforcement tasks. Of course, it must be acknowledged that many variables distinguish soldiers, local police officers, and federal agents, so a clearer answer to this question requires further research.

Earlier studies in the area of everyday law-related behavior highlight the important role of social values in encouraging citizen compliance with the law (Tyler 2006a, 2006b). It has been shown that people are more likely to comply with laws when they feel that legal authorities are legitimate and ought to be obeyed. The findings outlined here support this argument and extend it to a different arena—the agents responsible for maintaining social control and their relationship to the organization in which they work. This extension is especially striking since the work arena is one in which the influence of values has traditionally been downplayed in favor of alternative instrumental or “rational” approaches.

The current findings also extend previous work by considering not only the social value of legitimacy but also that of moral value congruence (i.e., the match between a person’s moral values and those of the organization). When those within an organization feel that the values of their organization are congruent with their own, their own motivation to behave morally leads them to follow organizational rules out of their intrinsic motivation to behave appropriately. These findings parallel findings in work settings, which show that employees’ rule-following is shaped by their views about the congruence of organizational policies with their personal moral values (Tyler & Blader 2005).

In addition to the empirical support for the utility of the self-regulatory strategy reported here, such an approach has additional benefits over a command-and-control strategy. For instance, it prevents organizations from expending resources on creating and maintaining credible systems of surveillance to enforce rules. These problems are typical of any efforts to regulate conduct using incentive- or sanction-based strategies. Exacerbating this problem, such strategies actually encourage people to hide their behavior and thus make it necessary to have especially comprehensive and costly surveillance systems.

Procedural Justice

A core issue within organizational psychology is the distinction between selection and training. The selection approach suggests that the key to organizational viability is to hire people with values that fit the organization. The training approach argues that the experiences people have within the organization can shape their attitudes, values, and behaviors. Those experiences can potentially develop from their general familiarity with the structures and processes of the organization, or they can result from particular training programs. The results outlined here support the argument that the general structures and processes of organizations shape the people within those organizations.

The findings suggest the importance of one particular aspect of organizations: their rules and procedures. Consistent with prior findings of the literature on procedural justice, rule-following, in particular deference to rules, is linked to the fairness of the actions that authorities take. However, in contrast to the many studies showing procedural justice effects among the general public (Tyler 2006a; Tyler & Huo 2002), this study shows that the manner in which agents of social control experience their own work organizations shapes their behavior in relationship to social rules. This study is more in line with research on the behavior of employees in work settings, which also finds that procedural justice motivates rule adherence among private sector employees (Tyler & Blader 2000).

This study explores adherence to rules. However, it does not differentiate between rules pertaining to dealings with authorities about job conditions and rules about how to deal with “outsiders” (i.e., community residents or civilians). It could be that procedural justice motivates agents to be better employees, i.e., work harder, do a better job, etc. It could also be that procedural justice motivates agents to treat community residents or suspects with dignity, not to use excessive force, and so on. Further studies need to clearly distinguish these two issues and measure each separately.

The findings outlined suggest a clear message about how to minimize abuses of authority among agents of social control. When agents experience their own working conditions as defined by principles of procedural justice, i.e., when they experience justice on the job from their superiors and work organization, they accept the values of their organization and follow its rules. Further, they are more likely to accept those rules voluntarily and indicate that they follow them even when they think they are unlikely to be caught and punished for rule-breaking behavior. Both the fairness of interpersonal treatment by higher authorities and the fairness of decisionmaking influence such procedural justice judgments.

Consider two approaches that authorities might take to try to secure rule adherence. One approach would be to stress the punishments associated with being caught engaging in rule-breaking, or the benefits of rule adherence in terms of promotion. A second approach would be to focus on creating fair procedures within the organization, so that people feel that decisionmaking follows just procedures, and that people are treated with dignity and respect. These results clearly point to the value of the second approach.

Limits of the Study

Of course, it is important to note the limits of this study. The data are cross-sectional, so we need to be tentative in inferring causal relations. Further, the behavioral data examined in these studies are self-reported, and of course the usual limitations of such data apply here as well. Fortunately, recent research conducted within work organizations suggests that self-reported data and externally measured performance produce similar findings (Bommer et al. 1995). Further, research suggests that both approaches—self-reported and independent behavioral assessment—support the values argument outlined here in studies of private sector employees (Tyler & Blader 2005). Obviously it would be most desirable to collect independent behavioral data in all settings; unfortunately, that was not possible in the settings studied here. Nonetheless, based upon studies in other areas where such comparisons are made, these findings should be regarded as an important step in the process of further exploring the factors that shape rule adherence in organizational settings, and in particular the role of self-regulatory factors in that process.

Conclusion

The argument advanced here is for a broader view of those responsible for maintaining social control and of the antecedents of rule-following behavior among those agents. This approach looks at the influence of both instrumental and value-based motivations in shaping rule-following behavior. The results presented suggest that the consideration of both models together better explains such behavior than is possible via either model taken alone.

The view presented here includes not only the motivations traditionally studied, motivations that are linked to sanctions and incentives, but also social motivations for following group rules. These social motivations are linked to concerns about acting in fair ways in work settings. The case for this broader model rests on the finding that, in two different studies, corporate actors are found to be motivated in their rule-following by their social values

concerning legitimacy and morality. These findings suggest that we will be better able to understand rule-following behavior in work organizations, as well as other settings, if we adopt a broader model of human motivation that adds an account of social motivations to our models of behavior.

Appendix A

Law Enforcement

The sample of 209 law enforcement agents was 75 percent male. The mean age was 39. The sample was 70 percent white. Of those in the sample, 29 percent had some college, while 59 percent were college graduates or higher. The sample was 57 percent federal agents and 43 percent local officers. The group included 98 percent with experience as active field officers.

Military

The sample of 210 soldiers was 98 percent male. The mean age was 30. The sample was also 66 percent white. Of those in the sample, 69 percent had some college, while 11 percent were college graduates or higher. The sample was 4 percent officers and 96 percent enlisted soldiers. All those interviewed were in an active field operation (Iraq).

Appendix B

The questionnaire presented items with fixed-response items. For example: “Agree strongly”; “Agree”; “Disagree”; and “Disagree strongly.”

Dependent Variables

Compliance

Five items measured compliance (alpha for law enforcement = 0.80; for army = 0.95): “How often do you: ‘Do as your supervisor requests’; ‘Follow established policies’; ‘Carefully carry out instructions’; ‘Comply with work-related rules and regulations’; and ‘Comply with regulations about when you work.’”

In-Role Performance

Nine items measured in-role performance (alpha for law enforcement = 0.91; for the army = 0.95). The items were: “How often do you ‘Fulfill the responsibilities specified in your job

description'; 'Perform the tasks that are usually expected as part of your job'; 'Work hard on your required tasks as a way of helping the organization'; 'Meet the performance expectations of your supervisor'; 'Do what your supervisor expects of you'; 'Fulfill your supervisor's requests'; 'Adequately complete your required work projects'; 'Exert your full effort when getting your job done'; and 'Complete tasks in a satisfactory manner.'"

Voluntary Deference to Policies

Four items measured voluntary deference to policies (alpha for law enforcement = 0.79; for the army = 0.86). The items were: "How often do you: 'Willingly follow policies'; 'Follow policies, even when you do not need to because no one will know'; 'Voluntarily follow policies'; and 'Follow rules and policies without questioning them.'"

Values and Workplace Contingencies

Legitimacy

A 12-item scale measured legitimacy (alpha for law enforcement = 0.90; for the army = 0.94). The items were: "Work organizations are most effective when people follow the directives of their supervisors"; "People should follow organizational rules even if they think they are wrong"; "Respect for the organization's rules is an important value for employees to have"; "In the long run, the organization is better off if workers willingly follow the rules"; "It is difficult to break the rules and keep one's self-respect"; "People should support the policies of their work organizations"; "An employee should accept the decisions made by their supervisor, even when they think they are wrong"; "Disobeying one's supervisor is seldom justified"; "Someone who disregards their supervisor's decisions hurts their work group"; "People should usually defer to their supervisor's decisions even when they could go to others to try to change them"; "Respect for one's supervisor is an important value to have"; and "It is wrong to ignore a supervisor's decisions, even if you can get away with it."

Moral Congruence

A five-item scale measured moral congruence (alpha for law enforcement = 0.80; for the army = 0.74). The items were: "I find that my values and the values of my work organization are very similar"; "What my work organization stands for is important to me"; "I agree with the goals that define my work organization"; "I agree with the things my work group stands for"; and "My values and the values of others in my work group are very similar."

Behavior Reward/Sanction Contingency

A four-item scale measured behavior reward/sanction contingency (alpha for law enforcement = 0.86; for the army = 0.66). The items were: "If you do your job well, how much does that improve your pay and benefits?"; "If you do your job poorly, how much does that hurt your pay and benefits?"; "If you were caught breaking a work rule, how much would it hurt you?"; and "If you were caught breaking a work rule, how much would your supervisor care?"

Organizational Characteristics***Procedural Justice***

A 13-item scale measured procedural justice (alpha for law enforcement = 0.94; military = 0.95). The items were: "How often are decisions made in fair ways?"; "How fair would you say that decisionmaking procedures are?"; "How would you rate the overall fairness with which issues and decisions are handled?"; "Is there a general sense that things are handled in fair ways?"; "Are you treated fairly?"; "How much of an effort is made to be fair to employees?"; "How fair are the procedures used to determine your salary/your job responsibilities/your workload/your work assignments?"; "How fair are the rules when decisions are being implemented?"; "How fairly are you treated when decisions are being made?"; and "How fairly are you treated when decisions are being implemented?"

Outcome Favorability

Three items measured outcome favorability (alpha for law enforcement = 0.85; for the military = 0.82). The items were: "How favorable are the resources and outcomes you receive at work?"; "How favorable are your job responsibilities?"; and "How favorable is your workload?"

Distributive Fairness

Six items assessed outcome fairness (alpha for law enforcement = 0.87; for the military = 0.83). The items were: "How fairly are resources allocated among employees?"; "How fair are your outcomes concerning your salary/your job responsibilities/your workload?"; "Would you say that there is an emphasis where you work on distributing things fairly to all employees?"; and "Are work assignments distributed fairly?"

Level of Pay

Six items measured level of pay (alpha for law enforcement = 0.91; for the military = 0.89). The items were: "Overall, I receive excellent pay"; "I am satisfied with my current pay"; "I am well compensated considering the hours I work"; "I receive better

pay than my counterparts in the private sector”; “Considering how much I work, I am satisfied with my pay”; and “Overall, I receive excellent financial benefits.”

Procedural Justice Elements

Previous research on procedural justice (Blader & Tyler 2003a, 2003b) demonstrates that there are four primary dimensions of procedural justice in organizational settings. This study measures each of these four dimensions.

Supervisor—fairness of decisionmaking (alpha for law enforcement = 0.95; for the military = 0.95): “My supervisor’s decisions are consistent across people and situations”; “My supervisor’s decisions are based on facts, not their personal biases”; “My supervisor’s decisions are equally fair to everyone”; and “My supervisor gives me an honest explanation for why decisions are made.”

Supervisor—fairness of interpersonal treatment (alpha for law enforcement = 0.95; for the military = 0.96): “My supervisor listens when I express my views”; “My supervisor considers my views when decisions are being made”; “My supervisor takes account of my needs when making decisions”; “I trust my supervisor to do what is best for me”; “My supervisor respects my rights as an employee”; “My supervisor respects my rights as a person”; “My supervisor treats me with dignity”; and “My supervisor tries to respond to the unique needs and problems of his/her employees.”

Organization—fairness of decisionmaking (alpha for law enforcement = 0.79; for the military = 0.92): “The rules call for equal treatment of employees”; “The rules dictate that decisions should be fair and unbiased”; “The rules are applied consistently across people and situations”; “The rules ensure that decisions are based on facts, not personal biases”; “The rules and procedures are equally fair to everyone”; and “The rules require that I get an honest explanation for how decisions are made.”

Organization—fairness of interpersonal treatment (alpha for law enforcement = 0.92; for the military = 0.93): “The rules ensure that my needs will be taken into account”; “I trust the organization to do what is best for me”; “The rules respect my rights as an employee”; “The rules respect my rights as a person”; “I am treated with dignity”; “The organization follows through on the promises it makes”; and “I am treated politely.”

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