

1 HOW TO IMPROVE PSYCHIATRIC NOSOGRAPHY IN THE XXI CENTURY: A PHENOMENOLOGIST'S
2 VIEWPOINT

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10 ABSTRACT

11 Classifications of mental disorders reflect much more the mind of psychiatrists than the patients'
12 mind since these classifications are more focused on the interests of stakeholders (including
13 governmental agencies, advocacy groups, medical insurance and pharmaceutical companies) than
14 on the experiences of patients. We live in times of rapid socio-cultural changes, and respective
15 changes in the forms of mental suffering increasingly characterized by fragmentariness and
16 episodicity. These new forms of suffering may escape nosographic framing based on the
17 identification of symptoms and syndromes. A paradigm shift in the psychiatric nosography is
18 necessary. The way forward could be to enhance the ability of clinicians to grasp the 'fragments'
19 provided by patients rather than aggregations of symptoms. 'Existential knots' can manifest
20 themselves in these fragments to be used as 'floating buoys' for clinical navigation, in the absence

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21 of exhaustive and detailed ‘maps’ of the symptoms and syndromes that afflict patients. A tentative
22 collection of these existential knots is provided, building on and extending the legacy of existential
23 philosophy and phenomenological psychopathology.

24

25 KEYWORDS

26 Existential knots; Fragment-oriented listening; Humanistic approach; Critique of Psychiatric
27 Nosography; Structural psychopathology

28

29 THE SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS OF PSYCHIATRIC NOSOGRAPHY

30 In his book *DSM: A History of Psychiatry's Bible* [1], sociologist and historian of psychiatry Allan V.
31 Horowitz shows that the various editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
32 Disorders (DSM) [2] reflect the cultural, social and political reality of their time. The ‘social
33 embeddedness’ – that is, its being constrained by the environment, including institutional,
34 political, economic or cultural factors - of the DSM is not a negative thing in itself. On the contrary,
35 it can be an advantage if it is understood as the attention paid by the authors of the classification
36 of mental disorders to the social and cultural transformations of their time. It is a serious limitation
37 when, instead of reflecting the way in which socio-cultural changes are mirrored in changes in
38 psychopathological forms, the DSM classification of mental disorders is a ‘social creation’ [1] that
39 instead reflects the demands of professional or political lobbies [3]. Although in the introduction of
40 the DSM it is stated that the classification is not “objective”, the limitation is even more serious if
41 the product of such intra-professional or extra-professional forces results in a widely circulated
42 manual, advertised as the faithful-mirror of mental disorders.

43 In short, if it is true that the various editions of the DSM reflect more the negotiations within the
44 professional group of psychiatrists than they do the reality of mental pathology, then it is

45 legitimate to suspect that they are a very objective, and therefore scientifically relevant, document
46 of the changes that have taken place over the last seventy years or so - not so much in the minds
47 of patients as in the minds of psychiatrists at the top of the so-called 'scientific community'. The
48 history of the DSM indicates the manual's deep entrenchment in the intra-professional and general
49 sociocultural forces that impact the psychiatric profession' [1, p. 145].

50

51 ANTIDOTES TO PSYCHIATRIC NOSOGRAPHISM: A PLEA FOR THE 'CLINICAL FACTOR' AND THE
52 STRUCTURAL PARADIGM

53 If each era, therefore, has the DSM it deserves, why not try to image a further edition that reflects
54 the recognition needs legitimately claimed by patients, and the therapeutic and professional needs
55 of psychiatrists working in the field? I emphasize the needs of those 'working in the field', i.e., the
56 concrete needs of those who work on the front line with 'real' patients, and not in laboratories, or
57 in those research contexts sometimes divorced from the reality of the clinic, frequented by insiders
58 more interested in the impact factor than the clinical factor [4]. Does all entitle us to dream of a
59 better classification of mental conditions? But let us base our dreams on some considerations
60 dictated by a philosophical, i.e., critical, reflection on the clinic.

61 First point: DSM diagnoses are only partially effective for 'real-world' psychiatric clinic. It has long
62 been claimed that patients often do not match diagnostic criteria and that therapeutic treatments,
63 including biological ones, do not match nosographic criteria [5]. The correspondence between
64 abstract criteria and actual symptoms and syndromes, and thus the clinical utility of the diagnosis,
65 is even more limited if the assessment is aimed at other therapeutic strategies such as
66 psychotherapeutic or rehabilitative ones. And the gap widens even more if diagnostic categories
67 are used in the relationship and dialogue with patients, e.g., to inform patients of their condition,
68 generating more misunderstandings than clarification between the two parties.

69 Second point: the antidote against the ineffectiveness of DSM-based nosographic diagnosis in the
70 context of the clinic basically consists in replacing the diagnostic procedure based on ticking boxes
71 - i.e., on detecting individual symptoms with a view to a diagnosis obtained by summation - with
72 another type of thinking and procedure that is called 'structural' [6] Structural thinking considers
73 abnormal mental conditions not as mere aggregates of symptoms. Symptoms are a special kind of
74 phenomena through which the hidden, yet operative (perplexing and disturbing) dimension of
75 existence is made manifest. They are not accidental to that patient, but rather the manifestation of
76 some implicit quintessential "core" dimension of her or his subjectivity. The overall change in the
77 core structure of subjectivity transpires through the individual symptoms, but the specificity of the
78 core is only graspable at a more comprehensive structural level.

79 This holistic approach bears little resemblance to the current atomistic operational definitions for
80 several reasons. It goes beyond the description of isolated symptoms and the use of some of those
81 symptoms to establish a diagnosis, and aims to understand the meaning of a given set of
82 symptoms grasping the underlying characteristic modification that keeps these symptoms
83 meaningfully interconnected. It is capable of revealing, beyond the combinations between
84 symptoms understood as juxtaposed elements *partes extra partes*, the reciprocal relationships and
85 links of meaning between the symptoms themselves. Psychopathological syndromes, in this view,
86 are not a cacophony without order, but a melody, however strange, peculiar, idiosyncratic. There is
87 a method – as Shakespeare would say - in madness.

88

89 THE LIMITATIONS OF STRUCTURAL THINKING IN THE LIGHT OF FRAGMENTATION IN 90 CONTEMPORARY CLINIC

91 As much as we may emphasize the importance of the 'structural turn' in psychiatry, however, if we
92 look at the presentations of psychopathological phenomena in the contemporary clinic we note a

93 significant increase in conditions characterized by fragmentariness and the crisis of the narrative
94 function. There is a general agreement about the hypothesis of temporal fragmentation of the self
95 in individuals with borderline personality disorder and the close connection between their typical
96 difficulties - e.g., in interpersonal relationships - and their personal narratives highlighting their
97 discontinuity and lack of coherence, and the association between disturbed identity and poor
98 narrative coherence [7].

99 In today's world, we see other examples of 'episodic' forms of existence, marked by a diminished
100 capacity to organize experiences into a coherent narrative, leading to existential fragmentation.
101 Key findings emphasize the significance of anomalies in narrative identity for personality
102 development during adolescence, especially in adolescents of the digital age [8]. We are
103 undergoing a global shift where digital screens have evolved from mere entertainment devices to
104 integral parts of a hybrid reality. To grasp the impact of this new hybrid reality, we must consider
105 the activities of young people within the context of their primary developmental goal: identity
106 formation. Constructing a personal identity is the main task of adolescence, and the ability to
107 create a coherent life story is crucial for this process. However, identity development influenced by
108 media experiences in the current digital ecosystem does not encourage the integration of
109 fragmented, chronologically dispersed selves into a cohesive narrative. This contributes to an
110 episodic and fragmented lifestyle, particularly among the post-COVID generation [8], who often
111 have disjointed accounts of their experiences and inconsistent recollections of past events,
112 affecting their ability to plan for the future. Clinicians are well aware of how fragmented their
113 discourse can be.

114 We must prepare ourselves to witness a metamorphosis of psychopathological suffering,
115 characterized by an increase of conditions whose brand is a profound alteration in temporality and
116 narrative capacity, the outcome of which could be precisely fragmentariness and episodicity. The

117 problem for the clinician may arise either from a scarcity of material due to the patient's laconic
118 speech or his lack of linguistic and narrative competence, or from a 'superabundance' that makes
119 it 'patently impossible to establish a synthesis by assembling all the particulars' [9 p. 257]. The
120 difficulty lies in the very lack of structure of the material. From this perspective, even the most
121 minute fragment can be an *Ansatzpunkt* ('starting point') for exploring the patient's subjectivity
122 which can spread a 'radiating power' - the 'power to shed light in a radiating fashion' [9, p. 263].
123 We will have to confront these new clinical forms and prepare for a clinic that is capable of
124 grasping the meaning of a psychopathological existence not through the reconstruction of a
125 'totality', but through fragments that are detached from a global structure - but not for this reason
126 devoid of meaning. Fragments in which an attentive listener can trace in hyper-condensed form
127 the 'existential knots' with which the unfortunate existences of our patients are confronted. As
128 explained more in detail in the next paragraph, existential knots are the diverse backdrops to a
129 common human fate.

130 We must educate young clinicians in the unpredictability of the fragment. In these fragments, the
131 existential knots are not formulated clearly, but so to speak 'shine' in them. The 'knot' appears and
132 quickly disappears from the sight: it flashes and shimmers so that it hardly lets itself be glimpsed
133 by the eye of an expert. The patient is only partially aware of the fact that that is the 'node' in
134 which her existence was trapped. Moreover, the node remains precisely at the stage of a fragment
135 and does not unfold or configure itself in a structure, in a form of existence or a 'lifeworld' that
136 develops by articulating itself around it. Those who listen must be ready to grasp it and recognize
137 its importance.

138 And if this were to be the future of our profession, then let us imagine a 'nosography' constructed
139 not as a collection of categories that assemble psychopathological symptoms (delusions,
140 hallucinations, mood abnormalities, etc.) - but as a sylloge of limit situations, embodied by our

141 patients, on which the becoming of their existence stops. In other words, we should try to
142 overturn the perspective from which we usually look at mental pathology: not mental illnesses as
143 deviations and distortions of the fundamental 'normal' structures of human existence, but mental
144 illnesses as conditions in which the existential knots or 'basic concerns' that characterize the
145 human existence – the humanity we all share - are revealed.

146

147 A SKETCH OF 'EXISTENTIAL KNOTS' FOR CLINICAL NAVIGATION

148 It is not easy to provide clinicians with a comprehensive collection of these existential 'knots'. In
149 the past, some syntheses have been attempted. Building on and extending these contributions, the
150 list may start from Karl Jaspers' 'limit situations', denoting the limits that are common for all
151 persons, against which the wholeness and unity of existence may crash [10]. To these belong
152 especially having to die, to suffer, to fight, being at the mercy of chance and facing the inevitability
153 of guilt. This non-systematic list of existential knots includes the fear of emptiness and
154 meaninglessness, the conflict between
155 individualization and participation, the anxiety related to isolation (the person lives in a vacuum as
156 if there were a glass between her and the surrounding), chaos (the person lives in an unfamiliar
157 and depersonalized world), facticity (the incapacity to shape one's matter-of-factness) and
158 absurdity of human existence [11]. It also includes the vertigo of freedom and the intertwining
159 between desire and prohibition, and, finally, the quest for spontaneity and authenticity or for
160 egocentric individual affirmation and the dialectics between existing as sentient flesh or as a visible
161 body.

162 There is no unambiguous correspondence between each of these knots and the diagnoses in
163 which traditional nosography is articulated. However, similarities can be recognized, for example
164 between the node of guilt and the category 'depression' or the node of chaos and the category

165 'schizophrenia'. But the point is obviously not to replace one classification with another, but to
166 identify 'floating buoys' (i.e., landmarks, cardinal points) for clinical navigation in the absence of
167 exhaustive and detailed 'nautical maps'.

168

169 CONCLUSIONS

170 Psychiatric classifications serve various social functions and are influenced by powerful interests.
171 Key stakeholders include governmental agencies, medical insurance companies, advocacy groups,
172 and pharmaceutical companies. In the 1980s, clinicians adopted the DSM to align with insurance
173 systems, while research institutes, advocacy groups, and pharmaceutical companies used it to
174 emphasize the need for more research, support, and treatments. However, its categories are not
175 up to date in an era of rapid cultural change and tumultuous psychopathological metamorphosis
176 (e.g., 'episodic' psychopathology), and may not provide sufficiently valid indications for either
177 translational research or treatment prescription - let alone for understanding patients' own ways of
178 being in the world. The time is perhaps ripe for a change of paradigm: from the formulation of
179 diagnostic criteria that attempt to draw a clear line between normality and pathology, to the
180 identification of 'existential knots', proper to the *condicio humana* and not only to its
181 psychopathological forms. Humans are inherently vulnerable and become ill when they respond
182 inappropriately when faced with these existential knots. Can we aspire to a classification of mental
183 conditions that truly seeks to understand the human aspects of mental sufferings, rather than
184 catering to politically motivated stakeholders who mask their interests with claims of scientific
185 objectivity?

186

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189 CONFLICT OF INTEREST

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