

do a sense of history and cultural change, can help offer us the languages we need to understand the conflict between the need we feel for synthesis, and the demand to recognise the integrity of difference. Hegel is an obvious example, although with him the synthesis wins the upper hand much too easily; but at least he recognises that there's a struggle.

I am not proposing that we abandon the Aquinas frontier. Far from it. This helps define one of the imperious demands we feel: somehow combine, make sense of it all together. But only philosophies of the modern age can help us come to grips with the demands of difference. Impossible as it is in practice, ideally analytic philosophy needs to be on more than one frontier at once.

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English-speaking Thomists are usually isolated from the mainstream of philosophy in their own countries. They fear it and they sometimes hate it. Likewise, mainstream analytic philosophers are woefully ignorant of any kind of contemporary Catholic philosophy, including Thomism. They vaguely assume that it has something to do with medieval theology and is consequently irrelevant to their own interests. Like Haldane, I find this disturbing. A *rapprochement* between Thomism and analytic philosophy would benefit both, but it is not going to be easy because the reasons for the division go deep, at least among the older philosophers on both sides. There are both good and bad reasons for failing to take each other seriously, and these reasons ought to be frankly acknowledged. Some reasons will die when the memory of past mistreatment by particular persons fades away, but some are learned, or rather, mislearned.

On the analytic side, Thomas' work was ignored for a very long time. The bad reason was an excessively narrow conception of the nature of philosophy which led analytic philosophers to dismiss the work of Aquinas as theology rather than philosophy. We need only look at what Bertrand Russell says about Aquinas in his quirky history of philosophy to find a blunt statement of what became a rather common judgment:

There is little of the true philosophic spirit in Aquinas. He does not, like the Platonic Socrates, set out to follow wherever the argument may lead. He is not engaged in an inquiry, the result of which it is impossible to know in advance. Before he begins to philosophize, he already knows the truth; it is declared in the Catholic faith. If he can find apparently rational arguments for some parts of the faith, so much the better; if he cannot, he need only fall back on revelation. The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy, but special pleading. I cannot, therefore, feel that he deserves to be put on a level with the best philosophers either of Greece or of modern times.¹

This is unfair to Aquinas whose love for the truth is indisputable. His work was disparaged by Russell because some of his most important beliefs were beliefs he had as a Christian, not just as a philosopher. If we adopted Russell's viewpoint we would have to say that philosophy never existed in the East since it is so difficult to separate Eastern philosophy from Eastern religion. Yet Aquinas was much more aware of the difference between philosophy and religion than were Asian philosophers, and took pains to distinguish those of his beliefs he justified by natural reason and those that he justified by appeal to Revelation.

Analytic philosophers not only ignored Aquinas, but they ignored virtually all of medieval philosophy for the same reason. When I began graduate school in a Ph.D. program in Philosophy in the late sixties, we were given a reading list of works in the history of philosophy to study for the preliminary exams. On a list of fourteen philosophers, there was nobody between Aristotle and Descartes. This eliminated not only the medieval period, but also late antiquity and the Renaissance. For a long time after I began teaching, I noticed that introductory courses in the history of philosophy in many departments skipped the medieval period, although I am happy to say that my undergraduate philosophy department at Stanford did not do so.

The good reason for the fact that analytic philosophy did not take Aquinas seriously for a long time was that most of the work on Aquinas was done by Thomists, who were not simply Aquinas scholars. What was always suspicious about Thomism as a movement was that it was *not just the careful study of the philosophy of Aquinas*—like the study of Plato, Descartes, or Kant, but it at least appeared to outsiders to be an ideology. Thomists believed what Thomas wrote, virtually every word of it. This is justifiably suspicious to philosophers, not because philosophers don't aim to form philosophical beliefs, but because they do. If we really care

about truth, how likely will we say it is that the thought of one man hits the target exactly, or even comes close? And how justified are we in believing that that man hit the target if we don't give the rest of the history of philosophy fair and open-minded study? The problem with many Thomists was not that they were historical, but that they were not historical enough. They stopped reading anything that did not presuppose most of what they already believed, and that meant huge chunks of the history of philosophy, including almost all of contemporary philosophy. Russell's jab at Aquinas was not fair, but it might have been fair if directed at some of his followers.

There is now a resurgence of interest in medieval philosophy in American philosophy departments. That is partly due to a greater emphasis on the history of philosophy in general, which does not indicate any special interest in Aquinas *per se*, but it does indicate a more broad-minded approach to the history of philosophy. As a result, there is much more work on Aquinas than ever before in mainstream journals and books published by mainstream university presses. But I have noticed that the other side is not always hospitable to the interest analytic philosophers have in medieval philosophy. On their side also there are both good and bad reasons for distrust.

The bad reason is that Catholic philosophers in general and Thomists in particular often think that analytic philosophy is atheistic and naturalistic. Fortunately, we find this attitude much less often among younger Catholic philosophers. What is especially ironic about it is that Aquinas's philosophy was seen almost exactly the same way right after his death. Thomas adopted the work of Aristotle, whose philosophy was much more naturalistic than Plato's, and was thought to be inhospitable to Christianity because of Aristotle's position on such issues as the eternity of the world and the ultimate end of human life. It took a genius to prove otherwise, of course, and Aquinas did just that. Maybe there will never be a genius of the calibre of Aquinas to merge analytic philosophy with the Catholic faith in a way that would capture the intellectual allegiance of Catholic philosophers for many hundreds of years, as happened with Thomism. Nonetheless, no fair observer of analytic philosophy of religion can deny that there have been many successful forays into the use of analytic philosophy in areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and philosophical theology that aid the Catholic faith in just the way Aquinas did seven hundred years ago.

The good reason for the Thomistic fear of analytic philosophy is that analytic philosophers until the last decade or two acted as if philosophy had to be continually reinvented. They had no sense that

philosophy can make progress. There was also an exaggerated sense of the intellectual duty not to take a philosophical position prematurely. This produced a sharp contrast in styles of intellectual engagement because there is *one thing* we can say for sure about religious believers: they have beliefs. Many analytic philosophers, however, had no beliefs at all, or at least, they had as few beliefs as they could get away with. Skepticism among some of them almost had the status of a religious commitment. The conflict between religious philosophers and the skeptical analytic philosophers, therefore, was not a conflict in the content of their beliefs, but was a conflict in viewpoints about the nature of intellectually virtuous philosophical activity. Conflicts of this kind are among the deepest that philosophers can have because they are conflicts over what counts as good and bad philosophy, not just true and false philosophy. Philosophers can accept big differences in the content of philosophical positions as long as both sides respect each other and see themselves as cooperatively engaged together in the same endeavour. But when equal respect fails, even identity of philosophical positions will not save the philosophical relationship. So even though analytic philosophy can be easily adapted to Thomism because the former has no body of doctrines but is primarily a method and a certain style, it is critically important that the people who make the *rapprochement* do it with sincere respect and openness to the unfamiliar.

In *Fides et Ratio*, Pope John Paul II warns us against “philosophical pride,” which, he says, “seeks to present its own partial and imperfect view as the complete reading of all reality. In effect, every philosophical system, while it should always be respected in its wholeness, without any instrumentalization, must still recognize the primacy of philosophical inquiry, from which it stems and which it ought loyally to serve.” (Intro., sec. 4). I believe this expresses a common ground for all Catholic philosophers.

- 1 Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 463.