

and in Poland, and the preparations and course of the revolution itself, both in Galicia and in Cracow. Readers unfamiliar with Polish history will find in this book all the facts necessary for studying the events of 1846.

At the same time, the author is clearly drawn to the main thesis of postwar Polish historiography, namely, that a successful uprising was impossible because of the deep gulf between lord and peasant, that the conspirators were somehow responsible for this failure because they were not sufficiently social-revolutionary, and that the Austrians were responsible for the peasant revolt because they did not protect the lords—including those who rose against the Austrian State—from the peasants. This thesis is very demanding of all participants in the revolt, including the peasants, a circumstance that may suggest to some readers the need for less finger-pointing, and more work on not only the reasons why Poles did not consider themselves Poles in 1846, but on what caused this attitude to change.

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WAGE, PRICE AND TAXATION POLICY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, 1948–1970. By *Jan Adam*. Veröffentlichungen des Osteuropa-Institutes München. Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft series, vol. 15. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1974. 231 pp. DM 66.60, paper.

After a wave of articles and books dealing with Czechoslovak socialist economic development and reforms in a general manner, Professor Adam has given students of East European economics a specific, detailed monograph devoted exclusively to wage, price, and taxation policies in Czechoslovakia during the period 1948–70. This is primarily a case study: the author's intention was to investigate and analyze several stages of wage-price policy adopted by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia after its seizure of power in February 1948. But in a sense, it is also a historical study. Although the first two decades of Czechoslovak socialist development were marked by an extreme degree of egalitarianism, contemporary Czechoslovak economic policy has been aiming at differentiation of wages and salaries. While the period 1948–68 could be described as investment oriented, the years immediately following the 1968 invasion have already shown that Czechoslovakia has definitely entered the stage of consumerism. Finally, although Czechoslovak income policy in 1948–58 more or less reflected well-known Soviet patterns of distribution (for example, the currency reform of 1953), specific Czechoslovak economic problems of the 1960s and 1970s have required a more adequate and sophisticated approach to price and wage regulations.

Professor Adam's monograph is well organized and logically structured. The author begins with a short description of the circumstances that caused both the reconstruction of the Czechoslovak economy after 1948, and the introduction of Soviet-type command management and planning. He then deals exclusively with wage and price policy and its impact on the level of consumption both in the pre-reform (up to 1965) and in the new managerial system (1965–69). Professor Adam's critical examination of the policy of low wages coupled with price reductions between 1953 and 1960 and his discussion of the role of the turnover tax are excellent, but his discussion of intersectoral wage differentials is less satisfying. The problem of *exploitation* of employees in nonproductive sectors and light industry by those engaged in heavy industry should have, at least, been mentioned. Chapters

dealing with price reform in the 1960s and with the impact of wage-price policy on consumption are generally informative. It is a pity, however, that the author does not take into account unofficial redistribution of income—through black market, moonlighting, bribery, and corruption—which substantially alters the final income structure pictured by official statistics. Although there is a lack of exact data necessary for scholarly analysis of these phenomena, a mere comparison of the official wage structure with the structure of final private consumption would indicate that the law of value was acting spontaneously, despite strict control over wage-price relations exercised by Czech planners.

On the whole, Professor Adam's monograph is a valuable contribution to the voluminous literature concerning the postwar Czechoslovak economy. Professor Adam must be given special credit for his impartial approach to the topic, and for a well-balanced evaluation of statistical material.

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THE NATIONALITY PROBLEM IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY: THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER VAIDA TO ARCHDUKE FRANZ FERDINAND'S CHANCELLERY. Edited by *Keith Hitchins*. *Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas*, 18. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1974. xviii, 188 pp. 48 Dglds.

Professor Hitchins, author of *The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 1780–1849* (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), has assembled—from the Nachlass Franz Ferdinand in the Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna—a collection of letters, written between 1906 and 1910, from Alexander Vaida Voievod to the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne and his associates. In preparing the sequel to his fine study of Transylvanian nationalism, the editor has furnished us with sources cited by Leo Valiani in his recent book, *The End of Austria-Hungary* (New York, 1973), and has fully described the efforts by Rumanian middle-class leaders of Hungarian-ruled Transylvania to secure the crown prince's support for the creation of a federated empire. Vaida and his associates affirmed, in this manner, that the three million Rumanians residing in the Dual Monarchy could be accorded national rights denied them by Hungarian landed aristocrats. This volume, which, unfortunately, was not translated from the original German language of the letters and reports, also reveals the naïve hopes placed in the enigmatic archduke by romantically inclined Rumanians, who apparently believed he would rectify centuries of abuse when he succeeded the aged emperor. In addition, Vaida's correspondence points out the incredible myopia of Istvan Tisza and other stubborn Magyar nationalists who, on the eve of the war which was to destroy the Dual Monarchy, could not appreciate the degree of solidarity the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Banat of Temesvar had with their brethren in the Kingdom of Rumania. Dreams of Aurele Popovici (1863–1917), the apostle of federalism, and other loyal Rumanians from Transylvania—including Vaida, a member of the Hungarian parliament—were shattered by bullets at Sarajevo in 1914. Irony triumphed in the end, when Vaida, named premier of Rumania in December 1919, secured the approbation of the Allied Powers for the incorporation of former Hungarian territories into enlarged Rumania—an act he refused to support until 1914.

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