EDUCATION, VALUES AND MIND: ESSAYS FOR R.S. PETERS, edited by David Cooper, *Routledge and Kegan Paul,* 1986, pp. 222, £12.95 (Hardback edition).

Rarely does one find a *festschrift* which really does philosophy. David Cooper's exciting anthology in honour of Professor R.S. Peters is a laudable exception. Cooper has assembled a fascinating collection of essays which honour Peters by doing philosophy in several areas where Peters labored during much of his active and quite productive life. Not only will readers find thoughtful discussions about Peters's highly valued work in the philosophy of education—the area for which he is called the British Founder and who called for 'real philosophy' in education as distinguished from 'undifferentiated mush' (p. 84)—they will learn much about contemporary philosophical discussions on many matters. In this collection, Mary Warnock writes on emotions, Michael Bonnett on Heidegger, John and Patricia White on Alasdair MacIntyre, Alan Montefiore on Kantian formalism, and D.W. Hamlyn on motivation. While some of the reading is a bit heavy-going, nonetheless the layperson interested in philosophical matters will find careful and understandable discussions elucidating important areas of contemporary philosophical work.

Why a *festschrift* for Peters? Paul Hirst notes emphatically that Peters is the pioneer in the philosophy of education in Britain—the Whites further suggest that Peters 'created contemporary British philosophy of education' (p. 170). Influenced by the work of Moore, Ryle and Wittgenstein, Hirst recalls that Peter's '... application of analytical techniques to educational concepts is rightly seen as one of his most important contributions to philosophy of education' (p. 11). Peters brought a rigour and precision to a field often known only as a collection of historical aphorisms on educational theory. As a practicing analytic philosopher—whose work on Hobbes is known independently of his status as a philosopher of education—Peters brought standards of intellectual rigour in its defense of liberal education in democratic societies. In addition to pursuing forcefully what an earlier generation of philosophers called 'conceptual analysis', Peters sought moral content for his education inquiries. For instance, while Peters (influenced by Piaget) generally accepted Kohlberg's theories of moral development, he has been critical of Kohlberg's lack of moral content. On this point, Hirst notes perceptively that 'reinstating character-traits against Kohlberg's emphasis is to restore an Aristotelian stand to both our understanding of morality and its development' ((p. 36). Influenced as he was by Kant and Hegel , Peters argued that educational theories must consider moral development with the goal being the development of a 'rationally autonomous person,' which he defined as a person possessing authenticity and rational reflection—important educational goals, to be sure. Given Peters's Kantian background, Alan Montefiore provides an enlightening critique of where Kantian moral theory might go without the crutch of Transcendental Idealism. Of course, not very far!

Where does Peters's work stand today amid changing concerns of British and American philosophers and changing issues of society? I think one can offer a twofold response. First of all, with the advent, following the publication of MacIntyre's *After Virtue,* of much interest in 'virtue ethics', Peters is often seen as an overbearing rationalist with formalist overtones. John and Patricia White attempt to provide an educational theory transcending Peters's Kantianism by appealing to insights from MacIntyre. Such insights, so the Whites suggest, will get moral philosophy beyond the weak theories of good normally associated with Rawls and Dworkin. Bonnet criticizes Peters's rationality thesis in Heideggerian terms and Warnock, using insights from Sartre and Robert Solomon, demands that the education of the emotions—especially 'hope'—play a more important role than reason alone.

A second response comes amid the dedication of recent British education leaders to vocational training. Perhaps Anthony O'Hear's 'Education and Rationality' is the most critical of this policy. A decade or so ago, Peters once suggested that possibly his own

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0028428900040804 Published online by Cambridge University Press

work demanding reason in education was a 'bit mundane and unexciting' (p. 90). O'Hear minutely analyses recent conservative economic and political thought as exemplified in the writings of von Hayek and Scruton and suggests provocatively how each theory depends upon non-rational themes. These theories based on a lack of reason (so opposed to Peter's own position) conjoined with a conservative political machinery spell, so O'Hear adroitly suggests, trouble for education. One of the most trenchant yet—as an American football quarterback is known to say—'right on the money' passages in the book attacks current educational policy and priorities:

> Given that in our cities particularly, we tolerate large groups of people being written off as superfluous to economic needs, it is hardly surprising that school is seen as itself part of the machinery whereby people are processed as superfluous or not, and I think that this view of school is going to be only reinforced by the current emphasis on education for work, the idea that the installation of computers in classrooms is going to be some sort of panacea and all the rest of the trashy thinking of businessmen dabbling in education and educators reinforcing the prejudices of the very people who have despoiled our town centres and our lives. If school is for work, and there is no work ... (pp. 90—91)

O'Hear strongly suggests that the ideals Peters has stood for so long are neither mundane nor unexciting; rather, given the political climate, their articulation, defense and reinforcement are needed more in the 1980s than earlier.

Mr Cooper is to be congratulated for assembling a fine anthology honouring Professor R.S. Peters. These essays are, for the most part, essays in which philosophy is done and done well. This fact alone is certainly a tribute to Professor Peters, the person known in both Britain and America as the leading exponent and practitioner of analytic philosophy of education.

ANTHONY J. LISSKA

DOES GOD CHANGE? by Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M. Cap., Still River MA: *St Bede's Publications,* **1985 Pp. xxii + 212. £15.25.**
PROCESS THEOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION by Illtyd Trethowan, Still River MA: *St Bede's Publications,* **1985. Pp. xii + 124. £10.15.**

Wittgenstein's aphorism 'theology as grammar' (P1, 373) becomes the more telling as we link it with his insight into grammar embodying distinctions forged by the 'natural history of language'. Weinandy's careful elaboration of the history of a doctrine in *Does God Change?* reveals with startling clarity just how the positions taken interact with one another to reveal in an emerging fashion the distinctions needed to answer Arius' taunt: 'How could he (Logos), being God, become man' (16)?

All of the pressure concentrates on the verb 'become', which cannot bear its ordinary meaning, for if God were to change into man, then the result would not answer to the growing faith in Jesus' divinity. For the articulation of that faith must meet three interlocking requirements: 'God truly *is* man, that it is truly *God* who is man, and that it is truly *man* that God is' (82). Were the becoming to alter either term—divinity or humanity—the last two items would be sacrificed, so one must discover how truly to predicate of God all that Jesus did and suffered without confounding divinity with humanity. Put another way, the simple identity reading of Christian faith in the incarnation (God = man) which provoked charges of idolatry from Jewish and later from Muslim religious thinkers, fairly defined what Christian theologians sought to avoid.

Clearer hindsight can already discern the lineaments of Chalcedon's 'One and the same Christ, Son ... (is) made known in two natures (which exist) without confusion, without change, without division, without separation ... concurring into one *prosopon* and one

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