"Thermidorian" consolidation. His essay, however, is more of a contribution to a description of change than to a *theory* of change.

In my opinion, the outstanding single paper in the volume is T. H. Rigby's fifty-page essay, "Politics in the Mono-Organizational Society." This concept, based on Rigby's earlier distinction between "traditional, market and organizational societies," and later applied in his essay in Robert C. Tucker's volume on Stalinism, seems particularly appropriate for focusing on the common features that distinguish Soviet-type systems—both in their phase of forcible, "totalitarian," transformation and in their postrevolutionary (or, in my language, "post-totalitarian") consolidation—from all systems of the Western type. Introduction of the term "mono-organizational" leads Rigby to a fruitful use of the results of organization theory. Though he gives credit to Alfred G. Meyer for having inaugurated the organizational approach to Soviet studies by his famous analogy with "USSR Inc.," Rigby avoids the major weakness of that analogy—that in a corporation the goals are given, while in the politics of any entire society they are necessarily disputed—by introducing the concepts of "goal ambiguity and conflicting standards." Beyond that, his distinction between a "mechanical" and an "organic" type of bureaucracy—with the organic type prevailing in the party hierarchy as distinct from the state machine—is highly enlightening. Rigby is, of course, very cautious concerning developmental future tendencies, perhaps because the organizational approach is less suited to illuminate ideological and value changes.

Zygmunt Baumann's interesting essay, "The Party in the System-Management Phase," is less fortunate in choice of terms but bolder in approaching the future. "System-management phase" itself is, of course, perfectly clear, but the term "party-nomial system" is a veritable monstrosity. Moreover, he attributes an arbitrary meaning to the familiar Hegelian-Marxist term "civil society." His definition—based on a French interpretation of Gramsci—explains the term as an intermediate space between the political power structure and the everyday behavior of the masses, linked by a belief system; this leads to such sentences as "all civil societies have entered the social system as ideological schemes . . ." (p. 102). But leaving language aside, Baumann is clearly concerned with the vital problems of legitimizing ideologies and value consensus, and he advances the striking thesis that the growth and semitoleration of intellectual dissent is shifting the locus of ideological activity away from the center of political power. That is, it is forcing the ruling elite to renounce its monopoly over ideology and to confine itself to intervening ex post facto, to truncate the ideologies produced by others. He even speaks of a modus vivendi between the regime and this new phenomenon. Although this seems to overstate the present situation, it is true that there are significant links between elements of the ruling elites and the main currents of the dissenting intelligentsia—both the "liberalizing" and Westernizing tendencies on the one side and the neo-Slavophile and ultranationalist ones on the other—and Mr. Baumann may well be right in pointing to these beginnings as a harbinger of future long-term developments.

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DISSENT IN THE USSR: POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, AND PEOPLE. Edited by *Rudolf L. Tőkés*. Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975. xvi, 453 pp. $15.00.

Of all the books and articles that have appeared since 1975 on the subject of cultural dissent and the so-called "democratic movement" in the USSR, this thoughtful and far-ranging collection remains among the best. It raises some key issues: the political significance of dissent, the range of ideas, beliefs, and convictions that motivate dissident activities, the modes of communication, and what, if anything, is being accom-

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plished. None of these problems is, or as yet can be, even provisionally resolved. That they are raised, and in seemly proportion and order, is a token of competence and understanding.

From the perspective of such a late review, the book is obviously dated—more an inevitability than a flaw. *Most* of the names that appear in its role of prominent Soviet dissidents are now living abroad. Between 1974 and the present, the export of souls has become a Soviet industry, which suggests a fundamental question that is not raised in the book: When a Solzhenitsyn is "exported" what remains of his "importance" in the USSR? And the songs of Galich (now dead; some would have it, murdered)—how do they sound from abroad? And what kind of an impression does the fracturing sectarianism of political movements in exile make in their homeland?

Amalrik's famous work, *Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?* (unfortunately no longer available in paperback), is cited by almost every essay in this book. He overshadows almost every one of its ideas, so vividly and presciently did he present the issues. Yet *his* bow in the direction of political and social science was more sportive than serious; it was the gesture of a playful prophet. There is something wrong with the solemn systematization found in many of these essays—their *wissenschaftlich* format—and my grounds for objecting to it are not purely aesthetic. The frequently acknowledged random and haphazard character of the materials makes intuition a more vital factor in interpreting them than conventional systematizing, which tends to hobble intuition. Gayle Hollander's highly interesting essay, "Political Communication and Dissent," is at its best when it casts off from its apparatus. The most brilliant essay in the book, George Feifer's, dispenses entirely with the social science format.

I sense a certain historical thinness throughout. A number of bows are made to the importance of history, and the obvious historical "linkages" are neither neglected nor overlooked: in her essay on religious dissent, Barbara Jancar cannot, and does not, avoid the historical dimension, and Robert Slusser writes specifically about dissenting historians and their struggle to free historical research from the constrictions of the official line. Yet the past weighs like an alp not only on the party, but on the dissidents as well. Not all past traditions with which they identify are emancipatory or liberating. Both Russian Orthodoxy and sectarianism contain enough obscurantism to darken ten suns; and not only Stalin, but many a "solid," research-minded, liberal pre-1917 Russian historian tended to feel a certain positive warmth in identifying with the Russian power clenched in the iron fist of Ivan the Terrible or Peter the Great. Although the importance of nationalism—and specifically Russian nationalism—keeps coming up, somehow it escapes the central position that Amalrik gave it; there is little, if any, attempt to speculate on its implications for the future of the democratic movement.

George Kline provides an intelligent synopsis of a very important philosophical essay by Pomerants that appeared over ten years ago in *samizdat* form. The essay attempts to detach the intelligentsia from their historical orientation, from their sense of bearing a historical burden of guilt with regard to the *narod*. Unfortunately, Kline provides no historical context in which the essay can be understood and its importance appraised.

More perfunctory than the bows to history are those to literature. Literature is acknowledged to have played a key role in Soviet dissent, and then edged out beyond the margins of discussion. And there is not a word written about the visual arts, where nonconformity and dissent have played as important a role as in their verbal counterparts, and which become increasingly and inextricably linked with the literary arts, as in the avant-garde movements of the 1920s.

Writing biographically about Sakharov, Peter Dornan touches on the controversy between that noble figure and the Medvedev brothers over whether the policy of détente should, as far as the West is concerned, be linked to the condition of liberal-

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ization within the USSR. Sakharov says yes, the Medvedevs say no. Dornan does not enter the debate, although he clearly leans emotionally in Sakharov's favor. Surely the issue is a major one—for us, as well as for the dissidents—and it is a pity that more has not been done with it.

I hope that my criticisms will be seen from the perspective of my admiration. This book is essential to all who would understand unofficial Russia.

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HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE USSR: PAST AND PRESENT. By *Rudolf Schlesinger*. Bombay: Orient Longman Limited, 1977. x, 485 pp. Rs. 100.

This complex volume, first printed in Italian translation in 1962 and updated in 1969, has now been published in the original English by an Indian press, eight years after the author's death. Although the principal theses of the book are not new, the supporting arguments and reasoning certainly are; and because Professor Schlesinger was something of an insider during the first two decades of Soviet power, his analysis of both that period and later years lends an extra dimension to his documented historical analysis.

This is far from an introductory text; reading the book should be a postgraduate experience even for the advanced scholar. Those familiar with Schlesinger's other works will find the present volume written in the same complicated, though often entertaining, prose, somewhat marred by a more-than-average number of typographical errors. But despite possibly detracting physical characteristics, the book deserves a wide academic audience.

In his introductory chapters, the author tries to illustrate a strong continuity between the goals of the pre-Marxist Russian revolutionary movements and what was to transpire in subsequent Bolshevik political development. Material on the early stages of Soviet party history plays down the impact of such habitually emphasized phenomena as the Stalin-Trotsky feud and the consolidation of Stalin's dictatorship, in favor of explanations of party development based on much more complex (and probably more realistic) interaction of personalities and institutions.

Throughout the middle portions of the book, Schlesinger attempts to separate Soviet party policy of the 1930s and 1940s (with which he certainly had a personal quarrel) from basic Marxist assumptions, and even from what he considers to be the mainstream of Soviet experience. He views such phenomena as Zhdanov's attack on postwar literary and musical trends and Lysenko's deadly assault on established Soviet genetic science as philosophical and political aberrations.

In the majority of cases, it is fair to say that Schlesinger's conclusions differ substantially from conventional Western academic wisdom. Nonetheless, they are presented with a high degree of scholarly objectivity, representing a sophisticated effort to perceive what was really going on behind the scenes of high-level Soviet politics. He indirectly makes a very strong case for continued institutional interest group politics over many significant issues, even during the darkest days of Stalinist terror and personal dictatorship.

The author's views and speculations are sometimes ingenious—those who supported Lysenko perhaps did so in order to direct Soviet science against all limiting concepts and thereby to influence the mood of postwar Soviet society—and sometimes naïvely irrelevant—that neither of the two schools of genetics could make a strong case for a necessary coincidence of its views with the basic principles of Marxist philosophy. But, taken as a whole, his assertions are thought-provoking; they prompt a reconsideration of available evidence and common assumptions.

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