

SOCIALISM AND HUMANISM

I

In the minds of the leading Marxist theorists of before 1917, the triumph of the proletarian revolution, the socialisation of the means of production and the setting up of centralized planning would inevitably lead to a society organized in such a manner that, after a preliminary phase of democratic dictatorship of the proletariat,¹ the social body would then cease to be divided according to classes and the exploitation of man by man would be abolished. This would subsequently lead to an integration of the major values inherited from middle-class humanism (universality, individual freedom, equality, the dignity of the human person, freedom of expression) so as to endow them, for the first time in the history of humanity, with a

Translated by Edouard Roditi.

¹ *Dictatorship*, insofar as it implies the existence of a proletarian State which applies measures of constraint to the middle class. *Democratic dictatorship*, insofar as this State represents the vast majority of the population and, for the first time in history, applies measures of constraint only to a small and reactionary minority.

quality of authenticity instead of the purely *formal* status that they had previously been granted in a capitalist society.²

True, democratic capitalist societies grant legal recognition to the equality and freedom of all citizens before the law and to the right of each individual to express his ideas freely. But economic inequality not only reduces this equality and the individual's freedom and his freedom of expression to a purely *formal* status inasmuch as the citizens of such a democracy are divided into a minority of the wealthy and a mass of relatively poor workers, but also inasmuch as this poverty deprives the mass of workers of the possibility of really enjoying the freedoms recognized by law³ and of using effectively the right of expressing their ideas publicly.⁴

A socialist society, on the other hand, was expected to reestablish real equality and, in its earliest stage, even to suppress all noticeable differences in wealth, so as thereby to give freedom, equality and human dignity their full meaning. In such a society, exploitation would be abolished, production would be rationally planned and the suppression of production for the market would reaffirm the qualitative nature of the relationship between human beings and goods or other human beings, all of which would make it possible for this society to achieve a synthesis, at a higher level, of the positive elements of the three great forms of society which had preceded it:

- a) the *classlessness* of primitive societies;
- b) the *qualitative relationships* of men with other men and with nature which had characterized pre-capitalistic societies;
- c) the *rationalization* that capitalist society had introduced in privately owned plants and the values of *universality*, equality and freedom which are closely bound to this rationalization.

For all these reasons, the socialist revolution was expected,

² The present study will also appear in a collective volume of studies, by various authors, on the same subject. This volume will be published in English, under the editorship of Erich Fromm, by Doubleday and Co. Inc., New York.

³ Anatole France once made a famous remark: that the law recognizes, both for millionnaires and *clochards* or bums, the same right to sleep beneath the bridges of Paris.

⁴ To do this, one would need enough money to publish a newspaper, to organize meetings, etc.

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in the minds of Marx, Engels and the Marxist thinkers who followed them, to mark the end of pre-history and the transition from the realm of necessity to that of freedom.

This scheme of things, worked out in the nineteenth century, continues moreover to dominate most of socialist thought in our own age. However, the existence, since 1917, first of a single State, then also of several others, which are all endowed with a socialist character and boast of it at the ideological level, although, at the political and social level, they actually function within the framework of a very complex reality, has brought out clearly a more or less striking discordance between, on the one hand, the social, economic and political reality of these societies or State and, on the other hand, the above-mentioned ideological superstructure. To resolve such a discordance should moreover be one of the primary tasks of a truly living socialist philosophy which would seek to operate in those areas of thought where the understanding of reality and the de-mystification of all ideologies are most advanced.

This discordance between reality and ideologies is in itself neither new nor surprising. Great social and political movements have, as a matter of fact, nearly always developed, almost inevitably, somewhat simplified conceptions of the future and of the possibilities of really achieving the values which inspired them. Nearly always, when social reality, once victory had been achieved, proved to be more tangled and complex than the men whose action had created it had been able to foresee, leaders have also appeared to take advantage of such a new situation in order to claim that it corresponded exactly to what the revolutionaries had wished and foreseen and that there was therefore no need to raise any problems.

But progressive thinkers have also always tried to reveal fully the distances that separated such affirmations from reality, to dismantle the machinery which made it possible for a revolutionary ideology to become an apologetic "ideology," and to reestablish between thought and reality the harmony which alone can endow the former with a truly progressive character. Such is, among others, the function that Marx and Engels fulfilled in their relationship to the ideologists of the triumphant middle class, and certainly too the function that all thinkers

who wish to keep the legacy of the great founders of Marxism effective and live should now fulfill in their relationship to:

a) the apologists of the new socialist States which were born of anti-capitalist revolutions,

b) the apologists of the Western capitalist societies which are undergoing an evolution, and

c) the apologists of the societies of the "Third World."

This is why we now face an urgent task, that of liberating ourselves from all the slogans that clutter up the political life and the thought and theory of the socialist movement, so as to be able to return to the kind of analysis of the world's social and political evolution, since 1917, that would be both positive and as exact as possible. Within the framework of this task, we would like to raise today, if only in a somewhat schematic manner, a problem which seems to us to be of particular importance.

If we actually compare the analyses that Marx has left us to the real evolution of both capitalist and socialist societies since, respectively, the end of the nineteenth century and 1917 until today, we feel that such a comparison calls for two very important *corrections* which, though they may appear, at the level of *theory*, to be of a kind that one could integrate easily within the general body of the philosophy of Marx or of the Marxists, would nevertheless require, in *practice*, considerable changes, for socialist action, in its aims and perspectives.

But each of these two corrections concerns, in the Western capitalist societies as well as in those societies which have a socialist character, the problem of relationships between social reality and humanist values.

Let us therefore begin by referring back to the first of the two major analyses of capitalist societies that Marx has left us:

a) the theory of the fetishism of goods or, to use a terminological correction later introduced by Lukacs, of their reification, and

b) the theory of the progressive pauperisation of the proletariat and of its necessary evolution towards an awareness of its own revolutionary role. The first of these two theories has proven to be not only valid but also much more important, in

any understanding of the evolution of the capitalist world in the twentieth century, than Marxist theorists of before 1917 had ever expected. The second of these two theories, however, has now proven more and more to have been rendered obsolete and indeed to have been contradicted by the real evolution of a society which was being modified in some of the essential aspects of its structure.

In spite of his orthodoxy, Lenin was quite characteristically obliged, in order to take into account the social and political reality of his age, to add to the analyses of Marx two very important notions:

a) that the spontaneous evolution of the proletariat leads to the creation of labor-unions and not to that of a revolutionary class, and

b) that there exists, throughout the West, a category of the proletariat which varies in its numerical importance but constitutes a "working-class aristocracy" which is integrated in capitalist society and provides the social foundations for the reformist movement.

To these observations of Lenin which need to be further elucidated and developed before we can understand even the evolution which has occurred in the first half of the twentieth century,⁵ one should add moreover some remarks concerning the changes undergone by Western capitalism since the end of the Second World War.

For lack of opportunity to develop these ideas here at greater length, we must limit ourselves to observing that, as a result of the delay, in the Western capitalist nations, of the revolution which orthodox Marxists had expected much sooner, and thanks too to the experience gained in the great economic slump of 1929-1933 and to the pressure of the expansion of the economic and, consequently, the military power of the USSR and also, as a corollary, of the whole socialist block, the capitalist world has now developed more or less satisfactory devices for economic

⁵ The proletariat of the Western world has some *essentially reformist social layers*, a phenomenon which seems to be due to the fact that the fraction of the Western working-class which has escaped, thanks to the existence of colonial markets and to union action, from the process of pauperization which Marx had predicted and expected has been much larger than Lenin had thought.

self-regulation which allow it to avoid, to a great extent, structural crises of over-production and thus to ensure, in the industrialized nations of the West and quite apart from the existence of markets beyond the limits of the capitalist world, not only a great expansion of productive forces but also a standard of life that constantly rises, though sometimes more rapidly or more slowly, for the great majority of the population, including the working-class.

It may of course be possible for a socialist economy to bring about even faster the expansion of production and the increase of the well-being of the population, but this has not yet been proven beyond doubt and, in any case, socialist action can no longer be founded, in the industrial societies of the West, on the increasing pauperization of the proletariat and on its *necessary* transformation into a revolutionary force.

In these circumstances, such societies are now beginning to follow a social, economic and political evolution which is different from the one predicted by Marx, with other perspectives and other dangers.

Men and, in particular, the workers, are no longer in these societies *necessarily* driven by increasing pauperization to choose the path of socialism. A true socialist world might indeed offer them, which it probably would, certain economic advantages and increased well-being. But they would first have to become aware of this and can scarcely be expected to acquire such an awareness as inescapably and predictably as the Marxist theorists of the nineteenth century once believed. The struggle between capitalism and socialism thus becomes, in these societies, one for domination over the class-consciousness of the workers and of the population as a whole. It is particularly important, moreover, that the infrastructure, far from being of assistance, in this struggle, to the forces of socialism, as Marx and the traditional Marxist's believed, operates on the contrary in favor of integration in the existing social order, as the economic changes which we have just mentioned also determine a very profound social and psychological evolution.

Actually, the evolution of Western capitalist society, if considered at a certain level, far from following a different course from the one foreseen by Marx, as in the case of the

pauperization of the workers, has on the contrary confirmed his analysis to an extent that goes beyond the expectations of nineteenth-century Marxist thinkers, that is to say in terms of the theories of Marx concerning the fetishism of goods.

Marx had indeed demonstrated to what extent the appearance of the market reduces all trans-individual values to something merely implicit by eliminating them from awareness and reducing them progressively to the phenomenological and quantitative aspect of two new properties of inert objects: their value and price, which transform goods into wares. Marx and especially Lukacs, after him, have insisted very much on the passive character that this development of reification imposes on life and on the behavior of individuals who are subjected to those economic laws of a market that acquire the characteristics of a quasi-natural power.

True, on the other hand, the development of production for the market has now created, for the first time in history, the foundations for the insertion of new values within social life and for their subsequent development, values indeed which, including those of equality, freedom and tolerance,⁶ contribute towards the constitution of Western humanism.

Later, however, the shift from a craft society producing for the market to an industrial capitalist society which involves so many economic inequalities, and the organization of production on a hierarchical basis within the plant, have contributed towards weakening these values of humanistic individualism, both in their extension or application and in their intrinsic nature. In

⁶ We feel that the opposition between *tolerance* and *freedom of thought and expression* constitutes one of the main differences between middle-class humanism and socialist humanism.

The very term *tolerance* indeed implies some degree of indifference to error. Born in the realm of religious belief and of faith, it corresponds to the inevitably atheistic and rationalist character of the rising middle-class and thus to a social and economic order which has suppressed trans-individual values. The classical rationalist or empirical middle-class becomes tolerant in religious matters because faith has lost, in its eyes, all of its importance and effective reality.

A socialist humanism which implies, on the other hand, the *right for each man to express freely his convictions* precludes any such indifference to the opinions of others and presupposes a common and permanent effort to find truth and achieve agreement through free, frank and open discussion.

their extension, they have indeed been eliminated from production and limited narrowly within the realm of the actual market to the abstract and peripheral field of law and politics. In their nature, they have likewise been minimized by being granted a purely formal character in opposition to the real content to which they had once applied.

However difficult it may be to contest the validity of these analyses, one must nevertheless admit today that neither Marx nor Lukacs had been able to see to what extent the societies which they were analyzing still maintained, as a result of the mere existence of the liberal market (and, later, of a monopolistic market subjected to very limited State intervention), an area, even very much reduced, of individual activity and of values that could still supply a structure for individual awareness. First, the development of monopolist imperialism, then too, especially after the Second World War, the massive interventions of the State, which were closely related to the appearance of self-regulating devices, eliminated in *reality*, on the other hand, every function or responsibility of individuals as such in production and in the market, thereby emptying the individual's awareness of all its autonomous or immanent context so as to achieve in him a degree of passivity which even the most pessimistic theorist of the early years of our century would have conceived only with great difficulty.⁷

Of course, this increasing passivity of the population creates a very dangerous situation for culture and, in particular, for humanistic culture. It reveals itself moreover in a constant weakening of interest in anything that lies beyond the scope

⁷ These are realities expressed both by the most important writers of our time, from Kafka to the most recent ones such as Beckett, Ionesco, Robbe-Grillet, Adamov, including Sartre in *La Nausée* and Camus in *L'étranger*, and also by sociologists to whom Marxism is as alien as it is to David Riesman, when he observes for instance the shift from a society which is regulated from within to one which is regulated from without. One might, of course, point out the same phenomenon by studying the evolution of modern art. In a brilliant remark, Erich Fromm pointed out the same phenomenon in his contribution to the debates of the Dubrovnik Congress when he declared that there had at first been people who travelled to learn and thus expand their knowledge, then tourists "who took cameras with them, whereas now we have only cameras that travel accompanied by tourists to service them."

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of the consumer-needs of the individual or of his family-unit; at the same time, his standard of living progressively improves, all of which contributes considerably towards the integration of the workers within the existing society and counters their evolution towards socialism.

But the socialists, in such a situation, must face the problem of formulating a program which would be adapted to their need of pursuing a campaign to acquire power over the awareness of individuals at the level of superstructures and political, social and cultural thinking. There are two possible alternatives between which the workers must choose consciously or implicitly in the contemporary Western world. On the other hand, they may choose a technocratic society which reserves powers of decision to a very restricted minority of technocrats who are capable of ensuring, and will probably ensure, a constantly rising standard of living for a great majority of the population, but who will at the same time lead us, if not necessarily, at least most probably, into a dishumanized world of cultural possibilities reduced to a bare minimum. On the other hand, they may choose a socialist and democratic society which is likewise capable of ensuring to the workers a probably equal and perhaps even higher degree of well-being which would also and above all ensure the development of a sense of individual responsibility in the whole population so as thus to create the social and economic foundations for a development of its spiritual and cultural life too.

The whole problem can thus be reduced to one of bringing wage-earners to understand that the path of facility and selfishness may well lead towards integration, but that their own interests and those of their families should inspire them to swim consciously against this stream in order to save both their own dignity and the great cultural values which we inherit from the past.

In conclusion, we can mention only briefly the very important change that such a novel situation implies at the level of political aims and perspectives. It indeed appears to be obvious that the suppression of absolute pauperization, the creation of devices for economic self-regulation and the progressive indifference, passivity and integration of the population as a whole have all contributed

towards stripping of its practical value and its political chances of success the traditional program of a political revolution, both socialist and proletarian, which would be born of poverty or pauperization and would *precede* all major economic changes or transformations.

This is why, in the capitalist societies of the Western world, the only truly realistic socialist program which might have some chances of success is today one of structural reforms⁸ that would analyze clearly and without hesitation or scruple the situation as indicated above, in such a manner as to try to make the workers understand that it is entirely in their interest to demand at first the right to control and then also to manage their plants, rights indeed which alone could assure them, in addition to economic advantages which may vary in importance, an effective participation and responsibility in the major decisions of economic, social and political life as well as an opportunity to

⁸ We had first written "reformist," but discussions with several socialists, especially Italian socialists, led us then to understand that this term might prove confusing. The meaning of words indeed depends on the context in which they are used. In socialist thought of the first half of the twentieth century, discussions thus occurred concerning the two concepts of *reform* and *revolution*, the former meaning mainly an adjustment of more or less important details within the capitalist régime while the latter meant the change of the capitalist régime into a socialist one through civil war, the seizure of power by the proletarian parties and the setting up of the dictatorship of the proletariat which would, among other things, socialize the means of production. But we are now concerned with a third concept which can be identified with neither of these two other concepts.

This new concept consists in the idea of a transition to worker-management which can be achieved progressively in one sector after another and yet implies the possibility of more or less acute conflicts, though without the necessity of a civil war preceding such economic changes nor a synchronic transformation of society as a whole. At one time, however, such a transition might of course involve a particular nation in civil war, but might also, in other nations, be achieved without such expenditure.

Actually, such a process is analogous, in its general lines, to the one which led to the transformation of feudal society into capitalist society, a gradual economic transformation which was sometimes accompanied by civil war (in England or France), but which, in other nations, was also achieved with some conflict, of course, but without any violent revolution. One therefore has the choice of calling such a transformation a *reform* or a *revolution*, but should nevertheless be careful, in either case, to state that the term used has a meaning which is different from what it had in Marxist literature of the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth.

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play an active part in the development of a truly humanist culture.

We thus reach a conception of a path which would lead to socialism and be analogous to the path followed by the middle class in feudal society. Along such a path, economic transformations would be gradual and peaceful, though born of conflict, and would thus precede a potential political revolution which, besides, would no longer be in all cases inevitable, as can be seen from the case of the rise to power, in nineteenth-century Germany, of the middle class.

II

If we now progress to the other side of our analysis, we are obliged to observe that the evolution of those societies which have a socialist character has also proven to have been extremely complex and, above all, different from what had been foreseen or predicted in a necessarily schematic and summary manner by the creators of Marxism.

The differences between these predictions and reality are numerous, but this should not be at all surprising since no theorist, however great a genius he may be, can find, outside of empirical and concrete experience, anything but a very summary and general scheme of reality, which poses, however, no major problem as long as such a scheme of reality, however general it may be, corresponds to the latter's essential structures.

In the philosophy of Marx, Engels and the Marxists who followed them, the socialist and, above all, communist society of the future was expected, thanks to the socialization of the means of production and the setting up of planned production, to make it possible to achieve, as we have already stated, a society which would be capable of bringing together the positive qualities of the three great forms of social organization that are characteristic of what Marxists have sometimes called the "pre-history of humanity," that is to say:

a) *the suppression of social classes and of man's exploitation by man*, which humanity had already known in primitive societies, though at a level of *extreme poverty*;

b) *the qualitative and not yet reified character of inter-human relations and of relations between man and nature*, which had characterized, in a *barbaric and unjust* manner, pre-capitalist and essentially traditional forms of the organization of production and distribution;

c) the two great contributions of production for the market and especially of capitalist production:

1. *the rational organization of production* and the rapid development of productivity that it brings about and ensures; capitalist society had originally introduced this rationalization in its own plants, but not yet in relationships between them and production as a whole, whereas the socialist society of the future was still destined to extend the application of rationalization to the whole field of the production of goods;

2. *the humanist values*, born and developed in Western society parallel to the appearance and development of production for the market, especially the values of universality, equality, individual freedom and, as part of the latter, freedom of expression.

It is obvious that a society founded on true community and real freedom would then be achieved as a result of the simultaneous application, for the first time in history, of the following characteristic principles: the abolition of exploitation, the suppression of class distinctions, the establishment of qualitative relationships between men and nature, the rational organization of production and, together with a great expansion of productivity, real universality, equality and freedom.

In describing this program, we must here be allowed to digress and analyze the meaning and nature of the two main transformations which production for the market has brought about in the structure of social life: the appearance of individualist values and the rationalization of the process of production. On these two points, the shift from the urban society, which produced goods in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, to capitalist society, and subsequently to the latter's imperialist phase and on to contemporary organizational capitalism, has had strictly contradictory effects.

As far as the *rationalization* of production is concerned, this evolution has indeed represented a *continuous progress*

throughout the four above-mentioned phases of production for the market, each one of these representing a higher level of rational organization of productive forces within the plant or enterprise, which meanwhile acquired increasingly vast proportions, while at the same time no rational organization of the productive economy as a whole was yet attempted.

In this respect, the leading Marxist thinkers have often believed that the socialization of the means of production, which they conceived as closely bound to global and centralized planning, was but a continuation, implying perhaps a qualitative leap forward, of the progression of rationalization of productive forces as it had already become apparent throughout the stages of the mediaeval craft-market, of liberal and of imperialist capitalism.

Inversely, in the development of individualist values (freedom, equality and individual dignity), the shift from a craft-society to capitalist society represented, as we have already pointed out, a considerable shrinking of their area of application and, above all, their essential deterioration, since they now tended to be reduced to the status of purely *formal* realities which the real *content* of social life contradicted, however much these values sought to conceal this real content so that men would not become aware of it. To this shrinking and economic and social deterioration corresponded moreover, at the cultural level, the deterioration of the humanism of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance too, as well as of that of the French eighteenth century and of the German nineteenth century, the two ages of the revolutionary or progressive middle-class. Instead, a new pseudo-humanism, a by-product of official pseudo-culture, profited by this whole evolution, whereas the real humanism of the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth began to adopt an oppositional and anti-bourgeois character.

In this respect, a socialist society was expected to represent not so much a continuation of the evolution from a craft-society to liberal and then imperialist capitalism as, on the contrary, a return to the traditional values of Western humanism, but at a level which should allow them at last to acquire a real content and thus be assured of their integral reality; this should be all

the more true because these individualist values, in the society of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as well as in German idealism of the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, had still been bound to the trans-individual and qualitative values of earlier cultures which production for the market had not yet destroyed, whereas the deterioration of individualist values, in capitalist society, had been further precipitated by the progress of their reification and by the almost total disappearance of these older trans-individual values.

Socialist society was thus expected to restore and further develop the tradition of the values of Western humanism, since it would not only strip them of their merely formal character by suppressing all exploitation and class-distinctions, but also insert them in and bind them organically to a community both truly human and fully conscious of those trans-individual values which would thus be liberated at last from the heavy handicaps that poverty and exploitation had imposed in the pre-capitalist periods of history.

In this general perspective, we may here be allowed to formulate a few considerations on the concept of freedom. It is probably quite reasonable to conceive history as a progression of societies which tend towards increasing freedom. In the present state of terminology and of controversy concerning this problem, it nevertheless appears important to stress the existence of two different contents which are partly, but only partly, complementary too. For these contents, we have not been able to find adequate French terms. In the course of a congress held in Dubrovnik, they had however been designated, in a discussion, both in English and in German as *liberty to* or *Freiheit zu* and *liberty from* or *Freiheit von*.⁹ We must therefore remain content

⁹ At a certain point, the discussion was concentrated on a specific example which we find useful to quote here. One of the participants had defined freedom only as freedom from legal shackles, in fact as *liberty from*, thereby proving himself faithful to the rational philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment. He quoted as an example of his view the fact that all citizens are free or not free to enter or not enter a library. We then replied that, in addition to this indisputably real and valuable freedom, there exists another freedom, *liberty to*, meaning freedom to build libraries which, it is important, of course, that everybody will later be free to enter. We then had to reject the proposal made by the speaker, to maintain the term *liberty to* designate as *liberty from* the right to enter the library,

here to designate these two concepts somewhat vaguely as "collective freedom" and "individual liberties," on condition that it be well understood that this terminology is but a makeshift and that every increase of collective freedom or of *liberty to* must also have an individual character, just as every increase or decrease of individual freedom or *liberty from* has likewise a collective character.¹⁰

If these terminological niceties are found acceptable, we can then consider that the increase of "collective freedom" is a feature which, together with, of course, some interruptions or even regressions, characterizes the whole of humanity's historical evolution, and that this very increase of freedom allows us to speak of progress in history. The materialist conception of history, which has now been confirmed by a whole body of psychological research on which we are not free to insist here, is founded moreover on the belief that man can be defined by his effort to invent constantly new conceptual or material instruments to allow him to become more and more master of his surroundings, whether natural or social, so that all other psychological structures, including man's values, must always be adapted to this requirement.

Individual freedom or *liberty from*, on the other hand, remains a *specific* value which first makes its appearance at a given point in history and represents only one stage, in fact only *one* of the many possible structures within history conceived as progress in collective freedom. It remains indeed a characteristic of a few particular periods in the history of the Western world, in ancient Greece, in ancient Rome too, to some extent, and above all in the development of Western society after the

but to use the term *power* to designate *liberty to*, meaning the freedom to build libraries. Our reason for rejecting this proposal is very important: in current linguistic usage, the term *power* designates the power to *destroy* all libraries, in fact to counter the whole progress of freedom, as well as the power to *build* libraries.

¹⁰ For the same reasons, the terms *positive freedom* and *negative freedom* also prove to be incorrect, since each one of these various freedoms has both a negative aspect (its progress implying the suppression of certain shackles) and a positive aspect (its progress implying the possibility of doing certain things which had not been previously possible).

appearance of its cities in the Middle Ages and until the twentieth century. It thus constitutes exactly that to which we refer as "individualistic humanism," meaning the affirmation of the autonomy of individual conscience within historical progress conceived as the development of collective freedom and of mastery over nature, though this autonomy is also in serious danger, as we have previously stated, of being emptied from within as a result of the forms that Western society, after having previously ensured its development, is adopting today.

Actually—and we have been able to understand this thanks to Marxism—the development of Western humanist values has been closely bound to the development of production for the market. But this connection has always been of a dialectical and contradictory nature because, at the cultural level, such values appeared to be all the more elaborate and radical when the character of the market itself was more individualistic, in terms of craft-production or of liberal capitalism, but at the same time the appearances of these individualistic forms of production for the market coincided with those periods when the latter was less developed and when the values that were related to it could not develop to the point where they might impose a structure on the whole organization of society. Later, the great development of production for the market, in the periods of imperialist capitalism and of contemporary organizational capitalism, suppressed for most men any active or responsible participation in economic life by making responsibility a privilege of a particular and limited social group, that of the technocrats, rather than a characteristic of the individual in himself; and this emptied individualism and even the humanist values of all their contents from within.

But the philosophy of Marx and Engels and of all the Marxist thinkers who followed them has developed, as has been stated often enough, within the general framework of Western humanism, whether in its Christian or its rationalist and atheist forms. However radical their critique of religion may have been, especially of the Christian and Jewish religions, however strong too their opposition to bourgeois society, their philosophy continued to develop along the lines of pure humanism, still reaffirming the values of individual freedom, freedom of ex-

pression, universality and equality. As dialectical thinkers, however, they had to consider and accept the necessity of periods of dictatorship as unavoidable but transitory stages along the path towards the authentic and integral attainment of these values. At the philosophical level, this poses again the whole classical problem of Evil and of its positive and progressive function in history as the only available means for the achievement of Good. To refer back to Goethe, man must sell his soul to the Devil in order to reach God; but the Devil is not God and the socialist philosophers at no time accepted dictatorship, even that of the proletariat, or its limitations of freedom and equality as a fundamental and lasting value in their philosophical systems.

Without going into details, it is nevertheless obvious to all serious-minded theorists that, at first in the USSR and later in a great number of nations which have adopted socialist forms, a considerable bureaucratic apparatus has developed, together with a society, in intellectual, social and political fields, in which the values of Western humanism, of freedom, especially freedom of expression, and of equality, have been allowed until now and are still allowed only a very reduced scope.

Descriptions of Stalinism and of the present situation in China and in some other Popular Democracies are numerous enough and deal with facts which are already too well known for us to need to comment on them here. There remains however, for the theorist, a problem which is the most important of all: that of explaining this whole phenomenon and the reasons which, at least in theory, might explain how so considerable a discrepancy has occurred, on essential points of doctrine, between the predictions of Marx and the Marxists of before 1917 and the actual realities of socialist societies, as they have now developed after the revolution.

There certainly exists, in the explanation of this fact in itself or at least of the importance and intensity it has now acquired, an intervention of factors which are connected with economic cycles and are therefore less disturbing than structural factors insofar as, by definition, their nature is transitory or localized. The first communist revolution indeed occurred, because the proletariat of the Western world was already to a

great extent integrated within the capitalist system according to the explicit policies of reformism or to the implicit and oppositional policies of the social-democrat international of before 1914, not, as Marx had expected, in an economically developed society, but in a backward nation which was still facing the problems of the middle-class revolution, such as agrarian reform and the suppression of feudal privileges, but also where the middle classes had already become too reactionnary to solve these problems. Besides, this revolution was facilitated by the 1914-1918 war and by the great nostalgia that the mass of the Russian peasants felt for peace.

This fact has had several consequences, some of them of a transitory, others of a lasting nature. Among these facts, we should note:

a) The backward and predominantly agricultural social structure of Russia after 1917, a structure which has today been outgrown thanks to the rapid industrialization of the USSR during the last fourty-five years;

b) as a consequence of this backward structure, the USSR's military weakness, compared to the surrounding capitalist world, and its subsequent position as a besieged fortress, a none too favorable position for the development of humanist values in general and of individual freedoms in particular.¹¹ Here too, however, the USSR's position as a besieged fortress is today outdated, so that the cultural and political consequences of this position are doomed to disappear more or less rapidly;

c) A lasting conjunctural reality seems to us, however, to have been created, in Tsarist Russia, by the absence, except in the opposition, of a democratic and humanist tradition which might have influenced to a decisive extent either the early years

¹¹ To appreciate the importance of this military situation in the political life of the USSR, we need but mention the obvious connections that any sociological study, however superficial, would reveal between: 1) the defeat of the revolution and the stabilization of capitalism in Germany after 1923 and the elimination of the Trozkyists in the USSR in 1925-27; 2) the break between Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists and the stabilization of a purged Kuomintang in China in 1927 and also the elimination of rightist-deviationists in the USSR in 1928-29; 3) the reestablishment of a balance of power thanks to the development of nuclear weapons and to de-Stalinization.

of the establishment of the first socialist society or its later evolution.

Undoubtedly, had a socialist revolution occurred in a more advanced nation, as Marx had foreseen, none of these three consequences, a backward social structure with a predominantly agricultural economy, military weakness and the lack of a democratic tradition, would have made themselves felt. This observation might indeed account in part for the difference between the view of the future socialist society that Marx proposed and its actual reality in the first decade of its existence.

Quite apart from these *conjunctural* factors which have undoubtedly contributed towards reinforcing the dictatorial character of socialist societies and thus prevented the latter from integrating humanist and liberal values, it remains nonetheless true that another factor, which is of a *structural* nature, may also have contributed to achieve the same results. Our own opinion is that it actually did; of course, insofar as its action might be of a lasting nature and thus threaten to be repeated in every society that has an analogous structure, problems of a far more serious nature are thereby posed to socialist thinkers.

It was indeed Marxist thought that first pointed out clearly that a historical relationship exists between the existence of production for the market and the liberal and individualistic values of middle-class or bourgeois humanism; in fact, a coincidence, peculiar to this particular historical structure, on the one hand, of the progress of man's mastery over nature and society, and of *liberty to*, which characterizes the whole of history, and on the other hand, of a noticeably important development of individual freedoms and of individualistic humanism, that is to say also of *liberty from*.

It was therefore natural and predictable, though neither Marx and Engels nor the later Marxist thinkers ever thought of it, that the suppression of production for the market and its replacement by centralized planning in socialist societies would change in one specific context the direction of this evolution by promoting a great trend in the direction of conformism and of the integration of individuals within their group, together with their acceptance of standards and opinions that this group recognizes and approves.

This is what actually occurred, to an extreme degree which can probably be explained by the fact that this structural trend was strengthened by the action of the three abovementioned conjunctural factors.

In concluding this study, may we now mention the importance, in theory and in doctrine, on the basis of such considerations, of the Yugoslav experiment, even if it happens to have been undertaken in a relatively small country. In seeking to react against bureaucratic or Stalinistic centralization, Yugoslavia has integrated to socialist thought the discovery of the fact that the socialization of the means of production does not necessarily imply, as Marx and later Marxists had thought, integral centralized planning and the suppression of the market.

The greatest achievement of Yugoslav Socialist Democracy, *self-management by the workers*, thus constitutes in theory a means of ensuring an effective democracy. It also ensures a considerable socialization of the ownership of the means of production, which makes it possible to suppress the exploitation of man by man and, in any case, of a considerable share of the manifestations of reification; and, at the same time, it ensures the maintenance of a production for the market which can constitute the basis for a real and authentic development of *liberty from* and of humanist values of freedom in general, of freedom of expression in particular, and of individual dignity.

By thus analyzing both the capitalist societies of the Western world and those societies which have a socialist character, one develops one *central* idea: that of *self-management by the workers*, an idea which seems to us to be the only possible foundation for a truly socialist program in the contemporary world. The character of this self-management and the road which must be taken to reach it will of course be different, depending on whether one starts from a capitalist society with a formal democracy, from a dictatorial system like that of Spain, from a socialist society with centralized planning, or from the society of a developing country. Of course, too, the maintenance of the market, even if accompanied by the suppression of private ownership of the means of production, may cause the appearance of important difficulties which can be solved only after first undertaking serious empirical and theoretical studies.

Socialism and Humanism

But these problems go beyond the scope of the present study, the purpose of which had been to point out the connection between the ideas of self-management by the workers, of the maintenance of the market and of the further development of a humanist culture within the framework of a struggle for a socialist future which alone can guarantee the future of man and of civilization.