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## ABSTRACTS

### THE LOGIC OF PARTY COLLUSION IN A DEMOCRACY

EVIDENCE FROM MALI

By JESSICA GOTTLIEB

A credible opposition is necessary for democratic accountability. However, in a multiparty democracy, a credible opposition may fail to emerge when it is in the strategic interest of political parties to collude rather than compete, effectively extinguishing all credible opposition. The author argues that illicit collusion among parties on a representative council is more likely when all viable parties win seats and are thus able to enter into a self-binding commitment to jointly engage in misconduct without risk of exposure. Conversely, when at least one party fails to win representation on the council, there is a credible opposition with the incentive and ability to threaten exposure of rent seeking among council members. The theory is tested using a regression discontinuity design where the electoral threshold to win a single seat is, within a narrow band, an exogenous determinant of whether or not there is an out-party or credible opposition. Exploiting the fact that Mali's decentralization produces within-country variation in both electoral and governance outcomes, the author uses data from commune council elections alongside local-level public goods provision as a measure of rent seeking. Poorer public goods provision is indeed more likely when all political parties in a district win seats on the council. To show that collusion is the mechanism driving this relationship, the author tests several observable implications in the data and uses qualitative evidence as illustration. This examination of when it is in the strategic interest of parties to engage in uncompetitive behavior contributes to the literature on when elections fail to produce democratic accountability.

### THE ART OF THE POSSIBLE

POWER SHARING AND POST-CIVIL WAR DEMOCRACY

By CAROLINE A. HARTZELL and MATTHEW HODDIE

This article focuses on the role that power-sharing arrangements play in making it possible for some countries to make the transition to democracy successfully after civil war. The authors hypothesize that the adoption of multiple forms of power sharing, measures constructed to end particularly difficult civil wars, facilitate the emergence of a minimalist form of democracy following some intrastate conflicts by helping to assuage warring groups' security concerns. The authors use a bivariate probit model to account for the possibility that the decisions by wartime rivals to engage in power sharing and whether to adopt democracy or not are interrelated. Employing panel data for all civil wars concluded between 1945 and the end of 2006, they find support for their hypothesis.

### HOW INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION

PREVENTING AUTHORITARIAN REVERSALS OR PROMOTING CONSOLIDATION?

By PAUL POAST and JOHANNES URPELAINEN

International organizations can promote democratization, but how exactly do they achieve this goal? The authors argue that to evaluate the effect of international organizations on democratization, one must distinguish between the prevention of autocratic reversals and the promotion of democratic consolidation. While international organizations cannot directly prevent autocratic reversals in nonconsolidated democracies, they can, through capacity building, increase the likelihood that a transitional democracy consolidates. An empirical analysis of democratic transitions from 1965 to 2001 supports the hypothesis that international organizations promote democratic consolidation without deterring authoritarian reversals in nonconsolidated democracies. Moreover, the authors find that international organizations are most important for consolidating transitional democracies in the difficult circumstances created by a history of military dictatorship.

## OPEN TRADE, CLOSED BORDERS

### IMMIGRATION IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

By MARGARET E. PETERS

This article argues that trade and immigration policy cannot be studied as separate policies but that instead scholars must take an integrated view of them. Trade and immigration policy are substitutes. The choice of trade policy affects immigration policy in labor-scarce countries through its effects on firms. Closure to trade increases the average firm-level demand for immigration, leading to immigration openness, and free trade decreases the average firm-level demand, leading to restricted immigration. To test this argument, the author develops a new data set on the immigration policies of nineteen states from the late eighteenth century through the early twenty-first century. This is one of a few data sets on immigration policy and, importantly, covers the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. The data show that indeed, trade policy has the hypothesized effect on immigration: immigration policy cannot be fully understood without examining trade policy. This article, therefore, suggests that trade and immigration policies, and other foreign economic policies, should be examined in light of each other.

## THE ECONOMIC SINS OF MODERN IR THEORY AND THE CLASSICAL REALIST ALTERNATIVE

By JONATHAN KIRSHNER

This article considers the economic sins of contemporary IR theory—that is, the pervasive errors of analysis that result from the embrace of different forms of economism. Much of structural realism, for example, derives from the misguided adaptation of price theory (that is, micro-economic competition), especially with regard to the implications of oligopoly. The minimalist assumptions of neorealism have also encouraged an all-too-easy reification of a style of analysis, now pervasive across most IR paradigms, that values prediction above explanation. This relates to another great economic sin of contemporary IR theory: the hyperrationalist turn. Most clearly seen in the influential rationalist explanations for war approach, it reflects the uncritical adaptation of a certain type of macroeconomics: rational expectations theory. But the limits to rational expectations were revealed analytically for decades and ultimately exposed by the global financial crisis. Worse, even where that approach adds value to economic theory, it is particularly unsuited for adaptation to IR theory. The rise of structural realism and hyperrationalism represented a turn away from an older, classical realist tradition. Classical realism, with its emphasis on choice, contingency, history, ideology, uncertainty, and unpredictability, was rejected in favor of more purportedly scientific and, in particular, economic approaches to IR theory. But in each instance, the newer approaches feature the misapplication of economic theories and analogies to the study of IR. Correcting these mistakes invites the renaissance of classical realism.