

of qualification. In Aronson's view the press, rather than being a vigorous critic of government, has become a voluntary servant of established power—principally by propagating cold war anticommunism, which is a device of the master class to stifle opposition and to protect its corporate profits. Citing the Wallace campaign, the Hiss and Rosenberg cases, his own experiences as editor of the *National Guardian*, the McCarthy witch hunts, the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis, and the Korean and Vietnam wars, Aronson shows the press's involvement in the anti-Communist crusades of the cold war and demonstrates that the press is far from an unfettered governmental critic. All this, however, fails to sustain the larger point. Aronson's subject requires and deserves more careful treatment.

PHILIP S. GILLETTE
Rutgers University

OUR OWN PEOPLE: A MEMOIR OF "IGNACE REISS" AND HIS FRIENDS. By *Elisabeth K. Poretsky*. London: Oxford University Press, 1969. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1970. x, 278 pp. \$7.95.

THE CANARIS FILE. By *C. Amort* and *I. M. Jedlicka*. Translated from the Czech, with a preface, by *Roger Gheysens*. London and New York: Allan Wingate, 1970. 158 pp. £1.75.

The leading spokesman of the United Secretariat, Fourth International, wrote the following item: "Ignace Reiss (Ludwig), communiste polonais, héros de la guerre civile pendant la révolution russe; un des principaux dirigeants des services spéciaux de l'Union soviétique; en 1936, à la suite du premier [procès de Moscou], rompt avec le stalinisme, renvoie ses médailles en déclarant: 'Je rejoins Trotsky et la IV^e Internationale'; assassiné quelques semaines plus tard aux environs de Lausanne par le Guépéou" (Pierre Frank, *La quatrième internationale*, Paris, 1969, p. 128). This brief identification summarizes the career of a Soviet intelligence agent, born Ludwik Poretsky in a small Galician town near the Austro-Hungarian border. He joined the Polish Communist Party in 1919 but soon began operating throughout Western Europe. His widow has written the memoirs.

This is more than the life story of "Ignace Reiss," because Mrs. Poretsky herself visited Moscow during the early stages of the Great Purge. Her conversations with many friends, who expected arrest at any moment, show an empathy for the fatalism prevalent among persons who had dedicated their lives to communism only to be executed or disappear into a forced labor camp. The book is well annotated with descriptive footnotes and explanations of events that are otherwise difficult to understand.

If Poretsky-Reiss had remained in the Soviet intelligence service, he probably would have become a member of the "Red Orchestra" so well portrayed by Gilles Perrault in *L'orchestre rouge* (Paris, 1967, p. 576), which performed important espionage missions for the USSR in German-occupied Western Europe during the Second World War. Another group operated from neutral Switzerland, according to Alexander Foote (pseud.), *Handbook for Spies* (London, 1949, p. 190). And a third Soviet espionage ring existed in the Far East, headed by a German Communist (see Charles A. Willoughby, *Shanghai Conspiracy: The Sorge Spy Ring*, New York, 1952, p. 315). Arrested by the Japanese and held more than three years in prison, Richard Sorge was executed on November 7, 1944, in Tokyo.

The title of the second book, written by two Czechs, is misleading, because the book describes the activities of an *Abwehr* agent named Paul Thümmel who provided Czechoslovak intelligence with classified information from February 1936 until his arrest in March 1942 by the Gestapo. He, like Sorge, was executed after three years' imprisonment, only a few days before he would have been liberated from the Terezin concentration camp. Whereas the motives of a Poretsky or a Sorge do not represent much of a problem, those of Thümmel are more complex. An old-guard Nazi, awarded the NSDAP gold medal, he had joined the German intelligence service in 1928. Although he received money for his services, there must have been other reasons why Thümmel worked for the Czechs and indirectly for the Allies.

Amort and Jedlicka throw some light on relations between the *Abwehr*, headed by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, and the Gestapo, which wanted to assume all foreign intelligence functions (for the Soviet version, see D. E. Melnikov and L. B. Chernaiia, *Dvulikii Admiral: Glavar' fashistskoi razvedki Kanaris i ego khoziaeva*, Moscow, 1965, pp. 108–14). According to the authors of the book under review, the Thümmel case was used by the Gestapo with good results in this struggle. Canaris himself was executed on April 9, 1945, having been implicated in the July 20 attempt on Hitler's life.

RICHARD F. STAAR
The Hoover Institution

EAGLES EAST: THE ARMY AIR FORCES AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1941–1945. By *Richard C. Lukas*. Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1970. ix, 256 pp. \$10.00.

This is a useful study, sketching in fair detail the story of American supply of military aircraft to the Soviet Union under Lend Lease, and the use of Soviet bases by American bombers. The author has evidently had access to much—though apparently not all—of the relevant information in the field. The book is weak on sources and coverage of tangential subjects, and to a much lesser extent also on the basic subject at hand, because general bibliographies covering such subjects as Soviet military affairs have not been used. One consequence is that such mythical sources as “Colonel Kalinov” and “Captain Krylov” are cited as if they were valid. Apart from rendering the first chapter weak and unreliable, these shortcomings do not on the whole dilute the basically sound and careful use of pertinent sources in the major part of the book.

The study illustrates in many specific ways how American military assistance to the Soviet Union for political and military reasons interacted with other military and a variety of bureaucratic and political problems. As the author notes, “Lend Lease had never been exclusively a response to military need; it was more a demonstration to the Russians of the Western commitment to the anti-Axis alliance.” Similarly, the book brings out the fact that the United States sent aircraft in part to placate the Russians for other disappointments, such as the postponement of a second front in Western Europe in 1942 and 1943.

The Russians, for their part, several times strung the United States along, postponing decisions and commitments to see if the course of events would make it possible to dispense with certain arrangements not to their liking. The Soviets rightly suspected that the Americans were interested in using Siberian airfields in 1941 not only for ferrying aircraft into the Soviet Union but also for possible future U.S. air strikes against Japan. Later the United States explicitly advanced its desire