

significance." While retaining the nationalist movement as one of the predominant factors in the Ukraine's awakening (a fact Professor Rudnytsky has chosen to ignore), I listed and discussed five other factors (four of which Professor Rudnytsky also disregarded in his assessment of my commentary). The six contributing factors were: (1) The nationalist movement. (2) The Ukraine's historical development. (3) The activities of non-nationalist political groups, for example, the Russian Menshevik, Bolshevik, and Social Revolutionary parties. (4) The social, economic, and political effects of German occupation, the Bolshevik invasion, civil war, and Allied intervention. (5) Actions of individual Cossack leaders, determined in part by their Cossack traditions. (6) Peasant *jacqueries*.

In respect to point 6, which was presented in two concluding paragraphs of my commentary, I said: "At least in part, the final years of the awakening of the Ukraine should be viewed as a history of a peasant *jacquerie* that crushed all lesser forces beneath its boots, until, at last, peasants and land were so exhausted that Bolshevism's patient workers were able to slip into power almost unchallenged." This is a strong statement, as I intended it to be, since I firmly believe that the role of the peasants has too often been underestimated and the role of the nationalist movement too often exaggerated. Taken in context, however, the statement obviously does not justify Professor Rudnytsky's extreme oversimplification of my interpretation of the last years of pre-Soviet Ukrainian history.

Since, despite our differences, we are both, I believe, primarily concerned with identifying the factors that have determined the course of modern Ukrainian history and in analyzing their influence up to the final Soviet victory in early 1920, I respectfully suggest that Professor Rudnytsky may wish to consider more carefully than he has the hypotheses I have advanced.

ARTHUR E. ADAMS
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TO THE EDITOR:

Like our capacity to overkill the Russians many times, William Henry Chamberlin repeatedly buries my book *The Cold War and Its Origins, 1917-1960* in his review in your September, 1962, issue.

Though he finds in it "an enormous amount of reference material," there is "so much standing of historical truth on its head" that "Fleming has failed." To prove the enormity of his failure, Chamberlin cites two cases of Fleming's monumental bias. He says: "In the face of overwhelming *circumstantial* evidence [my italics] that only the Russians were in a position to have massacred some 15,000 Polish officer war prisoners in the Katyn Forest" Fleming declares that "the evidence in the case is conflicting."

But note what I really said: "The evidence in the case is conflicting. On balance it indicates that the Russians killed the officers. . . ." Thus my conclusion was that the Russians were guilty. Why did Chamberlin give the opposite impression? Is it credible that he did not read immediately beyond the sentence he wanted to quote? Who is now guilty of standing truth on its head? I invite anyone to read my account of the Katyn affair and judge it for "perspective and objectivity."

But there is worse to come. Chamberlin finds that “the most monstrous among many examples of gross exaggeration” is my characterization of “the feeble, short-lived” Allied intervention in Russia in 1918-19 as “a full-scale effort on the part of the West to stamp out communism at its birth. This effort was pursued until the British and French peoples put a stop to it, and it resulted in the death of 7,500,000 Russians—as many as had died in World War I, but in more horrible ways.” Hardly knowing “where to begin in dealing with such historical nonsense,” Chamberlin cites George F. Kennan as saying that the Americans and Russians “appear” to have had “less than 500 killed” in *North Russia*. Therefore, since there was not “even minor fighting” with the Reds elsewhere, “the number of Russian deaths for which Allied intervention *with armed forces* is responsible shrinks from 7,500,000 to a few hundred . . .” (my italics).

This accords with our cold war view of that period, but it ignores the evidence of many scholars that from 1918 to 1921 the Allies intervened from *all four sides of Russia* to support the Whites against the Reds. *In the East*, the British sent seventy-nine shiploads of equipment to Admiral Kolchak. The Japanese sent 72,000 men and tried to hold much of Siberia. British, French, and American troops were also there. *In the South*, the French sent 140,000 men to the Odessa region and their foreign minister listed a total of 850,000 Allied troops in South Russia, from six nations. The British operated in the Caucasus (William H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921*, II, 167-68) and Churchill told of sending to Denikin’s armies “a quarter of a million rifles, 200 guns, thirty tanks and large masses of equipment,” along with “several hundred British officers and non-commissioned officers, as advisers. . . .” It was this aid which made possible Denikin’s great advance on Moscow. *In the West*, Yudenich’s drive on Petrograd depended on British munitions and American food and gasoline. Then in 1921 the Poles staged an all-out invasion to achieve “the permanent weakening of Russia” by cutting her off from the Baltic and Black seas (Chamberlin, II, 301), and the British and French poured munitions and officers in to save the defeated Poles. *In the North*, British and American troops totaled 37,000. After hard fighting all during the summer of 1919 they managed to disengage, after the Americans had suffered 2,845 casualties and the British had spent \$50,000,000 (George Stewart, *The White Armies of Russia*, New York, 1933, pp. 195-209). I invite anyone who doubts the key role of the Allied interventions in powering the Russian Civil War to read Stewart’s book. It is an unforgettable experience.

All of this evidence, and more, is contained in Chapter 2 of my book. I challenge anyone to read it and conclude that the Allied interventions did not have a great responsibility for the immense casualties and chaos of the Russian Civil War. The reader will find that Chamberlin himself knows, or once knew, this. In his book (II, 171) he maintains that if there had been no intervention, or if it had stopped after the armistice, the Russian Civil War “would almost certainly have ended much more quickly in a decisive victory of the Soviets. Then a triumphant revolutionary Russia would have faced a Europe that was fairly quivering with social unrest and upheaval.” In other words, Chamberlin’s own justification for the interventions admits their magnitude, and their costs for the Soviet peoples.

Something should be added about the extent to which the book has "failed." It is true that several reviewers have treated it in the same way that Chamberlin did, but the consensus of nearly one hundred reviews is strongly positive, as I would be glad to demonstrate. Two examples must suffice here: Dr. Henry L. Roberts, Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University, said in the *New York Times* that "such a book deserves serious treatment and should not be passed by blandly as an 'interesting point of view' or dismissed with abuse..." and Professor Norman Graebner, Head of the History Department, University of Illinois, concluded in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* that "Professor Fleming has placed the burden of proof on his detractors, for they will find it difficult, given the fog that continues to hover over Soviet intentions, to document with equal profusion any competing concept of the cold war."

The book is being published not only by Doubleday in New York, but by Allen and Unwin in London and by Feltrinelli in Milan, who issued Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago*. Thus, with the aid of repeated printings, three of the leading publishing houses in the West are giving it a world hearing.

Is it not strange that so many highly placed editors and others should have read the book and failed to see that it is "a pretty sorry performance," as Chamberlin alleges?

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MR. CHAMBERLIN REPLIES:

In my opinion, Mr. Fleming's long letter of protest against my review merely compounds the defects of his book: gross errors of fact and interpretation in an apparent effort to make out for the Soviet government a better case than the historical record warrants. By using the expression "conflicting evidence" he suggests an element of doubt about Soviet responsibility for murdering some 15,000 Polish officer war prisoners which is not warranted. If space permitted, I could give half a dozen reasons why only the Russians could have been responsible for the slaughter of these men. Perhaps it may suffice to recall that at the Nuremberg trial of Nazi war criminals an accusation against them as responsible for the Katyn massacre was quietly and shamefacedly dropped.

As regards Allied intervention in Russia in 1918 and 1919 Mr. Fleming merely repeats and adds to the misstatements of fact and gross exaggeration of the significance of this intervention which are characteristic of his book. His figures on intervention in South Russia in 1919 are simply grotesque. At the utmost some 45,000 French and Greek troops moved temporarily into Odessa, Nikolaev, and Kherson—not 850,000. What is more important, they did no fighting of any consequence and scurried away before the disorderly bands of Grigoriev and other Ukrainian guerrilla leaders who were then fighting on the Soviet side. There were no British and French *troops*, as distinguished from military missions, in Siberia. Japanese and American intervention was restricted to a small area of Eastern Siberia, and General Graves, the American commander, was more hostile to the Japanese and to such local reactionary leaders as Semyonov and Kalmykov than to the small,