

reserve. This is such a study. It is an extremely intelligent handling of the tradition, bringing out what is important in the distinctions and what their true status is for our understanding of the reality. Father Yarnold is not afraid of the plurality of theologies, showing how each honest attempt to account for the reality of our salvation yields only partial understanding. Orthodox and Lutheran objections to the Roman tradition are very sympathetically treated. The main intention of the book is to show that the transformation brought about by God's free gift of

himself is 'not realised in experiences which are distinguishable from natural human experiences': that the acts I perform in virtue of God's grace are still *my* acts, freely done. The very illuminating chapter on the sacraments is the place where this truth is most clearly established. But the book, which represents the Sarum Lectures of 1973-74, covers many other important theological topics in the process. Give a copy to your parish priest or local Catholic teacher, even if you have to do it without saying it was recommended in *New Blackfriars*.

ROGER RUSTON OP

CONSCIENCE, by John Donnelly and Leonard Lyons, ed. *Alba House*, New York, distrib. *T. Shand Publications*, London, 1973. x & 249 pp. £2.50.

This well chosen collection of published papers on conscience gives a good sample of what has been written on conscience within the analytical tradition—and a bit beyond—in the last forty years or so. The papers of C. D. Broad, Professors Ryle, A. Campbell Garnett and A. Duncan-Jones, and the extract from Professor Nowell-Smith's *Ethics* are well enough known to require no commendation here. (In the case of the Broad and Ryle papers no great commendation would have been given. They are not papers by which those admirable philosophers should wish to be remembered.) Peter Fuss ('Conscience') suggests that 'the distinctive role of conscience in [a man's] moral life is to establish a felt need or disposition to act in accordance with his knowledge or belief, giving him a sense of integrity when he does as best he can, and a corresponding sense of inner failure, frustration, or guilt when, through some fault of his own, he fails to do so' (43). The analytical work in this paper could be better, and the phenomenological sections are too bald to be convincing. And how does one distinguish phenomenologically between failure through one's own fault and (what would otherwise be the same) failure not through one's own fault? Yet this is a stimulating paper. J. F. M. Hunter ('Conscience') briskly demythologises beliefs that seem to involve reference to some special entity called conscience: a little too simplistically, perhaps, yet well representative of a certain style of analysis. David Jones's 'Freud's theory of moral conscience' should be read, though it would have benefited from some historical scene-

setting on theories of conscience. The Bishop Wand paper ('The content and function of conscience') comes down to doing some of what Mr Hunter was doing, and doing it less clearly than the latter was doing it.

What the Martin C. McGuire paper ('On conscience') seems to wish to say is not quite the same as what it does say. And had the author understood better what Professor Hare was saying, he could have put more clearly what he, Mr McGuire, wished to say, and could have avoided the kinds of infelicity to be found near the bottom of p. 150. The John Donnelly paper ('Conscience and religious morality') gives some historically dubious interpretations of Aquinas and Ockham on conscience. D. O. Thomas ('Obedience to conscience') wishes to argue that conscience requires that we do what we ultimately think we ought to do, and that it [text: 'is'] may be consistent with conscience to defer to the judgment of another' (184). I liked this paper: but will the distinction between 'private judgment' and 'ultimate judgment', crucial to the argument, serve its purpose? How, for instance, does what 'my adviser' thinks fail to come under 'all the relevant data and reasons. . .'. (182) or, rather, why should that factor alone be weighted so differently from the others? The point is neither properly explained nor argued for. The John T. Granrose paper ('The authority of conscience'), trying to make sense of the notion of an 'authority' for conscience, could have done with closer attention to what it meant (and what it might otherwise sensibly have meant) by 'authority':

but it is a paper worth reading. The William Earle paper ('Some paradoxes of private conscience as a political guide') is perhaps the weakest in the collection. There are four short editorial introductions, but no index has been provided, nor has a list been provided of the more important discussions of those articles in the collection which have been discussed. In this reviewer's opinion the provision of such items is not the least important service which the editor of a collection of articles can and should do for his readers. I repeat, however, that I think the present collection to be a useful one for students of moral and political philosophy.

And yet. The very fairness of this sample emphasises the point that conscience has not yet had, within the analytical tradition of the present century, the serious examination which it merits if it is of even half the importance commonly accorded it by non-philosophers. When St Thomas More spoke finally 'in discharge of [his] conscience' he did not give the impression that he was doing something of no great importance to him. When Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor speaks of taking possession of the consciences of men, he speaks as of something that is terrible. Most analytical moral philosophers, by contrast, content themselves with a relatively simple notion of conscience—with a long pedigree, it must be admitted—and in consequence allow no great moral significance to the activity of conscience. Thomists use another internally coherent notion, yet one which in view of the historical use of the technical terms it is positively misleading to call conscience. An intermediate notion, or conflation of notions, the liberal protestant view as it may be called (found as it is in Butler and Kant, with maverick anticipations

in Abelard and perhaps Pelagius) is left largely unexplored by philosophers: though it would seem to have had considerable influence on what modern non-philosophers have in mind when they appeal to conscience. The liberal protestant view is by no means obviously one unique, coherent view, but it has the merit of being by no means trivial either, and would seem to repay analytical effort spent on it.

As for historical studies, the best general survey of older theories is perhaps still a short Berlin dissertation, in Latin, from the second half of the 19th century. Fine monographs have appeared since, but good general works are slow in coming: students are still sent by helpful tutors to treatments by Sorley in *Baldwin's Dict.* and Joe Rickaby in the old *Cath. Enc.* What is first required is a thorough preliminary study of the liberal protestant view, made by a historically aware analytical philosopher. A good general historical survey of theories of conscience can then be made. Not until then is it likely that an informed analysis of conscience can be given which will be at once clear and capable of giving due weight to the impression that so many non-philosophers persist in having, to the effect that conscience is and ought to be of some considerable consequence in morality.

In the meantime the present collection can be commended, as a more than fair sample of recent or fairly recent writing on conscience from within the analytical tradition, and a bit beyond. If what it contains is nevertheless importantly dissatisfying, that is not through any editorial remissness. Before a notably better collection can be made, analytical moral philosophers will have to produce more satisfying material on conscience.

LAWRENCE MOONAN

FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS, by P. F. Strawson. *Methuen & Co., London. Harper & Row, New York, 1974. 214 pp. £3.20.*

One of the great sports involved in reading collections of previously published essays is trying to figure out if any one thing holds them all together besides a common index at the end. For, if one can discover some line running through all the essays, something about the author's overriding concerns, his style and method, becomes visible in a manner not otherwise available to a casual reader of one or other essay.

Most often, though, no such line can be found.

In the case of this latest collection of Professor Strawson's essays, bits of a common theme or common concern reveal themselves, but I could find none that held the entire collection together. But then, it seems, neither could Strawson himself. *Freedom and Resentment* is clearly a second harvest; the more connected essays from this period 1950-