

Book Reviews

This study concerns the major clinical findings and theoretical concepts of Melanie Klein, W. R. D. Fairbairn, and D. W. Winnicott in relation to Freud's theoretical elaboration of psychical phenomena. A vague set of pronouncements early on in the book about the interrelationships of these investigators are later transformed into a highly lucid and interesting account of the way in which clinical material in the analytic session reshaped the theoretical domain of psychoanalysis after Freud's death.

The more exciting elements of the book include Hughes's linkage of the personal analyses of Harry Guntrip with Fairbairn, and later with Winnicott (the former analysis is based on Guntrip's lengthy unpublished record of over 1,000 analytic sessions). A further dimension to the inner workings of the psychoanalytic scene in Britain in the post-World War II era is Hughes's discussion of the case study of 'Susan' in Marion Milner's important book *The hands of the living God* (1969)—this patient lived in the Winnicott household for seven years during Milner's treatment of her, and Winnicott's posthumously published *The piggle* provides, as Hughes puts it, "clinical material bearing on the issues with which Milner's Susan had been grappling for close to two decades".

Hughes's critical approach is refreshing, although not convincing in most places. For example, when she refers to "the downright sloppiness that plagued the work of Melanie Klein", one feels that Hughes has not prepared the ground properly. In the context of Hughes's analysis, the charge simply does not hold. But more serious problems abound in her discussions of the development of Freud's instinct and structural theories.

Hughes focuses rightly on the theoretical importance of Freud's unfinished and posthumously published 'Project for a scientific psychology' (1895). But she seems oblivious to the fact that the roots of the instinct theory can be found in Freud's 'Project' (endogenous *Q*[quantity] is not protected by a shield against stimuli), or that it evolved through three specific stages. In the first, the sexual and self-preservative (ego) instincts were given equal weight in shaping human behaviour and experience; in the second, beginning with the paper on narcissism (Freud, 1914), the self-preservative instincts were defined with reference to libido turning back onto the ego; in the third, the death and life instincts were posited as fundamental (1920) and Freud returned full circle to ideas that were embedded in the 'Project', especially with regard to the separation of two of the key psychological systems—memory and consciousness.

Hughes is certainly sensitive to the issue of the English rendering of "instinct" for the German concept *Trieb* versus the more preferred use of "drive" by the English-speaking purists. But in general she seems unacquainted with the current issues on the English translation of Freud, although several important papers of Ornston published in the last decade are in her bibliography. One significant item in the translation debates concerns Freud's structural hypothesis. Ornston, for example, supports the position that the so-called structural theory may in fact be James Strachey's invention, not Freud's. As Strachey is given more than adequate coverage as Freud's principal translator in the early chapters by Hughes, her unqualified assumption that Freud's structural theory is a fundamental "paradigm" of the Freudian system is a serious oversight.

Her strategy of analysing the differences between Freud's theoretical concepts and those of Klein, Fairbairn, and Winnicott is not entirely successful because she does not prepare the Freudian ground properly. On the other hand, the increasing interplay between clinical and theoretical material after the chapters on Freud and Klein sustains attention to the very end.

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EDWARD M. HUNDERT, *Philosophy, psychiatry and neuroscience: three approaches to the mind. A synthetic analysis of the varieties of human experience*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, 8vo, pp. xiii, 346, illus., £30.00.

More than one commentator has defended the obscurity of Hegel's philosophical writings on the grounds that the truths with which he was concerned are themselves invincibly obscure. Any book which claims to be an extension of the Hegelian programme is therefore unlikely to be an

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easy read. This one is no exception though it is unusual in that although intended primarily as a contribution to philosophy its author is a young-ish American psychiatrist with academic qualifications in other disciplines but, on the evidence of the book's extensive bibliography, no previous publication other than a paper on ethical problem solving in medicine.

Dr Hundert's aim is nothing less than to examine separately three approaches to the mind and then to advance a unifying theory of his own which he calls "synthetic analysis". Following J. L. Mackie's distinction between conceptual, epistemological, and factual analyses he employs a tripartite framework devoted respectively to traditional philosophy, to psychiatry and to neuroscience. Each section contains a detailed summary of earlier work regarded as most relevant to the argument and the choice is revealingly idiosyncratic. Thus while Descartes, Kant, and Hegel understandably dominate the philosophical section, the differences between psychiatry and psychology are deemed "irrelevant" and Piaget and Freud become pre-eminent in the second section. In the third section the neuro-scientific approach is represented principally by the work of Fodor, Hubel, and Wiesel, but there is very little on the neuropsychology of memory or of neuro-linguistics.

The "synthetic analysis" itself turns out to be an Hegelian attempt to go beyond the phenomenology of experience by means of "a dialectical synthesis of rationalism and empiricism". Drawn freely from the material presented in the body of the text, it represents an exercise in epistemology advanced as a mode of explaining the possibility of the realization of valid knowledge. The author describes it as follows: "By embedding its dialectic, not merely in self-conscious individual experience but in biologically grounded cognitive mechanisms which by definition apply equally to all members of the species sharing our everywhere-and-unavoidable world, the Synthetic Analysis establishes the possibility of intersubjective knowledge as an internal solution to the foundational problem of epistemology". If they can understand it some readers may find the theory persuasive. Others may see it as little more than verbose otiosity, especially as the author's expressed preference for the Kantian tradition overshadows the insights of Ludwig Wittgenstein. For them the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* will contain the most appropriate comment: "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent".

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PAUL WILLIAMS, GREG WILKINSON, and KENNETH RAWNSLEY (eds.), *The scope of epidemiological psychiatry: essays in honour of Michael Shepherd*, London and New York, Routledge, 1989, 8vo, pp. xiv, 536, £33.00.

The *Festschrift* has become an honourable tradition of twentieth-century science, wherein contemporaries of a leading academic produce original articles around the themes that have dominated his (usually) working life. Often such collections are workaday stuff, interleaved with the occasional piece of interesting and new work. For who would hide a *Nature*-bound article in the relative obscurity of a large volume? And such collections do tend to gather more dust than readers. Whether this present volume, in honour of Michael Shepherd, Professor of Epidemiological Psychiatry at the Institute of Psychiatry and The Maudsley, will go the way of such *Festschriften* is unpredictable, but I suspect its sheer detail will keep it afloat. There are humdrum pieces here, but many are excellent summaries of the Present State of Epidemiology—a "P.S.E." of scientific detail that aptly reflects Michael Shepherd's work—and references and index are extensive and useful.

Professor Shepherd himself was long renowned amongst trainee psychiatrists at The Maudsley as a consultant to be feared. His habit of reading the medical notes while you presented the case was disconcerting to those expecting obvious signs of attention; the absence of those same notes, as a guiding source to the well-rounded psychiatric history that was expected, led to many unsubstantiated assertions and ironic Shepherdesque smiles. This whole procedural theatre was part of the Aubrey Lewis tradition, of searching cross-examination and public exposure of loose thinking, that Shepherd very much represents. Some decry it, as too