

But this leader-oriented approach tends to direct attention away from the party as an institution and toward the general history of the USSR. *Lenin's Legacy* has very little to say about the structure and internal dynamics of the CPSU, and this is disappointing in a series devoted to, and entitled, "Histories of Ruling Communist Parties." The book offers some basic data on party membership through the years and a few bits on structure, but the emphasis is on high-level politics and general history. For example, the discussion of the collectivization of agriculture is more or less what one might find in any short textbook, except that the most specific reference to the role of the party seems to be erroneous. (If there is evidence that the Central Committee actually met in January 1930 and approved the all-out drive, this should be documented.) There is a good deal here and there on the foreign policy of the Soviet state (for example, Stalin and the eve of the war, Khrushchev and the Cuban missile crisis), but next to nothing on the Comintern (not even listed in the index), even though Wesson grants that Lenin attached great importance to it. Given the statutory subordination of the Soviet Communist Party to the Comintern and the reverse subordination in practice, this is a puzzling omission.

Lenin's Legacy is a readable and up-to-date synthesis of writings in English. Judging by the bibliography and 662 footnotes, only a few works in other languages were consulted and only one work in Russian. Interpretative originality is not the main thrust of the book. Its main departure from earlier works occurs in the fairly extended discussion of German financial aid to Lenin during World War I. Wesson goes further than the various writers who accept that such assistance did occur and even constituted a significant advantage for the Bolsheviks in 1917. He believes that the German government successfully influenced Lenin's policies and in particular induced him to sign the Treaty of Brest Litovsk, which was contrary to any reasonable perception of Soviet interest. Wesson even seems to suggest that Lenin's cultural Germanophilia led him to favor a German victory (p. 58). This is not persuasive. Wesson nowhere maintains that Lenin was other than a sincere Marxist revolutionary, and he states that, in the case of a German victory, the latter "certainly would not have permitted the continued existence of a Bolshevik neighbor in truncated Russia, treaty or no treaty" (p. 86). What, then, does he believe Lenin's calculation to have been in February 1918?

The short section on the Brezhnev administration, only thirty-five pages long, reflects the scant and uninspired literature on this period. Like other writers, Wesson has had trouble finding a focus or pattern in the years since 1964 in the USSR, and the chapter rambles somewhat.

Lenin's Legacy contains tables showing Politburo and Secretariat membership in 1977, party membership since 1905, ethnic composition, percent of female membership, age distribution, social status, number of local party organs, educational level of party members, and a curious one-page essay, "Women in the Party," along with a rather short "Bibliographical Note."

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THE SOVIET UNION. Edited by *R. W. Davies*, with the assistance of *Denis J. B. Shaw*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978. 191 pp. Illus. \$14.75, cloth. \$7.50, paper.

This textbook is a handsome contribution to undergraduate education. Intended to introduce students to the Soviet Union, it contains chapters from a *kollektiv* of British experts on the Soviet Union in the social sciences, humanities, and even science. Chapters are integrated so that no undesirable overlap destroys the book's unity, but each retains the special style and quirky interests of its author. Authors and

topics include Denis Shaw (geography), Maureen Perrie (the Revolution), R. W. Davies (politics, industrialization), M. V. Glenny (foreign policy), Moshe Lewin (Communist Party), David Lane (social classes in a Marxist schema), N. J. Dunstan (education), R. Amann (science and technology), T. J. Grayson (the factory), R. E. F. Smith (farms), and G. S. Smith (literature and art). All authors except one are from the University of Birmingham in England. The book includes a number of excellent photos and maps, contributed by Dr. Shaw.

The book has several drawbacks as a text for beginning students, none serious but all deserving the attention of a potential user. A number of important topics, such as the judicial system, are omitted. The book's brevity is commendable, however, and it gives the instructor ample freedom to add a pet interest, be it a novel, a film, or a special treatise. The vocabulary is mildly British; in the chapter on education, Dr. Dunstan writes of forms not grades, of streaming not tracking. Students who are only mildly literate or sophisticated will be puzzled. Chapter bibliographies emphasize British sources, many not readily available in libraries in the United States. This is unfortunate, because the bibliography is a useful pedagogical aid.

The availability of this text should nudge academics to offer a broad survey of contemporary Soviet affairs to students whose majors allow few electives. The Soviet Union is not only an important country but also a challenge to our established order and ideology. Although its aspirations and unresolved problems often resemble our own, its methods stir up controversy among Marxists and non-Marxists alike. This book encourages that controversy but encourages a judgment based on fact.

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THE SOVIET STATE. 2nd ed. By *Ellsworth Raymond*. Introduction by *Stanley W. Page*. New York: New York University Press, 1978 [1968]. xviii, 462 pp. + 8 pp. plates. \$15.00.

Professor Ellsworth Raymond adorns the second edition of his textbook, *The Soviet State*, with vivid anecdotes and memorable portraits. But for all its color, the work deserves caveats. Without a dominant focus, it appears arbitrary, disjointed, and superficial. No integrating theme sustains the reader through the successive chapters on geography, ideology, history, government, economy, and foreign policy. Moreover, in the absence of a limiting principle, there seems to be no justification for excluding anything from the book. In addition, *The Soviet State* is unscholarly. On the one hand, it slights the general issue of how one can know about Soviet society. On the other, when postulating particular interpretations of Soviet reality, it scrimps on documentation. For example, the average chapter has but one textual footnote; and tabular footnotes, when present, tend to be overly general (such as, "Source: *Moscow News*, 1976").

The effect of such practices can be illustrated with respect to the one area where Raymond could have made his greatest contribution to knowledge: in chapter nineteen, in which he contends that military considerations outweigh all other considerations in the economy, he also argues that Soviet industry is mobilized for future war. Although he refrains from analyzing the war contingencies for which this mobilization may be intended or from making recommendations for a U.S. response, he does provide many details of this "little known" peacetime mobilization. Thus, he describes the attachment of military personnel to each economic organization, specialized war production colleges for military and civilian personnel, and dual civilian and military (Jekyll and Hyde) production capabilities at industrial enterprises. While all of this may be true, one hesitates to take it seriously, given the absence of supporting evidence. Where Raymond postulates industrial mobilization, he should have documented it.