cohesion (cfr. Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind*, [New York: Simon and Shuster, 1987], 87.)

7 Cf. Scott Meikle, "Adam Smith and the Spanish Inquisition," in *New Blackfriars* 76 (1995) 78.

8 There is also a price to be paid for the elevation of individual liberty above communitarian restraint. MacIntyre comments: "The democratised self which has no necessary social content and no necessary social identity can then be anything, can assume any role or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself nothing" (A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, [Notre Dame University: UND Press, 1981], 30). For a response to MacIntyre see the collection *After MacIntyre*, J. Horton ed., (Oxford: Blackwells, 1994).

9 This would undoubtedly be the argument of the Government which was elected in 1979. What is the ethical response to a situation in which trades unions no longer hold secret ballots and exercise block votes at party political conferences as well as effectively exercising some power over Government economic policy? Such a scenario is not addressed by an unqualified assertion of the traditional Catholic option in favour of workers rights to associate in trades union movements.

10 Such a distinction was drawn in a response of Cardinal Ratzinger to specific applications of the American pastoral on the economy in which Catholics working on defence contracts *ipso facto* seemed to be the subject of censure by their ecclesiastical pastors.

Giving the Devil his Due?: St. Anselm on Justice and Satisfaction

Kevin E. Miller

According to the Preface to St. Anselm of Canterbury's *Cur Deus Homo*, the work, among other things, "prov[es] by necessary reasons ... that it is impossible for any man to be saved without [Christ]."[1] In the course of this project, Anselm must clarify what is meant by salvation—without knowing this, we could not know whether salvation could be brought only by Christ. Anselm develops an understanding of salvation involving a deliverance from the punishment that is our due because of our sin, and a correlative restoration to blessedness, which deliverance and restoration are made possible by Christ's "satisfaction" for sin. Hence, the question of the meaning of salvation and the need for Christ as savior includes the question of the meaning of satisfaction. Now, the

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Cur Deus Homo has been received as one of the most significant contributions to the Church's understanding of soteriology; most recently one finds echoes of Anselm's understanding of satisfaction in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (no. 615).[2] For this reason it is worth inquiring into what Anselm means by "satisfaction."

It is my intention in this essay to examine especially those sections of Book I of the *Cur Deus Homo* which treat the relationship between salvation and our deliverance from the devil, and to propose that one finds in Anselm's understanding of satisfaction a requirement for justice even for the devil (something that Anselm's rejection of the idea that our salvation requires payment of a ransom to the devil has tended to obscure). In view of this, I shall also argue, against one group of critics, that Anselm should not be said wrongly to attribute legalism to God; God's "justice" in need of satisfaction is a function of ontology as constituted in creation by his eternal will, not of a positivistic refusal to will our salvation until placated.

Redemption and the Question of Justice

Anselm's method is clarified in I.1–2 and I.10. He is writing in response to those interested in his "proofs" of doctrines, but more specifically those who "do not expect to come to faith through reason, but ... hope to be gladdened by the understanding and contemplation of the things they believe" (I.1). Anselm therefore presupposes the reality of salvation, even as he seeks to provide an understanding of what it means. Anselm's interlocutor in the dialogue, Boso, agrees, saying that "by God's prevenient grace I hold the faith of our redemption so firmly that nothing can shake my constant allegiance." Thus, providing to unbelievers "`a reason of that hope which is in' them" is to be distinguished from founding hope upon reason rather than upon faith. This, in fact, gives us reason to think that the work is at least as much about understanding salvation as about "proofs."

Consistent with this supposition, Anselm goes on to say "that if I say anything that a greater authority does not support, even though I *seem* (*videar*) to prove it by reason, it is not to be treated as more certain than is warranted by the fact that, at present, I see the question in this way, until God somehow reveals something better to me" (I.2; emphasis added). At the same time, in proceeding to inquire into Boso's question of "how [Christ's] death is reasonable and necessary," Boso also agrees to Anselm's suggestion that they "reject no reason, even the slightest, unless a weightier one is opposed to it," since "even the slightest reason has the force of necessity, unless it is outweighed by a greater" (I.10). In keeping with this principle, Anselm and Boso prescind from their prior knowledge of the Incarnation and ask what God would fittingly and necessarily do for humans and how he would do this.

Before these latter moves are definitively made, however, there intervenes after the introductory remarks of I.1–2 what I suggest is a

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rhetorical unit spanning chapters 3–8. Examination of this unit leads us from methodological considerations into more substantive ones. This unit begins and ends with reference on Anselm's part to the work of Christ as an expression of God's *mercy*. In I.3, responding to Boso's first objection that the Christian beliefs concerning Christ "do God injury and insult," Anselm says, "We do no injury or insult to God, but with heartfelt thanks we praise and proclaim the ineffable height of his mercy." In what respect has God shown mercy? Anselm continues immediately, "It is precisely in so far as he has restored us, marvelously and beyond expectation, from the great and merited evils under which we lay to the great and unmerited goods that we had lost, that he has shown greater love and mercy toward us." Chapter 8 returns to the same theme in what could therefore be called a parallel and framing passage; Anselm there, in response to a variation on the same concern of Boso's, says that "in the incarnation of God we do not suppose that he undergoes any debasement, but we believe that the nature of man is exalted."

In the course of the unit so framed, Anselm contends that redemption must be accomplished by God, else we "would *in no sense* (*nullatenus*) *have been restored* to the dignity [we] would have had if [we] had not sinned," since we would then be servants of a creaturely redeemer rather than servants "of God alone" as in the condition to which we are to be restored (I.5; emphasis added). All of this raises a significant question, however, as Boso goes on to point out: From what sort of captivity could only God's blood deliver us? Evidently not from God's own wrath, since "the wrath of God is nothing but his will to punish"; and evidently not from the devil's power, since "in whose power is hell or the devil ... save his who created all things?" (I.6). Importantly, however, Boso recognizes an additional dimension to the question (I.7). Perhaps it is not precisely or merely "power" that is at issue—"We also commonly say that God was bound to strive with the devil with justice, rather than by force." But Boso rejects this possibility as well, saying, "I cannot see what force this argument has. ... [T]he devil and man belong to God alone, and neither one stands outside God's power ... [E]ven though it was just for man to be tormented by the devil, it was unjust for the devil to torment him."

Here some closer examination of what is happening in the dialogue is necessary. First of all, it must be considered that this rejection of the view that the atonement consisted in "striv[ing] with the devil by justice" for humans is evidently *Boso's* rejection, not necessarily Anselm's.[3] Secondly, Boso's argument is not entirely cogent. After explicitly saying that he is turning from considerations of force or power to consideration of justice, Boso seems quietly to reduce the question of justice back to a question of power—his argument hinges on the observations that "neither [the devil nor humanity] stands outside God's power," and that the devil did not punish humans "by God's orders, but

only with the permission of God's incomprehensible wisdom, which orders even evil things for good."

In view of these observations, the conclusion that "[i]n I.7 the rights of the Devil over man are investigated and the traditional view which had been held for eleven centuries is refuted"[4] might suggest an oversimplification (that this conclusion requires qualification in view also of Anselm's own words will be argued presently). Boso has raised the question of justice, but it will be up to Anselm to provide a more adequate account of what it does and does not require. Until the justice calling for a divine redeemer is thus understood, the nature of the mercy brought as redemption's restoration and exaltation will remain obscure as well. Hence, the unit spanning I.3–8 ends with the need for a new beginning to the investigation.

Anselm's Solution

Thus, after the completion of the methodological considerations in I.10, chapter 11 introduces the notion of *debt*. Anselm defines, with Boso's agreement, that "the debt which we owe to God" is as follows: "Every inclination of the rational creature ought to be subject to the will of God." Sin is failure to pay this debt; a sinner is at fault until the debt has in fact been paid along with "more than he took away," this "more" being reckoned "according to the extent of the injury and dishonor" done to God by sin. If such payment is not made, the sinner is due punishment (I.12), for various interrelated reasons: It would be irregular and therefore unfitting for sin to require neither punishment nor satisfaction; were neither punishment nor satisfaction required of the sinner, then the sinner and the one who does not sin would be in the same position with God; not requiring payment for sin would make injustice freer than justice (I.12); it is intolerable and even impossible that God's honor be violated so God must be honored in punishment if not in satisfaction (I.13–15).

There follows next an excursus (I.16–18) arguing, in summary, that "God intended to replace with men the angels who fell" (I.19). In keeping with the principle that the *Cur Deus Homo* is more about understanding salvation than proving its reality, I propose that this conclusion is, in the context of the work, significant primarily because it prepares an understanding of what sort of satisfaction must be made for humans to be saved rather than punished. For having stated the conclusion and obtained Boso's agreement, Anselm immediately says, "It is necessary, then, for the men who are taken into the Heavenly City in place of the angels to be in the same state as those whom they replace would have been." This, however, serves precisely as the introduction to a direct examination of satisfaction.

At the same time as it thus serves a rhetorical value, it is not logically necessary for what follows, however, since Anselm adds, "Also consider man alone, apart from the question of his being made

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equal to the angels; should God raise him on these terms to any blessedness, even such as he had before he sinned?" Anselm answers his own question: It would be unfitting "if [God] restored man, stained by the dirt of sin and without any washing—that is, without any satisfaction—to remain in such a condition forever, at the very least in paradise, from which he had been cast out."[5]

This is the beginning, I contend, of a twofold qualification or elaboration—of the earlier, broader indication that satisfaction repays a debt *to God*, and also of Boso's denial that anything is owed in justice *to the devil*. I shall say more about the latter qualification below. With regard to the former: When Anselm moves to examine satisfaction directly, the very first thing that is said about satisfaction is not what it does for God, but *what it does for humans*.[6] It is ultimately God's honor that demands that there be no salvation without satisfaction; but this principle is made more precise here with the explanation that what God's honor demands is that no one who is not fit for salvation should be saved. The "extra" debt of satisfaction is, equivalently, that we should restore ourselves to our pure state (whereas the "basic" creaturely debt is the submission to God of the will of a creature in that state).

It is in this *context* that one must understand the discussions and analogy of I.20–21 concerning our inability to repay the debt of sin, and the "heavy weight" that sin is. It is surely correct to deny that all this should be understood in a primarily quantitative sense.[7] But more directly to see why we cannot repay the debt of sin, we return with Anselm to the context for this analogy—for this is what Anselm does in I.22–23. There Anselm specifies with still greater precision what it is that we cannot repay—why it is that we cannot simply stop sinning and thus be fit for salvation but must do something "more" that is no longer within our power. For there (I.23) Anselm returns again to the theme of restoration (not mentioned in the analogies of I.20–21).

Anselm indicates that the honor we should give to God is that of "conquering the devil, just as [we] dishonored him when [we were] conquered by the devil," and this "through the distress of death" since we have "justly incurred the penalty of mortality"—even though, "through the wound of the first sin," we can no longer do this (I.22). For by letting ourselves "be vanquished by the devil," we "took away from God whatever he had planned to make out of human nature." Therefore, Anselm asks as he concludes his examination of satisfaction, "Consider strict justice, and judge whether that man makes to God a satisfaction equal to his sin, unless *by conquering the devil* he restores to God precisely what he took away from him when he let himself be conquered by the devil" (I.23; emphasis added). Only in view of this conclusion can all else that has been said about the debt to God incurred by sin be fully understood.

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Justice and the Devil

At this juncture, more can be said about Anselm's assessment of the early Christian understanding according to which redemption would involve rendering justice to the devil. I have already noted that Anselm has not refuted this theory in his own name, but rather has placed a "refutation," of dubious implications, in a speech by Boso. It can now be added that Anselm's own examination of the justice of satisfaction involves a qualified acceptance of the notion that something is due the devil, as a matter of justice, as part of our redemption from his grasp. Now, it is in no way suggested that this "something" is after the manner of a ransom; it is not that God had, in justice, to propitiate the devil with blood in order to redeem humans. But justice to God is inseparable from justice to the order to which God and creation, including humans and the devil, all belong. Specifically, within this order, the "something" due the devil is *conquest by a human.*

It should be recalled again what humanity's original condition was, restoration of which is precisely that which is owed God as the debt of satisfaction for sin: a position of innocence "between God and the devil, *in order to overcome the devil*" (I.22; emphasis added). The effect of human sin upon the created order bears not only upon humanity in itself or upon the relationship between humanity and God, but rather upon the more complex relationship between God, humanity, and the devil.[8] Human sin makes humans the object of the devil's conquest *rather than vice-versa.* But an act of mere power, even divine power, could not solve this problem, inasmuch as the very problem to be solved is not simply that the devil has conquered humans, but also that humans have not conquered the devil. This is why there must be human involvement in the act of redemption—a *Deus homo* must redeem us.

Now, all this is what Anselm has in mind when he speaks of justice (cf. I.23). But precisely *whose* justice is this? In the first place, it is God's, of course, inasmuch as the order of creation and restoration or redemption is constituted by God's eternal, reasonable will—in fact it is the eternity of this will that enables us to understand redemption as "necessary." But *what God wills* is that humans, with free will, should live in accordance with this order, and, in particular, conquer the devil by sinlessness. Hence, the manner in which redemption must be effected is also a matter of God's rendering suitable justice to humans, in the sense of genuinely restoring them to the order that he eternally wills, rather than fundamentally changing them by subjecting them to himself apart from human will (as would have been the case without human co-operation in redemption).

Additionally, however, the devil is a creature with intellect and will—a rational creature. By virtue of his refusal "to subject every inclination to the will of God" (cf. I.11), he has rejected justice, and is himself beyond redemption (II.21)—justice for him will forever consist of punishment, not satisfaction (cf. I.14–15). But *by virtue of the*

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relationship God's eternal creative will has constituted between humans and the devil, it can be said still more precisely that the devil is due punishment in the form of conquest by humans, and that it would be a violation of justice for God to "subject" the devil to humans apart from the involvement of human will. However, since humanity has "*made himself*" no longer strong but "weak and mortal" by accepting the devil's temptation, humanity's conquest of the devil can only take place "through the distress of death" (I.22; emphasis added).

To recapitulate, then: If humans are no longer to be subjected to the devil, the devil is due conquest by humanity, as has been said; and this conquest can now take place only through death. *It is in this precise sense* that the death of Christ redeemed us by giving the devil his due. Christ's blood was not a payment to the devil but the only just means (in the sense of a means in accord with God's eternal will) by which the devil could be conquered.

Reference to this account can also be made in formulating a response to one strand of criticism of Anselm, that which charges him with "legalism."[9] Insofar as the debt of satisfaction is, for Anselm, one that is constitutive of and implied by what can alone genuinely be called redemptive *restoration* of the relationships between God and creation and among creatures—including even the devil—there is in fact no question of legalism. On the contrary: A merely "legalistic," in the sense of positivistic (which is evidently what these critics have in mind), account of redemption would be one according to which God failed to respect the free wills that his own eternal creative will gave to his creatures by subjecting them to himself and by subjecting the devil to humans apart from human willingness.

Justice and the Mercy of Christ

Anselm continues by clarifying that only Christ can make this satisfaction, and will proceed to show "in what way man is saved through Christ" (I.25). For the purposes of this essay, no extended exegesis of Book II—in which this latter issue is treated in full—is necessary. To adduce a few considerations relevant for completion of the my argument, however: Christ, the *Deus homo* (one should note that II.7 essentially presents the Chalcedonian account of the Incarnation), is able to die in his human nature. By allowing himself to be killed for the sake of justice, he expresses humanly the total gift of himself to God, which gift, since he himself is God, is "greater than anything under God" (II.11).

The fact that this gift is genuinely human means that what has been established above as the requirement for restoration of just order is fulfilled. The fact that the gift is also divine is, again, necessary not only because divinity can be said somehow quantitatively to outweigh humanity, but also because of the inability of sinful humans to offer God, even by dying justly, simultaneously the ordinary submission to God required on account of our creaturely status *as well as* what is required of

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us on account of the sins we have already committed to overcome the perversion of right order that these sins effect. The *Deus homo*, in contrast, being God, has no need to conquer the devil *qua* God, and neither does justice require his death (cf. II.10, 18). Therefore, his death constituted such an "offer[ing of] his humanity to his divinity" (Anselm's preferred description of what in common "usage" describes with the expression, "[T]he Son freely offered himself to the Father") as would avail to restore the right relationship between humanity and divinity that is, equivalently, human conquest of the devil (II.18).

Anselm indicates that this offering, given to us (cf. II.20), clarifies the justice of God's mercy, concern for which was equivalently what led to the objections to the Christian faith that Anselm's work set out to answer. In response, Boso claims that "whatever is contained in the New and Old Testaments has been proved." Anselm, however, has the final word, and qualifies Boso's description of what has been accomplished, saying that "if what we think we have discovered by reason is confirmed by the testimony of the truth, we should ascribe this, not to ourselves, but to God, who is blessed forever. Amen" (II.22). Insofar as God's justice and mercy, as displayed in satisfaction for our sins unto our salvation, are consistent, and insofar as we are able to reason about what is just, we can properly accept a methodology in which reason, unless refuted by further reason, is held to discover its meaning. But insofar as this justice is still, from the beginning—and, for us, from creation onward—a free act of mercy, the proper response to it is that we bless God.

1 Quotations from the *Cur Deus Homo* are taken from the translation of Eugene R. Fairweather in *A Scholastic Miscellany: Anselm to Ockham* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), 100–183. References are indicated parenthetically in the text by book and chapter numbers. Citations of the Latin are from the text in *Pourquoi Dieu s'est fait homme*, René Roques, ed., Sources Chrétiennes, no. 91 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1963).

2 For the treatment of Anselm's approach by medievals, see J. Patout Burns, "The Concept of Satisfaction in Medieval Redemption Theory," *Theological Studies* 36 (1975): 285–304.

3 Relevant here is an observation of Georg Plasger *(Die Not-Wendigkeit der Gerechtigkeit: Eine Interpretation zu "Cur Deus Homo" von Anselm von Canterbury, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters*, no. 38 [Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 1993], 72): As a consequence of the "dialogische Charakter" of the work, "[e]s ist nicht möglisch, Sätze und Thesen aus dem Zusammenhang herauszunehmen und isoliert zu betrachten."

4 John McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics: A Re-Interpretation of the Cur Deus Homo* (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1954), 61. Lest someone fail fully to grasp the scope he intends for this conclusion, McIntyre adds, "We shall not delay long to indicate what St. Anselm says on man's relation to the Devil as a result of his sinning. ... It is generally agreed that in a few swift strokes [in I.7] St. Anselm destroys a view of the control of the Devil over man in his sin which had been held from the second century almost to the twelfth" (70). (See also, e.g., Eugene R. Fairweather, "`Iustitia Dei' as the `Ratio' of the Incarnation," in *Congrès International du IXe Centenaire de l'arrivée d'Anselme au Bec, Spicilegium Beccense*, no. 1 [Le Bec-Hellouin: Abbaye

Notre-Dame du Bec, 1959], 329; Jasper Hopkins, *A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm* [Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972], 188–89.) This is not to say that McIntyre is unaware of the implications of the dialogue form, since he even goes on to suggest—despite an admission that "[t]here is no textual evidence to suggest that [the] attribution [of the speech in I.7 to Boso] is wrong"—that "[s]ince Boso's rôle up to this point in the book, and in fact throughout, is to raise objections and 'Anselm's' to answer them, it would not be incorrect to divide the speech, assigning the introduction to Boso and the refutation to `Anselm.'" In contrast to this approach, I assume that the speech is in fact Boso's but conclude that the status of objection, rather than answer, should be ascribed to it as a whole. Again, this will be still more fully substantiated upon consideration of some of Anselm's later speeches.

5 Gerald O'Collins (*Interpreting Jesus* [London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1983], 138, 145–57) points out that the Judeo-Christian tradition holds the effects of sin to include "contamination"; and he associates the model of redemption as "expiation" (which model he attributes to Anselm, among others) with this effect of sin. I think this analysis is very much in keeping with Anselm's understanding of the matter, given Anselm's association of "washing" and "satisfaction."

6 McIntyre (*St. Anselm and His Critics*, 77–82) misses the significance of this. He makes reference to the association of satisfaction with God's honor in I.11, but then "jumps" to I.20 and treats this and the following chapters as answers to the question "of whether anyone can make the satisfaction to God which He demands" (77). When he returns to the argument of I.19, he treats it with what precedes as "a `secondary ground' for the necessity of salvation" (81), concluding, "This argument is in the spirit of the times and it need not delay us further" (82). This is in keeping with the relationship of I.19 neither to what precedes it (as I have already indicated) nor to what follows it.

7 McIntyre, *St. Anselm and His Critics*, 73–74.

8 Plasger observes that in I.7, Boso "fordert ... Anselm schon auf, eine Antwort zu geben, die gegen die bisherigen Überzeugungen nicht mit dem Recht des Teufels argumentiert" *(Die Not-Wendigkeit der Gerechtigkeit*, 75). With regard to the rest of the dialogue, however, Plasger contends that "[i]m Zusammenhang mit der Darstellung der Bedeutung der Sünde nimmt Anselm diesen Einwurf auf und überbietet ihn sogar noch" (n. 184). I argue that Anselm's discussion of the meaning of sin must be read in light of his examination of satisfaction later in Book I, such as I have discussed, and that this must involve factoring the devil back into the calculus of justice in the manner I have explained.

9 A prominent exponent of this criticism is Gustaf Aulén. Aulén charges that Anselm's theory reflects "the legalism of the medieval outlook" (*Christus Victor: An Historical Study of the Three Main Types of the Idea of the Atonement* [trans. A. G. Hebert; London: S.P.C.K., 1931], 108).

10 The same confusion is reflected in a concern of Karl Rahner about attempts to "make clear the connection between the incarnate Logos and his function as the mediator of salvation." According to Rahner, "Western theology" has "established this connection" by "understanding the Incarnation as the establishment of a divine-human subject who, by obediently accepting the death for which he was destined, can offer God in his holiness expiation and satisfaction for the guilt of mankind. But a connection that is [so] conceived ... will make use of the solution that adopts the categories of German legalistic thinking in the theory of satisfaction" (Jesus, Man, and the Church, trans. Margaret Kohl, vol. 17 of Theological Investigations [New York: Crossroad, 1981], 29–30).