

THE MILITARY IN LATIN
AMERICAN POLITICS:
Internal and External Determinants

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- REFLECTIONS ON CLASS THEORY SUGGESTED BY ANALYSES OF THE PERUVIAN MILITARY REGIME, 1968–1979. By JONATHAN CAVANAGH. (Göttingen: University of Göttingen, 1980. Pp. 558.)
- YESTERDAY'S SOLDIERS: EUROPEAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM IN SOUTH AMERICA, 1890–1940. By FREDERICK M. NUNN. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1983. Pp. 365. \$26.95.)
- FUERZAS ARMADAS, PARTIDOS POLITICOS Y TRANSICION A LA DEMOCRACIA EN ARGENTINA, 1981–1982. By ANDRES FONTANA. Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 28. (Notre Dame: Kellogg Institute, 1984, Pp. 38.)
- NEW MILITARY POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA. Edited by ROBERT WESSON. (New York: Praeger and the Hoover Institution Press, 1982. Pp. 230. \$34.95.)

Although military regimes throughout the hemisphere have given way, at least temporarily, to a period of redemocratization, it seems appropriate at this time to examine a number of works on the military in Latin American politics. While the studies reviewed here constitute only a small fraction of the voluminous research on the topic, they afford some sense of the state of the literature.

A decade ago, Abraham Lowenthal's seminal article, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," stressed the importance of both "internal factors" (such as "class origins, socialization, training, cohort experience and degree of professionalization of officers") and "external or environmental circumstances" (societal "levels of economic and political development, political culture and social stratification") for an adequate theory of military behavior.¹ Influential theoretical contributions and case studies by Guillermo O'Donnell, Alfred Stepan, Philippe Schmitter, Robert Kaufmann, John Samuel Fitch, and others may focus more heavily on either the societal context of military politics (such as "organic statism" and the limits of dependent economic growth) or on

factors shaping the corporate outlook and interests of the armed forces (such as education, class origin, and military branch). Most, however, have recognized the importance of both elements.²

Jonathan Cavanagh's *Reflections on Class Theory Suggested by Analyses of the Peruvian Military Regime, 1968–79* employs classical Marxist class analysis in search of a "correct" interpretation of General Juan Velasco Alvarado's reformist military regime (1968–1975) and its successor, the conservative government of General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. After rather mechanically determining that Peru fits all of the characteristics of dependent, peripheral capitalism, Cavanagh briefly reviews the record of the Velasco reforms and, more importantly, the limitations of those reforms. Although the regime promulgated an extensive agrarian reform, expanded the role of the state, nationalized critical sectors of the economy formerly controlled by multinationals, weakened the traditional oligarchy, and introduced a limited amount of worker coparticipation, Cavanagh insists that the regime was doomed to failure because it did not undertake basic structural reforms aimed at dismantling dependent capitalism or developing an alternative to "the old export-led growth model."

Most of Cavanagh's book, however, is devoted not to discussing Peru but to analyzing classical Marxist theory and critiquing more recent interpretations of class theory (including works by Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Lipset, T. B. Bottomore, Ralf Dahrendorf, and Theotônio dos Santos—none of whom apparently understand Marx as well as Cavanagh feels he does).³ He also rejects some of the leading research on military politics (by Samuel Huntington and Eric Nordlinger)⁴ and on the Peruvian military experiment (by Alfred Stepan, E. V. K. FitzGerald, Julio Cotler, Aníbal Quijano, and Henry Pease García).⁵ Essentially, Cavanagh argues that the existing body of literature on the Peruvian military fails to recognize the overriding importance of antagonistic class interests (Stepan) or lacks an adequate social psychology of interests (FitzGerald and much of the Marxist tradition) or suffers from unfounded optimism about the future of class struggle (Cotler, Quijano, and most of the Peruvian left). Even when class analysis is introduced, Cavanagh insists, it is invariably misapplied. Only Pease García's *El caso del poder oligárquico* is credited with offering an adequate explanation of the limits of Velasquista reformism.

For those willing to struggle through Cavanagh's extremely turgid writing and strange outline form of organization, it is easier to comprehend what he dislikes in other authors than it is to appreciate how his discussion of Marx's classics leads readers to a more powerful analysis of Peru's antagonistic class relationships or the structural constraints that doomed military reformism. What is clear is that Cavanagh has little interest in analyzing the Peruvian military itself. Because he views

the military's bourgeois reformism as the inevitable playing out of forces inherent in dependent capitalism, he fails to discuss internal factors shaping the military's perception of Peruvian society. Indeed, some of his sharpest words are reserved for North American political sociology and its "subjectivist" emphasis on military corporate interests. Nordlinger and Huntington are targeted as primary representatives of this approach. Cavanagh concedes Nordlinger's limited use of class analysis but faults him for suggesting that the Velasco government had a will of its own, "instead of an analysis being undertaken into the conditions and the objective limits to [the military government's] reforms. . . ." Similarly, while crediting Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies* with "avoiding the pitfalls of a notion of linear progress in development," Cavanagh ultimately finds the analysis "too political," flawed in its attribution of institutional autonomy, and unable to recognize "the class problematic, which Huntington obscures."

Cavanagh's thesis stands in stark contrast to Liisa North's and Tanya Korovkin's far more insightful research on the Peruvian military.⁶ While their book falls within a broad framework of class analysis, they recognize the importance of examining the military's internal dynamics. Consequently, they describe an ideological continuum within the Velasco regime and skillfully show how ideological and political contradictions within the military weakened its reformist project. Not surprisingly, Cavanagh pays scant attention to such factors or to earlier studies by Luigi Einaudi, Victor Villanueva, and others that examine the influence of military traditions and training on the Peruvian armed forces' worldview. *Reflections on Class Theory* presents nothing on Peru that has not previously been published by FitzGerald (upon whom Cavanagh relies heavily for his description of economic policy) and others. More pages are devoted to discussing *Capital* and *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* than to analyzing Velasco's reforms and their limitations. Specifics such as the Velasco regime's obsession with large, capital-intensive development projects, its inability to mobilize political support, and its economic mismanagement were not discussed, perhaps because they were viewed by the author as inevitable aspects of capitalist development and hence not worthy of attention. Like too much of the dependency and class analysis literature, theory here precedes and supercedes individual facts to such a point that the country under study becomes hardly relevant. Analyses of military reformism in Ecuador or of bourgeois civilian governments in Venezuela or Mexico would differ in detail but would reach the same oft-repeated conclusions on the limits of reformism in dependent capitalist societies. Having largely dismissed Stepan's analysis of the constraints of the Iberian tradition, Cavanagh (like many dependista and Marxist theorists) must explain how peripheral capitalism in rightist authoritarian regimes such as

Taiwan and South Korea seem to have produced sustained economic growth coupled with relatively equitable distribution.

If Cavanagh's study seems uninterested in military training and education (or in any internal factors), Frederick Nunn's *Yesterday's Soldiers: European Military Professionalism in South America, 1890–1940* deals almost exclusively with that issue. It focuses on how German and French training missions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru between 1890 and 1940 influenced the professionalization of those nations' officers corps. But unlike Cavanagh, Nunn does not claim to have identified the key determinant of military attitudes and behavior. Although his focus is historical, he argues that "South American military professionalism was in essence the same in the 1970s as it was in the 1920s" in that "officer-corps . . . thoughts and self-perception changed but little" in that period. Nunn's book is designed to shed light on the more recent political involvement of the armed forces in those nations by tracing the transition from military professionalism to "professional militarism—the propensity and willingness to apply solutions based on a military ethos to social, economic, and political problems."

The core of Nunn's argument is that officers in these key South American nations "aped the attitudes" of European officers. Like their Prussian and French mentors, they longed for the mythical "good old days" when "society was stable, politics was minimal . . . and the entire population respected the army." Throughout the book, Nunn repeatedly points to the antiliberal, antidemocratic attitudes of South American officers and links those values to comparable European military perspectives. The difference was that the European officers ultimately accepted civilian control and parliamentary democracy while their South American students operated within a framework of weak civilian institutions that led them to increasingly interventionist positions. Before turning to the question of military training missions, Nunn briefly, but properly, describes the socioeconomic and political context within which the officers operated—a very hierarchical and dependent society.

Looking at events at the turn of the century, Nunn notes that in all four nations (Argentina, Brazil, Peru, and Chile, although less so in Chile), civilian political conflict contributed to the politicization of the officers corps. Ironically, European military training was often introduced for the express purpose of removing the armed forces from partisan politics. But the result was a rejection not just of partisan politics but of the political process itself. South American officers "reflected traditional European disdain for civilians . . . and a distinct wariness of liberal democracy." Seeing themselves as morally superior to civilian politicians, these officers viewed the armed forces as the only true defender of the national interest. Defending national security included

integrating marginal groups into the nation-state through obligatory military service. Referring to Peru's indigenous population early in this century, future Chief-of-Staff Gabriel Velarde wrote, "What more meritorious labor than to transform the unfortunate helot into a civilized being, the miserable slave of tyranny and superstition into a free man. . . ." Another officer, foreshadowing some of the Velasco regime's moderate *indigenismo*, urged that training of recruits stress the role of Tupac Amará as a precursor to independence in order to induce Indians and *cholos* to identify with Peru's history.

In the years following World War I, officers injected themselves more directly into the political system in a variety of ways: support for Alessandri in Chile, the *tenente* revolt in Brazil, and Uriburu's profascist faction in Argentina. The depression greatly accelerated that trend, as military professionalism turned to professional militarism. Like their German and French mentors, the South American military feared Marxism, distrusted liberal democracy, and viewed authoritarianism— even fascism—as preferable. The Prussian and French officers' paranoid fear of communists, socialists, capitalists, the English, and Jews was easily transferred to the South American military's anxieties about "the enemy from within." For Argentina's profascist officers, that enemy might take the form of political parties, unions, international organizations, or foreign investment, while for some Ibañistas in Chile, it encompassed the oligarchy and "ambitious members of the bourgeoisie," neither group being sensitive to the true needs of the population. In Peru junior officers adopted from the French the *mission civilisatrice*. Like their Chilean enemies, they perceived themselves as the protectors of the underclass. Nunn cites one Lieutenant Paz García on the need to save "the Indian [who] has been . . . vilely exploited by those who will not recognize . . . that he is a principal resource for the future of our nation." Such radical rhetoric in no way prevented the same officers from actively opposing Aprista populism or fearing "the tentacles of the communist monster."

Nunn argues that although both European and South American officers of the interwar period were frequently of middle-class origins, they rejected the bourgeoisie and the individualistic, materialistic, capitalist values represented by that class. Instead, "yesterday's soldiers" yearned for a nobler mythical past when self-sacrifice and patriotism were respected. This view conflicts with the "classical" analyses of both John Johnson and José Nun, who (from very different perspectives) linked the military's middle-class origins to a probourgeois orientation. Although the United States replaced Germany and France in the post-war period as the source of foreign training, Nunn thinks that the beliefs inculcated by the Europeans persisted through the institutional military regimes of the 1960s and 1970s. The officers who carried out the *golpes* of those decades, he notes, graduated from the military acad-

emies of the 1930s or early 1940s. Nunn's argument is interesting and well documented, and yet I was never convinced that the set of military values he reiterates (antipolitical, antiliberal, and a confused self-image of the military as the only truly democratic institution) were necessarily transferred from Europe. He argues that the common outlook characterizing the Argentine, Brazilian, Chilean, and Peruvian military from the early twentieth century until today "renders rather useless the labeling of military movements as rightist or leftist on the basis of their achievements." In his constant search for commonalities, however, Nunn discards the possibility that what differentiates a Velasco from a Pinochet is far more important than what unites them. The book is so intent on discerning common themes that it fails to demonstrate whether foreign military training can be related to the great differences that distinguish military regimes.

The subject of Andrés Fontana's *Fuerzas armadas, partidos políticos y transición a la democracia en Argentina, 1981–1982* is more limited in scope than the other works reviewed here. Yet, his analysis of the internal and external forces that shaped the military's retreat from office is richer because it involves a broader range of explanatory factors. In tracing the debate over an *apertura política* following General Roberto Viola's assumption of the presidency until the Malvinas disaster, Fontana focuses on an area not discussed by Cavanagh or Nunn—internal splits within the military regime. Fontana avoids both a simplistic form of class analysis (which views the military as no more than agents for some wing of the bourgeoisie) or rigid economic determinism. Political decisions within civil society (particularly by the parties), economic conditions, and armed forces schisms all interacted to produce the crisis of military rule.

The deterioration of the Argentine economy from 1980 onward contributed to growing popular discontent and the alienation of entrepreneurial groups previously allied with the regime. These factors, in turn, intensified the debate between Viola's *apertura*-oriented faction and the hard-liners led by Galtieri. Despite the political weakness of civil society and the absence of mass mobilization, Viola believed it necessary to forestall future social unrest. He questioned José Martínez de Hoz's neoliberal economic policies, appointed a labor minister more acceptable to the unions, and tried to open negotiations with the political parties. Such concessions were staunchly opposed by the hard-liners, who felt the political order had not been sufficiently reconstructed to permit redemocratization. Viewing the world in dichotomous terms of "order-chaos and friend-enemy," the hard-liners held the political parties partially responsible for the rise of subversion and were not ready to turn power back to them. This group vetoed many of the president's policies, creating a vicious cycle in which the Galtieri faction

made Viola increasingly dependent on civilian support but prevented him from making the political and economic concessions necessary to attain it. Ultimately, Viola was caught between two conflicting demands: maintaining unity within the armed forces and effectively governing the nation. In less than a year, these contradictions drove him from office. In the absence of mass mobilization (which the major political parties opposed lest it provoke a military reaction), the nation accepted the change rather passively.

Not surprisingly, the new Galtieri government returned to austere and anti-inflationary policies. Unexpectedly, however, it also announced that elections would be held in two years, a dramatic reversal of the hard-liners' previous position. That political opening was clearly inconsistent with the regime's unpopular economic policies. Emboldened by the opportunities that arose from the new situation, the political parties took a more confrontational stance toward the regime. Widespread union demonstrations in March 1982 and increasingly open criticism of the regime signaled that the formerly passive population was no longer paralyzed by military repression. An increasingly dynamic civil society challenged a progressively fragmented military that was divided along service and political lines. Hard-line military elements were unable to restructure the political order and destroy what they perceived to be the roots of subversion.

Yet, Fontana argues, the political parties also showed themselves to be weak. Failing to ally themselves with any military faction or to lead the opposition effectively, they abandoned political initiative and the representation of civilian demands to other actors. The Malvinas War represented a last desperate attempt to reestablish military authority and generate popular support for the regime. With the disastrous defeat, conflicts between military hard-liners and soft-liners gave way to squabbling between the branches of the armed forces over who was responsible for the loss. A profoundly isolated military was eventually forced to step down. The collapse of the regime was caused not by the strength of political parties or other civilian institutions but by the weakness of the military.

Robert Wesson's edited volume, *New Military Politics in Latin America*, examines the manner in which institutionalized military regimes during the 1960s and 1970s responded to mass political mobilization in South America. Case studies on the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of Brazil and the Southern Cone, Peru's military reformists, and civil-military relations in Venezuela and Colombia are accompanied by synthesizing chapters by Wesson, Martin Needler, and Edwin Lieuwen. Lieuwen's opening overview sets the tone of the collection. Clearly written, this essay summarizes and reviews previously published work rather than breaking new ground. Thus it seems to be

aimed less at the specialist than at the graduate or advanced undergraduate student level. Lieuwen finds bureaucratic-authoritarian theory "brilliant" and "original" but faults it for economic determinism, insensitivity to the role of the middle class, and a tendency to view the military as the "almost helpless victims of a societal crisis that forces it to act." His evaluation of the performance of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, written in late 1981, gives them higher marks for economic growth, containment of inflation, and stability than they would earn now. Lieuwen's ideological perspective is more conservative than that of the other books reviewed here. The same can be said of Wesson, whose tone in the concluding chapter on U.S. policy sounds like a State Department review of U.S. interests. It should be noted, however, that neither of these two authors is sympathetic to bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Lieuwen faults their human-rights record while Wesson feels that "moderate democracies" (like Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru) are more reliable allies for the United States. He also finds the Brazilian military too "socialistic" in their expansion of the state sector.

Wesson portrays recent military intervention in South America as largely a reaction to the failures of populism. He defines that over-used term as "clientelism translated into mass urban politics" and "clientelism in an electoral context." According to his view, because most populist regimes lack an ideology or a commitment to structural change, they depend on patronage. Mixing incompetence, graft, and corruption, they finance their programs with inflation (that is, deficit spending and borrowing).

The cycle leading to the rise of authoritarian military regimes described by Wesson is congruent with the work of O'Donnell and others in the bureaucratic-authoritarian and dependista traditions: runaway inflation and foreign debt lead to IMF pressures for austerity; resistance from the labor movement and government bureaucrats, coupled with calls for structural change by the left, contribute to a rightist backlash within the middle class; ultimately, growing polarization and class conflict induce military intervention. Unlike the dependistas, however, Wesson does not interpret Latin America's current crisis as the result of inexorable structural binds but as primarily the product of poor leadership: "The populist program could succeed if redistribution were accompanied by increased production. But the militants of economic justice lack the competence, breadth, education and sterling character necessary to bring this virtual miracle." Wesson notes the failure of import-substitution industrialization but offers no explanation for it other than the poor quality of leadership.

Wesson holds the bourgeoisie partially to blame for the breakdown of democratic regimes: "The apprehension of the possessing class

may be increased by bad conscience in view of the poverty of many of the less privileged.⁷ The view that reformers are Kerenskys preparing the way for Lenins greatly augments the horrors of the upper class and their determination to resist." Yet Wesson accords most of the responsibility to the left. As populist regimes (and those like Allende's UP government) falter, he charges, they become increasingly allied with communists and other radicals who demand structural change. Having previously noted that populists lack an ideology or a project for structural change, Wesson now seems to lump together Goulart's left populists, Altamirano Socialists, and Tupamaros. As society becomes more polarized, he insists, "radical populists" (pushed by those further to the left) seek to undermine the constitutional order "in order to make their revolution irreversible." Ultimately, he argues, populist regimes seal their own fate when they try unsuccessfully to undermine the status or integrity of the armed forces.

The country studies in this volume and Needler's discussion of the internal problems that faced military regimes do not offer any major breakthroughs but are well-written summaries of the areas they cover. Some, however, failed to anticipate future trends or missed existing ones. Wesson, Peter Snow (writing on Argentina), and Kenneth Johnson (on Uruguay) all underestimated the pressures building for redemocratization. Snow did not deal with the internal divisions (so well-analyzed by Fontana) that were already undermining the Argentine military, and he saw no prospect for redemocratization in the near future. Similarly, he did not foresee Alfonsín's reviving the Radical party. Wesson, unable to forecast the likes of Alfonsín or Alán García, foresaw no capable new civilian leadership emerging in South America.

What have we learned from the last two decades of military rule and redemocratization in South America? All four of the works reviewed here recognize (explicitly or implicitly) that the political role of the military is greatly influenced by the degree of mass political mobilization, the nature of political articulation by parties, and the level of industrialization and economic development within civil society. But all except Cavanagh reject vulgar historical determinism and recognize the need to study the internal political forces motivating the military. Dependency theory, so important in recent studies of Latin American politics, plays a very small role in these works. Nunn is concerned with extranational influences but focuses on military training missions and ideology, not multinational economics. Only Cavanagh evokes the dependista model *per se*, but he does not apply it to Peru in any meaningful way. Ultimately, dependency theory fails to explain the divergent nature of military regimes in countries such as Chile, Peru, and Argentina. To the extent that any paradigm has emerged from the period, it seems to be O'Donnell's bureaucratic-authoritarian model, which may

be rejected by some of these authors as overly deterministic and uniform but has still influenced most of them.⁸ Many of the works reviewed here may have been written too early to reflect the influence of Linz and Stepan's important collection on the collapse of democratic regimes.⁹ It is to be hoped that future research on the military will be influenced by the ideas in that series as well as by the forthcoming redemocratization literature by O'Donnell, Schmitter, Laurence Whitehead, and others.¹⁰

More important than what scholars have discovered about military rule in the last two decades is what South American civil societies (particularly the political elites) have learned from the authoritarian experience. My own conversations with Argentine and Uruguayan intellectuals and political activists suggest the sobering effect of intense repression on those societies. Leftists who insisted on the need for fundamental structural change in the 1960s now seem willing to work within the confines of a system that is actually marked by more inequitable economic conditions for the lower classes than during that earlier period. Others who once admired the audacity of the Tupamaros now blame them for contributing to the military backlash. Many who dismissed the value of bourgeois democracy now hail (or even work for) Raúl Alfonsín and stress the importance of democratic norms. At a recent conference on critical elections in the Americas, I was struck by the extent to which Southern Cone scholars were concerned with the need to contain class conflict within the confines of bourgeois democratic institutions.¹¹

If the past decades have served as a painful learning experience for the left, it is to be hoped that the same has been true for those elsewhere on the ideological spectrum. One should no longer take too seriously the positive role that John Johnson and others attributed to the military as an agent of political and economic modernization.¹² The limits of Velasco's "Peruvian experiment" and the more cautious reformism of Ecuador's Rodríguez Lara are now apparent.¹³ At the same time, my interviews with industrialists in Uruguay and Ecuador suggest that at least some of them (particularly the Uruguayans) now recognize the failures of the "Chicago Boys" who managed the economies of rightist authoritarian regimes.

NOTES

1. Abraham F. Lowenthal, "Armies and Politics in Latin America," in *Armies and Politics in Latin America*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1976), 12–13. The chapter was adapted from Lowenthal's article by the same name that appeared earlier in *World Politics* 27, no. 1 (Oct. 1974):107–30.
2. Guillermo A. O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of

- California, 1973); Guillermo A. O'Donnell, "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State," *Latin American Research Review* 13, no. 1 (1978):3–38; Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971); Alfred Stepan, *The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); Philippe Schmitter, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1973); Robert R. Kaufmann, *Transitions to Stable Authoritarian-Corporate Regimes: The Chilean Case* (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1976); and John Samuel Fitch, *The Military Coup d'Etat as a Political Process: Ecuador, 1948–1966* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1979).
3. Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Class, Status, and Power*, 2nd edition (New York: Free Press, 1966); T. B. Bottomore, *Classes in Modern Society* (New York: Pantheon, 1966); Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959); Theotônio dos Santos, *Concepto de clases sociales* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1973).
 4. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977).
 5. Stepan, *State and Society*; E. V. K. FitzGerald, *The State and Economic Development: Peru since 1968* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Julio Cotler, *Clases, estado y nación en el Perú* (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, 1978); Aníbal Quijano, "Imperialismo y capitalismo," *Sociedad y Política* (Lima), no. 1 (June 1972):5–19; and Henry Pease García, *El ocaso del poder oligárquico: lucha política en la escena oficial, 1968–75* (Lima: DESCO, 1977).
 6. Liisa North and Tanya Korovkin, *The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power, 1967–76* (Montreal: McGill University, Center for Developing-Area Studies, 1981).
 7. My own interviews with members of the economic elites in Ecuador and Uruguay uncovered little evidence of "bad conscience" on their part. Ecuadorian business leaders, for example, often admitted that income distribution in their country was very inequitable and levels of poverty disturbing. They were always quick to insist, however, that they personally were very fair in their own dealings with their employees. Frequently, they condemned the "unreasonable demands" of the labor unions and attributed any injustices in the system to historic factors that would gradually work themselves out.
 8. For a more detailed critique of bureaucratic-authoritarian theory, see Karen L. Remmer and Gilbert W. Merckx, "Bureaucratic Authoritarianism Revisited," *LARR* 17, no. 2 (1982):3–40.
 9. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America*, edited by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1978).
 10. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986). Earlier versions of some of this work appeared as working papers at the Woodrow Wilson Center.
 11. The conference entitled "Recent Electoral Changes in the Americas" was sponsored by the Center for Iberian and Latin American Studies at the University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, 21–22 Feb. 1985.
 12. John J. Johnson, *The Military and Society in Latin America* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964).
 13. On Ecuador, see Osvaldo Hurtado, *Political Power in Ecuador* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1980); and Howard Handelman and Thomas Sanders, *Military Government and the Movement toward Democracy in South America* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981). On Peru, the much more voluminous literature includes *The Peruvian Experiment: Continuity and Change under Military Rule*, edited by Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); *The Peruvian Experiment Reconsidered*, edited by Cynthia McClintock and Abraham F. Lowenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); *Post-Revolutionary Peru: The Politics of Transformation*, edited by Stephen Gorman (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1982); David Scott Palmer, *Peru: The Authoritarian Tradition* (New York: Praeger, 1980); and North and Korovkin, *The Peruvian Revolution and the Officers in Power*.