

Branko Lazitch have simplified matters considerably in the last few years, and several valuable secondary works are now available. With the publication of the Jules Humbert-Droz archives by the Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis, another reserve of raw material on the Comintern has become available.

Humbert-Droz, the Swiss-born pacifist who became a key functionary of the Comintern in the 1920s, maintained a file of his correspondence with Communist leaders from 1919 until 1932, including a number of confidential communications with Zinoviev, Rákosi, and others in Moscow. This first of three projected volumes contains more than 180 items—mainly letters and other internal memoranda—dealing with the International's affairs in France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Belgium. Since Humbert-Droz was head of the secretariat for Latin Europe, the book contains more detailed material on the inner workings of the Comintern in southwestern Europe than any previous collections.

The collection has both the virtues and the disadvantages of archives; it is offered as the complete papers that Humbert-Droz saved from his days in the secretariat, without deletions. There is a good deal of trivia in the papers, but the view they offer of organizational matters and personal relations is not likely to be surpassed unless we get some unexpurgated matter from Moscow.

There are few big surprises or revelations for students of the International Communist movement. The French Communist movement was the most important concern of Humbert-Droz at that time, and Robert Wohl had consulted these materials for his detailed history of the early years of that organization. Yet the book will be useful for scholars who want a more intimate look at the concerns and the decision-making process of the International.

A valuable feature of the volume is the extensive annotation. The documents are supplemented by elaborate descriptions of the individuals and events under discussion. Some of the more important tracts, periodical articles, and other published materials are included in the appendixes. This further enhances the value of the volume for future students of international communism.

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LETTERS

TO THE EDITOR:

Readers of the *Review* might be interested in the following errors in the explanatory notes to *Khrushchev Remembers*, for which Edward Crankshaw assumes responsibility. On page 139 Crankshaw writes that the areas annexed in 1939 by the USSR "were part of Imperial Russia until the Revolution"; in fact they included eastern Galicia, which was part of Austria after the Partitions of Poland and part of Poland from 1918 to 1939, and was never part of the Russian Empire. He continues: "Poland had not existed as a sovereign state since the Third Partition between Russia, Germany, and Austria in 1863." The Third Partition took place in 1795, and Germany did not exist as a state either then or in 1863; Prussia was one of the partitioning powers. On page 163 Crankshaw mentions "Bessarabia, acquired by Russia at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. . . ." Actually Bessarabia was acquired by Russia in 1812 by the Treaty of Bucharest; its southern part was retroceded in 1856 and regained in 1878.

Another point concerns the text itself. Khrushchev mentions the former commissar of internal affairs, A. I. Uspensky, and allegedly says (page 109): "He was a Russian even though his name was Polish." Anyone who knows Russian and Polish cannot be in doubt that his name was purely Russian, and was borne by the writer Gleb Uspensky and the historian Fiodor Uspensky among others. Is it conceivable that Khrushchev forgot that the name of one of the Kremlin churches is "Uspensky Sobor"?

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See review by Sidney Ploss on pages 178–80.

TO THE EDITOR:

An article by Rodney Barfield in the March 1971 issue correctly points to the utopian aspects of Lenin's *State and Revolution* and aptly remarks upon similar traits in other writings of Lenin. But the article also emphasizes, as a discovery of some importance, that *State and Revolution* was essentially completed before March 1917, the author concluding that since it could not have applied to the Russian revolution it was composed by Lenin, pessimistic with regard to the prospect of an early revolution, as a tract for the guidance of a future generation.

That Lenin passed through states of depression early in 1917, as indicated by Barfield, would not have been unusual, since he fluctuated between manic and depressive moods. But to derive from the above information, and various irrelevant if not ignorant comments by Trotsky and Louis Fischer, the notion that *State and Revolution* was intended by Lenin as a blueprint for some distant revolution is a product of Barfield's total failure to comprehend the train of Lenin's thought in the course of World War I. Part of this I have dealt with in my *Lenin and World Revolution*, published in 1959, and in this book I specifically stress the significance of the pre-March 1917 date of the compiling by Lenin of the data from Marx and Engels, and I also take up in considerable detail the function of *State and Revolution* in Lenin's scheme not for a Russian but for an imminent European revolution. "Never, I think," writes Krupskaya, "was Vladimir Ilyich in a more irreconcilable mood than during the last months of 1916 and the early months of 1917. He was profoundly convinced that the revolution was approaching" (see N. Krupskaya, *Memoirs of Lenin*, 2 vols., London, 1930, 2:197).

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Editor's Note: Though we have evidence that Mr. Barfield has received our inquiry whether he wishes to reply, he has not answered that inquiry.

TO THE EDITOR:

On opening the current June issue of the *Slavic Review* I was struck by its unusually well-distributed contents, and it occurred to me to write to that effect. Then I saw the Jacobs and Tompkins letters and lastly the "Editor's Note" and invitation. Hence this letter.

I used to gripe about the, to me, overemphasis on Soviet studies, as did most of my non-Russian-Soviet colleagues. To give adequate coverage to the par-