Weakening Ties with the Ancestral Homeland in China: The Case Studies of Contemporary Singapore and Malaysian Chinese

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In the last two decades there has been much scholarly and journalistic attention given to the issue of how Chinese overseas relate themselves to China. This happened against a backdrop of two major developments in Asia. The first has to do with the fact that many ethnic Chinese outside mainland China have been faring well economically and accumulating considerable wealth in Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Taiwan in the second half of the twentieth century. The second is the rise of China as an economic superpower attracting foreign capital after it reopened itself and launched economic reform in 1978.

Many writings have portrayed the economic interactions between Chinese overseas and China as a natural outcome of primordial sentiment and cultural affinity. Adopting a contemporary history approach and based on the case studies of Singapore and Malaysia, this paper offers a contrary view that Southeast Asian Chinese in general have been distancing themselves from the ancestral homeland in China and increasingly rooted in the countries where they reside. It first reviews the existing literature and examines the appropriateness of the notions and concepts that have been applied to Chinese

overseas. Then it demonstrates how the Singapore and Malaysian Chinese communities have developed their local identities following demographic and political changes. It also attempts to identify the features associated with the operation and expansion of Chinese economic activities. Having drawn a general changing picture of the communities, it will focus on two particular Cantonese groups in both countries. Based on field research, questionnaire survey, and in-depth interviews, it argues that the ties with the ancestral homeland in China have been considerably weakened.

Literature Review: A Myth about Chinese Overseas

The existing literature can be divided into three realms: *qiaoxiang*, Chinese business networks, and transnationlism. Many writings in these realms have, directly or indirectly, created a myth and misconception about the relations Chinese overseas have with China.

Qiaoxiang

The majority of the Southeast Asian Chinese trace their ancestral roots to Guangdong and Fujian. Since 1978 many government organs in these two provinces, particularly Qiaoban (Overseas Chinese Affairs Office) and Qiaolian (Returned Overseas Chinese Association), have employed the term *qiaoxiang*, literally sojourner homeland, as a propaganda tool to woo indiscriminately Chinese overseas and Hong Kong and Macau residents to revitalize China's economy after its political isolation and economic autarky between 1949 and 1978.[1]

The problem with this first realm of literature, *qiaoxiang* usage and studies, is that the term should, by strict definition, be applied only to *huaqiao* (Overseas Chinese) who retain the citizenship of China and reside temporarily outside China with political loyalty to China and an ultimate goal of returning to China one day.[2] Without any hard and

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[1] The popularity of the term *qiaoxiang* can be easily found in *qiaokan* (magazine of Overseas Chinese), newspapers, and websites published and run by the local governments across Guangdong and Fujian.

[2] For succinct analyses of the connotation and appropriateness of the term in different contexts, see Wang Gungwu, 'The Origin of Hua-Ch'iao,' in Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia* (St Leonards, NSW: Asian Studies Association of Australia in association with Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 1–10;

easy rule set to determine which locality is qualified as *qiaoxiang*,[3] the local interpretation in Guangdong and Fujian appears as a contrast to the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China, which not merely adopts one citizenship principle in dealing with Chinese overseas (*haiwai huaqiao huaren*),[4] but also clearly demarcates Chinese overseas from the compatriots (*tongbao*) in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan.[5] Meanwhile, there have been burgeoning academic writings making use of the term without much caution.[6]

The casual usage of *qiaoxiang* has demonstrated the ignorance, whether purposely or not, of the fact that there are now few real *huaqiao* and greater numbers of ethnic Chinese who are nationals of the countries where they reside, particularly in Southeast Asia.[7] In-depth research is definitely needed to examine what the so-called *qiaoxiang* areas, or more accurately ancestral homeland in China, exactly mean to Chinese diaspora,[8] in comparison to the countries where they reside and make a living.

Wang Gungwu, 'Sojourning: The Chinese Experience' in Wang Gungwu, *Don't Leave Home: Migration and the Chinese* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2001), pp. 54–72; Leo Douw, 'The Chinese Sojourner Discourse,' in Leo Douw, Cen Huang, and Michael R. Godley (eds.), *Qiaoxiang Ties: Interdisciplinary Approaches to 'Cultural Capitalism' in South China* (London and New York: Keagan Paul International, 1999), pp. 22–44.

[3] Lynn Pan (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore: Archipelago Press & Landmark Books, 1998), pp. 27, 30.

[4] The term 'Chinese overseas' has been coined by Wang Gungwu and will also be used here to refer to everyone, whether or not citizens of China, who is of Chinese descent and living outside mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. See Wang Gungwu, *China and the Chinese Overseas* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992).

[5] Compare *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guiqiao Qiaojuan Quanyi Baohufa* (The Law on Protection of Rights and Interests of *Guiqiao* and *Qiaojuan*, People's Republic of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo Minzhu Fazhi Chubanshe, 2000) and Guangdong Guiquo Huaqiao Lianhehui (ed.), *Qiaolian Qiaowu gongzuo ziliao huibian* (The Collected Materials of Overseas Chinese Affairs for Qiaolian) (1996).

[6] Among the huge literature, see, for instance, Leo Douw, Cen Huang, and Michael R. Godley (eds.), *Qiaoxiang Ties*; Wang Benzun, *Haiwai huaqiao huaren yu Chao Shan qiaoxiang de fazhang* (The Chinese Overseas and the Development of Chao Shan *Qiaoxiang*) (Beijing: Zhongguo Huaqiao Chubanshe, 2000); Zhuang Guotu *et al*. (eds.). *Zhongguo qiaoxiang yanjiu* (The Studies of *Qiaoxiang* in China) (Xiamen: Xiamen Daxue Chubanshe, 2000).

[7] For the recent studies on Southeast Asian Chinese, see M. Jocelyn Armstrong, R. Warwick Armstrong, and Kent Mulliner (eds.), *Chinese Populations in Contemporary Southeast Asia Societies: Identities, Interdependence and International Influence* (Surrey: Curzon, 2001); Leo Suryadinata (ed.), *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997).

[8] Chinese diaspora are loosely defined here to refer to those ethnic Chinese residing outside the mainland China's political system, thus including Hong Kong and Macau compatriots as well as Chinese overseas. For modification done on the concept of

Chinese Business Networks

The second realm of the literature, Chinese business networks, initially produced studies on how business connections have been operating domestically within a particular country and internationally between countries where there are Chinese diaspora communities. Then, there is a growing number of writings on how the Chinese overseas as well as the residents in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan have been forging links to mainland China in the context of a rising China as a huge manufacturing base and a great consumer market.

The proponents of the significance and effectiveness of Chinese business networks tend to view Chinese as a distinct 'tribe' with a particular set of shared values, beliefs, and practices that lead to the inclination of all the Chinese individuals and organizations towards grouping and cooperation among themselves.[9] Some point out that it is the traditional emphasis on family institutions that has enabled the Chinese to overcome political and administrative constraints in the countries of residence and achieve economic expansion.[10] According to these proponents, the Chinese economic networks and social connections, to which the special term *guanxi* has become fashionable to apply, have been and will continue to be successful to create a new superpower in Asia.[11]

For the purpose of this paper, what is of particular interest is whether there is any convergence between business networks and the kinship ties with ancestral homeland in China. What are the main objectives and prime considerations taken into account when Chinese overseas want to conduct economic activities in China? Do they want to do

diaspora and different categories of diaspora, see Robin Cohen, *Global Diasporas: An Introduction* (London: University College London Press, 1997).

[9] Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion, and Identity Determine Suceess in the New Global Economy* (New York: Random House, 1993); V. S. Limlingan, *The Overseas Chinese in ASEAN: Business Strategies and Management Practices* (Manila: Vita Development Corporation, 1986).

[10] G. G. Hamilton, 'Overseas Chinese Capitalism,' in Tu W. M. (ed.), *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 328–42; G. G. Hamilton, 'Competition and Organization: A Re-examination of Chinese Business Practices,' *Journal of Asian Business* Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996): 7–20.

[11] Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, *The Bamboo Network: How Expatriate Chinese Entrepreneurs Are Creating a New Economic Superpower in Asia* (New York: The Free Press, 1996); S. G. Redding, *The Spirit of Chinese Capitalism* (New York: de Gruyter, 1990).

something good for the people, such as giving more job opportunities, or they simply aim to reap economic profits?

Transnationalism

The third realm of literature evolves around 'transnationalism' that has emerged as a novel research field among the anthropologists and social scientists who study migrations and networks between the sending and receiving countries of migrants. Many scholars of different disciplines have reached a consensus that transnationalism constituted a complex social phenomenon at the end of the twentieth century as a result of the globalization of capitalism, technological revolution in transportation and communication, decolonization, universalization of human rights, and expansion of social networks.[12] In a special issue of *Ethnic and Racial Studies* on transnational communities, an attempt was made to demarcate the scope of transnationalism research:

For the purpose of establishing a novel area of investigation, it is preferable to delimit the concept of transnationalism to occupations and activities that require *regular* and *sustained* social contacts over time across national borders for their implementation... it excludes the occasional gifts of money and kind sent by immigrants to their kin and friends (not an occupation) or the one-time purchase of a house or lot by an immigrant in his home country (not a regular activity).[13]

It should be noted that the research works of transnationalism initially focused on the transborder social and economic activities conducted by the migrants who went out from the poverty-stricken Middle and South American countries and come to North America, particularly United States, as labor after World War II.[14] Later on, the concept of transnationalism has become so popular that scholars started adopting it to look at Chinese diaspora and the connections

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[12] Luis Eduardo Guarnizo and Michael Peter Smith, 'The Locations of Transnationalism,' in Michael Peter Smith and Luis Eduardo Guarnizo (eds.), *Transnationalism from Below* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1998), p. 4.

[13] Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo, and Patricia Landolt, 'The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promises of an Emergent Research Field,' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 22, No. 2 (Special Issues: Transnational Communities) (March 1999), p. 219. Highlights are my own.

[14] See the different chapters in Smith and Guarnizo (eds.), *Transnationalism from Below*, and articles in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* Vol. 22, No. 2.

they have with China.[15] What have not been examined enough are how regular and sustained these connections have been.

Family Extension, Political Reorientation, and Local Consciousness

The present Singapore and Malaysia have a shared history of British colonial rule that brought in large numbers of Chinese labor migrants,[16] and now become home to 2.7 million and 5.5 million Chinese respectively.[17] Over time, the Chinese communities in these two countries have developed their own localized identities which resulted from the extension of family into places where they live, the shift of political loyalty from China, and the rise of local consciousness.

Basically, the early Chinese communities that formed before World War II were transient in nature as the population was largely made up of male sojourners always longing to return to their homeland in China, where they had parents, wives and children, after accumulating substantial money. Physically away from but psychologically attached to their impoverished families in China, many sojourners sent remittances to their dependants for living expenses and donations to public projects like schools and transportation. This pattern of financial commitment was facilitated by the far-flung networks of private post offices that connected British Malaya as well as other places in Southeast Asia to South China.[18]

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[15] See, for instance, Alan Smart and Josephine Smart, 'Transnational Social Networks and Negotiated Identities in Interactions between Hong Kong and China' in Smith and Guarnizo (eds.), *Transnationalism from Below*, pp. 103–61; Elizabeth Sinn, 'Cohesion and Fragmentation: A County-Level Perspective on Chinese Transnationalism in the 1940s' in Douw, Huang, and Godley (eds.), *Qiaoxiang Ties*, pp. 67–8.

[16] Before 1957, the Colony of Singapore and the Malay Peninsula were governed under British Malaya. In 1965 Singapore was separated from Malaysia that, formed in 1963, included the former Federation of Malaya (1948–1963) as well as Sabah and Sarawak that were previously administered by British North Borneo Company and Brook's Family respectively.

[17] The figures are estimate in 1999. See M. Jocelyn Armstrong and R. Warwick Armstrong, 'Introduction: Chinese Populations of Southeast Asia,' in Armstrong, Armstrong and Mulliner (eds.), *Chinese Populations in Contemporary Southeast Asian Societies*, p. 2, Table 1.

[18] See a good documentation done in George L. Hicks (ed.), *Overseas Chinese Remittances from Southeast Asia 1910–1940* (Singapore: Select Books, 1993). For the studies on Guangdong as a place receiving remittances from overseas, see Lin Jiajing

The sentiment tied to homeland at times extended to nationalism towards the whole China, particularly from the late Qing dynasty to 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded. That was a period when China suffered from a decaying Qing regime, warlordism, Japanese invasions, the penetration of Western imperialism, and civil wars between the Chinese Communist Party and Guomindang.[19] Chinese patriotism was consolidated among the merchants and labor in British Malaya by many political activists from China, including Kang Youwei and Sun Yatsen who came with their respective proposals to save China at the turn of the nineteenth century. The task to cultivate a sense of obligation to and responsibility for China was continued by many Chinese intellectuals who arrived and worked at newspapers and schools in the 1920s and 1930s. The patriotism reached its climax with the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1937 that united almost all the Chinese in Southeast Asia to support, with money and manpower, the campaign saving China from the Japanese encroachment.[20]

It is, however, a mistake to assume that China is a single dominant center in the consciousness among all the Chinese in British Malaya. The China-oriented group consisted primarily of the first-generation immigrants as well as those who were born locally and received Chinese education with a syllabus inculcating nationalism towards China. Meanwhile, there was another group with more interest in and commitment to the local politics. They were essentially the Babas, offspring of the intermarriage between Chinese and indigenous people, who were assimilated partially first to Malay culture and then the Anglo-Chinese way of life. Between the China-oriented and local-oriented groups existed another group that consisted of the realistic majority of the Chinese who were more concerned with keeping low posture and the indirect politics of trade and community associations.

et al., Jindai Guangdong qiaohui yanjiu (The Studies of the Money Sent Back by Overseas Chinese in the Pre-1949 Period) (Guangzhou: Zhongshan Daxue Chubanshe, 1999).

[19] Yen Ching-hwang, *The Overseas Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaysia* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976).

[20] Stephen Leong's doctoral dissertation remains the most comprehensive account of the Chinese nationalism in British Malaya. Stephen M. Y. Leong, 'Sources, Agencies and Manifestations of Overseas Chinese Nationalism in Malaya, 1937–1941' PhD dissertation (Los Angeles: University of California, 1976).

These Chinese seldom openly engaged in the political arena, either locally or internationally.[21]

Over time, in both Singapore and Malaysia, the China-oriented group has been dwindling while the local-oriented group has been enlarging due to a set of factors. First, there have been numerical increases of the Chinese born locally and of the extended families built locally while the family ties with the ancestral homeland in China have been weakening over generations. As will be shown later in the case studies, Singapore and Malaysian Chinese appear more concerned with posterity than ancestry. Second, since their respective independences, the Singapore and Malaysian governments have, through single citizenship policy, demanded absolute loyalty from the ethnic Chinese residents. Third, the post-independence governments have, through education programs and media propaganda, fostered and inculcated national identities and local consciousness among the Chinese communities.

As it evolves, in Malaysia where the Chinese form the largest minority (25% of the population) the Chinese communities have gradually departed from China's traditions and developed their own local identities with indigenous influences.[22] In Singapore, where the Chinese constitute the majority (77% of the population), and where spectacular economic growth and modernization were achieved, the ethnic Chinese are proud of their own national identities.[23] In short, they have become Malaysians and Singaporeans rather than simply Overseas Chinese.

Non-Chinese Elements in Business Networks

The history of Singapore and Malaysia clearly shows that, while Chinese features like family and kinship institutions played their

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[21] See a full discussion on these distinguishable groups of Malayan Chinese in terms of political interests and activities in Wang Gungwu, 'Chinese Politics in Malaya,' in Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation*, pp. 251–80. For generalization made to Southeast Asia, see Wang Gungwu, 'Political Chinese: Their Contribution to Modern Southeast Asian History,' in Wang Gungwu, *China and the Chinese Overseas*, pp. 130–46.

[22] Tan Chee-Beng, 'Socio-cultural Diversities and Identities,' in Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), *The Chinese in Malaysia*. (Shah Alam: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 37–70.

[23] Chiew Seen Kong, 'From Overseas Chinese to Chinese Singaporeans,' in Suryadinata (ed.), *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*, pp. 211–27.

own roles in business activities, non-Chinese factors, particularly of the colonial and nationalist governments, have been more crucial in determining the operation and expansion of the economic scope in which the ethnic Chinese took part.

In the colonial period, it was the British government that facilitated massive immigration of Chinese labor, but the government also confined Chinese to the commercial sector. The Malay Reservation Enactment of 1919, which was in favor of the ethnic Malay, restricted Chinese access to agricultural pursuits, particularly rice farming.[24] Even within commercial sector, the first-generation Chinese capitalists had to rely much on colonial patronage to amass wealth. They had to seek monopoly rights before they could collect taxes on opium, alcohol, gambling, and other goods and services needed by the Chinese labor in tin mines and plantations. They paid large fees and rents to the authorities for these 'revenue farms'.[25] While they were leaders either of kongsi (worker's association), secret societies, *huiguan* (locality associations), or other Chinese social and economic organizations, they forged remarkably symbiotic relationships with the colonial state.[26]

The first decade after Malaya attained independence in 1957 witnessed many small Chinese family businesses transforming into large conglomerates. The business networking among the Chinese continued to be important, but the patronage of the Malay-dominated state and the utilization of foreign capital and technology were more vital to the expansion of the Chinese companies. One telling example is the rise of Robert Kuok Hock Nien. At first, he skillfully forged political networking with the Malay power elite and co-opted

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[24] Lim Teck Ghee, *Peasants and Their Agricultural Economy in Colonial Malaya, 1841– 1941* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 103–6. For historical studies of the Chinese economic activities in British Malaya, see, for instance, J. C. Jackson, *Planters and Speculators: Chinese and European Agricultural Enterprise in Malaya 1786–1921* (Kuala Lumpur: University of Malaya Press, 1968); Lee Poh Ping, *Chinese Society in Nineteenth-century Singapore* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978); C. A. Trocki, *Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johore and Singapore 1874–1885* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1979); Wong Lin Ken, *The Malayan Tin Industry to 1914, with Special Reference of the States of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang* (Tuscon: University of Arizona Press, 1965); J. H. Drabble, *Rubber in Malaya 1876–1922: The Genesis of the Industry* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973).

[25] C. A. Trocki, *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore 1800–1910* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990).

[26] Yen Ching-hwang, *A Social History of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya, 1800– 1911* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986).

Malays as substantive business partners and minority shareholders. As a result, he established his first large enterprise, Malayan Sugar Manufacturing, in 1959 and has since expanded his transnational enterprises by stretching the networks to Japanese and Western companies.[27] In one way or another, other Chinese capitalists adopted similar business strategies.[28]

In the wake of the 1969 racial riots, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was implemented from 1970 to 1990 with the objective to reduce poverty irrespective of race and restructure Malaysian society so that the identification of race with economic function would be eliminated.[29] The NEP gave rise to a class of Malay capitalists who have close relationships to the United Malay National Organization (UMNO), the Malay ruling party. New Chinese millionaires emerged in this period largely with intense and complex Chinese–Malay business alliances.[30]

When the NEP was replaced by the New Development Policy (NDP) in 1991, a strong Malay capitalist class had already existed. Compared to the pre-NEP period, Chinese business in the 1990s became more dependent on Malay patronage and capital for success and growth. Malays are no longer minority shareholders and sleeping partners. Instead, it is common for the Malay capitalists in the NDP period to invite Chinese entrepreneurs into their business as minority shareholders.[31]

[27] Two of the major Japanese partners to Kuok were Nissin Sugar Manufacturing and Mitsui Bussan Kaisha while his major western partner was Sucden Kerry International (French). See Heng Pek Koon, 'Robert Kuok and the Chinese Business Network in Eastern Asia: A Study in Sino-Capitalism,' in Timothy Brook and Hy V. Luong (eds.), *Culture and Economy: The Shaping of Capitalism in Eastern Asia* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997), pp. 155–85; J. Friedland, 'Kuok the Kingpin,' *Far Eastern Economic Review* 7 February 1991.

[28] Heng Pek Koon, 'The New Economic Policy and the Chinese Community in Peninsular Malaysia,' *The Developing Economies* Vol. 35, No. 3 (1997), pp. 262–92; Kunio Yoshihara, *The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 201–11.

[29] Malaysia, *Second Malaysia Plan* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, 1971), p. 1.

[30] Hara Fujio, 'Malaysia's New Economic Policy and the Chinese Business Community,' *The Developing Economies* Vol. 24, No. 4 (1991), pp. 350–70; Peter Searle, 'Rent Seekers or Real Capitalism? The Riddle of Malaysian Capitalism,' PhD dissertation (Australian National University, 1994), Chapter 9; Edmund Terence Gomez, *Chinese Business in Malaysia: Accumulation, Ascendance, Accommodation* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), Chapters 3 & 4.

[31] Heng Pek Koon and Sieh Lee Mei Ling, 'The Chinese Business Community in Peninsular Malaysia, 1957–1999,' in Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee Beng (eds.), *The Chinese in Malaysia*, p. 153.

Singapore also showcases that the state institutions and government policies have strongly determined the development pathway of Chinese companies. Between 1959 and 1975, the government adopted a 'two-legged' policy, which involved multinational corporations and government-linked companies directly in its effort to achieve industrialization and to restructure the national economy. As a result, the ethnic Chinese business was left alone and indeed encountered constraints to enter the economic mainstream. Following the severe recession in 1985, the government attempted various measures to boost the ethnic Chinese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and eventually abandoned its 'two-legged' policy in 1989. In the 1990s, with the assistance of the Singapore government, these SMEs endeavored to upgrade and help build the 'external wing' of Singapore through regionalization of economic activities.[32]

Economic Relations with China

Studies show that in the late Qing and Republican period (1911–1949) family remittances and public donations were the prime forms of economic relations that the Overseas Chinese had with China. Chen Ta pointed out in the 1930s that in Guangdong and Fujian provinces the families with connections to Southeast Asia relied heavily on overseas remittances, which made up between 75 and 80 percent of the income, for daily expenditures on food, clothing, light and fuel.[33] Where donation is concerned, a large amount was channeled to establish or expand schools, hospitals, ancestral halls, and temples, as well as to help victims of floods and earthquakes.[34] The amount Overseas Chinese invested in industries was minuscule compared to the monies they gave for remittances and donations.[35]

[32] Chan Kwok Bun and Ng Beoy Kui, 'Chapter 1: Singapore,' in Edmund Terence Gomez and Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao (eds.), *Chinese Business in Southeast Asia: Contesting Cultural Explanations, Researching Entrepreneurship* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001), pp. 38–61.

[33] Chen Ta did his field survey in Chaozhou in Guangdong and Quanzhou, Haicheng, and Xiamen in Fujian. See Chen Ta, *Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change* (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1939), especially tables on pp. 83, 95, & 115 for the breakdowns of the expenditures.

[34] Lin Jiajing *et al.*, *Jindai Guangdong qiaohui yanjiu*, pp. 35–7.

[35] To take Guangdong as an example, the monies allocated in this period for investment never exceeded five percent of the total amount received from Overseas

Between 1949 and 1978, when China was isolated internationally, those Chinese who chose to remain outside China made few economic contacts with China. This is because foreign monies were regarded as treacherous in China, especially in the Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976. On the other hand, the countries in Southeast Asia were suspicious of the loyalty of their residents of Chinese origin. This is particularly so in Singapore and Malaysia where social stability was threatened by the subversive activities of the Malayan Communist Party, whose members were mainly Chinese and which was perceived as having connections to the Chinese Communist Party in the mainland.[36] Thus, with the exception of the first few years after 1949, Chinese overseas made few remittances and donations to and no industrial investment in China.

After China reopened in 1978, the remittances and donations made by Chinese overseas to China never resumed the volume as in the pre-1949 period. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the Singapore and Malaysian Chinese, as will be discussed in more detail later, were more concerned about their extended families in residence countries and felt less obliged to help the kin in China.

Nevertheless, since 1978 trade and investment activities have been growing between Singapore and Malaysia, on the one hand, and China, on the other, with two remarkably new features. The first feature is that, while the pre-1949 investments were individual initiatives of Overseas Chinese, the post-1978 ones have been primarily fostered by Singapore and Malaysian governments. In 1974, Malaysia became the first country in Southeast Asia to open diplomatic relations with China.[37] Sino-Malaysian economic relations grew phenomenally in the mid-1980s when Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad deployed a proactive role to respond to China's economic environment that had became more conducive to trade and investment. As part of his shift towards an emphasis on East Asia, Mahathir advocated a 'controlled relationship' with China whereby the government began to allow its businesspeople to visit China and subsequently opened the travel permit to all Malaysians. In 1985, he led a large trade and investment

Chinese. See Feng Yuan, 'Luelun jiefang qian Guangdong sheng huaqiao huikuan' (A General Discussion on Money Sent Back by Overseas Chinese to Guangdong), *Qiaoshi Xuebao* No. 1 (1987), pp. 35–7.

[36] Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[37] 'China-Malaysia Joint Communique, 31 May 1974' in Jain R. K. (ed.), *China and Malaysia, 1949–1983* (New Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1984), pp. 221–2.

delegation of about 130 businesspeople on an official visit to China, during which four major trade agreements were signed.[38] He has since paid a number of official visits to China, each with the clear objective to promote economic relationships between the two countries. Joined by four cabinet ministers and at least 150 businessmen, his second trip in 1993 secured RM (Ringgit Malaysia) 1.5 billion worth of business contracts.[39] Doing business with and investing in China are, in the eyes of Mahathir, necessary for Malaysia's economic growth.[40]

While Mahathir has been proactively encouraging Malaysia's economic relations with China, Lee Kuan Yew has also acted as a great promoter pushing Singapore's government-linked companies and businesspeople to trade with and invest in China. Lee repeatedly expressed his view that Singaporeans could not miss out on the opportunities in China's thriving economy.[41] After his first two visits to China in 1976 and 1980, many businesspeople have responded to his appeals. The China investment fever appeared in 1985 when the Singapore government took on a more concrete policy to encourage companies and businesspeople to invest overseas and operate offshore business as a long-term solution to the limited domestic opportunities.[42] After a short decline in 1989 to 1990, the 1990s saw strengthened economic connections with China when the Singapore government broadened its geographical focus for investment from Europe and North America to East Asian and Southeast Asian countries.[43]

The second feature of the post-1978 investment is the emergence of non-Chinese participants. This is less obvious in Singapore where the Chinese constitute the majority, but particularly evident in Malaysia where Malay entrepreneurs have shown notable participation in

[38] Stephen M. Y. Leong, 'Malaysia and the People's Republic of China in the 1980s: Political Vigilance and Economic Pragmatism,' *Asian Survey*, Vol. 27, No. 10 (1987), pp. 1109–26.

[39] *Straits Times*, 14 July 1993.

[40] Ho Khai Leong, 'Recent Developments in the Political Economy of China-Malaysia Relations,' in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), *Southeast Asian Chinese and China: the Politico-Economic Dimension* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995), pp. 230–48.

[41] Yong Pow Ang, 'Singapore's Investment in China,' in Suryadinata (ed.), *Southeast Asian Chinese and China*, p. 251.

[42] Yeung Henry Wai-chung, 'Regulating Investment Abroad: The Political Economy of the Regionalization of Singaporean Firms,' *Antipode* Vol. 31, No. 3 (July 1999), pp. 245–73; C. H. Tan, *Venturing Overseas: Singapore's External Wing* (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 1995).

[43] T. Kanai, 'Singapore's New Focus on Regional Business Expansion,' *NRI Quarterly* Vol. 2, No. 3 (1993), p. 21.

business and investment in China. In June 1993, during Mahathir's second trip to China, Bridgecon Engineering Sendirian Berhad, under its chairman Datuk Wan Adil Wan Ibrahim, joined a consortium of Malaysian companies in an agreement to construct the Second Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge in China. Kuala Lumpur Industries, headed by Tan Sri Wan Sidek Hj Wan Abdul Rahim, signed a Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) with Ping An Insurance Company of China to set up a representative office of its subsidiary company, People's Insurance Company (Malaysia). Tengku Ahamad Rithauddeen, formerly the foreign minister and now chairman of Road Builder announced plans to diversify into China. In 1994, of all the 36 Malaysian large corporations that had signed MOU or joint venture agreements with China, many have predominant Malay equity.[44] Malay entrepreneurs are close partners to Chinese businepeople not only in Malaysia but also in China. The two Malaysian companies often cited as most successful in China, Kanzen and Lion Corporation, though largely Chinese, have significant Malay equity.[45]

It is doubtless that the post-1978 investments, characterized by government encouragement and significant non-Chinese participants, are primarily based on business calculation and aimed at gaining profits. They differ from the pre-1949 investments that were essentially Chinese and basically an outgrowth of patriotism towards China and sentiment towards native places. That the post-1978 investments have not been entirely motivated by primordial sentiment is also reflected in the distribution of the investments that stretched beyond the old *qiaoxiang* areas of Singapore and Malaysian Chinese. In the 1990s, the Malaysian investments ventured beyond Guangdong and Fujian, the two ancestral homelands for the bulk of the ethnic Chinese, and moved significantly to Beijing, Jilin, Shanghai, Tianjin, Anhui, Suzhou, and Hubei where new economic opportunities were opened up.[46] Singapore investors have been making similar forays

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[44] These corporations include Petronas, Renong, United Motor Works, Hicom, and Eon. See Lee Kam Hing, 'Malaysian Chinese: Seeking Identity in Wawasan 2020,' in Suryadinata (ed.), *Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians*, pp. 78–9.

[45] In 1986, Kanzen, originally named as Dreamland Corporation, signed an agreement with Dreamland Tianjin Pte Ltd to produce and market mattresses and by 1990 Dreamland Tianjin had established eight factories in different parts in China. The Lion Corporation is engaged in various development projects in China but its most successful has been in the retail business operating through a chain of Parkson stores. See Lee Kam Hing, 'Malaysian Chinese,' p. 79.

[46] Ho Khai Leong, 'Recent Developments,' pp. 237–8.

into China. In fact, the largest Singapore industrial project in China is located in Suzhou, even though most Singapore Chinese have no ancestral roots in that place.[47]

Diminishing Dialect Groups

Among Chinese overseas, identification with the ancestral home villages and towns in China is usually measured by how one can keep the pureness of the dialect spoken and what occupation one is involved in. The Chinese communities in British Malaya, right up to World War II, were structurally heterogeneous and segmented by dialect and kinship that had a lot to do with the places in China where the people originated from. Initially, these boundaries were engendered by the mutual dialect incomprehensibility and respective fidelity attached to the home villages and towns in China.[48] Later on, these demarcations were further reinforced by the founding and operation of different social organizations such as locality associations (*huiguan*), clan associations, and secret societies.[49]

These group boundaries, to a large extent, defined the residential pattern and occupational structures. The Hokkiens, the earliest Chinese immigrants, constituted a dominant group and made their dialect the lingua franca in major port towns such as Penang, Teluk Intan, Klang, Pekan, Kuala Trengganu, Kota Bahru, and Singapore,[50] with overriding influence in banking, finance, insurance, shipping,

[47] Yong Pow Ang, 'Singapore's Investment in China,' p. 251.
[48] The rigidity of boundary was not always in the same degree between any two particular dialect groups. See Mak Lau Fong, 'Rigidity of System Boundary among Major Chinese Dialect Groups in Nineteenth-Century Singapore: A Study of Inscription Data,' *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 14, No, 3 (1980), pp. 465–87 and Mak Lau Fong, 'The Social Alignment Patterns of the Chinese in Nineteenth-Century Penang,' *Modern Asian Studies* Vol. 23, No. 2 (1989), pp. 259–76.
[49] For a brief account of Chinese clan associations, see Yen Ching-hwang, 'Early Chinese Clan Organizations in Singapore and Malaya, 1819–1911' in Lee Lai To (ed.), *Early Chinese Immigrant Societies: Case Studies from North America and British Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Heinemann Asia, 1988), pp. 186–229. For Chinese secret societies, see Mak Lau Fong, *The Sociology of Secret Societies* (Singapore/London: Oxford University Press, 1981).
[50] Khoo Kay Kim, 'Chinese Economic Activities in Malaya: A Historical Perspective,' in Manning Nash (ed.), *Economic Performance in Malaya: the Insiders View* (New York: Professors World Peace Academy, 1988), p. 1.

manufacturing, international trading, real estate, and construction.[51] The Teochews were initially engaged in planting gambier and pepper. These agricultural activities, coupled with their coastal fishing and trade in marine products, resulted in the Teochew dominance in the trading and marketing of gambier, pepper, marine products, textiles, rice, chinaware and glassware, vegetables, fish, poultry products, temperate fruits, jewellery, and antiques.[52] The Cantonese, more inclined to occupations requiring higher degree of manual skills, were famous for manufacturing furniture, leather, soya sauce, clock and watch repairing, tailoring, gold smithery, jewellery, laundry, motor repair and engineering, drug shops, and restaurants. Contrary to the dominance of Hokkiens and Teochews in international trades, the industries in which Cantonese engaged in were more oriented towards the domestic market.[53]

Like the Cantonese, the Hakkas were also versatile in all sorts of crafts. Their principal economic activities were pawnbroking, trades in Chinese herbs and medicine, textiles, shoes, jewellery, iron foundry, blacksmith, the manufacturing of garments and tailoring.[54] In Malaysia, the Hakkas were primarily rural and worked as manual laborers in tin mines or plantations.[55] The early Hainanese were primarily agriculturists and many of them worked also as domestic servants, providing catering and personal services in the European quarters and armed forces. This led to their dominance in bakery and coffee shops and their reputation for chicken rice.[56]

After World War II, however, the traditional markers of dialect groups have been breaking down.[57] The younger generation of Chinese, regardless of what dialect groups, has left the traditional occupations and diversified into a wider range of careers. In order to find jobs, they are no longer bound to any particular locality where their predecessors of the same origin grouped around. This is evident

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[51] Cheng Lim-keak, *Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore: a Socio-Economic Geography with Special Reference to Bang Structure* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1985), pp. 90–3.

[52] Phua Chay Long, *Malaiya Chaoqiao tongjian* (The Teochews in Malaya) (Singapore), p. 41.

[53] Cheng Lim-keak, *Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore*, pp. 95–6.

[54] *Ibid*., pp. 96–7.

[55] Sharon A. Carstens, 'Form and Content in Hakka Malaysian Culture,' in Nicole Constable (ed.), *Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad* (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1996), 124–48.

[56] Cheng Lim-keak, *Social Change and the Chinese in Singapore*, pp. 97–8.

[57] Tan Chee-Beng, 'Socio-cultural Diversities and Identities,' p. 45.

in both Malaysia and Singapore. In Singapore itself, the restructuring of residential settlement and thus the mixing of dialect and ethnic groups in new estates have been induced by the government through the policy of the Housing and Development Board (HDB) since 1960.[58] In an interview I conducted in 1999, the president of Singapore Nanhai Association revealed that the Cantonese have been moving out from their traditional concentration area, Chinatown (Kreta Ayer), dispersing to other parts of Singapore and mixing with other dialect groups.

Leaving the traditional economic activities and residential settlements diluted group identities and, to some extent, weakened the ties to the homeland in China. Identification at the level of ancestral village is fading away, while identification at the dialect group level is also losing ground.[59] Only the older generation, which is rapidly dwindling, is able to identify more fully at the level of ancestral village. Among the younger generation, while not all those Chinese-educated are able to do so, many educated in English and Malay find no need to maintain such identification.

Panyu and Xinyi People in Singapore and Malaysia

Having examined the ethnic Chinese communities in general, the focus now turns to two particular Cantonese subgroups, Panyu and Xinyi people.[60] Panyu and Xinyi are two localities in Guangdong having special features in migration history to Singapore and Malaysia. On the one hand, the bulk of the Cantonese speakers in the two countries originate from the Sanyi area that comprises Nanhai, Panyu, and Shunde, three localities neighboring Guangzhou.[61] In fact, where Malaysia is concerned, in such Cantonese-speaking cities and towns

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[58] Sharon A. Carstens, *Chinese Associations in Singapore Society: An Examination of Function and Meaning* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1975), p. 19.

[59] Tan Chee-Beng, 'Socio-cultural Diversities and Identities,' p. 43.

[60] The Cantonese dialect variations in Guangdong can be divided into five subgroups: Guangfu, Siyi, Gaoyang, Goulou, and Wuhua, all spoken in most parts of the Pearl River Delta and the western part of the province. Panyu is located in the area where Guangfu variation is spoken, while Xinyi in the area of Gaoyang variation. See S. A. Wurm and L. Rong, *et al.* (eds.), *Language Atlas of China* (Hong Kong: Longman on behalf of the Australian Academy of the Humanities and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 1987), p. B-13.

[61] The scientific calculation of the population of the Chinese dialect groups is not available. This is the opinion I obtained from the interviews conducted in 1999

as Kuala Lumpur, Seremban, Ipoh, and Taiping, the dialect variation is identified as related to the Sanyi group.[62] On the other hand, in Guangdong itself and even in China as a whole, Xinyi is unique in that over 90 percent of its diaspora overwhelming concentrate in Malaysia and Singapore.[63]

Panyu is situated in a riverine plain at the mouth of the Pearl River, adjacent to the cosmopolitan Hong Kong and Guangdong's administrative centre, Guangzhou. Xinyi is remote in the mountainous southwest part of Guangdong and bordering the Guangxi's western part that is also hilly. Historically, from the mid-nineteenth century to 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded, both localities sent their people to British Malaya as well as other places.[64] However, in the reform period since 1978, both never resumed the migration to Singapore and Malaysia because of the immigration restriction adopted in both countries. Meanwhile, both localities have undergone different economic development pathways in the reform period; while Panyu transformed rapidly into an industrialized and modernized economy,[65] Xinyi remained poor as an agrarian society.[66]

In Malaysia, it was estimated that there were 105,469 Xinyi people in 1988 and 9,680 Panyu people in 1987. In Singapore there were 52,466 Xinyi people and 13,104 Panyu people in 1988 and 1987,

and 2000 with many Chinese leaders actively participating in social organisations in Singapore and Malaysia.

[62] S. A. Wurm and L. Rong, *et al.* (eds.), *Language Atlas of China*, Map B16 a.

[63] Yang Xuqing and Zhao Dingfang, 'Malaiya gedi Gaozhou Huiguan de chansheng he fazhan' (The Formation and Development of Gaozhou Associations in Different Parts of Malaysia), *Guangdong Huaqiao Lishi Xuehui Tongxun* (1982), pp. 20–2.

[64] Panyuxian Qiaowu Bangongshi (The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of Panyu) (ed.), *Panyuxian huaqiao, Gang Ao tongbao zhi* (An Account of Overseas Chinese, Hong Kong and Macau Compatriots of Panyu Origin) (Panyu: Internal Document); Chen Qizhu, *et al.* (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi* (The Annals of Xinyi County) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1993), p. 988.

[65] Lam Tao-chiu, 'Constitutional Constraints, Leadership and Development Strategies: Panyu and Nanhai under Reform,' in Jae Ho Chung (ed.), *Cities in China: Recipes for Economic Development in the Reform Era* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 256–95; George C. S. Lin, 'Transportation and Metropolitan Development in China's Pearl River Delta: The Experience of Panyu,' *Habitat International* (June 1999), pp. 249–70.

[66] Ezra F. Vogel, *One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong under Reform* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1995), Chapter 8, pp. 251–74.

respectively.[67] In both countries, there are altogether 24 Gaozhou associations representing Xinyi people, outnumbering the nine Panyu associations.[68] The founding years of these associations show that Panyu people were the immigrants earlier than Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia. The oldest Panyu associations were founded in Penang in 1819 and in Singapore in 1851 (Appendix 1). Meanwhile, the earliest Gaozhou associations were established in Singapore in 1883 and in Negri Sembilan in 1926 (Appendix 2).

The distribution of the Panyu associations suggests that Panyu people have a stronger foothold in the old Chinese settlements such as Penang, Singapore, Malacca, and more economically developed areas like Kuala Lumpur, Kampar, Teluk Intan, and Tronoh. These cities and towns are scattered along the western coast of Malaysian Peninsula (Appendix 1). On the other hand, Xinyi people formed enclaves in towns in Selangor, Perak, Negri Sembilan, Johore, Pahang, and Kedah, which developed as a result of rubber plantation and tin mining in the past. They, however, do not have any representative institution in Penang and Malacca, and have to combine with Guangxi people to form an association in Singapore (Appendix 2).

Like Nanhai and Shunde people in the Sanyi group, Panyu people at the early time were more engaged in the areas requiring a higher degree of manual skills and operating restaurants. Where Xinyi people are concerned, the first identifiable immigrant to Malaya was Chen Mingpan, who arrived from Huaixiang *zhen* as a capitalist in 1880. He operated Gaohua Tavern at Sultan Street, near Petaling Street now known popularly as Chinatown, in Kuala Lumpur, giving services in lodging and sending remittance.[69] However, it was not until the 1910s that the massive immigration of Xinyi people emerged, primarily induced by Li Jilian (1877–1936), through his transnational company,

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[67] Chen Qizhu, *et al*. (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi*, p. 988; Luo Jingxiang, *et al*. (eds.), *Panyu xianzhi* (The Annals of Panyu County) (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe, 1995), p. 927.

[68] In Chinese overseas communities, Xinyi people are customarily called Gaozhou people. This is because during the Ming dynasty, Xinyi was grouped together with Gaozhou, Maoming, Dianbai, Wuchuan, and Lianjiang counties under a larger administrative area called Gaozhou *fu*, which was continuously adopted by the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the late years of which saw a commencement of massive overseas migration of labor. See *Xinjiapo quanguo shetuan daquan* (Directory of Associations in Singapore, 1982–83) (Singapore: Historical Culture Publishers, 1983), p. L-57.

[69] Liang Jiyi (ed.), *Maoming huaqiaozhi* (The Annals of Overseas Chinese of Maoming Origin) (Guangzhou: Zhangshan Daxue Chubanshe, 1989), p. 66.

Jinluntai, with many subsidiaries in cities and towns in Guangdong, Hong Kong, Malaya, and Singapore.[70] The majority of the first-generation Xinyi migrants came to work as labor in rubber plantations, tin mines, and helped open up forest.

In the contemporary period after 1949, the Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia have not appeared with strong economic and financial commitments to their ancestral homeland. Their ties to Panyu and Xinyi were severed for the first three decades after 1949, but have never been fully revitalized since 1978.[71]

Reorientation over Generations: A Case of Transplanted Family

The gradual reorientation from China over generations can be clearly reflected in a case where Li Jilian transplanted his family to British Malaya where his descendants became deeply rooted. Li Jilian (1877–1936), who originated from Zhenlong *zhen*, the then capital of Xinyi, established the most crucial migratory chain to facilitate the inflow of Xinyi people to British Malaya. Born in a scholarly family, Li scored very well in examination and became an official of the Qing government, from which he resigned later because he was not comfortable with the decaying regime. He ventured into business, made friends with Sun Yatsen and became a member of Tungmenghui taking part in the revolution overthrowing the Qing government. In the newly founded Republican government, he assumed such positions as secretary of the civil administration department of Guangdong province and political advisor to the Guangzhou government. He migrated to British Malaya in 1904, but kept his political positions

[70] This information is based on a letter written by Li Ruchang, a close relative to Li Jilian, on 10 January 1987.

[71] In both Panyu and Xinyi during the reform period, the productive investments and donations made by Singapore and Malaysia Chinese have been minuscule and completely outshone by the Hong Kong people. For the case of Panyu, see Yow Cheun Hoe, 'Transforming an Old *Qiaoxiang*: Impacts of the Diaspora on Panyu, 1978–2000,' paper presented at the Second International Conference for Institute & Libraries for Overseas Chinese Studies 'Transnational Networks: Challenges in Research and Documentation of the Chinese Overseas,' in Hong Kong organized by the University Library System, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, and Ohio University Libraries, 13–15 March 2003.

in Guangdong until 1919 when he became fully engaged in business activities encompassing many places.[72]

The business networks forged by Li Jilian between the 1910s and 1930s transcended political boundaries and linked together Guangdong, Guangxi, Hong Kong, and British Malaya. At a time when Guangzhou, Shantou, and Hong Kong served as crucial portals for labour trafficking from the Pearl River Delta and Han River Delta regions, Li Jilian opened up another route in the 1920s by getting the custom restriction lifted in Guangzhouwen (the present Zhanjiang in Guangdong) governed then by the French administration. This route made possible labour migration from Xinyi, Gaozhou, and Leizhou in Guangdong's southwest part.[73]

What further triggered the overseas migration was the operation of his transnational company, Jinluntai, with many subsidiaries in cities and towns in Guangdong (Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Xinyi, Gaozhou, Meilu, Wuchuan, Huazhou, Luoding, Baoxu), Hong Kong, Peninsular Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, Ipoh, Seremban), and Singapore.[74] A transportation company cum hotel cum remittance agent, Jinluntai gave discounts on traffic fees for kinsfolk and even interest-free loans to those in need. In 1926 alone, Jinluntai helped transport over twenty thousand Xinyi people to Southeast Asia.[75] The number of Xinyi labour, like their counterparts from other localities in South China, was reduced drastically in the late 1920s and early 1930s with the deepening of the Great Depression, and ceased totally in 1949 when the People's Republic of China was founded.

The descendants of Li Jilian did not carry on with his role as a 'transnational capitalist' linking Xinyi with its people dispersed overseas. Li Jilian died in 1936 in a hospital in Hong Kong after a traffic accident in Guangxi.[76] Around a decade earlier, in 1924, his son Henry Lee Hau Shik (Li Xiaoshi) (1901–1988), who received his tertiary education in Cambridge, visited Malaya, bought a tin mine in Kepong and subsequently decided to settle down to take up tin mining. Henry Lee forged very close relations with the British colonial government and later the Malaysian government. He participated actively in

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[72] Liang Jiyi (ed.), *Maoming haiwai mingrenlu*, p. 90; Chen Qizhu, *et al.* (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi*, p. 1024.

[73] Chen Qizhu, *et al.* (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi*, p. 1024.

[74] See footnote 70.

[75] Chen Qizhu, *et al.* (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi*, p. 1024.

[76] *Ibid.*

the political arena before and after the independence attained in 1957. After World War II, he served in the Malayan Union Advisory Council and as an unofficial member of both the Federal Executive Council and the Federal Legislative Council. During the Emergency declared in 1948, he was made an adviser to the British Director of Operations. In 1949, he helped form the Malaysian Chinese Association that subsequently played an important role in fostering the political reorientation of the Chinese to Malaysia in the early stage of nation-building.[77] A member of the Merdeka (Independence) Mission to London in 1956, he was one of the eight signatories to the Independence of Malaya Agreement with the British Government. He later became independent Malaya's first Finance Minster and held the post for two years until he resigned for health reasons. A great proportion of his economic activities, primarily tine mines and banks, concentrated in Malaysia.[78] In fact, in contrast to Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng) who has always been portrayed as a patriot of China and having *qiaoxiang* sentiment to their ancestral homelands,[79] Lee Hau Shik has been illustrated in Xinyi as a symbol of how successful and respectable an 'Overseas Chinese' can be in the country of adoption.[80]

Douglas Lee Kim Kiu (Li Jianqiao) is the eldest son of Henry Lee Hau Shik. Born in Cambridge in 1923, he received part of his secondary education in Hong Kong and Guangzhou, but eventually completed his education in Malaya because of the outbreak of Sino-Japanese War in 1937. After China reopened in 1978, he went to his ancestral hometown, Xinyi, in 1986, two years before his father died in Malaysia. During the first visit, he donated RMB40,000 to the Xinyi Huaqiao Middle School and has since been visiting his ancestral homeland often to attend big events and ceremonies.

Douglas Lee is highly respected among the local officials and people in Xinyi, not really because of his contributions he made to Xinyi, but mainly because of his high political and social achievements in Malaysia. After World War II, he helped his father for years in tin mines, and later opened his own business in construction and

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[77] Heng Pek Koon, *Chinese Politics in Malaysia: A History of the Malaysian Chinese Association* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[78] Lee Kam Hing and Chow Mun Seong, *Biographical Dictionary of the Chinese in Malaysia* (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1997).

[79] On Tan Kah Kee, see C. F. Yong, *Tan Kah-Kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1987).

[80] See the coverage made in *Maoming Ribao, Dushiban* (The City Section), 11 April 2000.

banking sectors in Malaysia. He was a council member from 1952 to 1955, a high-ranking member of Malaysian Chinese Association until 1959, and joined in 1974 Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, another Chinese-based political party. He also assumed many high positions in such social organizations as the Guangdong Association and the Xinyi Association in Malaysia.[81] Indeed, the overseas legend of Douglas Lee as well as of his father has been told repeatedly to the students in the school opening and during important ceremonies of the Xinyi Huaqiao Middle School.[82]

During an interview conducted in August 2000, Douglas Lee discussed his personal views on remittance, donation, and investment, reflecting the sentiment of ethnic Chinese who are now rooted more deeply in the countries of residence. The most important thing he thought he should do in Xinyi was to help better the education institutions. He has, based on economic rationale, been looking for any opportunity to invest in Maoming, a prefectual capital that is more economically promising than Xinyi. Malaysia, however, is the most preferred place for him to make productive and business investments as it is, since he is living here, easier for him to supervise the operation. Malaysia is also his most preferred place to donate to social welfare as, he said, his roots and descendants are in this country. Where his kinsfolk in Xinyi are concerned, he has been helping one of his cousins, not by sending remittance, but by giving him part of the rental collected from his family houses in Xinyi.

Detached from Ancestral Homeland: An Analysis of Questionnaire, 2000

In August and September 2000, a questionnaire survey was conducted in Singapore and Malaysia's capital Kuala Lumpur, with twenty Panyu people and twenty Xinyi people interviewed in each site.[83]

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[81] *Maoming Qiaobao*, New No. 126, 15 May 1998; Chen Qizhu and Liang Qicheng (eds.), *Xinyi Qiaolian wu shi nian* (Fifty Years of Xinyi Association of Returned Overeas Chinese) (Shenzhen: Tianma Tushu Youxian Gongsi, 2001), p. 299.

[82] Interview with Deng Chongke, the school's headmaster, 20 January 2001. See also the coverage made in *Maoming Ribao, Dushiban* (The City Section), 11 April 2000.

[83] The survey started with some members in the Panyu and Xinyi associations, from whom a snowballing effect was generated to reach other Panyu and Xinyi people. As a matter of fact, many associations were facing a dwindling and graying membership problems and, outside the associations, it was very hard to identify Panyu and Xinyi

TABLE 1
Question: Are you an immigrant or a local-born?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Immigrant	1	5	4	1
First-Generation Local-Born	16	15	12	18
Second-Generation Local-Born	3	–	4	1
Total	20	20	20	20

The questionnaire was primarily divided into three parts, containing altogether 65 questions. The first part was to obtain personal particulars of the people surveyed, including information as to whether they were immigrants or born locally, and about their education backgrounds, occupations, religions, and local social and political activities. The second part was to understand what families and relatives they have in China and countries of residence. The third part was to examine how frequent the Panyu and Xinyi people have kept in touch with their kinsfolk in China through letter correspondence, telephone, e-mail, and visiting over different periods of time. Also examined were the economic contributions, if any, made by the Panyu and Xinyi people to their ancestral home towns or villages, over different periods of time, in terms of family remittance, productive and industrial investments, donation for social welfare and infrastructure. The periodization in the questionnaire was structured into (1) pre-1949, (2) 1950–1965, (3) 1966–1976, and (4) post-1978, fundamentally divided according to the political and economic changes and circumstances in China. The fourth part was dealing with the sentiment the surveyed people held towards their ancestral homeland in China. Throughout the questionnaire, *qiaoxiang* was defined loosely as their ancestral homeland in China.

Of all the 20 Malaysian Panyu people (MP) surveyed, 19 were male and one was female. The sex ratio is also the same for all the 20 Malaysian Xinyi people (MX) interviewed. 17 males and three females were surveyed for the Singapore Panyu people (SP) and this is also the same for the Singapore Xinyi people (SX).

As shown in Table 1, all the people surveyed held citizenship of Malaysia or Singapore. The majority of them were born locally. Only

people. All these point to the fact that the ethnic Chinese were losing identification with their ancestral origins.

TABLE 2
Question: What is/are the language(s) you can speak?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Mandarin	2	2	5	–
Mandarin and English	–	1	4	1
Mandarin and Malay	17	15	11	15
Mandarin, English, and Malay	1	2	–	4
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 3
Question: What is/are the dialect(s) you can speak?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Cantonese	20	20	20	20
Hokkein	8	15	12	18
Teochew	3	4	9	11
Hakka	16	18	6	12
Hainan	2	3	1	3
Others	0	0	0	0

a few were immigrants who arrived mainly in the 1930s and the first decade after World War II. There were more Panyu people who were of second-generation local-born, with three in Malaysia and four in Singapore, compared to the Xinyi people who only had one in Singapore. However, either among the Panyu people or Xinyi people, it is clear that the immigration generation, presumably with stronger attachment to *qiaoxiang*, has dwindled.

Living in multiracial and multicultural milieu, many Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia could speak languages other than Mandarin. The majority of MP (17), MX (15), SP (11), and SX (15) were able to speak both Mandarin and Malay (Table 2). The language versatility should have enabled them to assimilate more easily into the local non-Chinese cultures and communities. The survey also shows that the boundaries between different Chinese dialect groups have been waning. Many Panyu and Xinyi people surveyed could converse in dialects other than Cantonese, particularly Hokkien and Hakka (Table 3). More important is that many

TABLE 4
Question: How old are you?

Age	MP	MX	SP	SX
30s	1	1	3	3
40s	4	4	2	5
50s	8	7	3	6
60s	5	2	8	4
70s	1	3	3	2
80s	1	3	–	–
90s	–	–	1	–
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 5
Question: What is the economic sector you are working in?

Sector	MP	MX	SP	SX
Self-sufficient agriculture	–	–	–	–
Commercial agriculture	–	–	–	–
Industry	7	6	5	3
Agriculture and Industry	5	8	9	3
Commercial	6	6	4	5
Service	2	–	2	9
Total	20	20	20	20

interviewees have spouses not from the same ancestral homeland or dialect group; many married Hakka, Teochew, and Hokkien.

The bulk of the surveyed Panyu and Xinyi people were aged from thirties to sixties, a physically active period for all sorts of social and economic activities (Table 4). The main economic sectors they were involved in were of industries and commerce as well as a mixed one of industry and agriculture (Table 5). Many earned from $2,000 to $10,000, considerably well off by the standard of living costs in Singapore and Malaysia (Table 6). Nevertheless, few were financially powerful enough to venture beyond Singapore and Malaysia.

Since most of the surveyed Panyu and Xinyi people were born locally, their family ties with ancestral homeland in China have been loosening over time. All MP (20) and the majority of MX (14), SP (19), and SX (15) did not have or could not identify any direct family

TABLE 6
Question: What is the average monthly income for your family/household?

Malaysian Ringgit for MP and MX, Singapore Dollar for SP and SX	MP	MX	SP	SX
Nil	–	–	–	–
Less than $1000	1	1	2	3
$1000–1999	2	1	1	1
$2000–2999	2	1	4	5
$3000–3999	1	1	3	2
$4000–4999	2	3	2	3
$5000–9999	7	5	4	2
More than $10000	5	8	4	4
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 7
Question: Do you have any direct family member in qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Yes	0	6	1	5
No	20	14	19	15
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 8
Question: Do you have any relative in qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Yes	16	19	16	13
No	4	1	4	7
Total	20	20	20	20

member in their ancestral villages and towns (Table 7). Meanwhile, the majority of MP (16), MX (19), SP (16), and SX (13) still had relatives in *qiaoxiang*, such as uncles, aunts, cousins, nephews, or nieces (Table 8). The ties with relatives were presumably weaker than the ones with direct family members, but all were dwindling in number in Guangdong.

TABLE 9
Question: Have you ever written any letter to anyone in qiaoxiang *1949?*

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Yes	7	15	10	11
No	13	5	10	9
Total	20	20	20	20

Many proponents of the prevalence of transnationalism argue that technological revolution of communication is a crucial factor to sustain the connection of dispersed individuals across national borders.[84] This is not the case of the Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia, who used neither advanced nor traditional means to keep constant contact with their kinsfolk in China. The survey reveals that the majority of MP (13), a considerably large number of SP (10) and SX (9), and a small number of MX (5) had never written any letter to *qiaoxiang* since 1949 (Table 9). The purpose of their letter writing was mainly to send regards and the contents were mainly about the affairs associated with the family and relatives in China and countries of residence. The correspondence, on average twice a year, was not disrupted during the radical years of Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), but became less frequent or even stopped in the 1990s. This was partly due to the shrinkage of the generation with direct family relationships spanning national boundaries and partly due to the use of the telephone that began gaining popularity, particularly among the residents in the more developed Panyu.

However, even telephone calls were in general only made once a year, mostly during the celebration of Lunar New Year, or when there was an urgent need to inform about the passing away of a family member or relative. Telephone contacts were even less frequent in Xinyi where many families still could not afford to install a telephone and get wired to the outside world. Thus, the majority of MP (15), SP (12), and SX (16) and many MX (9) did not use the telephone to facilitate the transnational family connections (Table 10).

None of the MP, MX, SP, and SX surveyed used e-mail and fax to keep in touch with family and relatives in Guangdong. While the old generation, supposedly with stronger ties, was not familiar with the

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[84] Guarnizo and Smith, 'The Locations of Transnationalism,' p. 4.

TABLE 10
Question: Have you ever made any telephone call to anyone in qiaoxiang *since 1949?*

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Yes	5	11	8	4
No	15	9	12	16
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 11
Question: Have you ever remitted money back to qiaoxiangqiaoxiang *since 1949?*

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Yes	3	12	6	7
No	17	8	14	13
Total	20	20	20	20

advanced technologies, the younger generation, though equipped with the communication skill and knowledge, had no desire to be linked to *qiaoxiang* because of the weakening kinship connections.

As discussed earlier, remittance for family expenses was the major form of money sent back by Overseas Chinese in the pre-1949 period. The result of the questionnaire shows that many contemporary Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia no longer had financial commitment to their kinsfolk in China. The majority of MP (17), SP (14), and SX (13) had never remitted money to *qiaoxiang* since 1949. Only in the MX group were there more people (12) who made remittances, but those who did not still constituted a significant large portion (Table 11).

Generally speaking, all MP, MX, SP, and SX who made remittances gave money once a year to help kinsfolk to prepare for the Lunar New Year, or occasionally for ceremonies and the restoration of ancestral halls. The money remitted each time ranged from RMB100 to 2,000, an amount never sufficient to fully support their kinsfolk for expenditures throughout the year. The small amount of remittances continued during the Cultural Revolution but was reduced or even stopped in the 1990s. For all the people interviewed, remittances to ancestral homeland never constituted an important expenditure for themselves. They in fact spent most in the countries of residence on accommodation, food, clothing, car, and children's education. The

TABLE 12

Question: What was/is (were/are) the main reason(s) you wanted/want to visit qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Visit family and relatives	9	16	15	7
Visit ancestral shrine and hall	4	6	–	3
For tourist purpose	3	1	6	2
Seeking economic opportunities	–	1	1	–
Look for a spouse	–	–	–	–
Others	–	–	–	–
Never pay a visit	8	4	6	13

Panyu people in Singapore and Malaysia surveyed felt they no longer had an obligation to help their kinsfolk in Panyu that has been developing rapidly since 1978. On the other hand, many Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia considered their kinsfolk as self-sufficient by engaging in either agriculture or the industrial sector in Xinyi.

The weakening *qiaoxiang* ties were also reflected in fewer visits made to the ancestral homeland. Table 12 shows that many SX (13) and MP (8), and some SP (6) and MX (4) never paid a visit to their ancestral homeland. The most important reason for those MP (9), MX (16), SP (15), and SX (7) who made the ancestral homeward comings, many in the 1980s and more in the 1990s, was to visit their families and relatives. The second and third important reasons were to visit ancestral shrines and halls and for tourist purpose. Only a few went back to seek any economic opportunity to make investment in business and factories. None went to look for a spouse, a common practice among Overseas Chinese in the pre-1949 period and still prevalent among contemporary Taishan people in North America.[85] Given the main reason was to visit kinsfolk, the number of Panyu and Xinyi people visiting *qiaoxiang* are likely to decline in future as the generation with close blood ties is shrinking over time.

The majority of the MP (10), MX (9), and SP (12) confessed that they only knew their ancestral homeland a little bit, while the majority of SX (14) had merely general knowledge about what was going on at the place where their ancestors came from. Only two MX claimed

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[85] For an account for the contemporary case of Taishan people, see Madeline Y. Hsu, 'Migration and Native Place: *Qiaokan* and the Imagined Community of Taishan County Guangdong, 1893–1993,' *Journal of Asian Studies* 59 (2) (May 2000), pp. 327–8.

TABLE 13
Question: To what extent do you know your qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Fully know it	0	2	0	0
Know it very well	3	7	0	3
General	6	2	6	14
Know it a little bit	10	9	12	3
Do not know it at all	1	0	2	0
Total	20	20	20	20

TABLE 14
Question: What are the main sources of information about qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Family members and relatives in *qiaoxiang*	1	4	0	7
Huiguan (locality association)	4	6	1	2
Newspaper/radio/television	0	0	0	2
Personal visit	12	14	14	11
Qiaokan (overseas Chinese newsletter)	0	1	3	1
Old generation in Singapore and Malaysia	6	4	5	5

to know Xinyi totally and none of the MP, SP, and SX claimed full understanding of their *qiaoxiang* areas (Table 13).

The most important source of information about *qiaoxiang*, for the majority of the MP (12), MX (14), SP (14), and SX (11), was direct observation through visiting their ancestral homeland. The old-generation people residing in Singapore and Malaysia constituted the second important source, but merely provided outdated stories. Locality associations played a role only to supply news and information to a small number of the MP (4), MX (6), SP (1), and SX (2) (Table 14). Mass media, notably newspaper, radio, and television and the more specific publication of *qiaokan* (newsletter for Overseas Chinese) were of no significance to create an 'imagined community' linking the dispersed individuals across national borders.[86] While mass media normally did not report specifically on their ancestral homeland,

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[86] The concept of 'imagined communities' was advanced and meticulously examined by Benedict Anderson. See Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1998).

TABLE 15
Question: If you have a sum of money, what are you going to do in your qiaoxiang?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Invest in business	2	0	2	1
Invest in factory	0	1	0	1
Donate for Public Infrastructure	14	14	18	13
Give it to family and relatives	4	5	0	5
Total	20	20	20	20

qiaokan reached only a very small number of those who frequented locality associations and liked to read the newsletters.

When it comes to economic relations, almost all the MP, MX, SP, and SX revealed the same mentality, which was gradually detached from *qiaoxiang* and increasingly tied to local realities. Where *qiaoxiang* alone is concerned, only a few were willing to make investment, either in business or factory, should they have a sum of money. Nor would many give the money as remittances to their family and relatives, because of the loosening kinship ties. Their major concern about their *qiaoxiang* was to donate money for social welfare to build and improve the conditions of schools, hospitals, and roads. 14 MP, 14 MX, 18 SP, 13 SX were inclined to donate if they had a sum of surplus money (Table 15).

Apparently, ancestral homeland was not favored as location for investment by the Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia. Neither were other places in China that are more economically developed and conducive, such as Shenzhen and Shanghai. Most MP (19), MX (17), SX (15) and all SP (20) chose Singapore and Malaysia to invest (Table 16). The only difference is that there were more SP and SX who wanted to invest in Malaysia than MP and MX who liked to make investment in Singapore. As a matter of fact, many Singapore factories have been relocated to Malaysian Peninsula due to the rising land and labor costs in Singapore.

Why Singapore and Malaysia were favored for investment can be explained by examining what the main reason was taken into account when the Panyu and Xinyi people in Singapore and Malaysia want to invest. The majority of MP (14), MX (15), SP (18), and SX (13) considered 'geographical proximity, easy to supervise' as the most important factor before choosing a place to invest. *Xiangqing*

TABLE 16
Question: If you have a sum of money, where are you going to invest in factory and business?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Qiaoxiang	0	1	0	1
Elsewhere in China	1	1	0	1
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0
Singapore/Malaysia	19	17	20	15
Others	0	1	0	3

TABLE 17
Question: What is the main factor taken into account when you want to invest in business and factory in a place?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Economic Conduciveness	1	4	0	2
Political Environment	0	2	1	1
Market	0	0	0	1
Geographical Proximity, Easy to Supervise	14	15	18	13
Xiangqing	0	0	0	1
Local Sentiment	5	2	0	2
Others	0	0	1	0

(sentiment towards *qiaoxiang*) and local sentiment (towards Singapore or Malaysia) constitute no crucial determinants in selecting places to invest (Table 17).

While making investment, as the result has shown, is based on economic rationale, giving donation involves affection and sentiment attached to a place. Singapore or Malaysia was the major concern for donation for the majority of MP (14), MX (17), SP (18), and SX (10), although some MP (5), MX (3), SP (18), and SX (9) chose to donate to *qiaoxiang*. Among the reasons to choose a place to donate, the majority of MP (13), MX (14), SP (13), and SX (14) viewed that local sentiment is the most important (Table 18) among all the reasons. This local sentiment, they further explained, was closely tied to the fact that their offspring were growing in number and settling in Singapore and Malaysia. One difference among the people surveyed is that the Malaysian Panyu and Xinyi people showed more financial commitment to the local Chinese education than their Singapore counterparts. As

TABLE 18
Question: If you have a sum of money, where are you going to donate for social welfare such as school, hospital, and road construction?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Qiaoxiang	5	3	2	9
Elsewhere in China	0	0	0	0
Hong Kong	0	0	0	0
Singapore/Malaysia	14	17	18	10
Others	1	0	0	1

TABLE 19
Question: What is the main reason taken into account when you want to donate to social welfare in a place?

	MP	MX	SP	SX
Local Sentiment	13	14	14	8
Xiangqing	3	0	1	4
People's need at that place	4	7	3	7
Economic Development	0	1	0	1
Others	0	0	2	1

a matter of fact, Malaysian Chinese schools comparatively need more financial support from the Chinese communities.[87]

Only a few of the MP (3), SP (1), SX (4), and no MX regarded *xiangqing* as a driving force to donate to their ancestral homeland. More MP (4), MX (7), SP (3), and SX (7) would consider what the people really needed before making a donation (Table 19). At this point, *xiangqing* was apparently weakening. Giving financial aid to *qiaoxiang* appeared to be based on rational consideration. Indeed, many Panyu people surveyed explained that they would not donate to their ancestral homeland where their counterparts have now become better off than they were in Singapore and Malaysia.

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[87] For succinct studies of the struggle of Malaysian Chinese education in response to the local changing political trends, see Tan Liok Ee, *The Politics of Chinese Education in Malaya, 1945–1961* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997) and Tan Liok Ee, 'Chinese Schools in Malaysia: A Case of Cultural Resilience' in Lee Kam Hing and Tan Chee-Beng (eds.), *The Chinese in Malaysia*, pp. 229–54.

Concluding Remarks

For the contemporary Singapore and Malaysian Chinese, as the discussion has shown, the ancestral homeland in China has become less appealing in calls for their economic and social commitments. While they are deeply rooted in all aspects in the countries of residence, their ties with ancestral homeland are weakening, in the forms of remittance, donation, and investment.

During China's reform period that started in 1978, almost all the villages and towns in Guangdong and Fujian have not resumed emigration as they experienced before 1949. In the meantime, most countries in Southeast Asia have not reopened to receive immigrants from China. While Malaysia appears not welcoming Chinese migrants, Singapore only takes in those professionals and students who primarily arrived from places other than the two provinces. With these developments taking hold, it is unlikely to foresee revitalization of the relations with the traditional *qiaoxiang* areas in China. When the new talented and better-educated migrants congregate in numbers large enough in Singapore and maintain close ties with their homeland in China, the scenario will demonstrate new features as the content and magnitude of the relations are likely to be different from the ones the Chinese coolies had before 1949. In fact, how Greater China could incorporate Chinese diaspora, economically and socially, has always been a question subject to different contexts and interpretations.[88]

The rise of China may lead to renewed pride among the ethnic Chinese in Singapore and Malaysia towards Chineseness, but not necessarily to a specific ancestral village in the mainland. Recent years have seen many Singapore and Malaysian Chinese tapping the emerging China market by working in the cities like Beijing and Shanghai. That would be a new story definitely different from the traditional *qiaoxiang* history. For these 'overseas Singaporeans and Malaysians,' the real '*qiaoxiang*' is Singapore and Malaysia where they were born, grew up and still have families.

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[88] The present general view is that Greater China includes mainland China, Hong Kong, Macau, and possibly Taiwan. Nevertheless, whether or not Chinese diaspora should be included in such concept is still a subject of debate. See Wang Gungwu, 'Greater China and the Chinese Overseas,' *China Quarterly* No. 136 (December 1993): 926–48.

Appendix 1: *Panyu Associations in Singapore and Malaysia*

	State/ Country	Location	Name of Association	Founded in	Address
1	Singapore	New Bridge Road	Singapore Panyu Association 新加坡番禺会馆	1878	281, New Bridge Road, Singapore
2	Singapore	Oxford Street	Singapore Panyu Mude Association 新加坡番禺慕德乡会	1851	39, Oxford Street, Singapore
3	Kuala Lumpur	Kuala Lumpur	Selangor Panyu Association 雪兰莪番禺会馆	1926	404, Jalan Pudu, 55100 Kuala Lumpur
4	Penang	Penang	Penang Panyu Association 庇能番禺会馆	1819	330-A, Chulia Street, Penang
5	Perak	Teluk Intan	Nan-Pan-Shun Association, Teluk Intan 安顺南番顺会馆	1910	69, Market Street, Teluk Intan
6	Perak	Kampar	Nan-Pan-Shun Association, Kampar 金宝南番顺会馆	1933	120, Jalan Gopeng, 31900 Kampar
7	Perak	Tronoh	Nan-Pan-Shun Association,Tronoh 端洛南番顺会馆		71, Main Road, Tronoh
8	Malacca	Malacca	Panyu Group, Malacca Wuyi Association 乃六申五邑会馆番禺组	1898	10, Goldsmith Street, Melaka
9	Malacca & Johore	Malacca	Malacca-Johore Panyu Association 申柔番禺会馆	1965	13, Jalan Hang Lekir, Malacca

Sources: *Pili Panyu Huiguan chengli wu shi zhounian jinxi jinian ji zhuban di san shi yi jie Panlian Daibiao Dahui jinian tekan* (Special Publication of the 50th Anniversary of Perak Phun Yue Wui Kuon and the 31th Anniversary of the Federation of Phun Yue Associations) (Ipoh: Perak Phun Yue Wui Kuon, 1984), p. 67; *Malaixiya huaren shetuan cidian* (Dictionary of Chinese Guilds and Associations in Malaysia) (Kuala Lumpur: Mace Research Corporation Sdn. Bhd., 1980), pp. 143 & 208.

Appendix 2: *Gaozhou Associations in Singapore and Malaysia*

	State/Country	Location	Name of Association	Founded in	Address
1	Singapore	Kallang	Guangxi & Gaozhou Association 广西暨高州会馆	1883	142A, Sims Avenue, Singapore 387404. Tel: 7426609/7426442. Fax: 7495547
2	Kuala Lumpur	Kuala Lumpur	Malaysia Gaozhou Association 乃来西亚高州总会	1949	272, Jalan Pudu, 55100 Kuala Lumpur. Tel: 03-2414843. Fax: 2459760
3	Selangor	Kuala Kubu Bahru	Kuala Kubu Bahru Gaozhou Association 新古毛高州匾乡会	1938	68, Jalan SS2/53, 47300 Petalingc Jaya, Selangor. Tel: 03-8073101
4	Selangor	Kundang	Kundang Gaozhou Association 根登高州会馆	1946	49-A, Pangkalan Kundang, 48020 Kundang, Selangor. Tel: 03-6041023
5	Selangor	Rawang	Rawang Gaozhou Association 万挠高州会馆	1948	2-B, Jalan Silang, 48000 Rawang, Selangor. Tel: 03-6916731
6	Perak	Gopeng	Gopeng Gaozhou Associaiton 务边高州会馆	1947	51-53, (1st Floor) High Street, 31600 Gopeng, Perak. Tel: 05-3592046
7	Perak	Tanjung Malim	Gaozhou Association, Ulu Bernam, Tanjung Malim 丹绒乃林吁鲁安南高州会馆	1947	76, Jalan Besar, Ulu Bernam, Ulu Selangor, Tanjung Malim, Perak. Tel: 05-4594917. Fax: 05-4596248
8	Perak	Bidor	Bidor Gaozhu Association 美罗高州会馆	1947	14, Market Street (2nd Floor), Bidor, Perak. Tel: 05-4341177
9	Perak	Sungai Siput	Sungai Siput Gaozhou Association 和丰高州会馆	1947	154 Spg Jalong, 31100 Sungai Siput, Perak. Tel: 05-5984033

Appendix 2: *cont*.

	State/Country	Location	Name of Association	Founded in	Address
10	Perak	Sungkai	Sungkai Gaozhou Association 宋溪高州冚乡会	1947	C-46, Jalan Kelab, 35600 Sungkai, Perak. Tel: 05-4386236
11	Perak	Kampar	Kampar Gaozhou Association 金宝高州会馆	1949	164 (Tingkat 2), Jalan Gopeng, 31900 Kampar, Perak. Tel: 05-4651353
12	Perak	Taiping	North Perak Gaozhou Association, Taiping 北霹雳太平高州会馆	1950	639 V, Pokok Assam, 34000 Taiping
13	Perak	Tanjung Rambutan	Bercham Gaozhou Association 巴占高州冚乡会	1979	364, Kampung Bercham, 31400 Ipoh, Perak. Tel: 010-55655534
14	Perak	Ipoh	Perak Gaozhou Association 霹雳高州会馆		76, Jalan Leong Boon Swee, 30000 Ipoh, Perak. Tel: 03-2420406
15	Negri Sembilan	Seremban	Negri Sembilan Gaozhou Association 森美兰高州会馆	1926	178, Tingkat 4, Jalan Tuaku Munawil, 70000 Seremban, Negri Sembilan. Tel: 06-7626872
16	Negri Sembilan	Bahau	Bahao Gaozhou Association 乃口高州会馆	1957	106, Jalan Gurney, 72100 Bahau, Negri Sembilan. Tel: 06-4541103. Fax: 06-4546275
17	Johore	Kluang	Johore Gaozhou Association 柔佛州高州公会	1940	1, Tingkat 3, Jalan Mengkibol, 86000 Kluang, Johor. Tel: 07-7712642. Fax: 07-7724900
18	Johore	Bekok	Bekok Gaozhou Association 彼咯高州冚乡会	1941	72, Gunong Street, 86500 Bekok, Johore. Tel: 07-9222024/ 9221229

Appendix 2: *cont*.

	State/ Country	Location	Name of Association	Founded in	Address
19	Johore	Jemaluang	Jemaluang Gaozhou Association 冉罗宏高州会馆	1952	8-H, Jalans Mersing, Jemaluang, 86180 Mersing, Johore. Tel: 07-7921295/7921591
20	Johore	Tampin	Gui-Gao-Shuang Association 桂高泷联谊会	1979	202, Kampung, Tampin, Johore
21	Pahang	Raub	Raub Gaozhou Association 劳勿高州会馆	1940	56, Tingkat Satu, Jalan Tun Razak, 27600 Raub. Tel: 09-3551070. Fax: 09-3551070
22	Pahang	Kuantan	Kuantan Gaozhou Associaiton 彭亨关丹高州会馆	1947	E2328, 2nd Floor, Jalan Wong Ah Jang, 25100 Kuantan. Tel: 09-5139671
23	Pahang	Bentong	Bentong Gaozhou Association 彭亨文冬高州会馆	1958	1, Jalan Chui Yin (Top Floor), 28700 Bentong, Pahang. Tel: 09-2221321. Fax: 09-2221321
24	Kedah	Kulim	Kulim Gaozhou Association 吉打居林高州会馆	1947	287-M, Jalan Aman, 09000 Kulim, Kedah. Tel: 04-4905623/4904692

Source: *Xinjiapo Guangxi ji Gaozhou huiguan qingzhu chengli 117 zhounnian jinian ji xin huishuo dasha luocheng kaimu dianli tekan* (Special Publication of the 117th Anniversary and Opening Ceremony of New Premise of the Singapore Guangxi and Gaozhou Association) (Singapore: Singapore Guangxi and Gaozhou Association, 2000), pp. 153–4; Chen Yingyi, *et al*. (eds.), *Maoming shizhi* (The Annals of Maoming City), Vol. 2 (Zhengzhou: Shenghuo Dushu Xinzhi Sanlian Shudian, 1997), p. 1758. Chen Qizhu, *et al*. (eds.), *Xinyi xianzhi*, pp. 992–4; *Malaixiya huaren shetuan cidian*, (Dictionary of Chinese Guilds and Associations in Malaysia)(Kuala Lumpur: Mace Research Corporation Sdn. Bhd.), pp. 90, 178, &181.