fascinating movement and its opponents, though occasionally he pursues his arguments on to unsafe ground, as when he interprets the Greek adverb *adeos* (with impunity) as if it derived from the verb *deo* ('I bind') and meant 'unbound'. Brian Daley's *The Hope of the Early Church: a Handbook of Patristic Eschatology,* which appeared in 1991 and covers similar ground, came too late to be of help to the author. Though not aiming to provide bedtime relaxation for the general reader, Dr Hill's book offers valuable guidance for the student of the early Church.

EDWARD YARNOLD SJ

BEING IDENTITY AND TRUTH. By C.J.F. Williams. Oxford, *Clarendon Press,* **1992. Pp. xxii + 218.**

At the Great Dionysia a competing dramatist could present three tragedies and a satyr play. Over the years Professor Williams has given us *What is Truth?, What is Existence?* and *What is Identity?* and now, in *Being, Identity and Truth,* we have the tetralogy completed. The satyr play was supposed to provide comic relief of a rank and uninhibited nature. Williams' style is always urbane and witty, and this latest book, though the argument is closely woven, is as amusing as any work of philosophy could be hoped to be. If it lacks the grosser obscenities of the satyr play there is a constant stream of felicitous examples revealing the window on the world of a bachelor who has no desire to change hissituation, and lovers of books within books will be glad to add to their collection Wittgenstein's detective story *Viennese Mansions* (p. 135).

Being, Identity and Truth incorporates the main theses of the earlier books, but it is no mere epitome. New material has been added, the old material is completely reworked, and above all it provides a synoptic view of the heart-lands of philosophy. Williams is exceptionally systematic for a twentieth century philosopher and he not only has views on places, times, the mental-physical relation, personal identity and the real essences of individuals but can show us how they derive from his ontology. I am told that the small, umbrella-shaped objects we gather in the field are not, strictly speaking, mushrooms but the equivalent of flowers or fruit on the mushroom plant. The real mushroom is a huge organism many yards across which connects these familiar edibles but consists of filaments too fine to be seen by the casual digger. It is like that in metaphysics.The perennial problems are the fruiting bodies which swell up out of tenuous lines of thought about the nature of being which are often unconscious but which Williams here traces with delicate precision.

He relies especially on two instruments. The first is an account of sentence-construction in terms of what, following A.N. Prior, he calls 'wrapping around'. The sentence 'Mars is red' is obtained by wrapping the predicate-expression 'is red' round the name 'Mars'. The relation of wrapper to thing wrapped is limpidly explained in Chapter 1. Williams is able to argue that phrases consisting of a noun and an adjective like 'some', 'no', 'many' and, presumably, 'much', function as wrappers

around ordinary predicate expressions that could have been wrapped around names. He can then say that 'exist' and 'there are' in sentences like 'There are happy husbands', 'Happy husbands do not exist', function in the same way. This enables him to preserve the truth in the common claims that existence is a quantifier or a second-order predicate without their perplexing connotations.

His account of identity involves a wrapper which is not only, like 'exists', second-level, but also two-place. The identity statement 'Jocasta's husband is the happiest man in Thebes' is equivalent to 'Someone married Jocasta and he is the happiest man in Thebes'. So the notion of identity is the notion, not of a relation in which a husband could stand to a happy man, but of a predicable that can be wrapped around two first-level predicables like 'married Jocasta' and 'is the happiest man in Thebes'—something, a logician would express, not by a two-place predicate variable, but by (Ix)(... x & ... x).

Such binary forms of expression constitute his second resource. We can say 'Othello was happy at one time, but he was not married then'; 'He killed his wife in Cyprus, and he killed himself there too'. Williams makes truth out to be a kind of limiting case of this, analogous to the pairs of expression "someone . . . and he . . .', "somewhere . . . and there . . . ', 'at some time . . . and then . . .' 'we had the pair ' somewhether . . . and thether . . .' (roughly 'some sayable thing . . . and that thing. . . . ', then 'Epimenides' statement was true 'would beequivalent to 'Epimenides said somewhether, and thether!' The notion of correspondence in which truth is supposed to consist is what is expressed by 'For some proposition that p, A $\emptyset$ed that p and p ', where $\emptyset$ can be replaced by any verb of saying or thinking.

Williams' book is packed with original and challenging ideas. I should particularly like to discuss his mordant use of his theory of identity against those who try to identify the mental with the physical, and his ingenious explanation of why a single verb has all the uses of our verb 'to be'. But I shall limit myself to the one point on which I feel myself in serious disagreement. On p. 94 he tells us that he knows of no language which contains a pair of expressions that would translate 'somewhether' and 'thether'. Surely that should have been a warning. Why is there 'no natural language' that is not 'deficient' in this respect? The indefinite pronouns and adverbs that exist (Latin is particularly rich in them), signify some object or place or time or direction or action; they signify in each case something which as Aristotle puts it, is 'said without syntax', something expressed by a *component* of a sentence . Truth and falsity attach to 'things said with syntax ', things expressed by complete sentences . By assimilating this to what is expressed by constituent phrases Williams commits himself to attaching truth and falsity to entities analogous to places, times, properties and sorts of object. It is no use his assuring us that none of these entities really exists, that all are 'kooky'. I think we shall never see how anything expressible 'without syntax' could have the intrinsic connection with reality that is needed for truth and falsity. We certainly think that we can speak truly and believe what is the

case. But do we think there can be anything which both is true or the case and is said or thought by us'? If we did, then in some language there *would* be words translatable 'somewhether' and 'thether'; if there is no such language, we should look for a different analysis of the concept of truth.

For the rest, I agree with Williams that there is no such activity or state as existing, that truth and falsity are not properties of statements or beliefs and that there is no relation of being identical in which a person present at one place and time can stand to a person present at another. These negative theses may sound threatening to the metaphysician suckled on Aquinas or Heidegger. But at most they warn us against trying to defend the discipline by modelling its subject-matter on that of the sciences. We must learn to see how existence and truth are important without falsifying their character. In this we could not have a better teacher than Williams. Occasionally petulant with the word 'ontology' he has produced four hefty volumes of the thing, and this last one contains a synthesis fully as complete as any that descends from antiquity or the middle ages, and happily free of that romanticism about being which has tainted the work of so many philosophers and theologians since the Reformation.

WILLIAM CHARLTON

INTELLECTUAL LIFE IN THE MIDDLE AGES: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO MARGARET GIBSON, edited by Lesley Smith and Benedicta Ward. *The Hambledon Press*, **London, 1992, pp. xv + 322, £37.50.**

Margaret Gibson represents the best of recent medieval research. She has combined an attention to detail with a breadth of vision as well as giving much help to other scholars. We think immediately of her work on Lanfranc, but also of a host of other books and articles, including a number of collaborative ventures which she has helped to edit. All these works are listed in the bibliography of her writings at the beginning of this book.

Here twenty-one of her friends and colleagues provide contributions within the broad range of the honorand's own interests. They represent a distinguished gathering, with the subjects passing in time from the Carolingian era to Christopher Columbus.

Janet Nelson looks at the attempt to apply Christian learning to the problems of secular political life in the capitulary of Coulaines in 843. Rosamond McKitterick, 'Continuity and Innovation in Tenth-Century Ottonian Culture', sees this culture as much more than a pale imitation of that of the Carolingian period. David Ganz, '"Pando quod Ignoro": In Search of Carolingian Artistic Experience', reflects on the uses and limitations of religious images in the West. Henry Mayr-Harting, 'Ruotger, the Life of Bruno and Cologne Cathedral Library', underlines points made for the earlier period by Janet Nelson: Ruotger exalted the mixture of secular and religious and ecclesiastical functions, though admitting thereby that some were hostile to it, and stressed the vital connection