

interest in Finland is basically strategic and defensive (pp. 37, 39, 47, 80); (2) technological developments may make obsolete the necessity of spheres of influence (p. 11); and (3) Finland has an alternative in the Scandinavian subsystem (pp. 162–63).

In sum, there are many weaknesses in the book, but it is, nonetheless, substantially better than Max Jakobson's recent volume on Finnish-Soviet relations (*Finnish Neutrality: A Study of Finnish Foreign Policy Since the Second World War* [New York: Praeger, 1969]) whose audience is also the nonspecialist.

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FROM ENCROACHMENT TO INVOLVEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, 1945–1973.

By Yaacov Ro'i. New York and Toronto: Halsted Press, a division of John Wiley & Sons. Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1974. xl, 616 pp. \$26.75.

SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1970. By Robert O. Freedman. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975. xii, 198 pp. \$16.50, cloth. \$5.95, paper.

The diplomatic consequences of post-1945 decolonization in the Arab world, the deepening involvement of the superpowers in the area and in the succession of Arab-Israeli wars, the imperial policies and tenacity of Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and the heightened Western concern over Middle Eastern oil have all contributed to the "discovery" of the Middle East by specialists on Soviet affairs. The two books under review, both of which should prove useful for introducing college students to the complexity and twists and turns that are endemic to the subject, treat the unfolding of Soviet policies in the Middle East, but in very different ways: one is a documentary compilation of impressive scope and judicious selectivity; the other, a broad sketch of Soviet policies and dilemmas, primarily during the 1970–74 period.

Professor Ro'i has brought together 116 documents, speeches, communiqués, and commentaries that touch on all the key crises and developments of the 1945–73 period: the postwar settlement, the Iranian and Palestinian questions, Stalin's tentative thrusts, the evolution of Soviet perceptions of Arab world developments, the crises of 1956, 1958, and 1961, Soviet reactions to Egyptian-Iraqi feuding, the Yemeni civil war, changing Iranian and Turkish policies, and, of course, the June 1967 and October 1973 wars.

The usefulness of the materials—most of which are Russian and Arabic in origin—is greatly enhanced by Dr. Ro'i's background essays. Each selection is introduced by a concise essay, placing it in historical and political perspective, and each concludes with some bibliographical suggestions. The essays often contain important new information, for example, about Armenian immigration to the USSR after 1945 (pp. 45–46) and the Khrushchev-Sadat altercation in 1961 (pp. 337–44). The final product is a valuable chronological presentation in which key trends are interwoven with primary materials, guiding the reader through the Middle Eastern maze and leaving him with a heightened sensitivity to Soviet aims, policies, and attitudes. There are a very few minor shortcomings: the communiqués are not complete and the bibliographies are often too brief. However, this is an in-

significant point, because this valuable book will handsomely service the needs of those who desire a handy, accurate reference work. It is certainly the best documentary compilation available on Soviet-Middle East relations.

The heart of Professor Freedman's study—which gives one a feeling for the range and diversity of Soviet activities—is three chapters dealing primarily with Moscow's policy toward Egypt between 1970 and 1974, but with attention also given to Iraq, Syria, the Sudan, and Jordan. The book also contains a very brief introduction, a chapter on the 1945–70 period, and a concluding chapter. cursory attention to so many issues leads to a number of questionable assumptions, overly dramatic comparisons, and sweeping generalizations. Moreover, I question the validity of certain points: for example, that Nasser gave up "a considerable amount of Egyptian sovereignty in an effort to get revenge for his humiliation" (p. 43); that "the presence at Nasser's funeral of a senior American official, Elliott Richardson [whom the Egyptians actually considered a minor Cabinet official] was a matter of concern for the Soviet leadership" (p. 43); that the murder of Israeli athletes by Palestinian terrorists "set off a chain of events that greatly upset the pattern of Egyptian diplomacy" (p. 89) and helped to bring about an improvement in Soviet-Egyptian relations; and that the Soviets were expelled in 1972 both "from their air and naval bases in Egypt" (p. 172). Soviet naval facilities were curtailed, not terminated.

One final point. On page 1, the author correctly observes that influence is difficult to assess and that the superpowers have learned that aid is no guarantee of influence. Yet, throughout the rest of the book, he bandies the term influence about indiscriminately, making no apparent effort to maintain a distinction between establishing a presence and exercising influence, and with little differentiation between Soviet initiatives and responses.

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THE GREAT DÉTENTE DISASTER: OIL AND THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. By *Edward Friedland, Paul Seabury, and Aaron Wildavsky*. New York: Basic Books, 1975. x, 210 pp. \$7.95.

This is not a scholarly book but a book written (in fact overwritten) by three scholars who are exercised about the position of the United States in the world as a result of U.S.-Soviet détente and the oil crisis of 1973–74, and they speak out with unscholarly passion. This is as it should be. If doomsday is approaching, someone should tell us. Briefly the case is as follows: Oil is power, and that power is being abused by OPEC; the fourfold price increase is a catastrophe for the world, a systemic change in the international system; Western societies are disintegrating, both in economy and in political institutions, under the impact; the Soviet Union, taking advantage of the West's myopia about détente and inability to define and defend its own vital interests, is making uncontested gains; and the choice must now be made between defense and surrender, between order and disorder.

There is much talk of the decline of American will and the inadequacy of American policy generally, but the real burden of the argument has to do with what the United States did, and did not do, in the Middle Eastern crisis of 1973, and what the United States will do there next. The test is Israel. According to the